浅析如何看待动物的权利问题

动物的权利肯定说,旨在说明人类必须给予动物某些基本权利,从根本上保障它们不受到无谓的伤害。动物的权利否认说坚决反对动物法律人格化,反对动物享有人格和人格权。而是在法律上作为客体保护必须加强。目前在民法中应当将动物作为一类特殊的物来对待,当人类和动物之间的利益关系发生根本性改变的时候,才可以考虑将动物的权利纳入立法体系,这就是本文的主旨。     

论现代西方环境权益理论中的若干新理念

<正> 法律是立法者依照一定目的制定的具有强制性、社会性的行为规范。制定一部法律,其首要的要求是该法律符合立法的目的,也即制定该法律的意图或动机。以环境立法来说,它的立法意图应当是通过对环境的法律保护,从而达到实现衡平世代间的人类利益和保持经济社会的可持续发展的目的。然而,作为法律上的“物”,环境及其自然要素(自然资源)具有已被人类认识的对人类的经济价值和正在为人类认识过程中的对自然的生态价值的两面性,它们二者均为人类在地球上不断繁衍和生存的客观基础。因此在以传统法方法保护人类自身的既得权利和利益的同时,还存在着为实现人类社会和经济的可持续发展而对传统人类的法权(对环境     

动物法律地位之探讨——兼析我国民事立法对动物的应有定位

动物保护是一个全球性的话题。对动物的保护是否必须通过改变动物的客体地位 ,使其人格化、主体化的方式方能实现 ?笔者通过对《德国民法典》的相关规定和国内外学说的考证 ,以及对动物主体化观点的剖析 ,认为动物不可能成为人类道德和法律的主体 ,动物在法律上仍是特殊的物 ,动物保护立法是动物商品价值与非商品价值、当代人利益与后代人利益冲突的产物 ,对动物的区别对待 ,实质上体现的仍是不同动物对人类的不同利益。     

论公海生物多样性的人类共同遗产属性

公海生物多样性的法律属性是解决公海生物多样性问题的基础,在国际社会中,各国从本国利益出发提出了不同的主张。从公海生物多样性的自身特性、《联合国海洋法公约》的订立过程和立法宗旨、公海生物多样性的保护以及现有人类共同遗产的形成来看,公海生物多样性应当属于人类共同遗产。我国作为发展中大国,应当在有关公海生物多样性的国际议程中坚持人类共同遗产的立场,积极开发和利用,同时也应当主动承担起负责任的大国应尽的责任。     

从“活熊取胆”看动物权益保护的限度

日前在全社会热议的"活熊取胆"事件引发人们对动物权益保护极其限度的思考,目前取缔"活熊取胆"面临影响我国传统产业发展、法律资源不足等多方面的阻力,但是这些阻力并非不可逾越,从长期来看取缔活熊取胆是应当并且可行的;西方思想史对动物权利多有论证,本文对以汤姆雷根为代表的动物权利论进行批判,而将动物福利作为动物保护与人类权益之间的平衡点,并对我国的动物福利立法建设提出建议。     

论劳动就业权的外贸法保护构想

保护外贸领域企业职工劳动就业权应当是外贸法的规定,也是政府的重要责任。我国应当修改《对外贸易法》,将劳动就业权保护作为对外贸易立法宗旨的核心内容,并增设政府作为义务,将保护职工劳动就业权纳入该作为义务中,在外贸法律相关条款中都要注意贯彻保护企业职工劳动就业权这一宗旨。我们不仅应在外贸法体系中完善不当贸易壁垒调查和评估机制、对外贸易谈判机制,加快构建贸易调整援助制度,将劳动者视为贸易救济的重要对象,还应高度重视我国外贸法对外国政府滥用贸易法律政策不当侵害我国外贸企业职工劳动就业权的预防。     

动物法律人格之否定——兼论动物之法律“物格”

随着德国民法典第 90a条的修正 ,“动物不是物”的规定对法学界带来了巨大的冲击 ,另有环境伦理学有关动物成为权利主体主张的提出 ,似乎动物取得人格权 ,成为权利主体的现实就在面前。但环境伦理学的主张并不能等同于法律学的主张 ,法律人格无法扩张至动物。奥地利、德国、瑞士等国民法典的修正主旨并不是赋予动物以法律人格。不过对动物的法律保护必须加强 ,在民法中应当将其作为一类特殊的物来对待 ,在法律规则的适用上有别于普通物。     

