主观超过因素新论

主客观相统一的定罪原则并不否定主观超过因素的存在。无论大陆法系刑法抑或英美法系刑法基本都认可主观超过因素的定罪意义。所谓主观超过因素是指在构成犯罪的各要素中,超出故意内涵之外的主观要素,其中主要包括目的犯中的犯罪目的及倾向犯中的内心倾向。对于表现犯中的内心表现完全应该作为犯罪故意的内容,不宜按主观超过因素来对待。在司法实践中,由于主观超过因素存在与否的判断极为艰难,因此必须坚持弱化口供,强化推定及强化证伪的认定原则。     

On Self-Awareness in the Sautrāntika Epistemology

This paper aims to examine the role of self-awareness (svasa?vedana) for the Sautrāntika epistemological tenet known as the doctrine that cognition has a form (sākārajñānavāda). According to this theory, we perceive external objects indirectly through the mental forms that these objects throw into our minds, and this cognitive act is interpreted as self-awareness. However, if one were to interpret the cognitive act such that the subjective mental form (grāhakākāra/svābhāsa) grasps the objective mental form, the position of the subjective mental form becomes problematic—it becomes superfluous, as can be demonstrated with reference to Dignāga’s explanation of the Sautrāntika’s pramā?a-pramā?aphala argument. As a result, self-awareness itself becomes precarious. In connection with this problem, an argument on the relationship between self-awareness and the yogic perception of other minds given by Dharmakīrti leads us to discover that self-awareness is important for establishing subjectivity, in order to avoid another person’s access to one’s own mental states. Through examining Pramā?avārttika 3.448–459, this paper tries to find a way to interpret the svābhāsa-factor without relating to its object-factor (grāhyākāra), and to shed new light on the problem of subjectivity in the Sautrāntika epistemology.     

主客观相统一原则：价值论与方法论的双重清理

主客观相统一原则是苏俄犯罪构成理论的特色之一,亦为我国刑法学所承继。该原则具有价值论与方法论的双重属性。从价值论上说,主客观相统一原则是在所谓犯罪构成的客观结构与主观结构的基础上形成的,主张犯罪的客观要素与主观要素的统一。从方法论上说,主客观相统一原则超越了刑法客观主义与主观主义,具有两者折中的意蕴。但目前大陆法系犯罪论体系的发展早已超越了存在论,进入到规范论与价值论的知识领域,主客观相统一原则仍然局囿于存在论的知识范围内,并且其本身具有抽象性与含糊性,应以法益原则和责任原则予以取代。     

涉及民间借贷违法犯罪的法律适用问题研究

在办理非法集资犯罪案件的过程中,我们应从犯罪行为人的主观心态、集资行为方式、集资对象等方便进行考察,以界定行为所针对的对象是否为社会不特定对象。在对非法集资犯罪行为人非法占有目的进行认定时,要走出以犯罪结果为依据的客观归罪误区,坚持主客观相统一的原则。应当界定非法集资犯罪行为赃款的范围并明确追缴主体及其职责。非法集资共同犯罪的正犯包括集资人本人以及与集资人共谋并通过各种形式分得赃款的行为人。放任犯罪结果发生的下线人员属于集资诈骗罪的帮助犯,对不知资金获取人存在诈骗故意而将非法吸收的公众存款转贷给诈骗行为人的下线行为人,应以非法吸收公众存款罪论处。     

Crime Prototypes,Objective Versus Subjective Culpability,and a Commonsense Balance

Crime prototypes, which have been linked to jurors' story constructions and verdicts, were elaborated through narratives, yielding 600 detailed stories, across seven different cases, in two experiments. These stories were manipulated under conditions that explored the prototypicality of the case, she verdict outcome, and whether it was a rightful or wrongful decision; the latter two manipulations, when combined, allowed for a comparison of actual outcomes versus true outcomes, and a measure of true culpability. Three or four prototypes, rather than one, emerged for all crimes, and though extraordinary rather than typical, they were far from simplistic. While the subjective element of motive dominated the culpability determination in Experiment I, objectivity prevailed in most cases in Experiment II. A commonsense and complex balancing of objective and subjective factors is the rule, while simplism was the rare exception.     

