The Administrative Costs of Congressional Earmarking: The Case of the Office of Naval Research

Discussions about congressional earmarking often focus on their direct costs in the federal government's appropriations bills. This article shows that this conventional view neglects the administrative costs of earmarking by examining the extensive transaction and opportunity costs that come with the political, budgetary, and programmatic management of these earmarked projects in Congress and in the Office of Naval Research. One policy conclusion from this study is that the executive branch should make these costs transparent, as they remain largely hidden from public discussion and the consideration of the federal budget.     

The Bush Administration's Proposal for Credit Reform: Background, Analysis, and Policy Issues

Large recent and forecasted federal outlays to cover losses on deposit insurance and federally-assisted credit have increased concern in the executive and legislative branches about potential future liabilities of the federal government. These potential liabilities include federal credit; consequently, this renewed interest in federal credit reform. Credit reform would have to change the budgetary treatment of federal direct loans and federal guaranteed loans. Currently, the unified budget measures the cost of federal credit on a cash flow basis. Critics (including the Bush Administration) maintain that the appropriate budgetary measure of the costs of federal credit is the present value of the subsidies to credit recipients in the fiscal year that the credit is advanced. The Bush Administration's proposal for credit reform is presented in most detail in the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1989 (the Act), which was proposed but not enacted. The Act would have had federal officials estimate credit subsidies based on the equivalent interest rates in private credit markets. These subsidies would have been used to measure the budgetary cost of federal credit and would have required annual appropriations. Two credit revolving funds would have been established in the Treasury to finance credit flows. Many of these credit reform practices were included in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 though.     

The Evolution of Federal Spending Controls: A Brief Overview

This article reviews spending controls in the federal government over the past two decades. During this period, federal spending has grown significantly, despite budgetary controls. The article discusses various Impoundment Control acts throughout this time period with a focus on the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985 and the budget reforms of the 1990s. The article also gives an overview of whether current spending and deficit control procedures are inadequate and, if so, what stronger measures may be adopted.     

The President's FY 1990 Budget: The Last Act in a Decade of Change

This article examines the budget requests of Presidents Reagan and Bush for fiscal year 1990, and how the federal budget has changed during the decade of the 1980s. The author concludes that the federal budget has become less controllable, as the priorities and composition of federal expenditures have shifted during the Reagan years. While the Reagan and Bush budgets do not differ significantly, the manner in which they were constructed does. The effort of President Bush to define his budgetary version of a "kinder, gentler" America may be more illusory than real. The author also traces the change in federal assistance to state and local governments, concluding that, apart from transfer payments, the federal role has markedly declined.     

EC Credit Assistance Programs in the Light of the US Experience: Budgetary, Financial and Political Aspects

The bulk of the subsidy cost of European Communities (EC) credit programs is not represented in the EC budget. The cost of EC loans and guarantees are not shown, and only token entries are included for the possible activation of guarantees connected to borrowing and lending. Only in the case of credit programs which entail an interest-rate subsidy, does the budget show an amount corresponding to the subsidy cost. EC budgeting and accounting methods, like those in most member states, hide the full cost of the EC credit programs. The lack of subsidy disclosure has political implications in terms of budget decision-making and control; budget authorities have neither adequate information to compare the trade-offs among the various credit assistance programs and other expenditure programs, nor to evaluate or measure the efficiency and effectiveness of credit operations. Moreover, the citizens of Europe, who are taxpayers both in their states and, to a lesser extent, in the Community, do not have a clear understanding of the costs and benefits of credit programs, either at the state or the EC level. The article refers to the US experience of federal credit reform, especially with regard to the disclosure of the cost of credit programs, as a good example of budget transparency and investigates to what extent this experience could be applied to the European Communities.     

Testing the Policy Capacities of Budgetary Agencies: Lessons from Finance

The Commonwealth Department of Finance, together with the Treasury from which it was hived off in 1976, constitutes the central budgetary agency at the Australian federal level. For the purposes of this article, I identify Finance as a convenient working model of central budgetary agencies, at least in their traditional Australian incarnation. I accept that Finance is unlikely to be fully representative of all such Australian agencies, and I acknowledge that the federal government's annual budget is officially introduced into parliament by the Treasurer, and that the Treasury is deservedly regarded as the core budgetary agency. But my focus here is on Finance's special responsibility for the public management framework, and Finance's role in providing policy advice to government organisations on how to make the best use of budget funding. This article then presents the findings of a recent evaluation of selected policy-advising activities with the department.     

