From the horse's mouth: Luftwaffe POWs as sources for air ministry intelligence during the battle of Britain

British military intelligence as derived from the interrogation of prisoners‐of‐war (POWs) during the Second World War has been under‐valued by historians, whose attention has focused primarily on signals intelligence. While Sigint, in particular Ultra, was of undoubted value, Britain's armed services nevertheless attached much credence to POW‐derived intelligence, and by the war's end an abundance of information had been gleaned from the half a million plus Axis prisoners by then held in Britain. This article will examine the work of the Air Ministry Intelligence section known as AI1(K), which was responsible for POW interrogation, during the Battle of Britain, and attempt to illustrate both the wealth and value of such intelligence at a time when Ultra was still in its infancy.     

The First China Watchers: British Intelligence Officers in China, 1878–1900

In 1878, Britain developed the first systematic intelligence collection and analysis of China by a Western nation. Undertaken in response to intelligence failure and military defeat, the British Army in India established an intelligence section in Beijing using small numbers of Chinese-speaking British military officers. Their reports reveal their struggles to understand a culture and government radically different than their own and express a strong respect for Chinese military capabilities. The intelligence reports produced are a unique window into British history, intelligence practices and Chinese strategic thinking.     

Intelligence-led Peacekeeping: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2006–07

In the slums of Haiti, where pistol and machete wielding gangs dominated the populace through murder, intimidation, extortion, and terror, a UN peacekeeping mission managed to established law, order, and government control. The United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH) succeeded by ‘taking on’ the gangs in a series of military and police ‘search and arrest’ operations in 2006–07. The achievement was made possible by thorough ‘intelligence preparation of the environment’. This paper tells the story of the ‘intelligence-led’ military–police–civil operations and how they transformed the Haitian slum of Cité Soleil from a foreboding place inaccessible to police for years to one in which the UN workers could safely walk its streets. The functions, structures, problems and challenges of the mission's intelligence capability are described, especially the work of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC). Human intelligence proved to be key, while technologies helped considerably. Within the United Nations, intelligence remains a controversial and sensitive matter but the Haiti mission provides a valuable model of how to gather and use actionable intelligence.     

Policy Lessons from Iraq on Managing Uncertainty in Intelligence Assessment: Why the Strategic/Tactical Distinction Matters

This paper focuses on how pre-existing policy priorities and goals among policy elites in the US, UK, and Australia encouraged the blurring of strategic and tactical intelligence assessment as a mechanism for legitimising the Iraq invasion. Through the selective use and interpretation of sometimes vague or unsubstantiated tactical and technical intelligence and the many uncertainties it contained, proponents of the war were able to undermine existing strategic assessments on Iraq by introducing a range of possible, but largely unsubstantiated, threat scenarios as justification for military action. The paper argues that in so far as intelligence reforms are needed, they should be focused primarily on the interface between analysis and policy making, and the issue of how policy makers interpret and understand the uncertainties that intelligence assessments necessarily contain.     

Looking for Intel? … or Looking for Answers? Reforming Military Intelligence for a Counterinsurgency Environment

We analyze the recent Flynn Report and assess its implications for the future of military intelligence in Afghanistan. In particular, we argue that the report seeks to expand the substantive tasks of the military intelligence practitioner, while collapsing non-trivial aspects of existing organizational hierarchies. We argue that implementation of the Flynn Report's proposals would match poorly with the traditional nature of military intelligence and the realities of human resources constraints in the military. Further, the resulting scale of unfiltered data such a system would produce might serve to overwhelm rather than assist decision-makers. Finally, we conclude that the problems expressed in the Flynn Report should not be traced to the military intelligence apparatus per se, but rather to the inability of US political leadership to map out a clear vision for current operations – both in Afghanistan, and in the counterinsurgency environment in general.     

The Fate of an Orphan: The Hawley Board and the Debates over the Postwar Organization of Medical Intelligence

The US Army's medical intelligence program developed during World War II to meet the requirements for information on the medical threat facing soldiers deployed in the first truly global military conflict. The war served as a proving ground for the application of medical intelligence on a strategic, operational and tactical level. However, hasty postwar demobilization decimated many wartime intelligence programs, including medical intelligence. The US intelligence community recognized the utility of medical intelligence as part of the overall strategic scientific and technical intelligence program and sought ways to rebuild the program. During the post-World War II debates over the unification of the military services and the responsibilities of the nascent CIA, the ‘Hawley Board’ was one of several committees which studied the problems facing the medical intelligence program. Although there was broad consensus on the need for better coordination of medical intelligence, the intelligence community ultimately failed to adopt the recommendations of the Hawley Board. The principal reasons behind the failure of the Hawley plan were the re-emergence of prewar interservice rivalries, the dominant role of the Army medical intelligence program, and the lack of a joint military–CIA vision of a centralized medical intelligence service.     

Radio-Intercepts,Reconnaissance and Raids: French Operational Intelligence and Communications in 1940

Mentioned in memoirs by a few former military intelligence officers, operational intelligence has had little attention in academic writing on the Second World War before Ultra's decisive contributions began in 1941–2. Especially neglected has been the fighting provoked by the German offensive in 1940 that cleaved through France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg and drove Britain off the Continent. This article tackles this gap, analysing the military intelligence/military operations interface on the French side. It assesses the contributions and shortcomings of radio-intercept intelligence, along with intelligence-gathering by air and ground reconnaissance (demonstrating that German air superiority imposed a ‘battle blindness’ on Allied commanders wanting intelligence on approach marches and formation switches more than a dozen kilometres into the German rear). It reveals that frontline infantry raiding – redolent of intelligence-gathering techniques familiar to veterans of 1914–18 trench warfare – was again widely employed. This proved a highly effective recourse, particularly during the positional battles on the Somme, Aisne and Oise in June 1940, filling intelligence gaps left by more technologically sophisticated but more fragile sources. The factors that kept formations fighting so as to inflict significant delays and heavy losses on the German assaults were robust communications networks (to convey operational intelligence fast enough to permit counter-manoeuvres based on it), and the preservation of French chains of command and control. When these key nodes collapsed, preventing the hard-won operational intelligence being deployed to coordinate French military resistance, the latter declined into a series of disjointed, directionless and unavailing acts of courage that could not exploit the several instances during the campaign when the Germans, too, were afflicted by battle fatigue, re-supply bottlenecks and morale wobbles.     