论信用卡诈骗罪

信用卡诈骗罪是指具有法定情形之一,进行信用卡诈骗活动,数额较大的行为。本罪主体只能是自然人,主观方面为直接故意,客观方面表现为《刑法》第１９６条规定的四种情形。其侵犯的客体是信用卡管理制度和公私财产所有权。认定本罪数额较大的标准,应以超过透支限额一定倍数为宜,对恶意透支、盗窃信用卡、使用变造的信用卡、使用涂改的信用卡等行为,应区别不同情况分别定性,并作立法完善。     

What Should We Say We Say about Contrived ‘Self-Defense’ Defenses?

Imagine someone who deliberately provokes someone else into attacking him so that he can harm that person in defending himself against her attack and then claim “self-defense” when brought to court to defend himself for what he has done to her. Should he be allowed to use this defense, even though it’s clear that he has deliberately manipulated his attacker into attacking him precisely in order to be able to harm her with impunity (assuming he were allowed to use the defense and thus escape legal penalties)? This question is the focal point in the paper that follows. I argue first that the case described above is indeed an instance of an “actio libera in causa,” albeit arguably one at the margins of this controversial class of cases. Then, using a view about the justification of self-defense that I have defended elsewhere, I show why I believe that, while the manipulator should not be deprived of the legal right to defend his self-defensive actions in such cases by claiming they were a legitimate matter of self-defense, there is good reason to enact laws that will allow him to be prosecuted, independently of his “self-defense” defense, for manipulating his attacker as he did, thus allowing him to harm her in self-defense and then defend his actions as purely a matter of “self-defense.”     

定罪概念及原则的刑事一体化思考

从刑事一体化的视角将定罪作为动态的司法活动来考察 ,定罪是指国家专门机关依法定程序与证据 ,根据刑法 ,确定犯罪嫌疑人、被告人的行为是否符合刑法规定的犯罪构成的活动。定罪的主体是国家专门机关 ;定罪的对象是犯罪嫌疑人、被告人的行为 ;定罪的根据包括事实根据及法律根据 ;定罪的内容与目标是确定犯罪嫌疑人、被告人的行为是否符合刑法规定的犯罪构成 ;定罪既是司法人员的主观认识过程 ,又充满了法律价值的权衡与选择。定罪的原则包括程序法原则与实体法原则两大组成部分 ,定罪的程序法原则为程序法定原则、证据裁判原则、无罪推定原则 ;定罪的实体法原则包括罪之法定原则、主客观相统一原则、必要性原则。     

论未遂犯的处罚根据

世界各国的刑法大都规定了未遂犯,未遂犯为何遭受处罚即未遂犯的处罚根据则是中外刑法学者期望解开的谜团.为解开这个谜团,大陆法系出现了主观的未遂论、客观的未遂论和折中的未遂论的理论对立.主观的未遂论认为未遂犯的处罚根据是实现犯罪的行为者的意思或性格的危险性的外部表现.客观的未遂论认为未遂犯的处罚根据是惹起构成要件结果的客观危险性.折中的未遂论认为未遂犯的处罚根据在于实现犯罪的现实危险性和行为人的主观恶性.通过比较研究,我们认为折中的未遂论应是我国刑法中未遂犯的处罚根据.     

犯罪本质论——一种重新解说的社会危害性理论

近年来 ,我国有学者主张用法益侵害说取代社会危害性说。这种观点是值得商榷的。在德国和日本的刑法理论中 ,法益侵害并不是一个明确统一的概念 ,而是一个争议颇多的概念。法益侵害说只是在名称上取代了权利侵害说 ,但并没有解决权利侵害说所面临的问题。这种取代并不成功。在我国刑法学界 ,用法益侵害说取代社会危害性说的作法是在重复法益侵害说取代权利侵害说的老路。我国传统的主观与客观相统一的社会危害性说的基本方向是正确的 ,但没有解决如何把主观和客观统一起来的问题。其实 ,主观与客观相统一应该统一于行为的客观方面 ,只有表现为客观危害行为的主观心态才能给社会造成危害。这种客观危害既包括犯罪行为给被害人造成的直接危害 ,也包括给社会带来的犯罪预防成本和处置犯罪的诉讼成本。因此 ,在本质上 ,犯罪是以一定方式或样态给被害人造成直接损害的、给社会带来犯罪预防成本的并需要动用刑罚资源加以处置的行为。     

