寻找浪漫的玫瑰

福克纳的《献给艾米丽的玫瑰》讲述了艾米丽从一个对爱情渴望的淑女最终成了杀人的魔鬼的故事。虽然艾米丽的一生经历了痛楚，同时也形成了不少性格缺陷，她是一朵顽固的、受压迫的、冷酷凋零的玫瑰，但本文还是不断寻找艾米丽生活中的闪光点，最终寻找到了艾米丽那朵原本应该娇艳浪漫的玫瑰。     

Militarized occupations: evolution of Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom’s 1920s intersectional conversation

Abstract

This article brings together transnational feminism, intersectionality, and militarized occupations by recovering Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom’s (WILPF) 1920s intersectional conversation. Mary Church Terrell, Helen Curtis, Addie Hunton, Jane Addams, and Emily Balch negotiated WILPF’s stance on two occupations: the controversy over the French use of colonial troops in its occupation of Germany, and the US occupation of Haiti. My argument is that through the evolving intersectional conversation, WILPF came to understand the necessity of weaving racialized sexual politics into its analysis of and activism around the politics of militarized occupations. To develop the argument, I construct and apply an ideal type of an intersectional conversation that incorporates a notion of unbracketing substantive inequalities during the conversation. I conclude with some implications for today about what we can learn in the twenty-first century from a moment in an early twentieth-century genealogy of intersectional transnational feminism.     

Book Reviews

Books review: Daniel Cohen, The Wealth of the World and the Poverty of Nations Peter J. Taylor, The Way the Modern World Works: World Hegemony to World Impasse Anton Zijderveld, The Waning of the Welfare State: The End of Comprehensive State Succor Bill Jordan, The New Politics of Welfare: Social Justice in a Global Context Leonard E. Burman, The Labyrinth of Capital Gains Tax Policy TheConstitution of Iran, Asghar Schirazi. James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State Wolfgang Reinicke, Global Public Policy: Governing without Government? Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, and Edward Rhodes, eds. The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests Frederick W. Mayer, Interpreting NAFTA: The Science and Art of Political Analysis J. Nicholas Ziegler, Governing Ideas: Strategies for Innovation in France and Germany Pietro S. Nivola, Laws of the Landscape: How Policies Shape Cities in Europe and America     

Incentives and political contributions

Two implications from this research are noted. First, from a researcher's viewpoint, our research suggests the importance of age, wealth, tax rates, and marital status as determinants of political contributions by top U.S. wealth-holders. Therefore, these factors should be included in aggregated models that attempt to analyze the relations between such variables as voting, campaign expenditures and the outcomes of elections. Second, from politicians' viewpoints, this research suggests that individual economic variables such as marginal tax rates and wealth are major determinants of individual decisions to contribute to politicians. Assuming that such contributions reflect votes, this research suggests the relative importance of focusing campaign promises on economic variables — a strategy that low tax politicians like Ronald Reagan and George Bush may keenly be aware of.The views presented are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Treasury Department.     

Science and the climate change regime

Given rapidly increasing losses from extreme climate events, the world community already has a common interest in action to mitigate and adapt to climate change. However, this common interest is not well served through continued promotion of either mandatory (legally-binding) policies or do nothing policies by various participants in the regime established by the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change. The common interest would be better served by a third way, comprised of voluntary no regrets policies that are commensurate with the limited political power of the regime and already have succeeded on small scales in reducing vulnerabilities to extreme climate events and in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Both mandatory and do nothing policies, as well as the regime itself, have depended upon scientists for political support in the past. But scientists might better serve the common interest of the world community through support of a third way in the future.     

