United States democracy assistance in Malaysia: the nature and impact of concurrent strategy

This exploratory article seeks to analyze the nature and impact of one of the main democracy promoters in Malaysia i.e. the United States (US). The US is a promoter that is often being alleged with interfering with Malaysian domestic affairs, especially since the sacking of former Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim in 1998. This article argues that the US democracy promotion in Malaysia can be conceptualized under the framework of a concurrent democracy assistance strategy. This is due to the fact that while the US is supporting the non-regime compatible program, it is also concurrently channeling bigger aid for regime-compatible program to Malaysia from 1999–2015. The improvement of diplomatic ties between both countries since post-Mahathir era and the prioritization of security issues have led to a more engaging conduct of democracy promotion. Despite the US continuous funding of non-regime-compatible programs through non-state actors, this approach was nevertheless balanced by cordial relations at the state level. Nevertheless, the effect of US democracy assistance and promotion on Malaysia’s democratic development has been minimal, reinforcing the views on the difficulty to promote democracy in a semi-authoritarian regime.     

Administrative Reforms in Malaysia Toward Enhancing Public Service Performance

This article attempts to define and highlight the concept and context of administrative reform efforts in Malaysia. It describes changes and reforms in the civil service that are on-going processes along with the search for efficiency, effectiveness, economy and accountability that never ends. Reform efforts in Malaysia can be grouped into two phases: the period of rapid economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s which required development administration and institution building, and the period from 1985 to the present which necessitates the consolidation and qualitative upgrading of the machinery of government. The administrative reform experiences are uniquely Malaysian efforts to respond to the Malaysian socio-political environment and needs.     

Degrees of freedom in Canada's culture of redress

This article examines some recent Canadian projects of historical narrative revision in light of Canada's broader redress culture: the recurring norms and assumptions that govern its apportionment of causal and reparative responsibility for historic wrongs. To this end, it studies several grassroots commemorative projects funded under the Community Historical Recognition Program. It asks whether these projects contribute to forging a broader culture of redress capable of contributing to a goal that this article identifies as a central underlying justification for enterprises of historical justice in general: democratizing citizenship. Thus, the article aims to fulfil two main objectives. First, it offers an empirical analysis of some important Canadian historical justice initiatives, thus contributing to our understanding of a case often seen as a leader in redress politics. Second, by developing and then applying its own account of how historical justice projects can contribute to goals of democratic citizenship, the article offers what I hope is a suggestive model for analysing and evaluating particular acts or policies of historical redress more generally. A key conclusion from this analysis is that the Canadian example is much less inspiring than often assumed.     

Decentralization in Kerala: Panchayat government discretion and accountability

Kerala is regarded as one of the most decentralized states in India. Through a ‘big bang’ approach, Kerala implemented a significant fiscal decentralization program and then built the capacity of its local governments. We employ a diagnostic framework to analyze its local government discretion and accountability in political, administrative and fiscal domains. We find that Kerala's local governments have a very high degree of discretionary power accompanied by a high degree of accountability towards citizens. But the areas of administrative accountability and financial management need to be strengthened. Also there may have been excessive focus and investment on social accountability mechanisms at the cost of local government discretion and formal public sector accountability mechanisms. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Electoral accountability in the developing world

Do citizens of the developing world behave as economic voters? Do they blame and reward incumbent governments for their perceived economic performance? In addressing these questions, the current paper fills an important void left by the extant literature by adopting a large-n approach with the use of public opinion survey data and by focusing on emerging democracies of the developing world. The proposed analysis develops a series of incumbent support models to assess the impact of economic assessments. It relies on the use of public opinion survey data from countries of Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, South and East Asia, and the Arab world. The paper contributes to the extant literature at the empirical, methodological, and theoretical levels. Empirically, it provides a unique and systematic account of the phenomenon through a large-scale comparative approach. Theoretically, it contributes to the debate on the value of economic voting to explain electoral behavior in the developing world. Methodologically, it shows that using presidential approval is a fair alternative to vote choice and that a full model specification is not absolutely necessary to estimating the economic effect.     

On the problems of responsibility and accountability in referendums

Abstract.  Supporters of representative democracy tend to be critical of referendums. They argue that referendums give citizens more responsibility for political decisions than they have either the capacity or the competence to take. Moreover, they argue that referendums may undermine representatives' accountability. In this article, these arguments about responsibility and accountability are analyzed in the light of normative theories of democracy, especially the theory of deliberative democracy. Furthermore, different institutional forms of referendum are analyzed. Particular attention is paid to the following aspects: the extent to which governments control the use of referendums, how referendums interact with parliamentary decision making, and whether referendums are advisory or binding. It is argued that sometimes governments indeed use their control over referendums to avoid taking stands on difficult issues. More importantly, however, current forms of government-initiated referendums tend to weaken the accountability of the representatives, at least when interpreted in terms of liberal and deliberative democracy, and to distort parliamentary deliberations. Since delegation is a necessity in modern democracies, referendums should not undermine the mechanisms of representative democracy. In addition to the issues of citizens' capacity and competence, this viewpoint should be taken into account when designing referendum institutions.     

