Domestic Opposition and the Timing of Democratic Transitions after War

A substantial literature urges delaying elections and liberalization in postwar societies. There is little work, however, on when and how international missions that intend to delay elections and the transfer of sovereignty, such as those in Kosovo and Iraq, are able to do so. To fill this gap, I propose a theory that identifies conditions under which two forms of domestic opposition—elite objections and mass demonstrations—can at times force the international community to adopt an earlier transition plan. Following the predictions of the theory, I show that international occupations in Kosovo and Iraq were only able to implement their preferred transition plans when conditions were unfavorable for domestic opposition: when the absence of centralized authority within key groups makes an elite boycott unlikely, and when international policy does not threaten a major group's nationalist goals, making the emergence of widespread mass demonstrations doubtful. The implication for policy is that attempting to delay elections and liberalization is only advisable when domestic opposition is unlikely to be effective.     

Rescinding the signature of an international treaty: the United States and the rome statute establishing the international criminal court

The international communiry's efforts to create a global permanent penal court culminated in the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court of 1998. Although the United States of America initially signed it, it later withdrew the signature thus signalling its very strong opposition to it. This article attempts, on the one hand, to examine and analyze the US opposition from the standpoint of international relations and diplomatic law and, on the other, to determine its legaliry in the context of the law of treaties.     

Buying treaties with cigarettes: Internal side‐payments in two level games

Two‐level games models predict that domestic division within a state can alter the extent to which that state is able to reach agreements with other states, and also alter the content of any agreement that is reached. I extend the model by introducing internal side‐payments composed of unrelated domestic issues. Domestic opposition to an international agreement will inhibit cooperation most when the executive and median legislators are in relative agreement about other salient domestic political issues. Domestic opposition to an international agreement will inhibit cooperation least when the executive and median legislators are in relative disagreement about other salient domestic political issues. U.S. ratifications of the NAFTA and the Chemical Weapons Convention illustrate that not all types of domestic division inhibit international cooperation—some can facilitate it     

Crafting competitive party systems: Electoral laws and the opposition in Africa

After the resurgence of democracy in the 1990s, as was the case after independence, dominant party systems are predominant in Africa. This has occurred irrespective of the particular electoral system used. Both scholars and practitioners have so far failed to appreciate the fact that not fragmentation but concentration of the party system is the main challenge and that a choice between proportional representation or a plurality electoral system will do little to change the fortunes of the majority party and the opposition. This article goes beyond the current debate by suggesting that opposition parties in Africa could be crafted through a minority premium, preferably in combination with a majority ceiling. Such electoral engineering would in the long‐term contribute to the emergence of a two‐party system, generally recognized as the environment most congenial to a strong parliamentary opposition. In the short‐term, adoption of a minority premium would increase competitiveness.     

Immovable Positions: Public Acknowledgment and Bargaining in Military Basing Negotiations

Why might public acknowledgment of cooperative security negotiations generate bargaining constraints that provoke stalemate? Previous scholarship points to aroused public opinion. Yet in many cases where hard-line bargaining stances develop and talks collapse following public acknowledgment, it is not domestic political pressures that tie leaders’ hands. This article examines instead an international constraint attendant to publicity: opposition by third-party states. I argue that international power position shapes the balance of vulnerability between the negotiating parties to abandonment and entanglement. The act of official acknowledgment can constrain the more vulnerable partner by enabling third-party states to credibly scrutinize its intentions. By threatening strained relations, such scrutiny can create a security dilemma that reduces the weaker partner's bargaining range to a choice between cooperation on its terms and noncooperation. I evaluate this argument by studying foreign military basing negotiations. Statistical analyses and a comparative case study produce strong support for my argument.     

Rescinding the signature of an international treaty: the United States and the rome statute establishing the international criminal court

The international communiry's efforts to create a global permanent penal court culminated in the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court of 1998. Although the United States of America initially signed it, it later withdrew the signature thus signalling its very strong opposition to it. This article attempts, on the one hand, to examine and analyze the US opposition from the standpoint of international relations and diplomatic law and, on the other, to determine its legaliry in the context of the law of treaties.     