Social harm future(s): exploring the potential of the social harm approach

The notion of social harm has sporadically interested critical criminologists as an alternative to the concept of crime. In particular, it has been viewed as a means to widen the rather narrow approach to harm that criminology offers. More recently, the publication of Beyond Criminology: Taking Harm Seriously has renewed interest in the notion of social harm. The book asserted a number of very valid reasons for a social harm approach that provoked a number of interesting critical responses. The article seeks to respond to five recurring questions: Should the social harm perspective move beyond criminology? If so, where should the perspective locate itself? From this position, how will the perspective continue to engage within ‘law and order’ debates and address the concerns of those affected by crime? If the notion of crime is problematic, how will the perspective form an alternative definition of harm? Moreover, without a notion of crime and the accompanying concept of criminal intent, how would the perspective allocate responsibility for harm? The article is not offering definitive answers to these questions, but possible directions for the perspective’s future development.     

调解的技术合理性——一种中观的组织结构-功能论的解读

调解的同等组织结构,为嵌入该结构的民意沟通提供了平等而自由的“理想的言谈情景”,形成了“主体间性”和“主体间性结构”,为充分、深入而成功的民意沟通提供了可能和技术保障,并在沟通中滋生出一种建基于自身组织技术上的既不同于立法也有别于司法审判的沟通合法性,即技术合理性.制度的命运最终决定于自身技术.调解之所以能长存于古今中外,在于自身的技术合理性,而不是外在的意识形态因素.     

超越主客观解释论:刑法解释标准研究

合理解释刑法是正确适用刑法的前提,因而探寻解释合理与否的标准构成刑法解释理论的核心。传统刑法解释理论的解释标准,无论是主观解释论的立法原意标准还是客观解释论的客观意思标准,都存在诸多缺陷,因此,必须根据以人为本的理念,从理解人本身的视角确立刑法解释的标准。在以人为本的理念下,刑法解释主体是具有多元价值观的解释者构成的解释共同体,刑法解释的标准是多元互动解释共同体通过对话协商获得的共识。制度化的对话协商可以通过求同存异的办法防止实质性价值冲突的激化,成为刑法解释及适用的合法性保障。     

The impact of China's 2016 Cyber Security Law on foreign technology firms,and on China's big data and Smart City dreams

Chinese officials are increasingly turning to a policy known as Informatisation, connecting industry online, to utilise technology to improve efficiency and tackle economic developmental problems in China. However, various recent laws have made foreign technology firms uneasy about perceptions of Rule of Law in China. Will these new laws, under China's stated policy of “Network Sovereignty” (“网络主权” “wangluo zhuquan”) affect China's ability to attract foreign technology firms, talent and importantly technology transfers? Will they slow China's technology and Smart City drive? This paper focuses on the question of whether international fears of China's new Cyber Security Law are justified. In Parts I and II, the paper analyses why China needs a cyber security regime. In Parts III and IV it examines the law itself.     

犯罪客体构成性地位辨析——兼述犯罪故意的定义

犯罪客体的构成性地位决定着犯罪构成的体系编排。犯罪客体具有超规范性、价值性,即使诉讼中无独立证据,但由于它可以校正犯罪的边界,对于犯罪成立仍是不可或缺的。事实与价值是分立的,犯罪成立的要件也应是双层体系,即第一层是犯罪主体、犯罪主观方面、犯罪客观方面,第二层为犯罪客体。犯罪客体不是故意的认识内容,犯罪故意的通说定义以结果为本位、以知—意为内容,缺陷明显,应当表述为:行为人明知构成事实而任容该事实的发生或自觉实行构成行为的心理态度。     

撩开鉴定结论的"神秘面纱"

鉴定结论是具有专门知识的人接受委托或聘请,运用自己的知识、经验或技能,对案件中专门性问题作出的判断或推论.鉴定结论既有主观性,又有客观性,是两者的辩证统一.鉴定结论形成的方式有逻辑判断、经验判断和规范评价.从本质上看,鉴定结论属于"专家意见".目前,鉴定中使用的鉴定标准有3种基于个人经验的主观性标准、基于逻辑实证主义的客观性标准和基于建构主义的社会普遍接受标准.在诉讼中,司法人员和当事人不能对鉴定结论预设过高的证明力.     

Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the Crimes of Subordinates or Separate Offence of the Superior?