Games presidents do and do not play: Presidential circumvention of the executive branch budget process

The federal executive budgetary process has been severely criticized in recent years for its apparent inability to curb budgetary growth and limit deficits. Much of this criticism ignores the essentially political, rather than administrative, causes of these trends. Budgetary growth and deficit spending may be viewed in part as the results of presidential circumvention of budgetary and fiscal policy processes. Circumvention consists of the movement of spending decisions out of the annual review and evaluation of current-year budgetary formulation, thus evading the constraints frequently imposed by budgetary and fiscal policies. The precise mechanisms of presidential circumvention have changed over time. However, the long-term impact of circumvention has been a reduction in the controllability and comprehensiveness of the annual federal budget, as well as higher rates of budgetary growth.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the meetings of the American Political Science Association, September 1–4, 1983. We would like to thank George Downs, William Lammers, Harold Seidman, and James Sundquist for useful comments and discussion.     

A Comment on "The Great Unraveling: Federal Budgeting, 1998–2006"

To declare that the federal budgetary process is in utter shambles based principally on an analysis of a six-year interval during a single presidential administration, as Professor Irene Rubin does in the preceding article, is unfair to history and misleading. Drawing on significant budgetary experience as a U.S. Senate staff member, the author of this essay argues that (1) the contributions of emergency appropriations and earmarks to the federal budgetary imbalance are overstated, (2) the goal of perpetual budgetary balance is unsound policy, and (3) budgets—inevitably the result of a political process—are artifacts reflecting societal priorities at a given point in time.     

Budgetary Consequences of Selling Federal Power Assets

This article reports on an analysis of the long-term budgetary effects of selling federal power programs at market value. The analysis looks at changes in future budgetary receipts and costs for power operations and at changes in future federal taxes as a result of new ownership. Under current rate-setting policy, federal agencies must generate a future operating surplus (and hence, budgetary income) worth about $46 billion in today's dollars to repay past capital investments. With optimistic assumptions about rising power rates, market values for all federal power assets (including the power-generation assets of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers) could be as high as $62 billion. In that case, their sale would produce long-term budgetary savings of about $16 billion, in today's dollars. The analysis also notes that budgetary savings are not a measure of the gains in economic efficiency from privatization. Such considerations as efficiency or fairness to particular groups will be important in any debate about the future of federal power programs.     

Budget Reform Proposals in the NPR Report1

A new round of budget process changes began on September 7, 1993, when Vice President Al Gore released the National Performance Review (NPR) report. The report recommended major revisions in the structure and processes of the federal government. A number of these proposals would alter a broad range of budgetary procedures followed by the president and Congress, borrowing in some cases from the states. This article analyzes seven areas of budget proposals contained in the NPR report, analyzes their benefits and drawbacks, and makes general observations about their likely impact on executive-legislative relations.     

Ideas, Inheritances, and the Dynamics of Budgetary Change

Long the lifeblood of public administration, budgeting in the United States acquired a new importance during the 1980s and 1990s because of the fiscalization of the policy debate. But how much has American national budgeting really changed? This article examines the evolution of federal budgeting over the past half-century, exploring such developments as the massive growth of entitlements, congressional budget reform, and the protracted battle over the budget deficit. It finds that year-to-year changes in budget results have been relatively small even while budgetary rules and procedures have experienced sweeping change. At the same time, the composition of federal spending has undergone a quiet revolution. The traditional concept of budgetary incrementalism offers an incomplete explanation for these dynamics. To make sense of them, the article focuses on two key factors: the impact of policy inheritances, and the role of actors' causal and normative beliefs. These factors shape the ideational and material context within which boundedly rational actors negotiate decisions. The tension between changes in ideas and entrenched budgetary commitments has often served to stimulate institutional reform.     

Credit Reform, Negative Subsidies, and FHA

After several years' experience with the new budgetary treatment of federal credit activity, or credit reform, it is appropriate to consider how this innovation is working. One objective of the new approach was to provide both estimates of the cost of credit assistance and a means of monitoring the performance of those estimates over time. In at least one—admittedly difficult—case, FHA single-family mortgage insurance, the reform is not succeeding in reporting the performance of the subsidy estimate because the agency's budget submissions are not consistent with the new accounting. This failure may result from the agency's inability to accept or adopt the fundamental changes in accounting concepts affected by credit reform. This article attempts to explain some of those changes and to show how they may be used to provide relevant information in the budget.     

