It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger's Laws Upside Down)

This article presents, discusses and tests the hypothesis that it is the number of parties that can explain the choice of electoral systems, rather than the other way around. Already-existing political parties tend to choose electoral systems that, rather than generate new party systems by themselves, will crystallize, consolidate or reinforce previously existing party configurations. A general model develops the argument and presents the concept of 'behavioral-institutional equilibrium' to account for the relation between electoral systems and party systems. The most comprehensive dataset and test of these notions to date, encompassing 219 elections in 87 countries since the 19th century, are presented. The analysis gives strong support to the hypotheses that political party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule electoral systems, while multi-party systems already existed before the introduction of proportional representation. It also offers the new theoretical proposition that strategic party choice of electoral systems leads to a general trend toward proportional representation over time.     

Duverger's concept: Semi-presidential government revisited

Abstract The article attempts to follow up the fate of the concept Maurice Duverger created to explain the regime of the French Fifth Republic: semi–presidential government. Duverger expounded the concept in his fundamental book Échec au roi in 1978, trying to illustrate the fact that regimes of this type worked quite differently in the seven Western and Northern European countries that institutionalized it. 'Semi–presidentialism' is now widely, but very often controversially, used. The recent appearance of such regimes in newly democratizing states points to the fact that this form of government is often the preferred solution in times of transition. A critical review of Duverger's concept seems expedient as the diversification of these regimes raises new and perhaps intriguing questions. Due to the rejection of Duverger's concept or its ignorance in parts of the European scientific community, it is necessary to defend it as an important tool for political analysis. Moreover, it opens the opportunity for the examination of fundamental problems in political science.     

Duverger's concept: Semi–presidential government revisited

The article attempts to follow up the fate of the concept Maurice Duverger created to explain the regime of the French Fifth Republic: semi–presidential government. Duverger expounded the concept in his fundamental book Échec au roi in 1978, trying to illustrate the fact that regimes of this type worked quite differently in the seven Western and Northern European countries that institutionalized it. 'Semi–presidentialism' is now widely, but very often controversially, used. The recent appearance of such regimes in newly democratizing states points to the fact that this form of government is often the preferred solution in times of transition. A critical review of Duverger's concept seems expedient as the diversification of these regimes raises new and perhaps intriguing questions. Due to the rejection of Duverger's concept or its ignorance in parts of the European scientific community, it is necessary to defend it as an important tool for political analysis. Moreover, it opens the opportunity for the examination of fundamental problems in political science.     

Multi-party competition with exit: A comment on Duverger's Law

Contrary to Duverger's Law, there exist multi-party systems in conjunction with simple majority single-ballot systems. At least three exceptions exist to this law. Rae (1971) and Riker (1976; 1982) offer explanations for two of the most prominent exceptions, i.e. Canada and India. I also discuss another exception, Great Britain. In this paper, I use a simple one-dimensional spatial model to show that a multi-party system can be supported under a simple majority single-ballot system. This explanation depends on the way political parties exit the system. If parties decide sequentially whether or not to exit, a multi-party system can not be maintained. If political parties make this decision simultaneously, a multi-party system may be able to sustain itself.I am grateful to Evelyn Fink, Ken Shepsle, and Gordon Tullock for their very helpful comments. I would especially like to thank John Kautsky who introduced me to Duverger's Law.     

The political context and Duverger's theory: Evidence at the district level

A central tenet of electoral systems' research is that more parties should get votes in districts with large magnitudes than in districts with smaller magnitudes. This proposition is largely untested at the district level, even though that is the level at which relevant pressures are expected to work. At the aggregate level, research has found that there are systematic deviations from Duverger's law related to incentives from ethnolinguistic fragmentation, institutions, and strategic voting. This analysis confirms that many of these results hold at the district level, which is the most appropriate level for testing Duverger's law. District level party-system fragmentation patterns in 44 countries support Duverger's basic hypotheses. The effect of electoral institutions is contingent, however, upon the presence of social cleavages that generate pressures for additional parties, the establishment of patterns of party-system competition that help voters evaluate contenders' viability, and the absence of competing incentives generated by districts of varying magnitudes. These effects are robust to different specifications of social heterogeneity. However, we find no evidence that institutional features like federalism or presidentialism reduce the strategic effects of district level factors.     

Duverger's Hypothesis, the Run-Off Rule, and Electoral Competition

I analyze a model of electoral competition with entry underthe run-off rule. I consider both two- and multiple-party systems.The principal result is that two-party systems may prove stableunder the run-off rule: I show that a continuum of equilibriaexists in which only two parties enter and subsequent entryis deterred. This finding conflicts with the accepted wisdomon the run-off rule encapsulated by Duverger's Hypothesis. Theresults of the model are then reconciled with Duverger's Hypothesisand a more precise formulation is proposed.     

Between Europe and unity: The case of the Swedish social democrats

Sweden voted in November 1994 to approve EU membership. Although the Social Democratic Party's leadership advocated approval, the membership was badly divided. Against the backdrop of two Nordic sister parties’ similar difficulties, this article examines the leadership's management of the internal conflict. It analyses the evolution and main elements of its management strategy, the most important being an attempt to accommodate rather than confront the party's Eurosceptics. As the leadership's two goals for 1994, an election victory and a ‘Yes’ in the referendum, were both achieved, the strategy must be considered a qualified, short‐term success.     