The nature of command responsibility is still open to debatein international criminal law: is a superior to be held criminallyresponsible for the crimes committed by his subordinates ‘asan accomplice’, for having participated in the commissionof the crime by omission, or as a perpetrator of a separateoffence of dereliction of duty? This article surveys the post-WW2case law and the first international instruments on this point,and then analyses the jurisprudence of the International CriminalTribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The judges appearto have recently adopted a new approach to Article 7(3) ICTYSt.in that the superior is held responsible ‘for failureto prevent or punish with regard to the crimes of the subordinate’and no longer ‘for the crimes of his subordinates’.It is a responsibility ‘sui generis’ indeed, wherethe crime of the subordinate plays a central role in the attributionof responsibility to the superior. It is, therefore, necessaryto carefully consider the relationship between the superior'sfailure to act and the subordinate's crime, both with regardto objective and subjective elements. The same question finallyarises in relation to Article 28 of the Rome Statute, the literalinterpretation of which implies that a superior shall be punishedfor the same crime committed by his subordinates. In order toavoid the risk of holding a person guilty of an offence committedby others in violation of the principle of personal and culpablecriminal responsibility, it is crucial to consider separatelythe different cases of command responsibility, which are basedon distinct objective and subjective requirements.     

The Concept of Appropriation and The Offence of Theft

The English law of theft is confusing and problematic in principle. Since the introduction of the Theft Act 1968 there has been inconsistency in the interpretation of appropriation as court and commentators have grappled with the intuition that appropriation must entail some subjective element and cannot be purely objective. Although subjectivity is traditionally associated with culpability rather than with conduct, it is argued that some acts can be subjective and yet factual and stand as causes to effects. Appropriation is such an act, its necessary and sufficient condition being a mindset, here termed proprietary subjectivity, on the part of the actor. It is argued that clarification of the concept of appropriation can help to resolve misperceived problems. Such clarification will also reveal other problems in the law of theft. Some tentative comments de lege ferenda are made suggesting how these problems can be addressed.     

Voting Procedures for Complex Collective Decisions. An Epistemic Perspective

Abstract. In addressing a complex issue that is decomposable into several sub‐questions, a committee can use different voting procedures: Either it can let the committee members vote on each sub‐question and then use the outcomes as premises for its conclusion on the main issue (premise based‐procedure, pbp), or it can let the members directly vote on the conclusion (conclusion‐based procedure, cbp). The procedures can lead to different results, but which of them is a better truth‐tracker? On the basis of Condorcet's jury theorem, we show that the pbp is clearly superior if the objective is to reach truth for the right (= correct) reasons. However, if the goal instead is to reach truth for whatever reasons, right or wrong, there will be cases in which using the cbp turns out to be more reliable, even though, for the most part, the pbp will retain its superiority. In that connection, we also consider the truth‐tracking potential of a “sophisticated” variant of the pbp, which is sensitive to the size of the majorities supporting each of the premises.     

The Significance of Transferred Intent

The doctrine of transferred intent (or transferred “malice” in England) generally provides that if A attempts to harm B but, because of bad aim, misses and accidentally causes the same harm to befall C, A’s harmful intent vis-à-vis B is transferred to C, thus rendering A guilty of intentionally harming C. Commentators acknowledge the doctrine to be a legal fiction, but they differ regarding whether the fiction produces just results, some believing it does, others believing that A is guilty at most of attempting to harm B rather than intentionally harming C. Commentators who agree that the fiction produces just results nevertheless differ regarding whether the fiction should be retained or whether A’s intent to harm “a” person, in this case, B, is the only intent that signifies for crimes of intentional harm, regardless of whom A eventually harms. Doug Husak sought to achieve reflective equilibrium between intuition and theory regarding bad-aim cases by proposing in 1996 that A be punished for attempting to harm B (rather than for harming C) but sentenced as if he had harmed B. I once believed that Husak was correct. But I now have doubts, in part because Husak, along with others, cannot explain why the strength of people’s intuitions regarding A’s responsibility in bad-aim cases depends upon (1) C’s being a reasonably foreseeable victim, and (2) C’s being harmed by the same threat of force that A initially unleashed against B. I argue that one cannot achieve reflective equilibrium in bad-aim cases without inquiring into why resulting harm matters in criminal law, and that when one does, one discovers that just as people’s intuitions regarding whether intentional harms are proximate depend upon how resulting harms occur, so, too, people’s intuitions regarding whether an actor is guilty of intentional harm depend upon how resulting harm comes about.