Forging a Key,Turning a Lock: Counterinsurgency Theory in Iraq 2006–2008

Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine is designed to combat a defined insurgency. In the present situation in Iraq, COIN's definition has been radically extended to include nation-building as well. This additional function has expanded the scope of the role of the Coalition Forces in Iraq. Yet COIN in its present incarnation may not be enough to finalize the implementation of the strategy of nation-building. This article finds three main criticisms/limitations of contemporary COIN strategy: (1) It is predicated on a classic notion of insurgency that looks very different from present conflicts. (2) Although COIN advocates a political solution to a political problem, it uses (by default) mainly military mechanisms to carry it out. (3) Completion of the intricate and ambitious tasks necessary to defeat insurgencies in foreign lands may lie outside the direct control of the United States.     

Killing People,Dividing a Nation? Analyzing Student Perceptions of the Boko Haram Crisis in Nigeria

The causes and consequences of the Boko Haram insurgency as well as its possible solutions have been subjected to different interpretations among scholars, politicians, and journalists. Little is known, however, about how the Nigerian populace thinks about the uprising. The present study contributes to the literature on Boko Haram by analyzing the perceptions of Nigerian students vis-à-vis Boko Haram's agenda and the government's response. The results demonstrate a north–south divide with Christians or Igbo and Muslims or Hausa-Fulani holding different ideas on the causes of the crisis, being differently affected by it, and slightly disagreeing on the desirability of military government responses. In conclusion, perceptions on Boko Haram lay bare ethno-religious fault lines reflecting existing grievances, thereby possibly undermining efforts at nation-building and peaceful coexistence in the multi-ethnic Nigerian society.     

The al Houthi Insurgency in the North of Yemen: An Analysis of the Shabab al Moumineen

The Yemeni government has fought an insurgency in the north of Yemen against a group called the Shabab al Moumineen, (Believing Youth) since 2004. The insurgency is portrayed by the Yemeni government in the press as a localized phenomenon led by the single al Houthi family and state that their ranks have been decimated by near-continuous fighting. However, the al Houthi Insurgency, led by the Shabab al Moumineen, is far more than a localized uprising: it is a full-blown insurgency–and one that Yemen's government and people may not be prepared to combat. This article explains the origin of the Shabab al Moumineen and conveys the importance of this conflict in Yemen and its potential multiple impacts on the broader Middle East.     

The Strategic Hub Concept: Plan C for Iraq?

This article will apply what shall be termed a “strategic hub” concept of counterinsurgency to the war in Iraq. This concept posits that the development of insurgent and militia nodes or “hubs” of activity could provide a more relevant way to address the key dilemmas of the Iraq equation in light of the Coalition and Iraq government's inability to secure Iraq. The article will argue that ceding the insurgency and militias ground on a temporary basis may be required to maintain both military and political momentum in the post “surge” Iraq given the draw down of U.S. forces, the immaturity of the Iraqi Security Forces, and the present state of American and Iraqi politics.     

Crafting democratic control of the military in South Korea and the Philippines: the problem of military factions

This article explores how a military's organizational character (cohesion or lack thereof) shapes military officers' attitudes toward new civilian leadership in democratizing South Korea and the Philippines. It suggests that a factionalized military makes civilian control much more difficult and the route to democratic consolidation highly unstable and incomplete for three reasons. First, in the factionalized army, individual officers' allegiance is directed toward their factional leaders, not toward the military as a unified body and the civilian leadership. Second, factionalized military will create ‘monitoring’ and ‘sanctioning’ problems for civilians. Finally, competition among various factions in the military promotes officers' appetite for political domination. The structured-focused analysis of democratization in South Korea and the Philippines clearly sustains the theoretical arguments. The study implies that the institutionalization of civilian control of the military in democratizing nations depends on new leaders' ability/willingness to remove military factions and rebuild the armed forces into a cohesive organ.     

Is the shining path the “New Khmer rouge”?