Who Can Reform the Labor Market? IMF Conditionality,Partisanship, and Labor Unions

Labor market reforms are critical for economic growth. Yet, they are politically contentious, and governments, more often than not, are faced with strong opposition from interest groups. Scholarly work shows that governments often rely on external intervention to implement politically difficult reforms. This is the case with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that typically conditions its financing on the implementation of required reforms. Do borrowing governments benefit from IMF programs to overcome domestic opposition to reform by organized interests? Utilizing a unique new data set on IMF conditionality, I show that partisan and electoral concerns and domestic alliances strongly affect the implementation of labor market reforms, even when the IMF imposes them. When faced with increasing number of strikes, left-wing governments are more likely to implement labor market reforms than center/right-wing governments. However, the left is less likely than the center/right to fulfill its international commitments during election years when labor groups are militant. These findings highlight the left’s unique ability to form pro-reform coalitions and the IMF’s conditional role in removing domestic political opposition to reform. Counter-intuitively, right-wing governments still struggle to reform the labor market, even during economic crises and under IMF programs.     

When States Prefer Non-Citizens Over Citizens: Conflict Over Illegal Immigration into Malaysia

Why would a state encourage illegal immigration over the opposition of its citizens? According to the theories of immigration and citizenship, we should expect exactly the opposite: that states will monitor, control, and restrict illegal immigrants' access to citizenship on behalf of its citizens, as has been the experience of most countries. I use my research on Filipino immigration to Sabah, Malaysia to show how Malaysia utilizes census practices and documentation to incorporate an illegal immigrant population from the Philippines. Illegal immigrants play an electoral role in Sabah because of the loosely institutionalized nature of citizenship, a feature common to many other developing countries. Our examination of Malaysia reveals several elements of illegal immigration and citizenship that are common to migratory flows in other developing countries. I conclude by showing how this case is generalizable and what it tells us about illegal immigrant participation in the international system.     

System Structure and State Strategy: Adding Hedging to the Menu

This paper presents “strategic hedging” as a way to conceptualize much of the strategic behavior currently employed by second-tier states like China, Russia, Brazil, and France. Hedging is an alternative to strategies like balancing, bandwagoning, and buck-passing. Like those other strategies, hedging is driven by structural incentives associated with the current polarity of the international system and power concentration trends within it. Hedging will be most prevalent in international systems that are defined by a leading state that, while in a position of power preponderance, is also in the process of relative decline. Strategic hedging behavior is effective for second-tier states in such deconcentrating unipolar systems because it avoids outright confrontation with the system leader in the short term, while still increasing the hedging state's ability to survive such a direct military confrontation should it occur in the long run. Strategic hedging behavior can also be used to insure the hedging state against security threats that might result from the loss of public goods or subsidies that are currently being provided by the system leader. In this article, I define strategic hedging behavior, present a mechanism for identifying empirical evidence of strategic hedging, and apply that mechanism to three case studies: the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, Brazil's approach to regional leadership, and French opposition to the 2003 us invasion of Iraq.     

Threats at Home,Threats Abroad: Bargaining and War in the Shadow of Coups and Revolutions

I analyze a two-level game in which a leader bargains over the spoils of international bargaining with a domestic opposition that can threaten her with a coup or revolution. While fighting an international war shrinks the domestic pie, it also alters the distribution of domestic power. This has three main implications. First, if war will undermine the opposition, fighting may be so attractive that leaders demand more for peace than foreign states are willing to give, leading to war. Second, if war will bolster the opposition, leaders accept harsh terms to avoid fighting—strategic selection that has implications for the observed relationship between war and political survival. Finally, prospective shifts in the distribution of domestic power caused by war can reduce the effects of international asymmetric information, though the result may be to increase or decrease the chances of war.     

The transnational protection regime and democratic breakthrough in Taiwan and South Korea

External state pressure is understood to have played a causally significant role in democratic breakthrough in Taiwan and South Korea during the 1980s. This article problematizes the international dimensions of democratization in Taiwan and South Korea by first providing a revisionist account of external agency which involved complex networks of transnational nonstate and substate actors. These included human rights activists, Christian churches and related ecumenical organizations, members of the Taiwanese and Korean diaspora communities in the US, academics and students, foreign journalists, and members of the US Congress. In forming a transnational “protection regime” during the 1970s and 1980s to protect the political opposition from repressive governments, they contributed to the development of effective democratic movements. The case studies provide us with a more comprehensive view of the international dimensions of democratization, speaking to both the country specific and general theoretical literatures on democratization at the same time.     

