Do electoral institutions have an impact on population health?

There is an emerging political economics literature which purports to show that legislatures elected based on proportional electoral rules spend more and redistribute more than legislatures elected based on majoritarian electoral rules. Going a step further the authors of this paper consider whether degree of electoral proportionality has an impact on population health and, in particular, the health of the least advantaged members of society. A panel of 24 parliamentary democracies for the years 1960?C2004 is used to examine the relationship between electoral institutions and health. The authors find that greater electoral proportionality is positively associated with overall population health (as indicated by life expectancy) and with the health of the poorest (as indicated by a reduction in infant mortality). A panel of 17 countries for the years 1970?C2004 is then used to show to that electoral permissiveness modifies the impact of health spending on infant mortality.     

Characterising Electoral Systems: An Empirical Application of Aggregated Threshold Functions

This article proposes a new way to measure proportionality using aggregated threshold functions. Electoral systems can be summarised by a single value that shows the necessary share of the total vote to win either one seat or half of the seats in parliament. The article calculates aggregate threshold values for 142 different electoral systems that were used in 525 democratic elections between 1946 and 2000. These results are also contrasted with the most commonly used indices of proportionality and turn out to be both substantively and empirically richer. Aggregated threshold functions provide both students and reformers of electoral systems with a measure based purely on institutional variables that offers an exhaustive summary of the functioning of many electoral systems.     

Proportional Representation in Scandinavia: Implications for Finland

The comparative study of electoral system requires uniform methods easily applicable to every country's electoral data. In this paper we have presented two such possibilities: a new graphical method that portrays the proportionality profile of a country's electoral rule, and measures to calculate the systematic and random deviation from proportionality. The empirical data consist of election results from Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Around 1950, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden changed from the d'Hondt method of allocation to the modified Sainte Lague rule. The consequences of this shift represent the primary focus of this article. What can the present Finnish constitutional reformers learn from the Scandinavian experience? According to the empirical results, three distinct patterns of proportionality profiles can be distinguished: 1) systems involving nationwide adjustment seats, 2) modified St. Lague (without adjustment seats) and 3) d'Hondt (without adjustment seats). The d'Hondt system gives a high advantage ratio to large parties, the modified Sainte Lague method favors middle-size parties, and the adjustment seats system overrides the basic characteristics of both the d'Hondt and modified Sainte Lague methods. The proportionality indices show the modified Sainte Lague to be more proportional than the d'Hondt method. The proportionality of elections is nearly perfect with adjustment seats system irrespective of the method of allocation applied.     

Which Electoral Formula Is the Most Proportional? A New Look with New Evidence

A ranking exists in electoral systems research of differentelectoral formulas—the mathematical functions governingthe conversion of votes into legislative seats—in termsof both proportionality of seats and votes and favorabilityto the largest party. I reexamine this issue with new methodsand new evidence, attempting to cross-validate previous rankingsusing a larger and more controlled data set and more preciseparametric methods than have been applied previously. The resultsby and large confirm previous knowledge but also illuminateseveral important new facets obscured in previous investigations.For example, at common ranges of district magnitude (from 5to 15 seats), it is shown that electoral formula may matterat least as much as district magnitude in shaping proportionality.     

Measuring the effects of electoral systems on regionalism

Richard Rose has argued that the difference between electoral systems should be seen more as a matter of degree than of principle. This article contends that the apparent similarity in outcome of varying systems flows from the index of proportionality which Richard Rose employs. Particularly in polities with intense regional divisions the form of electoral system has a vast influence on the result.     

Support for electoral system reform among voters and politicians: Studying information effects through survey experiments

Does information about the consequences of proposals to change the Norwegian parliamentary electoral system influence voters' and politicians' attitudes towards the system? Is the willingness to accept change greater among voters/politicians who “lose” under the present electoral system? These questions are illuminated using empirical data from two identical survey experiments, with responses from both voters and politicians about 1) increased proportionality between parties (more seats for smaller parties) and 2) increased geographical proportionality (stronger representation for the more populous counties). The results show that being informed about the consequences of the proposals has a major effect on voters' and politicians' attitudes. This applies especially to the question of increased proportionality between parties, where feedback was particularly negative from respondents who were told that the proposal might weaken the larger parties’ representation and make it more difficult to establish viable governments. The responses to the question about increased proportionality between parties were also influenced by partisanship; politicians who belonged to or voters who voted for one of the smaller parties favour increased proportionality. We also find that there is limited support for the proposal to distribute parliamentary seats according to the number of inhabitants in the counties, and this support is further reduced when the respondents are informed that the measure will increase representation from the more populous parts of the country.     

