LOCAL GOVERNMENT DISCRETION AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN TURKEY

After ratification of the European Charter of Local Self‐Government in 1993, Turkey has witnessed major local government reform efforts in 2000s. The policy objectives of these reforms were granting more political, administrative and fiscal discretion to local governments along the principles of democratic decentralization and strengthening accountability linkages between citizens and local governments. We employ a diagnostic framework to analyse the impact of these reforms. We argue that reforms have achieved limited success in improving decision‐making autonomy and accountability of local governments. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC SECTOR AUDIT: HOW EFFECTIVE ARE EFFICIENCY AUDITS?

Abstract: A crucial issue facing the public sector is the extent to which efficiency and effectiveness are elements in the concept of accountability to parliament and the people. This paper argues that the recent moves towards efficiency audit in many countries, including Australia, need to be extended to effectiveness audit, and that to the extent that this does not occur, efficiency (and compliance) audit in the public sector is ineffective and accountability lacking.
An examination of Australian public sector auditing is undertaken first, based on a discussion of the 1974–76 Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration, the 1977–82 Review of New South Wales Government Administration and the subsequent implementation of their recommendations as the means of clarifying and elucidating the definitions of compliance, efficiency and effectiveness audit, as well as a means of critically analysing Australian developments. Developments in public sector auditing in the United Kingdom and the United States of America are critically examined. Finally, the future prospects and problems facing public sector audit in Australia are reviewed, and policy options relating to the development of comprehensive audit are outlined.     

Policy design without democracy? Making democratic sense of transition management

This article explores the complex relationship between democracy and long-term policy design for sustainability. At one extreme, democracy can be framed as problematic for policy planning because of the myopia fostered by some democratic institutions, such as regular elections. Alternatively, democracy can be seen as an ally of long-term policy design to the extent that it can generate public legitimacy and accountability, and potentially foster more equitable and just outcomes. Recent debates on how to ‘manage’ policy transitions to sustainability have been curiously silent on democratic matters, despite their potential implications for democracy. To explore what democracy might mean for transition management this article considers empirically how actors engaged in the Dutch Energy Transition Program make democratic sense of their activities. The analysis finds that in practice transition policies promote implicit narratives or democratic storylines on how reforms should be developed, who should participate in these, and how they should be legitimised and accountable to the public. The dominant narrative, which espouses elite theory and technocracy, privileges epistemic matters over democratic considerations. Other democratic storylines draw on representative democracy and interest group pluralism. The paper considers some possible ways to foster more productive interfaces between the governance structures of transition management, and the polycentric context of contemporary democratic systems.     

ACCOUNTABILITY, EFFICIENCY AND THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION

Abstract: This paper deals first with alternative concepts of accountability and efficiency. It views accountability—and associated concepts of efficiency—in a hierarchy of increasing sophistication and potential usefulness, but corresponding operational difficulty. The lowest level is fiscal or fiduciary accountability, relating to the actual expenditure of funds and procedures by which that expenditure is accounted for. The second level is efficiency accountability, defined in terms of the ratio of some physical measure of output to cost. The most sophisticated level is effectiveness accountability, in which the output measures used reflect the attainment of objectives or programs. Corresponding to these levels is a hierarchy of approaches to auditing, namely financial, efficiency, and effectiveness auditing.
The second part of the paper looks at the present situation in Australia and at the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration in terms of this framework. It argues that the government should commit itself to a continuing, comprehensive process of analysis and evaluation of public programs and activities aimed at making programs efficiently effective in a manner consistent with regular financial procedures. A "package" for implementing this approach—including revised institutional arrangements—is discussed in terms of the difficulties likely to be encountered—difficulties such as the shortage of capable personnel and problems of extending analytical practices to the State and local spheres of government.     

Ministerial Turnover and Why Reshuffles Matter for Parliament

Reshuffles are a relatively common occurrence in British politics. We expect to see them whenever a new Prime Minister enters Downing Street, after elections and following ministerial resignations. Recent research from the Institute for Government warns that the regular churn of ministers has negative consequences for policy making and for parliamentary accountability. This article summarises their latest research and what this tells us about the potential implications of Boris Johnson’s February 2020 reshuffle on government and Parliament.     

