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1.
Employment sector and employer size account for substantial variation in workers' participation in employer-sponsored retirement plans. Other things being equal, employees in the public sector--that is, federal, state, and local governments--are much more likely to be offered a retirement plan than workers in the private sector. Within the private sector, workers in firms with 100 or more employees are significantly more likely than workers in smaller firms to have the opportunity to participate in a retirement plan. This situation has prompted Congress to seek ways of reducing small businesses' obstacles to pension coverage. For example, Congress has authorized retirement plans that have fewer reporting requirements and less stringent contribution rules than those imposed on larger employers. Evaluating the effect of these laws on pension coverage is complicated by the many other variables that affect an employer's decision to sponsor a retirement plan and a worker's decision to participate in it. Nevertheless, data collected in national surveys of employers and households can be used to establish a baseline against which future changes in retirement plan sponsorship and participation can be measured. Recent surveys of employers and households reveal that: During the 1990s, participation in retirement plans rose among workers in firms with fewer than 100 employees but remained steady among workers in larger firms. The 1990s saw a substantial shift from defined benefit retirement plans to defined contribution plans. Despite increases in participation, workers in firms with fewer than 100 employees are only about half as likely as those in larger firms to participate in an employer-sponsored retirement plan. In both the public and private sectors, part-year or part-time workers are much less likely than year-round, full-time workers to be offered an opportunity to participate in an employer-sponsored retirement plan.  相似文献   

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Even though a citizen participation component is included in nearly every major local government planning and policy initiative, most citizen participation techniques have been judged to be less than adequate tools for informing policy makers about the people's will. Recently, having planners or policy analysts work closely with long-standing citizen panels composed of a randomly selected sample of community members has been proposed as one appropriate response to many of the inadequacies of traditional techniques. In this article, staff from a municipal government policy analysis unit describe and critique a yearlong citizen panel project focused on developing a transportation master plan in a university community. They argue that panels can overcome many of the limitations to effective citizen participation. The authors also suggest that panels can work well, but only if policy analysts assume more pro-active and advocacy roles than those routinely found in local government.  相似文献   

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It is the task of policy science, as of political theory generally, to recommend a scheme of reason that will presumably result in better public decisions. This may seem profoundly undemocratic, for in a democracy, should not the people be free to think precisely as they please? Yet all political theory intimates an idea of political reason and unreason. The problem then is which ideal of reason to teach in the name of a policy science of democracy. Herein I compare three common schemes of reason: utilitarian calculation, liberal rationalism, and practical reason. My conclusion is that there is no reason to suppose that the capacity for the more public-spirited forms of deliberation is less widely distributed in the population than calculated self-interest, and that either liberal rationalism or practical reason, or some combination of the two, is more compatible with democracy than utilitarian calculation.  相似文献   

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A recent appraisal by Farr et al. (Am Polit Sci Rev 100:579–587 2006) credited Lasswell with raising important questions of professional responsibility for political science. However, the appraisal rejected working answers to those questions offered by Lasswell and his colleagues without considering them substantively or comprehensively. In doing so, the appraisal misleads those academics in political science and other disciplines who may be interested in a genuinely professional role for themselves, a role that takes into account the social consequences of the exercise of their knowledge and skills. This article provides a more authentic introduction to Lasswell’s life and work and vision of the policy scientist of democracy, and suggests some alternatives for would-be professionals.
Ronald D. BrunnerEmail:
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Retrospective review of existing regulations is an increasingly common aspect of the regulatory policy cycle. As with prospective regulatory policymaking, public participation is a central feature of many retrospective review initiatives. Despite its theoretical and practical significance, participation in retrospective review has received little scholarly attention. This paper presents the first systematic assessment of participation in United States retrospective regulatory review. Utilizing content analysis of an original dataset of government documents and public input produced pursuant to Executive Orders 13563, 13579, and 13610, the paper analyzes participatory institutional design, the level and composition of participants, and participation processes. The results suggest that retrospective review participation processes largely reflected the modes of stakeholder outreach and engagement employed in prospective regulatory policymaking, but resulted in comparatively low levels of participation. Consistent with the purposes enumerated in the executive orders, participation processes facilitated information exchange and were relatively representative of and responsive to stakeholders.  相似文献   

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《Society》1998,35(5):A2-A6
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