Duverger's Law in mixed legislative systems: The impact of national electoral rules on district competition

How do institutional factors shape district competition in mixed legislative systems? Preliminary evidence suggests the distinction between sub‐types of mixed systems alone poorly explains variation in district results. Consistent with the contamination thesis, this analysis suggests three additional national‐level factors at play: fused ballots, the electoral threshold for proportional representation seats, and the existence of compulsory voting laws. Regression analysis on an original dataset covering 90 mixed system elections in 23 countries (1990–2012) finds that while mixed member majoritarian systems correlate with fewer district candidates, these three often overlooked factors are also statistically significant. This analysis highlights the complexity of mixed systems and suggests why many of them diverge from Duverger's Law.     

Duverger's Law, Penrose's Power Index and the Unity of the UK

As predicted by Duverger's Law, the UK has had two-party competition for long periods in most electoral districts. However, there are different patterns of two-party competition in different districts and more than two effective parties in the Commons. Since 1874, parliament has always contained parties wishing to modify the Union and contesting seats only outside England. By calculating the Penrose power index for all parties in the House of Commons for all general elections since 1874, we identify when such parties were pivotal. We explain various legislative changes (for example the Crofters Act 1886, the first three Irish Home Rule Bills, the Parliament Act 1911) and non-changes (for example the failure to enact female suffrage before 1914) by reference to the Penrose index scores. The scores also explain how and why policy towards Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland changed and did not change in the 1970s.     

Between knowledge and power: Utilization of social science in public policy making

Most conceptualizations of the linkage between science and politics have traditionally been informed by rationalist concepts of science and decision-making. The result has been a false dichotomy between (legitimate) rational research utilization and (illegitimate) political research utilization. This dichotomy must be overcome, on normative as well as empirical grounds. Scientifically generated knowledge constitutes an important, but on the whole unquantifiable part of the enormous store of knowledge which participants in the politico-administrative decision-making process apply to their practical tasks. To understand the complex interfaces between social science research and the political-administrative decision-making process, it is necessary to be aware that research is transferred to, and becomes part of, a discourse of action, in the philosophical as well as the everyday practical sense — a discourse in which (self)reflecting participants deliberate on and debate norms and alternatives with a view to concrete action. This makes the contribution of science to policy making both less tangible and potentially more influential than is usually assumed.     

Social determinism,rationality, and partisanship among college students

This study finds high rates of defection from parental partisanship among a sample of undergraduate students at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, despite relying on students' perceptions of their parents' party loyalties, which almost certainly exaggerate agreement between students and parents. There was a much higher rate of defection among students from Republican families than among students from Democratic families. The pattern of defections from parental partisanship was consistent with the rational reevaluation hypothesis: liberal-conservative self-placement was strongly related to party identification among students from Republican families and families without a party preference.     

Bureaucratic control and information processing: An institutional comparison

Standard models of bureaucratic control argue that politicians vulnerable to asymmetric information rely on third‐party monitoring to expand information supply. This solution to information asymmetry assumes that politicians can process all information that comes their way. However, advocates strategically oversupply information to crowd out rivals, making such a solution counterproductive. Using data on administrative reorganization in Hong Kong, we examine the alternative proposition that bureaucratic control is contingent not only on how information is obtained but also on how it is processed under two different institutional arrangements: one that splits attention across domain‐specific streams and one that concentrates attention in a single sequence. In both cases, bureaucrats refrain from major changes when politicians break from these arrangements. Moreover, bureaucratic action is significantly more likely to respond to changes in attention allocation when politicians process information in multiple streams.     

The Italian budgetary process: Political and institutional constraints

The Italian budgetary process requires constant interaction between executive and legislature. As a result budgetary policy is a reflection of Italian legislative activity in general. Time‐consuming negotiations and compromises are required between a wide range of political interests. Coherent and consistent economic policy‐making is, in these circumstances, difficult to achieve.     

Informal institutions rule: institutional arrangements and economic performance

Institutions are widely believed to be important for economic development. This paper attempts to contribute to our understanding of how institutions matter by examining the effect of formal and informal institutional arrangements on economic progress. Formal institutions represent government defined and enforced constraints while informal institutions capture private constraints. The findings suggest that the presence of informal institutions is a strong determinant of development. In contrast, formal institutions are only successful when embedded in informal constraints, and codifying informal rules can lead to negative unintended consequences. This suggests that institutions cannot be easily transplanted in order to spur economic development.     

Social divisions and institutions: assessing institutional parameter variation

This paper investigates the hypothesis that the association between property rights institutions and income is weaker in countries with high social divisions. It argues that social divisions should have a negative effect on perceived institutional inclusiveness, which in turn should depress institutional payoffs. Absent a property rights indicator that captures the perceived inclusiveness of institutions, social divisions should then weaken the observed association between property rights institutions and income. The empirical results support this hypothesis, and highlight the importance of evaluating whether the institutions measure used captures the institutional framework applying to the population at large.