Contradictions in the TrumpAdministration’s Russia Policy

Since President Donald Trump took office,the United States’policy toward Russia has experienced upswings and downturns,oscillating between opposite sides and demonstrating starker contradictions.An in-depth study of the Trump administration’s Russia policy will assist in deepening our knowledge and understanding of the nature of USRussia relations,so that we can better grasp the development trend of the relationship and provide a useful reference for China to more proactively handle its own relations with other major powers.     

The Baltic predicament in the shadow of Russia’s war in Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has once again reinvigorated the debate about the likelihood of conflict spreading into NATO’s frontline states, namely the Baltic republics. This article argues that somewhat paradoxically, the Baltics currently find themselves in both the best of times and the worst of times. On the one hand, with each “turn of the screw”—Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014 and 2022—Moscow has ensured a greater allied presence across the Baltics. Still, despite this and Russia’s substantial losses incurred in the war, the Baltic lawmakers will not write off Russia as a military threat any time soon.     

Ukraine’s President Zelensky Takes the Russia/Ukraine War Viral

As Russia amassed thousands of troops and tanks on Ukraine’s border at the end of 2021 and the threat of nuclear war loomed large, Ukraine’s leadership ramped up a distinctly non-physical counter-offensive. President Volodymyr Zelensky and his tech savvy team focused on building a communications machine harnessing social media messaging, marketing savvy and celebrity to fight Russia digitally as well as directly on the battlefield. Never has a sitting president relied so heavily on various social apps to communicate both at home and abroad, and to build Ukraine’s brand. Whether or not this strategy is sustainable amidst a protracted war and short internet attention spans is yet to be seen, but Zelensky has made a case for marketing war that other leaders are sure to follow.     

Evidence of securitisation in the economic sector of security in Europe? Russia’s economic blackmail of Ukraine and the EU’s conditional bailout of Cyprus

Although the Copenhagen school’s securitisation theory and their sectoral analysis are integral parts of European security studies, the school’s economic sector of security has almost been completely ignored. In this article I examine why this is, and whether it makes sense to retain this sector. In the process I flesh out the logic of securitisation in the economic sector. I suggest that one reason why the economic sector of security has been neglected is that real life examples fitting the Copenhagen school’s logic of security as the exception have – in this sector – remained outstanding. Research in other sectors of security has shown however that securitisation does not need to include extraordinary countermeasures; instead it can play out below the level of the exception. Using alternative formulations developed in securitisation studies that relax the threshold for the success of securitisation, I attempt to locate evidence of economic securitisation by looking at two empirical cases. 1) Russia’s economic blackmail of Ukraine at the start of that country’s ongoing crisis. 2) The EU’s conditional bailout of Cyprus during the Eurozone crisis which necessitated capital controls. On the basis of the empirical evidence gathered I conclude by arguing the case for the economic sector of security.     

Ukraine,Russia and the strategic partnership dynamics in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood: recalibrating the EU’s ‘self’, ‘we’ and ‘other’

The present contribution explores the changing relationship between the European Union (EU) and the two largest countries in its eastern neighbourhood, namely Ukraine and Russia, between 1991 and 2014. Taking the differential between the existence of the EU Strategic Partnership (SP) with Russia and the absence of such an arrangement in the relationship with Ukraine as a point of departure, it investigates how the EU has dealt with different aspirations and challenges stemming from its two largest eastern neighbours. Adopting the Social Identity Theory perspective, the contribution analyses the interrelationship between the evolution of the EU’s SP approach towards the eastern neighbours and the development of (particular dimensions of) the EU’s identity. It demonstrates how the process of categorization relating to the ideational ‘self’, ‘we’ and ‘other’ took place; and how only the EU’s relationship with Russia and not that with Ukraine has accumulated the discursive markers of a strategic partnership. The contribution, furthermore, analyses the challenges to the EU changing approach stemming from the 2013–2014 Ukraine crisis.     

Deterrence and Protection in the EU’s Migration Policy

EU migration and asylum policy is facing tough challenges at the southern borders of the Union as migration and asylum pressures rise, fuelled by political instability and poverty in several regions of Asia and Africa. Current European border control practices create three spaces of control: externalised borders, through readmission and return agreements which enrol third countries in border control; the EU borders themselves through the work of Frontex and the development of a whole arsenal of technology tools for controlling mobility to and from the EU; and the Schengen area, whose regulations tend to reinforce deterrence at the borders through the Smart Border System. As a result, the EU’s balancing act between irregular migration control and protection of refugees and human life clearly tips towards the former, even if it pays lip service to the latter. More options for mobility across the Mediterranean and more cooperation for growth are essential ingredients of a sustainable migration management policy on the EU’s southern borders. In addition asylum management could benefit from EU level humanitarian visas issued at countries of origin.     

Russia as a Gravity Pole of the GCC’s New Foreign Policy Pragmatism

Abstract

Despite the obvious differences over the Syrian crisis and Iran, the GCC countries do not seem to be distancing themselves from Russia politically. To a large extent that is due to Russia’s growing military role (in Syria) and military cooperation (with Iran), as well as the diminishing role of the United States under Obama. Having accepted the situation in Syria (after the fall of Aleppo) as a fait accompli, the GCC’s elites seem to be looking at Russia as a powerful player able to reduce the scope of Iran’s expansion in the region. Their approach involves a carefully established mechanism of economic interaction exploiting Russia’s need for GCC finances and arms acquisitions.     