This article assesses the claim that Peru's Shining Path insurgency is the “new Khmer Rouge,” a reincarnation of the brutal communist movement responsible for the death of more than one million Cambodians during the 1975–1979 “Democratic Kampuchea” era. Although Shining Path is unlikely to seize power in Peru the analogy is still worth evaluating, given its prominence in public debates over the nature of the insurgency. On the basis of Foreign Broadcast Information Service reports, party statements, and other primary and secondary sources, two major characteristics of these organizations are compared: ideology and prerevolution behavior in their respective “liberated zones.” While acknowledging that the Shining Path and the Khmer Rouge share a number of important features, the article concludes that a Shining Path regime would be less extreme than Democratic Kampuchea, and that it is an overstatement to call the insurgency the new Khmer Rouge.     

Perilous presidentialism or precarious power-sharing? Hybrid regime dynamics in Myanmar

ABSTRACT

Although Myanmar's transition from military rule has been thoroughly studied, research into the evolving presidential system is lacking. This article maps Myanmar's unique hybrid form of presidentialism and characterises executive-legislative relations between 2012 and 2017. It not only examines institutions themselves but also explores how actors within them have acted and shifted strategically. It is argued that elite-behaviour determines how institutions work. Myanmar's 2008 constitution imposed by the military established a hybrid presidential system with a formally powerful president. The first phase under President Thein Sein saw competitive yet cooperative executive-legislative relations between President Thein Sein and the ambitious House Speaker Shwe Mann, both members of the former military regime. However, this power-sharing arrangement of former members of the military regime became increasingly fragile with the rise of Aung San Suu Kyi and her attempt to change the 2008 constitution. After the election victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and the passage of the state counsellor law, a de facto semi-presidential system was established – Burmese style. Since then, the frontline has been between the civilian and military parts of the administration.     

Becoming Patani Warriors: Individuals and the Insurgent Collective in Southern Thailand

Focusing on the case of Thailand's ongoing insurgency in its southern Malay Muslim majority region, this article examines the circumstances surrounding individual's choices to engage in violent revolt and their conformity and non-conformity with the norms and disciplines of the movement in which they operate. Insurgent-driven violence in Thailand's southern border provinces has attracted considerable attention, but little has been published about the people who become “Patani Warriors” (juwae). Based on the authors’ direct encounters with current and former insurgents and study of Thai official documentation and captured insurgent propaganda material, this article presents the most detailed information currently available on southern Thailand's shadowy fighters. We argue that there is no single type of Malay Muslim insurgent: this variegated reality defies the normative ideals projected in insurgent's indoctrination material while it also poses a challenge for the Thai authorities to define in simple terms those who oppose the state.     

The twenty-first century Armed Forces of the Philippines: orphan of counter-insurgency or military geared for the long war of the century?

This article examines the factors that account for the Armed Forces of the Philippines's (AFP) never-ending involvement in many wars of the third kind. It discusses the essence of counter-insurgency warfare or low-intensity conflict in the Philippine setting. The article then notes that the disruption in the US military assistance after 1992, the AFP's inability to modernize, and its continuous campaign against communist and secessionist insurgents have adversely affected its structure and overall combat efficiency. It also analyzes the impact of the global war on terror on the Philippine military's counter-insurgency operations and the reforms undertaken by the Philippine defense establishment to address these issues. In conclusion, the article argues that reforms will not lead to a significant transformation of the AFP as it will continue to be an orphan of counter-insurgency in the near future. However, if wars of the third kind will persist, this situation will paradoxically make the AFP the only military in Southeast Asia aptly geared for the long war of this century.     

ISIS as an Existential Threat to the Druze: The Struggle for Survival

Faced with an existential threat by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria on one hand, and the repressive regime of Bashar Al-Assad on the other, the Druze community in Syria is faced with a dilemma of what political and military position to take. This study examines a variety of internal and external factors that affect the Druze's political and military choices in Syria, and finds that their best choice is to remain neutral in the conflict. I argue that any political and military choice by the Druze in Syria besides neutrality risks endangering the survival of the entire community. This article examines how internal organizational factors and the international community's divided position play important roles in understanding the Druze's decision to maintain a position of neutrality.     