Ambient accountability: intelligence services in Europe and the decline of state secrecy

Abstract

In the 1990s, judgments in the European Court of Human Rights concerning state surveillance forced many West European countries to introduce new parliamentary bodies and formal systems for accountability. Promising both greater transparency and lawful intelligence, these frameworks were then energetically rolled out to Central and Eastern Europe. Although officials boasted about their effectiveness, these formal accountability mechanisms have failed to identify serious abuses over the last decade. Moreover, the security regime in much of Central Europe still remains largely unreconstructed. The article argues that a robust culture of accountability cannot be conjured into existence merely by introducing new laws and regulations, or indeed by the increasing tide of media revelations about intelligence. However, it suggests that we are now seeing the rise of a more complex pattern of ‘ambient accountability’ which is at last challenging the secret state across Europe.     

Transparency and accountability: principles and rules for the construction of publicity

Western countries have experienced a growing demand for accountability as a key element to the democratization of the State. This demand has given rise to an advocacy towards a transparency of State institutions and its subsequent public policies. This advocacy, in turn, aims to make governments accountable before the public. The goal of this article is to establish a critical perspective towards what we call transparency policy in favor of what we call publicity policy. The latter provides a normative argument for the concept of accountability aimed towards a deeper democracy and stronger public management processes. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Newspapers and political accountability: evidence from Japan

This study examines the effects of local and national newspapers on local political accountability. Local newspapers are expected to monitor local governments’ behavior. However, national newspapers could also contribute to local governments’ accountability by attracting nationwide attention to a local policy issue. Using the method developed by Snyder and Strömberg (J Polit Econ 118:355–408, 2010), I construct a variable that measures the weighted market share of locally circulated newspapers in an administrative district in Japan. I find that an increase in the market share of local newspapers is associated with a reduction in local public works spending (seen as rents for local interest groups), which indicates an improvement in political accountability. In addition, the accountability effect of local newspapers becomes greater one year after national newspapers focus readers’ attentions on the issue of unnecessary public works. This result suggests that national newspapers serve as an agenda setter and complement local newspapers for strengthening local political accountability.     

Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies

Abstract. Parliamentary democracy has been widely embraced by politicians and especially by the scholarly community but remains less widely understood. In this essay, I identify the institutional features that define parliamentary democracy and suggest how they can be understood as delegation relationships. I propose two definitions: one minimal and one maximal (or ideal–typical). In the latter sense, parliamentary democracy is a particular regime of delegation and accountability that can be understood with the help of agency theory, which allows us to identify the conditions under which democratic agency problems may occur. Parliamentarism is simple, indirect, and relies on lessons gradually acquired in the past. Compared to presidentialism, parliamentarism has certain advantages, such as decisional efficiency and the inducements it creates toward effort. On the other hand, parliamentarism also implies disadvantages such as ineffective accountability and a lack of transparency, which may cause informational inefficiencies. And whereas parliamentarism may be particularly suitable for problems of adverse selection, it is a less certain cure for moral hazard. In contemporary advanced societies, parliamentarism is facing the challenges of decaying screening devices and diverted accountabilities.     

The colour purple: perceptions of accountability across the Tasman

This article explores the changing rhetoric and substance of accountability in the relationships between parliamentarians and public servants in what Alex Matheson terms the ‘purple zone’—where the ‘blue’ of political strategy and ‘red’ of public administration merge in ‘strategic conversation’. The primary focus is on current developments in Australia. As the Westminster system of governance, and the role of public administration within it, undergo profound transformation, the prerogatives of elected parliamentarians (in the blue corner) and the responsibilities of career public servants (in the red corner) are changing fundamentally. In Australia and New Zealand the increasingly complex relationships that exist between government, parliament, public service and the wider community challenge the traditional notions of accountability. Both the lines of accountability, and its standards, are under challenge. The acceleration of Australia's move to contract out the delivery of government services is creating new arenas of creative tension between administrative review and management for results. Public service agencies are increasingly perceived to be themselves in a contractual relationship with government. There is a risk that the public good may become subverted by private interest. How will we ensure that agencies will ‘not contract out responsibility at the citizen's expense’? © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. Vol. 17 , 293–306 (1997). No. of Figures: 0. No. of Tables: 0. No. of Refs: 33.     