论人类个体基因的人格权属性

民法学界对人类个体基因法律属性的认识有不同见解。根据人类个体基因的本质、特征以及在现实中的运用,应当将人类个体基因确定为具有人格权的属性,并通过民法人格权制度对之加以保护。人类个体基因人格权属性以及人格权的法律保护体系既不会将人类个体基因的人格物化,又能通过人格权的商品化理论保护人类个体基因所拥有的财产利益,并且,人类个体基因的人格权保护是世界各国立法的趋势所在。因此,将人类个体基因权利确定为人格权属性并纳入人格权保护体系是人格权法立法的重要内容之一。     

浅论动植物的法律地位

本文通过对动植物权利理论的诸多方面分析,认为动植物不可能成为道德和法律的主体,在民事立法上,动植物只能作为民事法律关系的客体而存在。但在民法中应当将其作为一类特殊的物来对待,在法律规则的适用上应当有别于普通物。     

禁食野生动物的刑法规制与教义阐释——以《刑法修正案(十一)》第四十一条为中心

《中华人民共和国刑法修正案(十一)》增设了针对陆生野生动物以食用为目的的危害行为的法律规制,在原有罪名基础上进一步拓展了野生动物刑法保护的外延。这一立法条款修订与疫情防控的社会背景相关,体现了积极主义刑法观回应社会现实的功能。此次刑法修正案对野生动物的立法完善不仅是尊重动物伦理生命权的体现,而且深层次地涉及公共卫生安全的法益考量,是弱人类中心主义在刑事立法领域的生动展现。野生动物的刑事法律规制并未采用全面保护的立场,这一保护的有限性是刑法作为保障法的地位所决定的,这也决定了在野生动物保护的法律规则体系中,需要审慎辨析刑法与行政法律规范之间的关系。在具体适用时应当结合此次修正案的条文设置进行教义分析,合理把握具体要件的内涵与彼此之间的逻辑关系,防范以保护之名而随意逾越刑法边界。     

Beyond the property debate: animal welfare as a public good

Abstract

Animal protection is socially constructed through laws specifying which animals should be protected and how. Most jurisdictions codify animal abuse by specifying the legal protections granted to animals. While these vary between jurisdictions, western legal systems generally provide for better levels of animal protection by incorporating animal welfare and wildlife crime laws into criminal justice systems. UK legislation has long held that animal welfare is a public good, thus animals should be protected in the public interest. However, despite the protective provisions of animal protection laws they generally fall short of giving animals actual rights, protection exists only to the extent that animal and human interests coincide. Animals’ legal status as property dictates that much anti-animal abuse and wildlife crime legislation is about allowing animal exploitation commensurate with human interests. However, UK legislation in the form of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 subtly shifts this position in respect of domestic animals by imposing a duty of care towards companion animals. This paper argues that by requiring owners and responsible persons to give active consideration to the needs of individual companion animals, the Animal Welfare Act provides animals with a level of protection that amounts to a form of legal rights.     

Visibility and Invisibility of Animals in Traditional Chinese Philosophy and Law

There is yet to be any animal welfare or protection law for domestic animals in China, one of the few countries in the world today that do not have such laws. However, in Chinese imperial law, there were legal provisions adopted more than a 1,000 years ago for the care and treatment of domestic working animals. Furthermore, in traditional Chinese philosophy, animals were regarded as constituent part of the organic whole of the cosmos by ancient Chinese philosophers who saw no strict delineation between humans and non-human animals. Notwithstanding, the attitude and practice towards animals in ancient Chinese life was also ambivalent and was predicated upon the practical utility of animals for the service of humans and society. Such practice can be seen through the legal provisions in imperial China. This paper first discusses animal’s place in traditional Chinese philosophy and then in Chinese imperial law. It raises the issue of the gap discernable from the philosophical thought on animals and practice regarding animals in everyday life in China. The paper argues that given the gap in perception and attitude regarding animals, law can play an important role that moral teaching has not been able to achieve.     

胎儿的准人格地位及其人格利益保护

胎儿是一种人类生命,但又不是人;其不具有现行法规定的民事权利能力,但又必须享受一些权益的法律保护。对于胎儿的人格地位,民法理论素有争议。胎儿属于准法律人格者。准法律人格即非完全法律人格者亦非完全无法律人格者。它是法律立足于胎儿的生命特质、胎儿保护的价值理念以及民法人格制度的立法逻辑所作出的人格定位。准法律人格者享有不同于自然人的特殊的人格利益及其权益保护规则。     

The Animal: A Subject of Law? A Reflection on Aspects of the Austrian and German Juridical Systems

