THE RIDDLE OF TROXEL

This article addresses the United States Supreme Court case of Troxel v. Granville, which is unique for its attention to the changing face of the American family and the Court's willingness to venture into the troubled waters of family law. Troxel conflates standing with standards and muddies the lines between private and public, between therapeutic intervention and state coercion. The article attempts to unravel the challenge of Troxel, considering both the cases' significance and inflammatory potential, while also raising significant questions that will confound professionals for years to come.     

MUDDLING THROUGH THE MURKY WATERS OF TROXEL

A critical case in the area of third-party visitation rights was decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in July 2000 ( Troxel v. Granville ). A plurality in this case held that a Washington grandparent visitation statute was not facially unconstitutional but was as applied to the facts of that case. The author discusses the varying opinions of the Supreme Court justices in the Troxel decision. Next, he analyzes the plurality opinion to determine the appropriate standard of review in grandparent visitation cases. Following is a consideration of how the decision will affect other state grandparent visitation legislation. Examining these issues, the author concludes that future third-party visitation cases will be decided on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis.     

Dolly and Alice

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, In re Roslin Institute, rejecting patent claims to mammals cloned from somatic cells, was rendered about a month before the United States Supreme Court''s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International. The Alice opinion explicitly sets out the standard for determining whether an invention falls within statutory patentable subject matter. Thus one is thus left to wonder what the Roslin opinion might have looked like had it been decided only a few weeks later, after the Alice decision was published, with the benefit of the Supreme Court''s further direction on patentable subject matter. In this essay I explore whether in hindsight the Alice standard might have dictated a different outcome in Roslin, suggesting how the two-part test articulated by the Supreme Court in Alice might apply to a ‘products of nature’ analysis for cloned mammals. Drawing on that analysis, I then use the Roslin case as a vehicle to highlight certain issues with the Supreme Court''s current subject matter jurisprudence as applied to biotechnology. By juxtaposing Dolly with Alice, it becomes clear that the Supreme Court has revivified a number of dormant biotechnology patent problems in the guise of subject matter analysis.     

Is state power to protect health compatible with substantive due process rights?

Public health laws may mandate drastic limitations on individual liberty, such as forced medication and quarantine. This results in a tension between public health laws and guarantees of liberty such as the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court has resolved this tension in favor of one or the other of these legal principles, depending on the facts and issues involved. Nevertheless, Supreme Court jurisprudence is internally consistent. The Court has applied a level of scrutiny that, while rigorous, is more flexible than strict scrutiny. I denote this as "enhanced public health scrutiny." Applying this scrutiny, the Court will uphold public health legislation if it protects an inchoate class of people who may not yet be identifiable, who will incur a specific disease or injury absent the law, but who will not experience this disease or injury if the law is enforced. If this doctrine were explicit, it would constitute a clear guideline to courts seeking to balance health and liberty concerns. This guideline would be consistent with current case law, and would not impact on law affecting reproductive liberty.     

STATE SUPREME COURT APPLICATIONS OF TROXEL v. GRANVILLE AND THE COURTS' RELUCTANCE TO DECLARE GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL

In this article, the author reviews state supreme court applications of Troxel v. Granville , analyzing the impact of the decision on the courts' ongoing efforts to adjudicate visitation disputes between parents and grandparents. Set against a background of legislative recognition of grandparents' rights and judicial uncertainty regarding the appropriate role of nonparents in children's lives, Troxel reaffirmed the constitutional right of parents to direct their children's upbringing. The author argues that state supreme courts evaluating gradparent visitation statutes and seeking to enforce Troxel 's presumption in favor of parents should be more willing to strike down overly broad statutes. Such an approach would be a positive step toward addressing the excessive judicial discretion that the Troxel Court found so problematic, and would signal to state legislatures the need for statutes that both provide for the needs of children and protect parental rights.     

IN THE AFTERMATH OF TROXEL V. GRANVILLE

While the Court in Troxel v. Granville opines about the problems litigation creates, that of both expense and intrusion into the lives of families in the midst of grandparent visitation disputes, the Court decision falls short of posing a solution. The focus of this note is to propose a standard for mediation as a viable alternative to traditional litigation in such cases. The hope is that mediation will serve the best interests of the child.     

Situating Exclusion of Evidence Analysis in its Socio-Legal Place: A Tale of Judicial Populism

In the 2009 case of R. v. Grant, the Supreme Court of Canada reformulated the exclusion of evidence framework in the context of Charter breaches. The case was something of a revolution for those who study evidence law and the Charter. Thus far, the case has been the subject of much debate and even empirical study. Few academic papers have explored the philosophical predilections of the Court in the decision. In this paper, the authors briefly review the history of the exclusion of evidence test, explain the new framework and discuss the academic and legal responses to the case. The authors place the reasoning of the Court in a broader socio-legal context arguing that the test articulated by the Court is informed by a type of populism that combined with recent Charter cases in the police powers context allows for flexible potentials, ones that could, on occasion, encroach on due process protections. The authors call for scholars and activists to keep a close eye on the emerging jurisprudence in this critical area of Charter adjudication.     

