Political corruption,economy, and citizens' evaluation of democracy in South Korea

South Korean politics has been haunted by numerous corruption scandals as well as the prosecution of politicians and their cronies for their corruption. Yet despite the prevalence and salience of political corruption, many citizens of South Korea tend to overlook the problem by continuing to support corrupt politicians and administrations. This study defines under what circumstances political corruption shapes citizens' judgment of government and the political system as a whole in South Korea. The results indicate that national economic conditions as a perceptual screen mediate the effect of political corruption on the evaluation of democratic governance.     

Rebels-Turned-Narcos? The FARC-EP’s Political Involvement in Colombia’s Cocaine Economy

Abstract

According to the ‘rebels-turned-narcos’ premise, increasing involvement in the illicit drug industry causes insurgent groups to lose sight of their political aims, as they shift their focus to profit-making. The (former) Colombian rebel group, the FARC-EP, became a paragon for this idea. Drawing on primary research, we argue that the FARC-EP’s involvement in the illicit drug economy was itself political. Their involvement included governance activities, which are by their very nature political. Furthermore, these activities formed part of the FARC-EP’s political project, aimed at ensuring the reproduction of the peasant smallholder economy. Our argument challenges the rebels-turned-narcos premise more broadly by showing why involvement in the illicit drug economy, on its own, is insufficient evidence to posit the depoliticization of an insurgent group.     

Elections and democracy in Russia

The word `democracy' has predominantly negative connotations when referring to its practical implementation in Russia. However, Russians are favourable to the idea of democracy in principle, and support the establishment of genuine democracy in the country. Beliefs that elections ensure accountability of elected officials, allow public input on the policy direction of government, and give personal benefits to individuals would help to increase acceptance of the value of Russian democracy. A combination of factors, however, makes it doubtful that the current negative attitudes can be overcome quickly.     

In the service of democracy

The notion of service can encompass much more than the basic duties of obedience, loyalty, trust, and courage directed solely to some higher secular authority. It can also encompass a duty to a “common good,” a “good society,” a “public,” or a people. If public service is to be viewed as an integral component of our democratic political system, the ethical-moral values of faith, hope, and love must be recognized as the critical impulses which energize a life dedicated to the service of democracy. But such an approach is very different from the current focus of democratic ethics. In particular the love ethic inevitably moves on a collision course with many of our basic canons of public sector management such as the concept of formal, institutionalized, bureaucratic authority, the notion of detached, dispassionate, objective neutrality, and the almost absolute emphasis placed on rational, routinized, programmed behavior.

To labor in the service of democracy is to recognize that all of us are called, in one way or another, to be watchmen, sentinels, or prophets of others. It is a recognition of the fact that a life in service of democracy is a life of constant instruction, giving and receiving knowledge about right conduct in the formation of one person's character by another, and in the acceptance of another's guidance in one's own growth. In a word, society is dependent on the career professionals in governments at all levels to lead it to a new value vision of the common good. As a first step in this direction, public administrators must be willing to confront the suppressive and debilitating constraints which currently are being imposed on bureaucracy from all directions, and to reaffirm the values and virtues inherent in the notion of service which have unified the ethical forces of democracy so well in the past.     

Illiberal democracy and the future of opposition in Singapore

There are quite a number of ways by which politics in Singapore can be meaningfully approached. One perspective is to focus on the guiding beliefs and values of the People’s Action Party (PAP) governing elite and its nature of state governance since its assumption of power in 1959; it has ruled the state continuously since then. Its success in turning Singapore into a modern metropolis the envy of many has helped to buttress and legitimise its rule. Despite the growing criticisms, especially by the opposition parties, of the highly regulated manner by which the country has been managed, the PAP government, led by its first and former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew, and now by Goh Chok Tong, has unrepentantly stuck to its long-held world-view and governing paradigm. To the government, Singapore’s rapid economic growth and political stability could not have been achieved if the country were to follow the Western liberal democratic path and its attendant notions of development. While gradually allowing for greater citizen participation in the formulation of policies in more recent times, the present leadership, mindful of opening up a Pandora’s box, is still cautiously wary of the growth of a more pluralistic political environment; hence, its preference for what can be described as an illiberal, (soft) authoritarian democratic culture. Given this particular regime mindset and its parameters of governance, it is indeed a Herculean task for Opposition parties to make any significant inroads in the Republic’s future politics. However, all may not be lost for opposition parties and for those aspiring to see the evolution of a civil society. If they can capitalise on some probable future happenings—such as intra-party PAP factionalism consequent to the departure of the ‘old guard’, a prolonged economic downturn, and the rise of a new educated, IT generation—then their political future may hold some promise.     

菲律宾的"异俗游戏"

斗鸡在菲律宾有千年历史,素有"国技"之称,可见其受到喜爱的程度.最近,"斯莱舍杯"世界斗鸡大赛在首都马尼拉举行."斯莱舍大赛"号称世界上规模最大的斗鸡比赛,吸引了数以万计的狂热观众.     

Beneath consensual corporatism: traditions of governance in the Netherlands

This article begins with a historical account of the various styles of governance in The Netherlands from the post–war period to date. That overview reveals the persistence of an underlying more traditional form of governance, that is, the tradition of consensual corporatism. Although conventionally believed to be an invention of the Catholic Church and subsequent political theorists, the present twentieth and twenty–first–century historical review of this corporatist style of governance leads to the conclusion that its historical roots are, instead, the age–old Dutch state traditions of tolerance, pragmatism and consensus. It looks as though the worn–out clichés of 'images of the Dutch' are indeed the fundamentally underlying core–concepts behind the Dutch style of governance. The ruling, merchant, partrician families of the Dutch Republic, in order to defend their international trade interests, in the midst of somewhat dogmatic Protestant preachers, were pragmatically tolerant of deviant ideas and groups and thus were able to reach a feasible compromise.     

Social capital and democracy in Russia

The two basic objectives of this study are to determine whether or not Russia has stocks of social capital upon which to draw as it seeks to democratize, and to examine the nature of the relationship between social capital and democracy in Russia. I present both qualitative and quantitative evidence that social capital exists in many parts of Russia. After a quantitative analysis of social capital and democratization, which identifies a strong positive relationship, I suggest that if the center is able to sustain democracy, Russia should be able to consolidate democratic rule.     

Business and the Politics of Urban Violence in Colombia

What explains variation in local government policy responses to urban violence? Existing research on the politics of urban violence overlooks the pivotal role that private sector interests play in shaping the public provision of security in major developing world cities faced with conditions of intense violence. I argue that business is a pivotal political actor that mobilizes through powerful private sector institutions to shape policy responses to urban violence in ways that advance its economic interests and preserve its privileged status in local political arenas. The security policy preferences of business vary across economic sectors due to variation in relations to urban space and violence. This cross-sectoral variation in security policy preferences generates both opportunities and challenges for political and societal actors that seek to stem and prevent urban violence. Analysis of puzzling variation in policy responses across Colombia's three principal cities—Medellin, Cali, and Bogota—and over time within each shows that a focus on business can strengthen our understanding of the politics of urban violence and, more broadly, its implications for development.