Accounting and accountability: recent developments in government financial information systems

In developed countries, governmental accounting is considered as an integral part and a successful aspect of public sector reforms. In developing countries, besides being a tool for government financial management modernisation, accounting is regarded as a weapon against fraud and waste in government. The aim of this article is to compare, taking the IPSAS No.1 as a benchmark, the information content of the financial statements submitted by the central governments of Anglo‐Saxon, Nordic, European Continental and Mercosur zone countries. The results give us a point of reference as to where the central governmental accounting of each country studied lies in the ‘spectrum’ from cash to full accrual accounting and to what extent the IPSASs are able to fit into diverse public administration styles in order to improve the transparency, accountability and reliability of the financial information disclosed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decentralization in Tanzania: An assessment of local government discretion and accountability

A large part of the decentralization literature is fragmented along political, fiscal, or administrative lines. In this article we employ a diagnostic framework to draw these dimensions together in a coherent manner to focus on analyzing local government discretion and accountability in Tanzania. Tanzania seems to have a deconcentrated local government system with central appointees having large powers at the local level. Centrally‐funded mandates—such as constructing secondary schools—dominate local government plans and budgets. Central control over administrative functions has ensured that administrative decentralization is yet to occur. In the fiscal sphere, progress has been made in transparency and harmonization of transfers in the last 5 years but local governments still have some way to go in raising own revenues, being less reliant on transfers, and ensuring downward accountability. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Place-making: Chin refugees,citizenship and the state in Malaysia

Southeast Asia is a transit point as well as a point of destination for thousands of migrants and refugees. This is not new, as people movements in and through the region have a long and diverse history. However, the spaces for movement have been severely restricted by modern national borders and border protection enforcement. A significant part of the migration flows are made up of refugees. This is particularly so in Malaysia, which is currently home to approximately 200,000 refugees. The Malaysian government continues to resist outside and internal pressures to face up to and remedy the refugee crisis it increasingly finds itself in. As a result, refugees live in a liminal and extra-legal place in Malaysia, which makes any real engagement with the Malaysian body politic and Malaysians problematic. This paper traces the attempts at place-making by Chin refugees in Malaysia and their attempts to evade, confront and circumvent Malaysian authorities.     

Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work

Abstract. In modern democracies political parties exist because (1) they reduce transaction costs in the electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas and (2) help overcome the dilemma of collective action. In Western Europe political parties are the central mechanism to make the constitutional chain of political delegation and accountability work in practice. Party representatives in public office are ultimately the agents of the extra–parliamentary party organization. In order to contain agency loss parties rely on party–internal mechanisms and the institutionalisation of party rights in public rules and, in contrast to US parties, they apply the full range of ex ante and ex post mechanisms. Generally, the role of party is weaker the further down the chain of delegation.     

Taxation and local government accountability in a clientelist context: Colombia

Increasing the accountability of local government is an important objective of decentralisation. One way to achieve greater accountability is to enhance the reliance of local governments on locally raised taxes. Property taxes are a prime source of increased revenue for local governments. However, it is difficult to levy them effectively in clientelist political systems, like that of Colombia. Recent reforms there have increased the capacity of municipal governments to raise revenue through property taxation. Giving responsibility for assessments of property values to an independent national agency has been especially useful. Municipal government finances are now to some degree independent and protected from the influence of clientelistic political parties. However continuing problems include: the reluctance of mayors to enforce taxation liabilities; the obstacles to opening local political debates on taxation; and the problems faced by national governments in trying to monitor municipal revenues and expenditures. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Organizational reform within government: accountability and policy management

The article considers, from a United Kingdom perspective, the ways in which relations between Government Departments and Agencies are organized to ensure clarity of roles and effective accountability; and also looks at the ongoing need for effective policy management at the centre of Government. It describes the progress of the Next Steps programme, examining its successes and perceived weaknesses. In particular, it rehearses the debate running in the UK on the question of Ministerial accountability, and considers the distinctions between responsibility and accountability, and between policy matters and operations. (© 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)     

Regulatory enforcement against organizational insiders: Interactions in the pursuit of individual accountability

The UK Financial Conduct Authority has developed and implemented policies targeting individuals for regulatory non-compliance in the post-2008 crisis period. This article develops a tripartite framework that differentiates between individual–firm, regulator–individual, and regulator–firm interactions to capture the complexity of these enforcement proceedings. Drawing on interviews with stakeholders, administrative decisionmaking observations, and documentary analysis, it outlines the process of individualizing responsibility for non-compliance and finds that this approach poses evidential and investigative challenges for the regulator as a result of individual and corporate responses. The evidence shows that individuals are more likely than firms to engage in an adversarial response to an investigation rather than to settle. At the same time, through an inverse process of “corporatization” of the enforcement proceedings, firms may employ resources and strategies aimed at obscuring individual responsibility or binding together more closely the corporate and the individual case. The article concludes that the prospects of a successful outcome in investigating individuals depend not only on regulators' activities but also on corporate responses and on which managers are considered assets to the firm and which may be thrown to the wolves.