Why Do Some Insurgent Groups Agree to Cease-Fires While Others Do Not? A Within-Case Analysis of Burma/Myanmar, 1948–2011

This article uses Burma/Myanmar from 1948 to 2011 as a within-case context to explore why some armed insurgent groups agree to cease-fires while others do not. Analyzing 33 armed groups it finds that longer-lived groups were less likely to agree to cease-fires with the military government between 1989 and 2011. The article uses this within-case variation to understand what characteristics would make an insurgent group more or less likely to agree to a cease-fire. The article identifies four armed groups for more in-depth qualitative analysis to understand the roles of the administration of territory, ideology, and legacies of distrust with the state as drivers of the decision to agree to or reject a cease-fire.     

Taking Hand-Outs or Going It Alone: Nationalization versus Privatization in the Funding of Islamist Terrorist Groups

This article explores the consequences for the funding of Islamist terrorist groups of nationalization, in the form of state sponsorship, versus privatization, in the form of autonomous financing. The article begins by examining the evolution in terrorist groups’ sources of funding from state sponsorship to autonomous activity, then turns to the benefits and costs to terrorist groups of relying on state sponsors. The article then analyzes the benefits and costs of procuring funding autonomously. Finally, the article weighs those benefits and costs in relation to a terrorist group's emphasis on enhancing its constituency versus pursuing its agenda. The article's central conclusion is that nationalization tends to boost a terrorist group's constituency while privatization tends to bolster a group's agenda. Determining which advantage takes priority depends on the relative importance to a given terrorist group at a particular time of enhancing its constituency versus advancing its agenda.     

Fighting Networked Terrorist Groups: Lessons from Israel

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States faced “networked” adversaries: insurgent groups that communicated and coordinated their political and military campaigns without a central command. The rise of networked groups is a direct result of the preponderance of U.S. military power. Consequently, this article asks: What strategies have been most effective in defeating networked groups? To answer this question, the article examines Israeli operations against Palestinian groups during Operation Defense Shield in 2002. It argues that the most effective strategy to defeat networked adversaries is to use networked strategies. In Israel, this meant establishing multiple units to penetrate Palestinian urban areas, swarm together from several directions, and kill or capture militants.     

Why are Informal Loans Still a Big Deal? Evidence from North-east Thailand

Abstract

This article examines the use and benefit of informal loans for different income groups of rural households in north-east Thailand. Using a difference-in-differences estimation approach, which is later complemented by propensity score matching, the article shows that different household groups profit from informal loans in different ways. Poor households increase their asset endowment, and in particular farming assets, whereas rich households’ (food) consumption rises, especially if households borrow due to a shock. By showing that informal loans serve different households for different purposes, this article provides an explanation why they still play an important role.     

Social Class: Perception and Reality

Middle class is a social construct and a moniker so central to the identity politics of the United States that it has become a persistent part of the rhetoric of both major political parties. This article seeks to understand how the way in which people categorize themselves in social class matches the observable characteristics that might be used to objectively classify them into such groups. This article examines survey data from a national poll and finds that a majority of the respondents consider themselves members of the middle class. While those in the lowest and highest income categories are less likely to categorize themselves as middle class (controlling for other factors), many in these groups also consider themselves middle class.     

In defense of the realm: Financing loyalist terrorism in Northern Ireland—part one: Extortion and blackmail

The revival of loyalist terrorism has been one of the most important developments in Northern Ireland in the 1990s. This article examines the recent fund‐raising activities of the two main loyalist paramilitary groups, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). The article focuses particularly on the financial importance of extortion and blackmail to the groups in the 1990s. It also explores how the loyalist paramilitaries have responded, as organizations, to the constant need for funds, a need that has continued unabated since both groups implemented cease‐fires in 1994. The paper concludes that because of internal arrangements, the loyalist groups are consistently risking the spread of corruption among their most senior members.     

The Lebanese Hizballah and Israeli Counterterrorism

This article examines Israel's attempts to weaken and defeat the Lebanese Hizballah. It reviews Hizballah's rise after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Hizballah's successful effort to force Israeli forces to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000, the 2006 war, and Israeli attempts to deter Hizballah. The article argues that Israel has largely failed to defeat Hizballah militarily and politically. Israel's experience offers lessons for how terrorist groups learn, the effectiveness of terrorist attrition strategies against casualty-sensitivity states, the difficulties in coercing terrorist groups, and the importance of an information strategy. Finally, Israel's clash with Hizballah indicates the importance of thinking of groups that are large and multi-faceted from a counterinsurgency paradigm.     