Promise and peril

The size of the federal budget tells only one part of the tale of government's presence in the market economy. The enormous amounts of non-tax dollars government requires to be spent on regulation – estimated at $647 billion per year – powerfully argue for some sort of regulatory scorekeeping. Regulatory costs are equivalent to over one-third of the level of government spending. A regulatory budget can be an effective tool both for spurring reform and monitoring regulatory activity.At bottom, today's rulemaking process is plagued by the fact that agency bureaucrats are not accountable to voters. And Congress – though responsible for the underlying statutes that usually propel those unanswerable agencies – nevertheless can conveniently blame agencies for regulatory excesses. Indeed, Americans live under a regime of Regulation Without Representation.A regulatory budget could promote greater accountability by limiting the regulatory costs agencies could impose on the private sector. Congress could either specify a limit on compliance costs for each newly enacted law or reauthorization of existing law, or Congress could enact a more ambitious full-scale budget paralleling the fiscal budget, a riskier approach. A comprehensive budget would require Congress to divide to a total budget among agencies. Agencies' responsibility would be to rank hazards serially, from most to least severe, and address them within their budget constraint. In either version of a regulatory budget, any agency desiring to exceed its budget would need to seek congressional approval.Regulatory costs imposed on the private sector by federal agencies can never be precisely measured, and a budget cannot achieve absolute precision. Nonetheless, a regulatory budget is a valuable tool. The real innovation of regulatory budgeting is its potential to impose the consequences of regulatory decisionmaking on agencies rather than on the regulated parties alone. Agencies that today rarely admit a rule provides negligible benefit would be forced to compete for the right to regulate. While agencies would be free to regulate as unwisely as they do now, the consequences could be transfer of the squandered budgetary allocation to a rival agency that saves more lives.Budgeting could fundamentally change incentives. Under a budget, adopting a costly, but marginally beneficial, regulation will suddenly be irrational. Congress would weigh an agency's claimed benefits against alternative means of protecting public health and safety, giving agencies incentives to compete and expose one another's bogus benefits. Budgeting could encourage greater recognition of the fact that some risks are far more remote than those we undertake daily. In the long run, a regulatory budget would force agencies to compete with one another on the most important bottom line of all: that their least-effective rules save more lives per dollar spent (or correct some alleged market imperfection better) than those of other agencies.There are clear benefits to regulatory budgeting, but there are also pitfalls. For instance, under a budget, agencies have incentives to underestimate compliance costs while regulated parties have the opposite incentive. Self-correcting techniques that may force opposing cost calculations to converge are only at the thought- experiment stage. However, limitations on the delegation of regulatory power and enhancing congressional accountability can help.Certain principles and antecedents can help ensure that a regulatory budgeting effort succeeds. Explicitly recognizing that an agency's basic impulse is to overstate the benefits of its activities, a budget would relieve agencies of benefit calculation responsibilities altogether. Agencies would concentrate on properly assessing only the costs of their initiatives. Since an agency must try to maximize benefits within its budget constraint or risk losing its budget allocation, it would be rational for agencies to monitor benefits, but Congress need not require it.Other ways to promote the success of a budget are to: establish an incremental rather than total budget; collect and summarize annual report card data on the numbers of regulations in each agency; establish a regulatory cost freeze; implement a Regulatory Reduction Commission; employ separate budgets for economic and environmental/social regulation; and control indirect costs by limiting the regulatory methods that most often generate them.A regulatory budget is not a magic device alone capable of reducing the current $647 billion regulatory burden. Yet a cautious one deserve consideration. Having good information is an aid in grappling with the regulatory state just as compiling the federal fiscal budget is indispensable to any effort to plan and control government spending.     

"西学东渐"与清初"中西会通"的科学观

明清之际的"西学东渐",在一定程度上改变了清初学人的科学思维方式,极大拓宽了他们的科学视野,从而推进了中国传统科学向西方近代科学的历史性转变.但在"天朝情结"和"以夏变夷"观念误导下,清初学者由"会通"滑入"索源",提出了"西学中源"说,把"中西会通"转向乾嘉时期对中国传统科学的盲目推崇,从而延缓了中国近代化的进程.     

Admissible and sincere strategies under approval voting

This essay reasses the assumptions of the Brams-Fishburn theory of approval voting, and proposes modifications to make the theory correspond better with likely voting choices. With a small number of candidates, voters who use the inadmissible strategy of voting for all candidates can help to produce a result that better reflects the voters' wishes than is possible with admissible strategies, so we propose a widening of the definition of admissibility to encompass this case. With more than three candidates, we define first-order admissible strategies, which are the most likely strategies to be used in practice, and are also strongly sincere, in that a vote for any candidate is always accompanied by votes for all more or equally-preferred candidates. Their number is less under approval voting than under plurality voting. Both proposed modifications strengthen the technical arguments favoring approval voting over plurality voting.     