Exploring Strategies and Implications of an Opportunistic Alliance: A Case Study of Pakistan and China

This article seeks to test the validity of ‘balance of threat’ theory as propounded by Stephen Walt that states react to imbalances of threat. It takes into account the factors enumerated by Walt to explore threat perceptions of Pakistan and the strategy they developed to cope with security threats. It attempts to take an overview of Pakistan's security dilemma its responses in twin time frames: the Cold War period (1980–1989) and the post-Cold War period (1990–2000) with relevance to the contemporary period. Pakistan's arms acquisition, upgradation in sophistication of arsenals, increase in fund allocation in defence have all been its tangible tactics to neutralize India's military superiority. Pakistan explored Pan-Islamism to bring the support of the Islamic states. Pakistan also resorted to an active alliance with China, to increase its competency. From a theoretical angle, this article adopts a realist viewpoint, focuses on security concerns of state actors.     

Ethnic and sectarian violence and the propensity towards praetorianism in Pakistan

This article focuses on Pakistan and its divided society, and on its decades of characteristic irresponsible and unaccountable leaderships. It argues that a culture of mistrust--a product of a society divided along ethnic and sectarian lines--and poor governance has facilitated fluid civil and civil-military alliances which have in turn legitimised praetorianism by either 1) giving rise to inter-ethnic clashes; 2) fomentation of ethnic and sectarian violence; or 3) formidable multi-ethnic opposition to civilian governments. These outcomes have consequently increased the utility of coercion and the saliency of praetorianism (direct or indirect military intervention). As such this article utilises the 'coercion thesis', put forth by scholars of Asian civil-military relations, which maintains that, as the utility of coercion increases, so does the influence and saliency of praetorianism. It is ultimately argued that Pakistan's divided society, with its subsequent ethnic and sectarian violence and fluid alliances, has contributed to the country's propensity toward praetorianism. The significance of this thesis is summarised as the need for both accountable leadership and economic recovery.     

The PKK Problem: Explaining Turkey's Failure to Develop a Political Solution

This article discusses why Turkey has failed to propose an effective political solution of the Kurdish problem. It is argued that Turkey's failure to propose an effective political agenda is the main explanation of why Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK) insurgency has been rampant for so long. Turkey's commitment to militaristic methods worsened the Kurdish problem by creating deeper social problems. Furthermore, it is argued that the explanations tendered also point out the important factors that may affect the fate of any political agenda on the Kurdish problem, including that of the recent Kurdish initiative of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government.     

Peacekeepers Fighting a Counterinsurgency Campaign: A Net Assessment of the African Union Mission in Somalia

In response to Somalia's decades-long political and humanitarian crises, the African Union has deployed a peace support operation known as the African Union Mission in Somalia. Tasked to help eliminate an ongoing insurgency, the mission has seen heavy combat as it fights to reclaim territory held by the al-Shabaab militant organization. This article applies the techniques of open source campaign analysis to assess the mission's prospects for long-term success. The prognosis is not good. Analysis reveals a range of vulnerabilities that threaten the deployment's core security objectives, suggesting that the optimism many have expressed for the mission is misplaced.     

Boko Haram: understanding the context

Boko Haram insurgency has caused the death and displacement of thousands of Nigerians. Its means of terror has evolved from the use of crude weapons to bombs, kidnappings and the use of children as suicide bombers. Its reach has expanded beyond Nigeria into neighbouring West African countries and it has pledged allegiance to Al-Qaida and Islamic State. To address this security concern, its cause should first be ascertained. This paper argues that to do this, Boko Haram should be located in northern Nigerian historical context/environment. This paper reviews economic greed and grievance, extreme religious ideology and political opportunity in historic insurgencies in northern Nigeria. It finds that while the interplay of different factors shaped these insurgencies; it was political opportunity that ignited their onsets. Finally, the article submits that as long as these factors remain the same, military quelling of Boko Haram will not prevent a re-emergence of its likes.     