Decentralization,provincial policy making and the law in Papua New Guinea

Shortly after independence in 1975 Papua New Guinea decided to decentralize political power by creating nineteen provincial governments, complete with legislatures and executives. The division of powers between the two levels of government was set down in the Organic Law on Provincial Government and subsequent delegations of power by the National Executive Council (cabinet). The ability of provincial governments to fulfil the role in policy making set out for them depends on a number of political, financial and legal factors at both the national and provincial levels. A close examination of the legal base of provincial policy making reveals a number of shortcomings and incoherencies in the legal arrangements which pose obstacles to the realization of effective decentralized policy making. There are several possible approaches to resolving these problems, but the most appropriate one requires co-ordination between the National Government and provincial governments in replacing delegated powers with provincial legislation.     

Regulatory regimes and accountability

This research considers accountability issues for new forms of regulation that shift the emphasis from prescribing actions to regulating systems or regulating for results. Shortfalls at various levels of accountability are identified from experiences with these regimes in the regulation of building and fire safety, food safety and nuclear power plant safety. These experiences illustrate how accountability shortfalls can undermine regulatory performance and introduce a potential for subtle forms of regulatory capture. These concerns underscore the importance of finding the right fit between regulatory circumstances and the design of regulatory regimes.     

THE POWER OF THE PURSE AND BUDGETARY ACCOUNTABILITY: EXPERIENCES FROM SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN CHINA

Accountability is the cornerstone of fiscal administration. This research studies the relationship between accountability and the sharing of budgetary power. We found that the accountability in China is supported by the superior of bureaucratic power, instead of the comprehensiveness of various accountability components. The implication is that the accountability is facilitated in terms of emphasising to whom government officials are accountable within the chain of command, reducing goal conflicts and improving strategic goal attainment. However, it is hindered at the same time in terms of lacking evaluations perceived to be impartial, limited room for democratic accountability, over‐implementation of policies at all costs, and weak comprehensive awareness of ‘accountable for what’ (as long as it is a policy direction from the top). The structure of the power of the purse both enables and limits the tone and terrain of budget accountability in particular and government accountability in general. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Life Cycle of the Government-Sponsored Enterprise: Lessons for Design and Accountability

The federal government uses government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) to allocate credit to sectors such as housing and agriculture that are considered to deserve special support. The GSEs illustrate the importance of life cycle in the design and accountability of federal agencies and instrumentalities. Four case studies are presented here. In general, market and political dominance and rapid growth are inherent in GSE design. Dominance means inadequate feedback, which can foster poor management and financial risk. Government lacks an exit strategy for GSEs that have outlived their usefulness. Government should systematically review the organizational structure, accountability, and design of all agencies and instrumentalities, both at inception and over their life cycles.     

The Continued Relevance of Local Parties in Representative Democracies

This article assesses the value of local parties. It asks why political parties value their local sections. It also considers the ways in which local parties can benefit society. Local parties act as a democratic training ground for party members, are a conduit for political communication and provide parties with a range of resources. They also act as problem solving agencies; they ensure that policy is responsive to local needs; they provide an additional channel of communication and accountability; and they link citizens with the state. The article ends with an appeal to party scholars to refocus their attention towards local parties.     

Connecting deliberative mini‐publics to representative decision making

Despite some prominent critics, deliberative democrats tend to be optimistic about the potential of deliberative mini‐publics. However, the problem with current practices is that mini‐publics are typically used by officials on an ad hoc basis and that their policy impacts remain vague. Mini‐publics seem especially hard to integrate into representative decision making. There are a number of reasons for this, especially prevailing ideas of representation and accountability as well as the contestatory character of representative politics. This article argues that deliberative mini‐publics should be regarded as one possible way of improving the epistemic quality of representative decision making and explores different institutional designs through which deliberative mini‐publics could be better integrated into representative institutions. The article considers arrangements which institutionalise the use of mini‐publics; involve representatives in deliberations; motivate public interactions between mini‐publics and representatives; and provide opportunities to ex post scrutiny or suspensive veto powers for mini‐publics. The article analyses prospects and problems of these measures, and considers their applicability in different contexts of representative politics.     