In recent years there has been a marked increase in interest in animal welfare issues worldwide. This subject often evokes extreme points of view, and can be both intellectually challenging and emotionally dividing. It is undeniably a field where substantial progress has taken place, with a multitude of countries worldwide implementing their own animal welfare and protection laws. However, calls continue to be voiced for more extensive and courageous measures to be taken concerning both the content and the enforcement of animal welfare legislation. To highlight a variety of these promising and noteworthy ideas this article outlines and examines some selected and qualified aspects of a potential juridical approach to the subject by consulting the legal systems of Austria and Germany under this particular premise. The aim will be to ascertain the extent to which animals have been granted consideration and protection, for instance in spheres of Constitutional or Civil Law. What options exist to safeguard an animal by a legally founded and secured position, and on which rank in the legal system could such provisions possibly be established? Ideally, a complete legal network on all possible levels of the legal system should be developed, ensuring a comprehensive and an all-embracing protection of the individual animal.     

Judicial-biotechnological system and the right to life: an approximation from the European and Spanish law]

This work consists in the systemisation of the complex and diversified of the group of normative regulations of life, of all life. This is based on the premises that it is a core value as a principle and a right and overcoming its static and predetermined conception, replacing it with a new, dynamic, individual and creative vision. Life, as a legal fact, is the basic idea in a wide legal regulation, that, notwithstanding the diversity and mobility of the norms relative to human, animal and vegetable life should be redirected at last instance towards a common and unitary legal status.     

Criminology and animality: stupidity and the anthropological machine

Although a relatively small, yet growing group of scholars have been lamenting the exclusion of nonhuman animals from the scope of criminology for over thirty years now, animals have been historically present in criminological theorizing, legal practices, and research. However, this presence has not been of the form advocated for by scholars who variously identify themselves as non-speciesist criminologists, green criminologists, or ecological criminologists, who have been arguing largely for recognition of harms perpetrated against animals, or ‘zoological crime’. Instead, the longer history of animals in criminology is as offenders or as prototypes of criminality. In this article, we are concerned with the production – vis-à-vis the anthropological machine – of the ‘stupid’ animal and subhuman within criminology and criminal justice. Guided by the political philosophy of Giorgio Agamben, we trace the animal through criminological thought from the premodern period to Lombroso to contemporary criminological scholarship illustrating how the animal has been (ab)used to shore up the classifications between humans, between humans and animals, and the intelligent and the stupid. We also examine how historically through criminal trials of animals and the feebleminded, criminal justice has played an active role in buttressing these classifications and acting on these classifications to produce bare life, that is, life without form or value.     

Bestialitatis and the New Ethics on “Human” Animals

This article discusses how the legal systems in several Western countries, with a special focus on Italy, address our present day animal rights movement and how these legal systems can faithfully reflect the movement’s values as well as promote them in a manner that will ultimately change the rights themselves and their cultural context: this is an extremely interesting issue for the semiotic study of the “humanization of animals”. Therefore, I will summarize several semiotic arguments using the model of the four ontologies by Philippe Descola and the concept of prospectivism by Eduardo Viveiros De Castro. I expect several important changes will come about thanks to the ties between philosophical animal rights discourse and legal discourse and I also believe that the two most interesting issues will be animal labor and reproduction. I will concentrate on the debate over zoophilia laws in Denmark, Germany and Italy in order to propose a way to understand the threshold which separates humans and animals in our naturalistic ontology. Nowadays, “becoming animals” and “becoming humans” seem to be two central and open-ended semiotic processes: legal rights and animal rights philosophy help bring several issues into focus such as animal subjectivity and informed consent.     

Reflecting on 25 Years of Teaching Animal Law: Is it Time for an International Crime of Animal Ecocide?

2019 marked the 25th anniversary of the introduction of Animal Law to the law degree at Liverpool John Moores University. This article examines changes in the legal protection of animals during this time and the impact this will have on research and scholarship in the law relating to animals. We examine whether the overall international treatment of animals has improved and how far the approach to the Animal Law curriculum should be influenced by the growth in concerns around climate change. In this context, we examine the development of the law of ecocide and the extent to which it addresses concerns around animal welfare across the globe. We suggest that those involved in the development of Animal Law, ethics and policy might usefully engage in a new vision of ecocide, which incorporates a clearer notion of ‘animal ecocide’. This new approach would enhance the international and national focus on animals in their own right, would recognise increasing knowledge of animal sentience and would move our responsibilities to them beyond anthropocentric approaches to environmental protection. We argue that the inclusion of a more specific reference to animal ecocide would contribute to the development of Animal Law and would lead to an enhanced relationship between Animal Law and attempts to protect the environment.