The EU,Russia and the potential for dialogue – different readings of the crisis in Ukraine

Recent developments in European security have shown the growing need for a better understanding of the security dynamics on the European continent. This article presents an analysis of differing Russian and European perceptions of European security in general, and concerning the crisis in Ukraine in particular. As much of the literature on these issues has been normatively driven, we aim to provide an impartial presentation and analysis of the dominant Russian and EU discourses. This we see as essential for investigating the potential for constructive dialogue between Russia and the EU. If simplistic assumptions about the motivations and intentions of other actors take hold in the public debate and policy analyses, the main actors may be drawn into a logic that is ultimately dangerous or counterproductive. With this article we offer a modest contribution towards discouraging such a development in Russia–EU relations. After presenting an analysis of the differing EU and Russian perceptions, we discuss the potential for dialogue between such different worldviews, and reflect on potential implications for European security. As the article shows, there are tendencies of a certain adjustment in the Union’s approach that may make a partial rapprochement between the two sides more likely.     

Future of Germany＇s Policy of Active Diplomacy

When the German Grand Coalition formed by the two major parties of the Bundestag came to power in December 2013, the new government discontinued its constrained foreign policy profile and, by sending out signals of adjustment, expressed its ＂big power ambition.＂ The reality of German proactivity became obvious to the international community during the Ukraine crisis and the U.S. hacking incident. Although factors from German history will slow the full implementation of this policy in the near future, the country cannot but succeed in developing its position among big powers.     

China’s Russia/Ukraine Problem,and Why It’s Bad for Almost Everyone Else Too

The war in Ukraine, the international responses targeting Russia, and China’s reaction to the conflict point to complex and possibly growing China-related challenges for international order and security, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. On issues of great power diplomacy, state sovereignty, economic sanctions, and the use of military force, the lessons Beijing’s behavior appears to teach and the lessons Beijing may be learning in the context of the Ukraine crisis are complex but mostly bode ill. These Ukraine-related developments are greater causes for concern because they are consistent with, and likely to reinforce, prior trends and patterns in China’s perceptions and behavior.     

The EU–Russia Energy Approach under the Prism of Interdependence

Abstract

This essay aims to analyse and interpret the EU–Russia approach in the energy sector under the prism of interdependence. It seeks to account for both the increasing cooperation among EU member-states and Russia as far as security of supplies is concerned, but also provides a sound explanation for the steady clashes between the two sides. For this reason, we use the terms sensitivity and vulnerability to refer to the position that each side holds on bilateral energy matters and, accordingly, to the actions it is capable of taking to resolve its problems. This model of interdependence provides a profound understanding of the bifurcated relationship between the EU and Russia and interprets both its cooperative and conflictive elements.     

Foreign Policy and the Ideology of Post-ideology: The Case of Matteo Renzi’s Partito Democratico

The post-communist Italian Left has experienced a long phase of ideational misalignment between ideas placed at different levels, as a qualified discursive institutionalist approach demonstrates. Background public philosophies have often clashed with post-communist political ideology, while foreign policy programmes have often contradicted specific policies. Under the leadership of Matteo Renzi, however, the PD is now experiencing a moment of remarkable ideational consistency. Rather than being founded on entirely new premises, this new consensus folds old elements into new ones and shows all the defining traits of post-ideology. Yet, by espousing post-ideology, Renzi is making an ultimately ideological move whose limitations may soon start to show.     

A Review of the Obama Administration’s Taiwan Policy

Since May 2008, relations across the Taiwan Strait have experienced a ＇historical turning point. The two sides of the strait have tided over a ＂high-risk＂ period and embarked upon a path of peaceful development and benign interaction. When the Obama administration came to power in January 2009, the new situation in cross-straits relations had already taken hold. By then,     

Impression of the NGOs in Norway and Germany

Attheinvitationofthe″MoralRe-armament″Nor-wegianFoundationandtheFriedrich-EbertFoun-dationofGermanythedelegationoftheChineseAssociationforInternationalUnderstandingCAFI-UheadedbyVice-PresidentMr.ZhuDachengpaidavisittoNorwayandGermanyfromMay17to27.DuringthevisitwedidsomeresearchonthestateofNGOsinthetwocountries.Throughthevisitwehavefoundthattheso-called″matureNGOsphenomenonoftheWest″alsocalledphenomenonofthecivilsocietyisinfactanimportantoutcomeoftheevolutionofthecapi-talistpoli…     

Germany’s Ocean Greyhounds and the Royal Navy’s First Battle Cruisers: An Historiographical Problem

Recently some revisionist historians have contested the evidential basis for the argument put forward by their post-revisionist colleagues that the growth of the German mercantile marine, most particularly ships capable of being transformed into armed commerce raiders, was viewed with alarm in the British Admiralty and played a significant part in shaping British naval policy before 1914. Looking in detail at their reasoning, this assessment demonstrates that the rejection of this argument is based upon a faulty and incomplete understanding of the documentary record. Moreover, it is driven by a desire to defend the thesis that they have previously articulated that the expansion of German maritime power played a limited role in British defence policy before 1914. However, their objections do not withstand detailed scrutiny. Whatever might have been the British view of the long-term threat posed by Russia and France, Germany’s growing strength, including in merchant shipping, loomed large as a security problem in the decade and a half before 1914. The wartime activities of German commerce raiders, notably the Kronprinz Wilhelm, suggest that fears of a German commerce war were entirely rational.     

Status and Foreign Policy Change in Small States: Qatar’s Emergence in Perspective

ABSTRACT

Small states are just as easily seduced by status and glory as other states. When conceived as situated in a stratified international society, small states acquire an inherent tendency to overcome their disadvantage in conventional power terms through the pursuit of status. Hence, it is precisely because of their position in the international hierarchy, not in spite of it, that strategic ideas based on state size stimulate foreign policy change in small states. This mechanism provides an explanation to the question why the small state of Qatar has pursued such a high-profile diplomatic strategy since its emergence in the late 1990s.