State Power and Its Implications for Civil War Colombia

The following article examines the relationship between state power and civil war in Colombia. It presents three key findings. First, state weakness has provided armed groups with the political opportunity for rebellion. In this respect, most rebel consolidation takes place in areas of Colombia that lack a strong state presence. Second, the growth and evolution of Colombia's armed groups are directly related to their ability to loot exportable natural resource commodities. In stateless areas of Colombia, rebel consolidation tends to take place in areas where the drug trade is also present. Third, the conditions of civil war have led insurgent groups to mimic some of the basic functions and attributes of statehood. Colombia's conflict is more than just a manifestation of popular frustration; indeed, this article shows that civil war is also a form of state-building.     

Single-Issue Terrorism: A Neglected Phenomenon?

The willingness of some single-issue groups to use violence in the pursuit of their cause has received surprisingly little attention within the literature on terrorism. This article seeks to add to our understanding of this phenomenonnamely that of single-issue terrorismby focusing on the increasing tendency of groups within the British animal rights movement to utilize violent methods in order to achieve their objectives. The article will seek to further the argument that some single-issue groups have been willing to use violence in past campaigns, thereby highlighting the understudied nature of the phenomenon. This will be illustrated by examining the campaign of single-issue terrorism undertaken by the militant suffragettes in Britain in the 1910s.     

Drink,Drugs, and Rock'n'Roll: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland — Part Two

Though the main loyalist groups have now been observing cease-fires for nearly five years, the fund-raising activities of these organizations has continued unabated. Following from the previous article on this subject, this paper gives an account of the various fund-raising methods which are currently being used by the loyalists. Particular attention is focused on the controversial topic of drug dealing. Related to this topic, the article considers in detail the emergence in 1996 of the splinter group, the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF). The rise and subsequent fall of this faction provides a telling case study in the importance of understanding the fund-raising methods and policies of terrorist groups. The article concludes that the financial dimension to terrorism in Northern Ireland presents an as yet unrecognized and extremely serious obstale to lasting peace.     

International terrorism

In this article, it is argued that the U.S. ICBM force has no strategic value and should be dismantled. The article outlines a post‐cold war U.S. strategic nuclear force and proposes how this dyad force fits a strategy rather than offering a strategy to fit within the force. Deterrence theory anchors the analysis here. Second, this article asserts that U.S. security will be enhanced in the next century with Russian‐American cooperation on nuclear issues. Moving to a dyad now is step one in that direction, which in turn changes the perception of U.S. strategic weapons.

As weapons proliferate, deterrence against renegade nations and groups must become the cornerstone of U.S. doctrine. A dyad force and Russian‐American cooperation, both steps that restructure U.S. doctrine, will begin a process that deters these nations or groups.

This article depicts how each leg of the U.S. triad that remains following the START II treaty is a continuation of START I logic and planning. In other words, the article attempts to show how the rationale for a START II treaty force does not mirror a changed world. The purpose of this evidence is not to be dogmatic or critical but to strengthen the argument that U.S. nuclear strategy is still reflective of a bygone era.     

Images of Populism and Producerism: Political Cartoons from Serbia’s ‘Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution’*

This article contributes to debates about the break-up of Yugoslavia by focusing on Serbia’s ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’, a large protest wave that occurred in 1988. Unlike most discussions which focus on elite involvement, this article emphasises the wider cultural resonance of anti-bureaucratic populism. More generally, this article shows that populism can be strengthened if it is coupled with producerism, that is, a discourse that divides society into productive and parasitic groups. Around 800 political cartoons from three Serbian newspapers are analysed. The common theme that emerges is the opposition of the blue-collar worker to the parasitic political functionary.     

Ideological Rigidity and Flexibility of Secular and Religious Terror Groups: The Case of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Hamas

This article explores the ideological rigidity of secular and religious terror groups. Analyzing leaflets disseminated by two Palestinian groups during the First Intifada, it examines if and how each shifted its identity and goals in response to repression, political shifts, or resource changes. The results suggest that while similar catalysts led to ideological reformation among the secular and the religious group, the extent of ideological change within the religious group was more limited. The article argues for the need to disaggregate ideological analysis further in order to identify more subtle shifts, alterations, and omissions, in the positions held by religious terror groups, moving past the exploration of if such changes exist in ideological templates and instead focusing on the extent and type of alterations the different groups allow.     