Catalysts and barriers: Explaining electoral reform in Western Europe

Most accounts of electoral system change tend to consider it as being driven by purely partisan interests. Political parties are expected to change the electoral rules as a way to maximise gains or minimise losses. However, little work has been done on the question of why electoral reforms are so scarce in spite of these potential benefits. In this study, a wide range of both factors that may foster (‘catalysts’) and ones that may hinder (‘barriers’) the change of electoral institutions are investigated. A statistical analysis is performed of 16 West European countries from 1975 to 2005, covering 23 reforms of the proportionality of their electoral systems. It is found that procedural barriers are more effective for explaining the likelihood of electoral reforms than (most of) the catalysts. Additionally, there are indications that courts may play a more active role in triggering reform than previously thought.     

Does district magnitude matter? The case of Taiwan

A sizable literature on electoral institutions argues that proportional electoral rules lead to higher voter turnout. However, recent work finds little evidence that the effect generalizes beyond western Europe and suggests that the theoretical arguments in the literature remain sparse, incomplete, and contradictory. I use a well-chosen data set to resolve the problem of omitted variable bias and Bayesian model averaging to address model uncertainty. I use Bayes factors to evaluate evidence both for and against the null hypotheses and find that the proportionality of electoral rules exerts no meaningful effect on turnout or any of the theoretical mechanisms I test.     

Normative Modelle, institutionelle Typen und beobachtbare Verhaltensmuster: Ein Vorschlag zum Vergleich parlamentarischer Demokratien

The article proposes a two-dimensional, institutional determination of types of parliamentary democracy, with respect to the proportionality of the electoral system and (quasi-)legislative veto points. Three basic types of parliamentary democracy are distinguished: pluralitarian, majoritarian and supermajoritarian. The typology has important advantages over the approach of Arend Lijphart. It has a consistent two-dimensional conceptual foundation, it can be directly related to central controversies in normative democratic theory, it can be systematically linked to action theory approaches such as Veto Player Theory, and it highlights the characteristics of democracies with majoritarian constitutions, which are systematically downplayed in Lijphart’s approach. The most important variant of this type uses a proportionality principle in the electoral system and a majoritarian principle in the legislative system. It is shown that in these democracies, legislative majority rule can itself contribute to “consensual” patterns of behavior.     

The role of electoral geography in the territorialization of party systems

When does a country's social structure foster the development of territorialized party systems? This article argues that electoral geography – defined as the interaction between the geography of social diversity and electoral rules– is key to answering this question. I make two claims: first, the impact of geographically concentrated diversity on party system territorialization depends on the proportionality of electoral rules. Second, the types of geographic cleavages (ethnic versus economic) and whether they are overlapping or cross-cutting also affects the likelihood of party system territorialization (conditional on the electoral system). I test these claims with an original dataset measuring party system territorialization in 382 elections across 60 countries that also includes comparable cross-national measures of different types of geographically concentrated diversity (language, race, religion and income). The main conclusion is that proportional electoral systems and cross-cutting cleavages can act as a powerful constraint on the translation of territorial ethnic cleavages into territorialized party systems.     

Electoral rules,corruption, inequality and evaluations of democracy

Features of electoral systems have been found to have positive effects on evaluations of democracy. This article proposes that there are larger social forces that must be accounted for in such analyses. Using European Social Survey measures of democratic expectations and the ‘satisfaction with democracy’ item, this study tests for effects of electoral rules on perceptions of democracy. It is found that multipartyism/proportionality and preferential ballot structure appear to correspond with positive evaluations of elections and parties, and with greater satisfaction with how democracy is functioning. However, these relationships dissipate when corruption and income inequality are accounted for. This suggests substantial limits to the capacity of electoral reforms to enhance democratic legitimacy. It also suggests that studies of mass perceptions of democratic performance may over‐estimate effects of electoral rules if country‐level corruption and income inequality are not accounted for.     

The political consequences of the electoral system in the Republic of Ireland

The single transferable vote electoral system, popular with many electoral reformers, has been used for parliamentary elections in the Republic of Ireland since 1922. Examination of its impact shows that it has delivered as high a degree of proportionality as most PR systems despite the unavoidable use of relatively small district magnitudes. It has not produced either a fragmented party system or unstable governments. Critics have blamed it for contributing to a weak parliament, but these criticisms remain unproven. Suggestions are made for the wider use of STV, especially in countries currently employing preferential list systems.     

Mixed-member proportional electoral systems – the best of both worlds?

Mixed electoral systems are often associated with the hope of combining proportional election outcomes with a concentrated party system, and thus achieving the best of both worlds in electoral system design. It is especially the mixed-member proportional (MMP) variant that has retained a good reputation in this regard. Via a comparative analysis, we analyze whether or not the general praise for MMP systems is corroborated empirically. Our results show that the performance of MMP systems is heavily influenced by technical details, and elections conducted under MMP vary broadly with regard to possible proportionality–concentration combinations.     