Relating systems concepts and public planning

Scientism so pervades our society that its methodological arm, the research approach, is assumed to be de rigeur for establishing policies and solving problems. Using the research approach, modern disciplinary developments created many techniques, such as operations research/management science/systems analysis (OR/MS/SA), ostensibly for finding solutions to pressing organizational and societal problems.This paper's emphasis on scientism and the research approach is deliberate - these concepts are the Weltanschauung of OR/MS/SA, the major systems concepts available. Their analysis, modeling of what exists, quantification, and reductionism are assumed to be the beauty of their logic and their only rationality. Public planning also assumes that analysis, modeling, quantification, and reductionism are the fundamental parts of problem solving and policy setting. This paper shows how this research approach and the unstated assumption that it must be used when establishing policies or solving problems now loom as the problems, and may be the biggest stumbling blocks to finding the good solutions society needs.Adapted from the author's forthcoming book, The Planning and Design Professions: An Operational Theory, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1981.     

Crime,punishment and human nature

In Thinking About Crime James Q. Wilson brings a new dimension to crime policy research by explicating the failure of criminologists to adequately consider the philosophical perspectives on man and society which underlie alternate policy options. As a result, they rarely appreciate the inherent limits on government efforts to deal with crime. Wilson's consideration of these limitations, together with a critique of causal analysis in criminological thinking, lead him to propose an alternate conceptual framework, policy analysis. Our inspection of Wilson's own thinking reveals, however, that policy analysis is no less problematic and shortsighted than causal analysis, a result we attribute to serious flaws in his critique of criminological thinking and to the incorporation of his own biases about human nature into his conceptual framework. We seek in the concluding section to remove this bias and to demonstrate how policy analysis may be expanded into a more flexible, multi-dimensional framework, one which accounts for different assumptions about human nature and different policy goals.     

Interest groups and the regulation of pesticides: Congress,coalitions, and closure

This article is essentially a rejoinder to Christopher Bosso's piece, Transforming Adversaries Into Collaborators: Interest groups and the regulation of chemical pesticides, which appeared in this journal (21: 3–22). The case of pesticides regulation is re-examined and some new insights are offered. At the center of Bosso's argument is the contention that Congress is passive. John Kingdon's agenda/alternative distinction is utilized to arrive at an alternative way to think about the role of Congress in today's permeable pressure system.     

Waste,weapons, and resolve: Defense posture and politics in the defense budget

The defense budget poses many problems to the student of budgetary behavior and its ever-changing structure makes it difficult to identify patterns and trends in allocation. This study examines defense budget requests from the Eisenhower through the Reagan administrations. An analysis of changes in allocation to the 54 appropriation categories suggests that the defense budget responds to new doctrines and management introduced by each administration. Shifts in allocation among the services are greatest in the first two budgets of an administration and reversals of previous program priorities also occur early in each administration. After three or four budget requests, year-to-year continuity in allocation to winners and losers finally begins to emerge. Two other findings also shed light on the politics of defense budgeting. First, the degree of variation in allocation is least when the defense budget increase is large. Second, low presidential popularity leads to less variation. The identification of such trends should permit future budget requests to be evaluated in the context of the long-term evolution of defense politics.     

Public opinion and presidential responsibility for the economy: Understanding personalization

The general mechanisms which underlie the psychological phenomenon ofpersonalizing (cognitive simplification and defensive attribution) would seem to have great utility in explaining attributions of presidential control over the economy. Yet previous research has generated inconsistent and inconclusive empirical results. This study identifies several sources of inconsistency and then attempts to clarify the approach by focusing separately on the object and the subject of personalizing. Our findings suggest that the determinants of personalizing to the president are different from the factors that explain personalizing to the incumbent. In addition, we find that the impact of the two psychological mechanisms differs substantially within economic subject areas.Paper prepared for delivery at the 1984 Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, Fort Worth, Texas.     

Evolution,consciousness, and political thinking

Evolutionary theory is utilized to sketch the outline of a performance-based perspective of political thinking. It is argued that human consciousness evolved as an emergent and interactive mechanism for enabling the individual to cope strategically with environmental exigencies. Within the context of this evolutionary perspective, consciousness at the individual level is shown to develop in patterned yet flexible and individually variable ways as a result of the interaction of biological and environmental variables including, among the latter, those elements of the social environment like ideas, values, and intentions, as well as institutional patterns of conflict, affiliation, and authority, which are themselves products of coping strategies. Political thinking, it is suggested, is a strategic coping enterprise involving equilibration between the individual's own strivings and social demands for conformity in collective affairs.     