Political Capital,Everyday Politics and Moral Obligations: Understanding the Political Strategies of Various Elites and the Poor in Kyrgyzstan

Using the Bourdieusian framework to analyse the nature of social stratification in rural Kyrgyzstan, this article examines how local politics is strategised by different groups in the social field. The article suggests two modifications to the Bourdieusian framework to reflect better the nature of local politics. First, despite lacking significant capital holdings, poor groups undertake everyday resistance and mediated politics. Second, intellectual and traditional elites engage in the politics of ‘doing the right thing’, motivated by a sense of moral obligation. The article provides a critical challenge to the concept of clan and elite-led politics which is often used to explain events in Central Asia.     

From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: how the Ethiopian intervention and the ‘War on Terror’ exacerbated the conflict in Somalia

Abstract

External intervention has frustrated and continues to frustrate peace and stability in the Horn of Africa and Somalia, adding various adverse layers to an already complicated and complex conflict. The level of forceful military engagement intended for regional domination has profoundly affected negatively the efforts of peacebuilding and statebuilding in Somalia. This article examines how the earlier Ethiopian policies towards Somalia has reshaped the (post)-Cold War politics of the Horn. In doing so, it traces the roots of the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia vis-à-vis new non-state armed groups to chart the changing political dynamics of the conflict in Somalia. By using historical approach, the article argues that Ethiopia’s agenda is central to understanding why the ‘War on Terror’ has strengthened and subsequently midwifed armed militant movements (e.g. new insurgency groups) in Somalia, starting from Al-Itihaad to today’s Al-Shabaab. In focusing upon various regional actors and groups, the article moves from the emphasis of internal systems to external power structures, considering the wider historical and political factors in the region that must be closely examined if the regional and local conflicts are to be deeply understood. While it is a context-specific study, the article aims to contribute fresh perspectives and insights to ongoing discussions on the consequences of the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia.     

Explaining Strategic Violence after Wars

This article aims to explain why strategic violence against targeted groups emerges after some civil wars but not others. It argues that when one side has captured the coercive apparatus of the state, and the potentially hostile losing side is less vulnerable to predation, the leaders of the victorious group can reward their domestic constituents and conduct in-group policing to prevent opportunistic violence. But when an armed group fails to achieve state capture and the losing side remains in a vulnerable position relative to its former enemies, neither side can credibly guarantee their domestic allies a share of the resources of the state or conduct effective in-group policing of potential extremists. Using Kosovo and East Timor as case studies, this article shows that in these cases, strategic violence is less a function of a concerted attempt to spoil a settlement than of the internal bargaining of new splinter groups.     

Politicized policy access: The effect of politicization on interest group access to advisory councils

Current scholarship often concludes that technical expertise is one of the most important commodities for interest groups wishing to gain access to political-administrative venues. Less attention has been given to politicization and the scope of societal support that interest groups bring to bear. Specifically, I hypothesize that the capacity of interest groups to supply broad societal support is decisive for gaining access in highly politicized policy domains. To test this expectation, the article combines a mapping of interest group membership in 616 Belgian advisory councils with survey data from more than 400 organized interests. The empirical analyses demonstrate that interest groups with broad support are more likely to gain access to advisory councils in highly politicized policy domains, but this effect is negatively moderated when interest groups involve their constituencies intensely in advocacy processes.     

Joel Gregory Prize/Prix Joël Gregory 1989

In Sudan the pastoral groups of nomad origin constitute an important component of that society. Nevertheless, these groups have been the object of a constant “invisibalisation” (symbolic and material) and of a “setting of otherness” contrasting them with other social categories in the country. This article offers a reflection on the contribution of a “pastoral perspective” as a critique of the reductionist trends of a complex of dichotomisation of the categories to consider the two Sudans and their populations. In expanding on the view of several timely ethnographies on the work of various researchers on Sudanese shepherds, as well as on the official “treatment” of these groups in national censuses or development plans, the article proposes avenues for reconsidering Sudanese studies beyond a persistent categorisation of “nomad pastoralism”, which contributes to an accentuation of the differences between the social components at the heart of each of the Sudans as well as between the current two Sudans.     

The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime,A Case Study

Scholars have long recognized that terrorist groups have engaged in transnational organized crime activities. But the question that comes up is, “When does a criminal enterprise become a terrorist group or vice versa?” Terrorist groups have used physical violence, participated in weapons and drug trafficking networks, immigrant smuggling, and money laundering. More recently a number of terrorist groups have established what Jonathan White has referred to as “illegal multinational criminal organizations.” This article will examine the convergence of terrorism and organized crime through the prism of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK).