日本司法体制

日本是实行典型的三权分立的国家,国家司法权由最高法院和下级法院行使。但司法制度指的不仅是与法院有关的制度,还包括检察制度、律师制度、警察制度等。检察机构是设在法务省内的行政机关,警察由国家公安委员会、警察厅长领导,律师是独立的,归律师联合会管理。司法警察受检察机关的指挥,刑事犯罪的侦查、对嫌疑犯的逮捕由司法警察实施。律师在诉讼过程中与法院、检察机关的地位平等。     

反对司法审查的核心理由

本文清楚地阐述了反对立法的司法审查的核心理由,适些理由是在特殊宪法体系下,封特殊决策和司法审查出现的历史的简洁讨论中得出的。本文批判司法审查基于两个基础：第一,文章主张没有理由认为由司法审查保护权利能比由民主的立法机关做得更好。第二,本文认为,除了产生的结果外,司法审查是民主但不正当的。然而,反对司法审查的理由也不是绝对或者无条件的。在本文中,这些理由以若干条件为前提,包括假定社会有着运作良好的民主机构,社会申的大部分公民认真对待权利（即使他们可能并不赞同他们拥有的权利）。文章末尾则讨论这些前提条件丧失时会出现的情形。     

Constitutional judicial review and political insurance

Considering constitutional judicial review of policy, the power of courts to annul legislation, as a political insurance mechanism to protect against losses from adverse election outcomes, the paper analyzes three questions: First, under what circumstances a political ruler, who wins an election and the right to propose measures of policy, subjects those measures to the checking powers of an independent judiciary. Second, the net expected gains of a political ruler from granting binary choice to the reviewing judiciary rather than open choice. Third, the equilibrium degree of policy review power granted to the judiciary. Differences in the policy preferences of competing politicians, the judiciary and the status quo, the probability of winning an election and the probability that the judiciary confirms legislation passed by the incumbent emerge as the main determinants of judicial review and its political independence.     

Constitutional democracy and the legitimacy of judicial review

It has long been argued that the institution of judicial review is incompatible with democratic institutions. This criticism usually relies on a procedural conception of democracy, according to which democracy is essentially a form of government defined by equal political rights and majority rule. I argue that if we see democracy not just as a form of government, but more basically as a form of sovereignty, then there is a way to conceive of judicial review as a legitimate democratic institution. The conception of democracy that stems from the social contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls, is based in an ideal of the equality, independence, and original political jurisdiction of all citizens. Certain equal basic rights, in addition to equal political rights, are a part of democratic sovereignty. In exercising their constituent power at the level of constitutional choice, free and equal persons could choose judicial review as one of the constitutional mechanisms for protecting their equal basic rights. As such, judicial review can be seen as a kind of shared precommitment by sovereign citizens to maintaining their equal status in the exercise of their political rights in ordinary legislative procedures. I discuss the conditions under which judicial review is appropriate in a constitutional democracy. This argument is contrasted with Hamilton's traditional argument for judicial review, based in separation of powers and the nature of judicial authority. I conclude with some remarks on the consequences for constitutional interpretation.I am indebted to John Rawls and Burton Dreben for their helpful advice and their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

论我国行政自由裁量权的司法审查

行政自由裁量权是行政主体在行使其职能时必不可少的权力,其存在有其正当合理性。从理论上讲,不存在不受控制的权力;从现实上看,当前,在我国行政执法过程中,存在着大量行政自由裁量权被滥用的事实。将行政自由裁量权置于司法的监督与控制之下,以防范滥用的行政权力侵害公民的合法权益,是我国现代法治建设急需要解决的重大课题。     

The judicial review of legislation in the United Kingdom: a public choice analysis

The Human Rights Act 1998 unprecedentedly enabled the senior courts in the United Kingdom to review parliamentary enactments for compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. This article seeks to analyze within the framework of public choice economics two phenomena arising from this development that are counterintuitive: What made Parliament voluntarily invite the judiciary to monitor its acts? Why has Parliament consistently complied with rulings of the Judicial House of Lords that challenged primary legislation over the last 10 years? It argues that the Act was designed in a way that fulfilled the electoral commitments of the enacting majority by supplying promised policies to its constituencies, while minimizing agency costs and information problems in favor of Parliament’s corporate interests. Significantly, the Act left intact the veto powers of Parliament and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. As such, it disincentivized the Judicial House of Lords to risk costly overturns of its rulings by Parliament for straying too far from the range of the ideal policy positions spanned by Parliament and Strasbourg. Drawing from the empirical evidence of the past decade, it will be shown that in nearly all cases the Law Lords have either upheld the compatibility of challenged statutes, reaffirmed parliamentary preferences, or followed the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court.     

中国司法审查制度需关注的几个问题

一、中国法院没有违宪审查权。但中国法院的法官有选择适用法律的权力。以确保司法审查中法制的统一实施 (一)依据《宪法》和《立法法》的规定,中国法院的法官有选择适用法律的权力,法官在法律审判中依据法律适用的规则,有权不适用与《宪法》和上位法不相一致的法律规范。按照《宪法》及《立法法》的规定,中央和地方不同立法主体制定的法律规范,其效力范围     

“司法和谐“的维度

司法和谐是和谐社会的应有之义,是法治建设的目标,是现代司法理念的创新。本文从和谐主义模式的构建、协同主义的推动、多元纠纷解决机制的确立三个方面探讨如何把握司法和谐的维度。     

论入世后我国的司法审查

司法审查是法院对行政行所进行审查,法院是司法审查最合适的主体,本文就我国在入世后的司法审查问题,进行了探讨和研究。笔者认为我国司法审查的范围应该有所扩大,而司法审查所适用的法律,虽然主要应该是国内立法,但WTO相关协定对法院的司法审查也应该有一定的参考价值。     

简述德国司法制度

德国实行联邦制,全国划分为联邦、州、地区三级,联邦和各州均有自己的立法机构、行政机构及司法机构,并根据《德意志联邦共和国基本法》之规定履行各自权力。一、审判制度 (一)德国法院的设置、管辖和审级。 德国主要设有六类法院:即宪法法院、普通法院(包括专利法院)、行政法院、财政法院、劳工法院、社会福利法院。此外还设置有纪律法院。1、宪法法院。德国设有联邦和州两级宪法法院。两