Democratic Accountability in Decentralised Governance1

This article develops a conceptual framework for studying democratic accountability in decentralised governance, and discusses critical issues about democratic accountability from a citizen's perspective. First, the concept is discussed and adapted to make it useful for studying democratic accountability in different governance structures. Second, the article scrutinises conditions for democratic accountability in decentralised governance based on three models. Third, democratic accountability is discussed with reference to a case study of public reviewers operating in four municipalities in Sweden. The study indicates that municipal auditors and the local media have the greatest impact on municipal policy. On the whole, auditors improve local governments’ internal control and systems for steering and monitoring municipal policy, whereas the media sometimes alter the policy agenda without changing the policy. Auditors maintain and support an elitist democratic orientation of democratic accountability, and the media maintain this democratic orientation and in addition promote democratic dialogue. Viewed from a citizen's perspective, the traditional accountability system does not work satisfactorily. State inspectors and municipal auditors – two important public reviewers in the current system – could improve their work to make it more useful to citizens’ democratic control. Another way discussed to develop democratic accountability is to promote participatory policy and concrete means of accountability (e.g. on‐site visits, conducted tours and different forms of democratic dialogue). The formal way to improve democratic accountability implies more transparency, monitoring and control, which may also lead to distrust and scapegoat thinking (i.e. a surveillance society), whereas concrete modes of accountability, more associated with participatory and deliberative democracy, imply mutual responsibility and trust building. Strengthening participatory policy, active citizens, collective responsibility and democratic dialogue could be an alternative to the emerging audit society.     

Broken Promises or Selective Memory Planning? A National Picture of HOPE VI Plans and Realities

Government efforts to redevelop public housing often face a contentious gap between plans and realities. This paper compares 2014 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) administrative data on housing unit counts and unit mixes for all 260 developments receiving Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) revitalization grants with data provided in the original HOPE VI grant award announcements. We find that HUD records undercount approximately 11,500 once-proposed units. The biggest changes were a 29% decline in the number of market-rate units and a 40% decline in homeownership units. The chief shortfall during implementation, therefore, was not with public housing units (although the HOPE VI program as a whole did trigger an overall decline of such units). To help elucidate the dynamics at play when the unit allocation shifts between initial grant award and implemented project, we include a series of five brief case studies that illustrate several types of unit change. Interviews with HUD staff confirm the baseline for record-keeping shifted during implementation once project economic feasibility became clearer; adherence to original unit mix proposals remained secondary. HUD prioritized its accountability to Congress and developers over its public law accountability to build the projects initially proposed to local community residents. Although these changes have sometimes been interpreted as broken promises, it is even clearer that HUD’s monitoring system exemplifies what we call Selective Memory Planning: when planners and policy makers, willfully or not, selectively ignore elements of previous plans in favor of new plans that are easier to achieve.     

THE POLITICS OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT: MONITORING EDUCATIONAL REFORM IN SIX STATES

Legislative oversight traditionally has been viewed as a rational tool for achieving democratic accountability. Legislators conduct oversight to ensure consistency between implementation and official policy directives. The major theme of this paper is t h a t oversight is best understood as an integral part of legislative-administrative politics. By examining how six states monitored recent educational reforms, the author finds that legislators conducted oversight in ways that minimized time commitments and maximized political benefits.
The paper concludes that legislative interest in controlling implementation often was secondary to political considerations. Oversight, therefore, may not really be effective as an accountability tool.     

Accountability Expectations in an Intergovernmental Arena: The National Rural Development Partnership

This article explores the expectations and accountability relationshipspresent in an intergovernmental experiment known as the NationalRural Development Partnership (NRDP). As such, this study extendsearlier analyses of accountability dynamics beyond the boundsof a single agency into the organizationally less tidy realmof intergovernmental relations. This research focuses on theunique expectations and accountability dynamics facing participantsin the NRDP and identifies gaps between expectations at thecorporate (agency) and individual levels and between arenasin the intergovernmental system. These gaps complicate the accountabilitydynamics for NRDP participants and contribute to the challengesof operating within the rural development policy arena. TheNRDP is designed to emphasize the relationship between processesand substantive outcomes. It has developed a tendency to relyon professional and political accountability relationships thathave little to do with formal responsibilities.     