An Exercise in Legal Honesty: Rewriting the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht

This article contains an urgent plea for the re‐establishment of legal honesty in Europe. European law is a victim of European economic crisis. The emergence of the concept of conditionality within national and European jurisprudence, or the judicial imposition of a market discipline upon national budgets, is also a part of a chronicle foretold given in the face of the volatile power of international finance markets. Yet, in rewriting the judgements given by the Court of Justice in the case of Thomas Pringle and by the German Constitutional Court in its matching jurisprudence on the European Stability Mechanism, this article seeks to overcome the destruction of constitutionality within Europe, the foreclosure of a European space for the politics of alternatives and the condemning of individual Europeans to lasting suffering within a perpetual austerity regime.     

Lochner redeemed: family privacy after Troxel and Carhart

At least since its 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Supreme Court has differentiated its review of abortion laws from its scrutiny of other intrusions on family privacy. Whereas abortion restrictions are reviewed under the middling "undue burden" standard, incursions on other family-related liberties, including marriage, kinship, and child rearing are said to be subject to the strict scrutiny ordinarily employed in the defense of fundamental rights. This Article contends that the Court's most recent decisions in this context give reason to reconsider both sides of that equation. Stenberg v. Carhart, striking down Nebraska's ban on "partial-birth" abortions, suggests that the Court's scrutiny in the abortion context will be more aggressive and rigid than most had supposed. At the same time, its decision in Troxel v. Granville, limiting states' authority to order grandparent visitation over the objects of a parent, suggest that there is more fluidity in the Court's review of other family liberties than is conventionally assumed. Together the cases signal a convergence in both sorts of family-privacy controversies toward a common standard of "reasonableness." That standard bears, for many, an uncomfortable association with the much-maligned "natural law-due process formula" of the Lochner era, but Professor Meyer argues that it is precisely the right approach in the context of family privacy. Although more rigid doctrinal formulae are sometimes preferred on the ground that they constrain judicial judgment, here they are undesirable precisely because they obscure the value judgments that are inevitably at the core of every family-privacy decision.     

A generalization of the obligation to prevent: From genocide convention to racial discrimination convention

The decision of the International Court of Justice in the case concerning the application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”) highlights states’ obligations under the Convention, especially the obligation to prevent. When it comes to the case concerning the International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“Racial Discrimination Convention”), the decision of the Court indicating provisional measures seemingly purported to generalize its jurisprudence in the Genocide Case. By elaborating this kind of new jurisprudence, the Court echoed to the responsibility to protect, as well as to Article 48 and Article 54 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Draft Articles of State Responsibility”). It appears that each State Party should have an obligation to intervene in the coming genocide incidence, perhaps as well as in the coming racial discrimination cases. Nevertheless it is unclear in what manner a state could implement it effectively.     

The normative foundation of social science in law revisited: A reply to melton

Conclusion The primary thrust of Melton's argument is that opposition by organized psychology to the Bork nomination would have been consistent with the jurisprudential philosophy on which social science in law, as a scholarly movement, is based (p. 317). If APA is to justify opposition to Bork or future Supreme Court nominations (e.g., Souter), there should be a clearly identified normative foundation that directly leads to such advocacy. A stance based partly upon scholarship thatimplies reverence for constitutional values and partly upon preambles and principles of an ethical code is too slender a reed from which to cast APA's institutional support for a Supreme Court candidate. When such a stance is adopted, APA unfortunately becomes one of an increasing number of organizations attempting to influence political decisions by claiming allegiance to values consistent with democracy.Advocacy based on a normative foundation of social science in law jurisprudence could be justified by APA if, and only if, (a) there is an identifiable SSL jurisprudence, (b) there is consensus on the values underlying such a jurisprudence, and (c) adherence to these values argues against the nomination of Bork or others (e.g., Souter) to the Supreme Court. Because these conditions currently cannot be met, organized opposition to Supreme Court nominations cannot be justified on a normative foundation of SSL jurisprudence.Editor's Note: This issue marks the introduction of theComments section. Readers are invited to submit brief comments on articles published in this journal.     

Are Domestic Violence Courts working for indigenous peoples?

It is well established that the disproportionate imprisonment rates for indigenous peoples surpass that of non‐indigenous peoples. What is troubling is the alarming statistic that indicates that the rate of apprehension, prosecution and recidivism of indigenous women surpasses that of not only non‐indigenous peoples but also male indigenous peoples. This article proposes a court setting for domestic violence that incorporates therapeutic jurisprudence as an appropriate vehicle for the recognition of an indigenous law system as the answer to this problem. The model proposed comprises two components; a specialized Domestic Violence Court underpinned by the doctrine of therapeutic jurisprudence and the implementation of an indigenous legal system such as tikanga Maori.     

Text Matters: Some Reflections on the Forging of a New Constitutional Jurisprudence in South Africa

The South African Constitution establishes a constitutional democracy with a strong form of constitutional review. The Constitutional Court is required to declare invalid any legislation or conduct of the President which is inconsistent with the Constitution. The author, a former judge of the Constitutional Court, argues that the text of the Constitution has been an important determinant of the Court's jurisprudence, both in relation to the Court's jurisprudence concerning the institutional structures established by the Constitution and its Bill of Rights jurisprudence.     