Electoral institutions, partisan status, and political support in Lesotho

Does the introduction of proportionality in electoral systems help to boost popular evaluations of democracy? This article takes advantage of an electoral reform in Lesotho to conduct a natural experiment. We trace shifts over time in popular political support, using Afrobarometer data collected before and after reform to measure mass satisfaction with democracy and public trust in political institutions. We find both direct and indirect effects. In the aggregate, Lesotho's transition from a majoritarian to a mixed electoral system is directly associated with increased levels of citizen support for the country's state and regime. Importantly, however, formal institutions have only indirect effects at the individual level, where a person's informal partisan status – as a member of a winning majority or losing minority – mediates the impacts of institutional change.     

The Japanese House of Councillors election 1998 in comparative perspective

The Japanese House of Councillors is elected by a two-vote electoral system that is a unique combination of non-unique components. As such, it provides a useful case to examine theories about the impact of electoral systems on the number of parties that will compete nationally and within each constituency, and on the level of proportionality. The election is considered within a comparative context provided by two-vote elections in Germany, New Zealand, Scotland and Wales. It emerges that the level of vote-splitting in Germany, though extensively studied, is relatively low in comparative terms. The extent and impact of malapportionment are also examined.     

Income-based voting and polarization over redistribution under alternative electoral systems

Democracies that have proportional electoral systems spend substantively more on welfare policies than those that have majoritarian systems. Theoretical accounts of this empirical regularity are generally tested using macro-level data, leaving micro-level implications untested. In this paper, I take an alternative approach, leveraging the fact that the theories in question make predictions about the electoral coordination between parties and voters around broad-based redistribution under alternative institutional arrangements. To test the theories, I create a novel measure of income-based voting, which captures the sensitivity of vote choice to changes in income and forms the dependent variable in a second stage model. Overall, I find robust support for more proportionality leading to more income-based voting.     

The field of electoral systems research: A critical survey

The purpose of this article is to survey and evaluate the development and the current state of the field of electoral systems research. It will treat both the field's strengths and its weaknesses, but my main emphasis will be on the weaknesses and, on the whole, I shall be quite critical. My critique will move from the general to the specific: I shall begin with some very general observations concerning the state of the field, and end with a discussion of one specific, but by no means minor, problem: the crucial question of how we should measure the degree of proportionality or disproportionality of different electoral systems.     

Electoral Competitiveness and Issue Voting

This article suggests that voters rely more strongly on “substantial” criteria, such as issues and ideology, when elections are competitive. In such contexts, voters should attach more importance to their own choice and rely less on “heuristics.” Three aspects of election competitiveness are considered: the fragmentation and polarization of the party system and the proportionality of the electoral system. Elections are more competitive when there are many parties in competition, when they differ strongly from one another in ideological terms, and when the threshold of representation is lower. These hypotheses are tested with data from the 2007 Swiss federal elections. The electoral districts differ markedly from one another as far as electoral competitiveness is concerned while being similar in many other respects. The results show that competitiveness strengthens issue voting and reduces the impact of party identification.     

Do people want a ‘fairer’ electoral system? An experimental study in four countries

When judging how ‘fair’ voting rules are, a fundamental criterion used by both scholars and politicians is their ability or inability to produce proportional results – that is, the extent parties’ seat distribution after the elections accurately reflects their vote shares. How about citizens? Do citizens care about how proportional the outcome is? Or do they judge the outcome solely on the basis of how well (or poorly) their party performed? Taking advantage of a uniquely designed survey experiment, this article investigates the causal effect of proportionality on voter support for voting rules in four countries: Austria, England, Ireland and Sweden. The results show that proportionality drives support for the voting rules not above, but beyond party performance. There is little cross-country variation, which suggests that proportionality is appreciated in different contexts with little status quo bias. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the causal mechanisms linking electoral rules to voter support.     

On proportional non-representation

This paper contends the main virtue conventionally attributed to proportional electoral rules (i.e., effective representation of political views). It discusses a number of shortcomings that lead too much proportionality to a self-defeat: it reduces vote mobility through the strong cultivation of voters' loyalties; it smooths out vote variations when transforming them into seat variations; it reinforces intraparty ties to the detriment of vertical attention to constituents and it impinges on the working of checks-and-balances. The paper does not aim at a systematic evaluation of the properties of various voting systems, nor is it the proportional principle as such that is under attack. However, its combination with other institutional features can entrap voters in their own choices, thus nurturing political collusion. It is because of the ensuing lower influence of the voters on political decision-making that too much proportionality can lead to poor representation.