An Evaluation Crucible: Evaluating Policy Advice in Australian Central Agencies

Policy advice is a core function of government that until quite recently remained outside the formal processes of performance evaluation. Evaluation, by its very nature, is designed to question both the effectiveness and relevance of government activities; applying it to policy advice opens up a traditionally confidential and politically sensitive arena. This paper reports on an evaluation experiment in Australian government — policy management reviews (PMRs) — that sought to evaluate the quality of central agency policy advice. It traces the development of the PMR model around interdepartmental committee processes, the bureaucratic politics that diluted the focus on policy outcomes, and examines how central agencies steered evaluation away from questions of public accountability towards arrangements for achieving more effective control of the processes underpinning production of advice. By targeting the process rather than outcomes of policy advising, PMRs sought unsuccessfully to adhere to the divide between management and policy and, in doing so, marked out the limits to performance evaluation.     

Democracy through Multilevel Governance? The Implementation of the Structural Funds in South Yorkshire

This article considers the democratic qualities of multilevel governance at the stage of policy implementation closest to the ground, involving local residents and organizations. Drawing on a case study of the structural funds in South Yorkshire (United Kingdom), it puts forward three models of democracy through which to evaluate the democratic credentials of multilevel governance. The case study illustrates that among the expected complexity and technocracy at this stage of policymaking, there are also experiments in local democracy that have not previously been identified in the academic literature. As such, in the context of deep multilevel governance, there is evidence that while traditional mechanisms of accountability may be undermined, other mechanisms may provide a valuable alternative.     

Transformation or Bureaucratization? The changing role of community representation in local strategic partnerships in England

Abstract

The debate about the need to build social capital and to engage local communities in public policy has become a central issue in many advanced liberal societies and developing countries. In many countries new forms of governance have emerged out of a growing realization that representative democracy by itself is no longer sufficient. One of the most significant public policy trends in the United Kingdom has been the involvement of community organizations and their members in the delivery of national policy, mediated through local systems of governance and management. One such policy area is urban regeneration. Central Government now requires local authorities in England to set up Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) to bring together stakeholders who can prepare Community Strategies and deliver social and economic programmes which target areas of deprivation. This paper reviews the key institutional processes which must be addressed, such as representation, accountability and transformation. It then investigates three very different examples of LSPs based on interviews with key representatives. The paper concludes that political commitments to community engagement in civil society are always mediated through existing institutional arrangements. Thus attempts to change deep-seated political structures and power relationships require a commitment to increase representation as well as to transform the practices and repertoires of deliberation and action.     

Government Information Policy in the Era of Big Data

Reliable public sector information serves as a pivotal source for big data. Government postal codes, for instance, have been crucial for predicting demographics. Confidentiality, however, may be at risk when combined with other sources. Public sector information not only describes government activity but contains material, such as campaign finance filings, produced by outside sources. How does information production impact policy concerns if material is reused for big data projects? Information production is analyzed using a framework of five methods of production. The framework considers information that the public sector writes, publishes, manages, produces through research, and compiles through legal mandates. This paper examines the policy implications of using U.S. federal public sector information in big data projects.     

Public Policy and Behavior Change

Changing behavior is often necessary to tackle societal problems, such as obesity, alcohol abuse, and debt problems. This article has two goals. First, it aims to highlight how governments can try to change the behavior of citizens. Government can use policy instruments to do so, including incentives, bans and mandates, information campaigns, and nudges. However, the government should not be a manipulator that applies policy instruments without societal support. Therefore, the second goal of the article is to provide a conceptual framework that helps analyze whether public policies to stimulate behavior change are effective and supported by key stakeholders. This conceptual framework has five criteria indicating the extent to which there is effective and supported behavior change: the policy is (1) effective and (2) efficient, and there is support for the policy among (3) politicians, (4) implementing organizations, and (5) citizens. The article ends with suggestions to study public policy aimed at behavior change.