Durie v Gardiner: Public Libel Law and Stare Non Decisis

This note examines the controversial case of Durie v Gardiner, a recent decision of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, which radically altered the nation's public libel jurisprudence. It argues that Durie is incorrect as a matter of public libel law for three reasons. First, both Durie judgments failed to engage in freedom of expression theorising. Second, this undertheorising has caused significant confusion in Durie, including misinterpretation of material facts, breakdown of the ‘theory-doctrine’ interface, and a precipitous and unwarranted dismissal of the Court of Appeal's settled public libel principles. Third, owing to these difficulties, the Durie courts were in no position to import a new ‘public interest’ defence from foreign jurisdictions. Above all, by hastening towards wholesale law reform and ignoring its earlier comparative law deliberations, Durie arguably scuppers public libel law's best hope for advancement.     

The Limitations of a Multilingual Legal System

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the way in which it works can be seen as a microcosm of how a multilingual, multicultural supranationalisation process and legal order can be constructed—the Court is a microcosm of the EU as a whole and in particular of EU law. The multilingual jurisprudence produced by the CJEU is necessarily shaped by the dynamics within that institution and by the ‘cultural compromises’ at play in the production process. The resultant texts, which make up that jurisprudence, are hybrid in nature and inherently approximate. On the one hand, that approximation can lead to discrepancies between language versions of the Court’s case law and thus jeopardise the uniform application of EU law. On the other hand, that approximation and hybridity define EU law as a distinct, supranational legal order. This paper analyses the operation of the CJEU and considers whether a linguistic cultural compromise exists within that institution which exercises a formative influence on the character of its ‘output’—i.e. its jurisprudence—and what that may mean for our understanding of the development of EU law.     

Reproductive Health: Morals,Margins and Rights

Reproductive interventions and technologies have the capacity to generate profound societal unease and to provoke hostile reactions underpinned by various moral concerns. This paper shows that this position currently goes relatively unchecked by the European Court of Human Rights, which allows the margin of appreciation and consensus doctrines significantly to limit the scope of reproductive rights under the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8. This occurs both in relation to the interest in avoiding reproduction at stake in abortion, and that in achieving it at stake in medically assisted reproduction. The paper demonstrates significant flaws in the Court's framing and deployment of these doctrines in its reproductive jurisprudence. It argues that, as regards existing and upcoming reproductive interventions and technologies, the Court should attend to the concept of reproductive health, long recognised in international conventions and policy materials.     

The Jurisprudence of Precision: Contrast Space and Narrow Tailoring in First Amendment Doctrine

The United States Supreme Court often requires that laws regulating free speech be narrowly tailored. The narrow tailoring requirement lacks analytical rigor in the Court's opinions, however. This article analyzes narrow tailoring in the context of Alan Garfinkel's model of "contrast space," which facilitates an examination of the precise range of alternatives the Court considers in its decisions. The article offers suggestions for improving narrow tailoring jurisprudence with a more precise account of the process.     

City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital: government responsibility for an arrestee's medical care

City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital presented the United States Supreme Court with its first opportunity to consider whether a state or municipality has a constitutional duty to pay for medical treatment received by an individual in police custody. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had held that the city had an eighth amendment duty to pay for an arrestee's treatment. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, observing that eighth amendment rights and duties are not implicated prior to conviction and that fourteenth amendment due process concerns were met once the arrestee received adequate medical care. No obligation to pay arises, the Court held, absent a specific state law provision requiring such payment. Because arrestees are subject to physical restraints similar to those imposed on convicted prisoners, this Case Comment argues that courts undertaking to determine the scope of a state's duty to provide treatment to arrestees should apply a due process standard which draws upon eighth amendment analysis. The Comment concludes that under such an eighth amendment equivalence approach, no duty to pay arises because the state's failure to pay the health care provider does not reflect "deliberate indifference" towards the recipient of the treatment.     

The Court of Justice and the Union Citizen

Abstract Over a decade since the conception of the Union citizen, the aim of this article very simply is to measure his growth and maturity with a sustained analysis of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in this regard. After all, it was Advocate General Lèger who stated that it was for the Court to ensure that its full scope was attained. The article focuses predominantly on three areas of study: Member State nationality law and citizenship, the effect and meaning of Article 18 EC, and the ever‐evolving right to equal treatment for the Union citizen. It is fully updated in the light of recent case law, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, and the newly adopted Directive 2004/58 EC.     

State sovereign standing: often overlooked, but not forgotten

Critics of Virginia's challenge to the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act have asserted that Virginia lacked standing to even raise the issue. Such criticism is inconsistent with foundational understandings of the role of states in providing a check on federal power and with the modern standing jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, especially as reflected in the Court's decisions regarding a state's sovereign interest in defending its code of laws. This Article demonstrates that, as a matter of constitutional design and history, as well as under relevant precedents, Virginia clearly had and has standing to bring its challenge.