The Fables and Foibles of Federal Capital Budgeting

This article critically evaluates the notions behind proposals to institute capital budgeting at the federal level. Four critical assumptions are found to be behind the contention that capital budgeting will improve federal investment policies: (1) an agreed-upon and accepted definition of a capital budget exists; (2) a capital budget "adds value" by improving the quality of information; (3) better information leads to better decisions; (4) better decisions lead to better actions. Each of these assumptions is evaluated using examples drawn from various levels of government and from the private sector. The general finding is that if these assumptions hold, then it is reasonable to expect that capital budgeting will lead to better programmatic decisions. Unfortunately, one or more of these assumptions usually does not hold and for this reason the case for federal capital budgeting is not very strong     

After the Earthquake: The President's Budget for FY 1996

What changes has the political earthquake of November 1994 wreaked on the federal budget and, in particular, on the president's budget? Are the policy dynamics of federal budgets so entrenched that they transcend politics and are impervious to shocks? Or do the political changes presage radical policy changes, reversing decades of cumulative commitments? Are budgetary institutions and processes flexible enough to accommodate enhanced conflicts while maintaining their integrity and purpose? This article discusses the fate of the 1995 budget and the initial problems faced in the president's budget for 1996.     

Organizational design and its consequences for administrative reform: Historical lessons from the U.S. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921

The landmark U.S. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (BAA) instituted a series of administrative reforms that proponents claimed would improve budgetary control, stability, and coherence. We maintain that the compatibility of governance structures between agency and system levels is critical for understanding why these administrative centralization efforts were successful in achieving these aims for some federal agencies but not others. The BAA reforms impact on budgetary outcomes is evaluated using panel data on major U.S. federal agencies between 1894 and 1940. Applying semiparametric heterogeneous treatment estimation techniques, we find compelling support that administrative centralization of the federal budgetary process enhanced budget stability and coherence for executive departments while resulting in a lower caliber of budgetary performance for independent agencies. These findings imply that system‐level administrative centralization efforts may be effective only when public agencies are structurally amenable to such reforms.     

The contractual nature of budgeting: A transaction cost perspective on the design of budgeting institutions

Viewing budgets as contracts, transaction cost theory focuses on the costs of negotiating and enforcing the myriad political agreements by which policymakers allocate the government's resources. This essay provides an overview of transaction cost theory and its implications for the design of budgeting institutions. It contrasts the behavioral premises (bounded rationality and opportunism) of the transaction cost approach with those of more traditional budgetary theories, and examines whether commitment and agency costs have structured budget actors' institutional choices. Investigation of the usage of key budget instruments- entitlements, multi-year appropriations, and tax expenditures - suggests that Congress has been more discriminating in its institutional choices than is commonly supposed. Sensitivity to the importance of transaction costs would increase the effectiveness of budget reforms.     

Portfolio Budgeting in the Australian Portfolios-Principles and Practice

In the mid-eighties Australia implemented a budgeting system that is similar in its principles to the U.S. PAYGO rule and the now defunct Policy and Expenditure Management System of Canada. Termed as portfolio budgeting, it seeks to encourage greater ministerial participation (a ministry comprising a number of related departments) in the portfolio budget process. It obligates portfolio ministers to offer offsetting savings for funding new policies. Ministers have to thereby set new policy priorities so that only the most deserving new policies obtain funding through the savings identified. Additionally, portfolio budgeting requires ministers to prioritize their ongoing programs so that budget allocation to these programs reflects ministerial priorities. The article examines the practice of portfolio budgeting in the Australian portfolios in light of these objectives. The article suggests that portfolio budgeting has caused greater ministerial involvement in budgetary management. However, there has been little significant change in budget decision making at the portfolio level. The state of play of portfolio budgeting at the national budget process (cabinet and the Department of Finance) offered little incentive to portfolios to provide offsetting savings for new policy proposals. And, the appropriation structure and the organizational and political dynamics impeded ministers from allocating and reallocating their budgets (operating expenditure or running costs) for ongoing programs along ministerial priorities.     

The administrative state and fiscal policy: A comparative analysis of political issues in China and the United States

This article examines the budgetary politics in China and the United States. It illustrates the inherent political nature of fiscal policies produced by different political and economic systems. Although both countries are concerned with the distributive effects of reform, the study indicates that the central government of China confronts issues related to the distribution of power between the center and the provinces during economic transformation. In contrast, the debate in the United States is produced by the distribution of costs and benefits brought about by federal fiscal policy. The context of the debate is influenced, in part, by the administrative state.     

Budgeting for Federal Capital

This article examines the issues involved in federal investment budgeting and planning for the acquisition of federally-owned assets. It describes the unique role of the federal government and examines the different issues and reforms prompted by differing types of capital and investment sponsored at the federal level. It suggests that meaningful changes can be instituted in our budgeting practices that can make a difference for our budgetary choices without adopting a full-scale capital budget. It also presents a framework for improving federal agency capital decision making based on a study of practices used by leading state and local and private sector organizations. The article is based on testimony delivered before the President's Commission to Study Capital Budgeting.