Public resistance to privatisation in water and energy

Since the 1990s, development agencies and international institutions have promoted private-sector involvement in infrastructure, assuming that this would inject both investment and efficiency into the under-performing public sector. In the water and energy sectors, these expectations have not been fulfilled. Private-sector investment in developing countries is falling, multinational companies have failed to make sustainable returns on their investments, and the process of privatisation in water and energy has proved widely unpopular and encountered strong political opposition. This paper examines the role of this opposition in delaying, cancelling, or reversing the privatisation of water and energy. Local civil society has successfully mobilised highly effective political activity, its opposition being based on the perceived conflicts between privatisation and equity, and over the role of the state and community in these sectors. Such opposition has involved dynamic interactions with existing political parties and structures, including the use of existing electoral and judicial mechanisms. Its success poses challenges for the multilateral and donor community, NGOs, the opposition campaigns themselves, and the future of national systems of electricity and water.     

Opposition dynamism under authoritarianism: the case of Yemen, 1994–2011

In contrast to the empirical conditions in large parts of the authoritarian world, the systematic literature on political opposition under authoritarianism either treats the opposition as a static entity or fails to comprehensively address its dynamic character. On the basis of a critical literature review and an ensuing analysis of the Joint Meeting Parties, a cross-ideological opposition alliance that gradually evolved to become the main competitor of the Salih regime in Yemen, we suggest that political opposition in electoral authoritarian regimes is an intrinsically dynamic institution in terms of its organizational shape, its goals and its modes of contestation. We also show that, while authoritarian structures do set the basic conditions defining opposition action, much of what motivates this action and contributes to opposition dynamism emerges from within the opposition. In addition, our findings on the Yemeni case suggest that opposition dynamism peaks when the strength of the opposition is nearly on par with that of the regime.     

Conclusion: agency,context and emergent post-uprising regimes

This conclusion summarizes the evidence explaining the divergent trajectories taken by post Arab uprising states in terms of multiple variables, each illustrated by an iconic case, namely: State Failure and Competitive governance (Syria), Regime Restoration and Hybrid Governance (Egypt) and Polyarchic Governance (Tunisia). Factors include the starting point: levels of opposition mobilization and regimes' resilience – a function of their patrimonial-bureaucratic balance; whether or not a transition coalition forms is crucial for democratization prospects. Context also matters for democratization, particularly political economic factors, such as a balance of class power and a productive economy; political culture (level of societal identity cleavages) and a minimum of international intervention. Finally, the balance of agency between democracy movements, Islamists, the military and workers shapes democratization prospects.     

Political competition and foreign policy power sharing

In this essay I examine the intersection of domestic and international politics in the formation and conduct of foreign policy. 1 develop a three‐actor model that allows us to specify the incentives for power sharing under different assumptions about the distribution of preferences and capabilities between a government, a domestic opposition, and a foreign state. The model generates several interesting hypotheses about the interaction of policy goals and the willingness of actors to share power. In particular, I show that under certain conditions there are important asymmetries whereby doves may be more willing to share power than hawks. Importantly, this willingness is endogenous to the model and comes from the alignment of preferences in the policy space, rather than from an a priori value for the democratization of foreign policy making. The model also suggests several hypotheses about the circumstances under which states have incentives to meddle in the foreign policy processes of other states.     

Rhetoric and ethics: looking at the marks of our reading/speaking in society

ABSTRACT

This article follows aspects of the current debate on racism as embodied in the AIDS-HIV controversy. It discusses President Thabo Mbeki's AIDS letter to world leaders in terms of the religious reality it invokes and his reaction to opposition at home regarding his stance on the link between AIDS and HIV. His handling of opposition is analysed in terms of Emmanuel Levinas's concept of the Other and J Hillis Miller's concept of the law of the text. The article concludes that the debate on racism is still stifled by essentialist thinking on both sides of the racial spectrum, making it very difficult to transcend the situation.     