Education and mass belief systems: An extension and some new questions

Using the SRC/CPS's national election surveys from 1956 to 1976, this paper investigates the effect of education on consistency among the public's domestic policy opinions. Evidence from both gamma correlations and factor analysis indicates that education has neither a strong nor a linear effect on issue constraint over the 20 years covered by the data, for the lowest and the highest education strata consistently show the highest levels of constraint. We do not conclude, however, that education is unrelated to recognition of ideological concepts, for almost one-half of the lowest education stratum do not use liberal and conservative terms. We conclude that issue constraint does not directly translate into ideology and suggest some new directions that future research should take if we are to evaluate effectively the effect of education on opinion structuring.A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 1978 Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.     

Between science and politics: assessing the risks of dioxins in Canada and the United States

Conclusions The history of U.S. and Canadian risk assessments for dioxin is an increasingly familiar tale of debates within the scientific community played out in the political arena. Uncertainty among scientists creates the possibility of large disparities between different governments' policies. However, the pattern of differences that emerges reflects the context in which science policy decisions are made within each agency and within each country. The political environment has implications not just for how mandated science is received, but for how it is conducted.Many features of the dioxin case are consistent with observations by others. In the cases of formaldehyde, alachlor, alar, and amaranth, EPA relied on mathematical models to assess the risks of potential carcinogens, while Health and Welfare Canada relied on the more traditional safety factor approach.³⁵ This body of evidence is suggestive of national styles of transscience. Features of the U.S. style include explicit rationales for regulatory decisions, reliance on consistent and explicit risk assessment principles, and public debate over scientific aspects of public policy. The Canadian style is exemplified by closed decisionmaking, case-by-case review, and the absence of public discussion of the scientific basis for government decisions.The differences between FDA and EPA in this case study suggest an important caveat, however. The U.S. style is most clearly reflected in the implementation of the non-discretionary environmental, health and safety statutes passed by the U.S. Congress since 1970. More closed and traditional styles of regulatory decisionmaking may survive within the U.S. as vestiges of a more deferential past.Even less than pure science, trans-science is not a universal enterprise. When scientists do reach agreement, it can be a powerful force that can even overcome political and national differences (Haas, 1989). However, when science is uncertain, as is typically the case in assessing the risks of toxic chemicals, there is more room for political factors to shape the way different countries interpret science in making policy decisions.     

The design and use of questionnaires for participation practices in town planning—Lessons from the United States and Britain

One means by which planning agencies may hear the constructive views of the public is the questionnaire technique. A questionnaire is not just a list of questions...;. It is essentially a scientific instrument for measurement and for correlation of particular kinds of data ...; it has to be specially designed. (Oppenheim). This paper considers the problems of questionnaire design, a number of examples of the use of the questionnaire in the United States and Britain, and attempts to draw lessons and profit from experience for those people committed to the use of the technique in exercises of public participation in the planning process.     

Reviews and notes

A response to block and Hirschhorn ? This piece grew out of discussions between the author and several (but not all) members of the editorial collective.

The Capitalist State: Its ‘Relative Autonomy’ Reexamined ? Presented at the 1981 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Sociological Society in Minneapolis, Minnesota, April 8–11, 1981.

Friendly Fascism: The New Face of Power in America by Bertram Gross, New York: M. Evans and Co., Inc., 1980, $15.95. ISBN 0–87131–317–0.

Wealth and Power in America by Gabriel Kolko, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962, 178 pp.; American Class Society in Numbers edited by Bob Howard and John Logue, Kent, OH: Kent Popular Press, 1978, 98 pp.; Class in the United States: Workers Against Capitalists by Charles Loren, Davis, CA: Cardinal Publishers, 296 pp., 1977.

Feminism and Materialism. Women and Modes of Production, edited by Annette Kohn and AnnMarie Wolpe (London, Boston and Henley: Rout‐ledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), viii, 328 pp., paperback $9.00.

An Interview with Jacques Attali ? Jacques Attali was chief economic adviser to Mitterand before the Socialist Party victory in France.      

Institutional Choice and Policy Transfer: Reforming British and German Railway Regulation

The notions of "policy learning" and "policy transfer" have become increasingly influential in the public-policy literature. By utilizing a comparative analysis of regulatory change in the railways in Britain and Germany, it is argued that an institutional approach adds to the understanding of "learning" and "transfer" processes, as well as explaining which institutions mattered as Britain and Germany adopted distinctively different regulatory regimes. The institutional approach points to the constraints involved in the selection of regulatory design ideas and, by assessing three institutional factors that structure relationships between the policy domain and its environments, suggests that in the case of railway privatization in Britain and Germany in the 1990s, it was the structure of the political-administrative nexus that centrally shaped why particular policy options were selected while others were neglected.