Hybrid Actors,Tactical Variety: Rethinking Asymmetric and Hybrid War

Wars like those in Iraq and Afghanistan should be understood as hybrid wars, wars in which elements of ethnic or tribal conflict, ideologically based insurgency, factional squabbling, and organized crime are inextricably intertwined, with the same actors playing multiple and partially conflicting roles. Hybrid war is inherently transnational, featuring transnational crime networks, “migrant warriors,” transnational diaspora links, legitimate international trade, and foreign intervention. It takes place in hybridized states reliant on local warlords and other actors whose power prevents effective state-building. In this context, while counterinsurgency doctrine prescribes appropriate military strategy and tactics, the core problem is more political than military. Since a hybridized client state is not likely to be politically reformable even if a foreign ally achieves military success, outside allies like the United States should generally refrain from boots-on-the-ground intervention, pursuing instead a diplomatic solution, even though such a deal is likely to be unpalatable.     

Terrorism: A strategic perspective

This paper compares the U.S. national security strategy's vision for counter‐terrorism missions to the political realm in which conventional military forces and terrorists operate. Terrorist acts and state responses are analyzed to demonstrate that they have differing political effects, which calls into question the political utility of a conventional military counterterrorist response. Terrorism is placed within context of the present era as, according to Martin van Creveld, evolving historical conditions are wrenching warfare out of the political realm in which Clausewitz's analysis originally posited warfare's extension of political activity based on state power. The article also discusses terrorism's nebulous placement within the levels of war to reveal another aspect of terrorism's different relationship to the political realm. Ultimately, this challenges the U.S. national security strategy's conclusion that conventional military force used in “punitive” or “counterterrorism” operations is an effective political response to terrorism.     

A Comparative Study of U.S. and Iranian Counter-ISIS Strategies

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)'s activities now go beyond insurgency and conventional operations in the territories it controls in the Middle East. It poses a threat to U.S. interests and allies in Europe, and a serious threat to Iran and its borders. While Washington formed an international coalition encompassing many European and Middle Eastern states to combat ISIS, it only coordinates some tactical and operation-level efforts with a key player on the ground: Iran. For its part, Iran is leveraging similar counter-ISIS tools as those adopted by the United States, despite their strategies differing fundamentally.     

Authority in rebel groups: identity,recognition and the struggle over legitimacy

This article asks how rebel leaders capture and lose legitimacy within their own movement. Analysing these complex and often uneasy relations between elites and grassroots of insurgency is important for understanding the success or failure of peace processes. This is because internal contestation over authority between rival rebel leaders can drive a movement’s external strategy. Based on ethnographic research on the Karen and Kachin rebellions in Myanmar and insights from Political Sociology, the article suggests that leadership authority is linked to social identification and the claim to recognition among insurgent grassroots. If rebel leaders manage to satisfy their grassroots’ claim to recognition, their insurgent orders are stable. Failing this, their authority erodes and is likely to be challenged. These findings contribute to understanding insurgency and peace negotiations in Myanmar and civil wars more generally by showing how struggles over legitimacy within rebel groups drive wider dynamics of war and peace.     

Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israel's Controversial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising 1

We assess the impact of Israel's targeted assassinations policy on rates of Palestinian violence from September 2000, the beginning of Al-Aqsa uprising, through June 2004. Literature concerning the relationship between repression and rebellion suggests four plausible effects of targeted assassinations on insurgents: deterrence, backlash, disruption, and incapacitation. Using differenced and lagged time-series analysis, this article utilizes multiple and logistic regression to evaluate the effect of targeted assassinations on Palestinian violence. It is concluded that targeted assassinations have no significant impact on rates of Palestinian attacks. Targeted assassinations do not decrease rates of Palestinian violence, nor do they increase them, whether in the short or long run. Targeted assassinations may be useful as a political tool to signal a state's determination to punish terrorists and placate an angry public, but there is little evidence that they actually impact the course of an insurgency.