International Plug 'n Play? Citizen Activism, the Internet, and Global Public Policy

One of the most dramatic changes in world politics has been the rise to prominence of citizen networks. Among the many factors responsible for their emergence are new communication technologies, and in particular the World-Wide Web. Opinions on the nature and significance of these citizen networks, however, are mixed. Some applaud citizen networks as potential counter-hegemonic forces and expressions of democratic participation. Others see them, on the contrary, as undemocratic and largely destructive. Straddling both of these views is a third argument that suggests "real" communities cannot be sustained on the Internet, hence calling into question the long-term viability of citizen networks as actors on the world political stage. To help push these debates further, this article examines the case of the citizen networks that emerged to lobby against the Multilateral Agreement on Investments, focusing in particular on how the Internet played a part in the opposition movement. The case suggests that, contrary to those who see new media as an obstacle to global citizen etworks, the Internet and World-Wide Web greatly facilitated their activities. As a consequence, citizen networks will likely continue to grow and expand, intruding into international policymaking processes. The article concludes by examining several global public policy issues that are raised by this shift in the landscape of world politics that will have to be addressed by practitioners of international relations in years to come.     

Discourse,genealogy and methods of text selection in international relations

Abstract

Discourse analysis, once the purview of critical theories of international politics, has emerged as a mainstream methodology for understanding international relations. While interest in such perspectives has enriched international relations theory, much about the nature of methods—that is, specific empirical processes for the gathering and analysis of evidence—is left ambiguous in this scholarship. Which texts should discourse analyses focus on? And, more practically, how should those texts be chosen? Building on discussions of case study methodology from both qualitative and interpretive social science, this article contributes to theoretical and empirical projects within discourse theory by suggesting a method for text selection: the random selection of texts. I argue that random selection processes are beneficial for discourse analyses that aim to study broad cultural patterns, such as genealogy. Random selection is not simply a means of choosing texts, but also a more comprehensive logic for thinking about the purpose of texts in discourse analysis.     

International politics: The continuing search for theory

The decline of the search for a general theory of international politics during the past two decades is generally conceded by scholars. Disillusionment with the search developed out of the conviction that the ambitious efforts of the 1950's proved to be inadequate and unsatisfactory in explaining the complexity of international politics. In recent years scholarly interest has shifted to the development of inductive approaches involving the increasing use of quantitative methods and techniques as an aid to the understanding of international behavior. These efforts have also prompted criticism and dissatisfaction but they continue to dominate research. To correct or reverse this trend and to revive interest in explicit theorizing, Kenneth Waltz in Theory and International Politics has attempted the formulation of a systems theory of international politics using a philosophy of science approach. His purpose is to indicate the relative influence of international system and state forces on international behavior, the variation of causes and effects in different types of international systems and the specification of the elements of international systems. A critical examination of Waltz's work reveals that he has achieved only the last objective primarily because of a pronounced tendency to neglect or minimize the influence of states on the international system and to attribute too much influence to international systems on the behavior of states. The result is at best a theoretical framework but not a rigorously developed systems theory. The writer has modestly attempted a reformulation of Waltz's framework taking into account the increasing importance of the regional level in systems theory. Hypothetical relationships between the global system, regional systems, and states are suggested to draw attention to the interrelationship of levels of analysis in the study of international politics in an effort to promote theoretical coherence if not a general theory of international politics.     

Social Media Influence on Diplomatic Negotiation: Shifting the Shape of the Table

Social media is changing not only the atmosphere in which international negotiations take place; it is also changing the very substance of the deals. Because of the pace and proliferation of social media, negotiators must read “weak signals” early on—and anticipate a quickly organized, highly motivated opposition. However, diplomatic negotiators still lack the tools to engage in this sort of anticipatory strategy design. This article examines two recent cases, one involving the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the other involving a German Constitutional Court’s ruling on the European Central Bank’s Public Debt Purchasing Program, in which social media had a highly disruptive, unanticipated impact on international negotiations—to the point of forcing negotiators’ hands—and suggests institutional remedies to better anticipate the catalytic impact of advancing technology on diplomatic interactions.