‘A reach greater than the grasp’: Israeli intelligence and the conflict in south Lebanon 1990–2000

This article examines the way in which intelligence was used by Israel in its war against Hizb'allah in south Lebanon. By using ideas drawn from the literature on strategic culture, it argues that in trying to replicate methods used in countering Palestinian insurgents, Israel's intelligence agencies failed to appreciate fully the finite political aims of Hizb'allah's guerrilla struggle. As such, the paucity in Israel's collective intelligence effort allowed operatives of Hizb'allah's military wing, al-Muqawama, to score notable intelligence triumphs over Israel, triumphs that did much force the IDF into a unilateral withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000.     

Planting the espionage tree: the French military and the professionalization of intelligence at the end of the nineteenth century

Abstract

Intelligence in France evolved as it professionalized at the end of the nineteenth century, led by determined individuals within the French army. However, in the centuries prior to the professionalization of espionage and counterespionage, military men rejected intelligence, viewing the practice with skepticism and disdain. This article asserts that there was a change in views towards espionage, particularly among the military, beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century. As the army went from eschewing intelligence to embracing it and taking the lead in its practice, the nature of intelligence work in France consequently reflected the goals and aims of the army, prioritizing military intelligence over others.     

Waking up on another September 12th: implications for intelligence reform

Abstract

After 9/11 the US Government tried to ‘fix’ intelligence by adopting the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). Resources increased and, to varying degrees, performance improved – particularly in counterterrorism. This article, however, argues that the constellation of Intelligence Community authorities and organizations, either created or left in place by the IRTPA, coupled with the challenges of a complex security environment, leaves us ill-prepared to deal with the Country’s twenty-first century intelligence requirements. Should that critique prove accurate, and should future intelligence failure(s) be judged strategically and politically unacceptable, the second half of the article provides a framework for revising the IRTPA; the proposals substantially increase the authority of the head of the Intelligence Community, consolidate structures, and create centers of analytic critical mass necessary to meet the knowledge requirements for both regional and transnational security issues. Reflecting the Intelligence Community’s long standing tradition of questioning assumptions, the article is meant to foster reflection and debate about whether the Intelligence Community is postured to meet the needs of the Country, and if not, what needs to change.     

A weak pillar for American national security: The CIA's dismal performance against WMD threats

American preemptive or preventive military action against WMD-armed adversaries in the future will simply not be feasible without high-quality and timely intelligence. But is American intelligence up to this load-bearing task for the post-11 September national security? This article surveys the Central Intelligence Agency's record of gauging potential WMD threats for more than a decade and assesses its overall performance as dismal. The CIA's recent intelligence debacle against Iraq was one of the greatest in a long series of failures that has publicly exposed the Agency's profound weaknesses. These intelligence failures were due in large measure to the CIA's poor human intelligence collection and shoddy analysis, areas that cannot be remedied alone by the creation of the new Director of National Intelligence post. This article recommends steps needed to increase the quality of intelligence produced by CIA, or elsewhere in the new intelligence community, to move American intelligence in lockstep with military transformation to give the Commander-in-Chief realistic options for countering hostile nation-states or terrorist groups seeking or acquiring WMD.     

Military Intelligence and Controversial Political Issues: The Unique Case of the Israeli Military Intelligence

Contrary to intelligence services in other democracies worldwide, the activity of the Israeli Directorate of Military Intelligence, AMAN, is not merely centered around collection and research regarding military intelligence matters. Instead, AMAN covers the majority of intelligence activity arenas, including intelligence regarding state-related issues. This field of activity presents a situation where AMAN's officers, and predominantly, its research division, are compelled to deal with sensitive issues embedded well within Israeli political and public controversy. This is commonly illustrated in the field of ‘Intelligence for Peace’ in general and more specifically in the Palestinian arena. Intelligence research surrounding the question of Palestinian commitment to peace throughout the Oslo Process and following the onset of the al Aqsa Intifada – activity classified as ‘Intelligence on Intentions’ – placed AMAM at the heart of political debate in Israel and resulted in bitter internal disagreements in AMAN as well as tensions between the intelligence service and the political leadership. Throughout the years, numerous recommendations have been repeatedly voiced to end AMAN's monopoly over Israel's national intelligence assessment (including aspects of intelligence regarding state-related issues). These recommendations were based predominantly on hindsight evaluations, such as AMAN's repeated failures in intelligence assessments. This paper calls for gradual termination of AMAN's activity of intelligence regarding state-related issues, in light of its contradiction with the appropriate military–political separation in a democratic society. Moreover, it places AMAN at the heart of the political debate dividing Israeli society.     

A New American Way of War? C4ISR,Intelligence and Information Operations in Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’: A Provisional Assessment

This work examines publicly material available released as of 2 September 2003 on the role of intelligence for the Coalition side during the 2003 Gulf War. It assesses how far the Coalition side practised deception, psychological warfare, and information operations during that conflict, and how far intelligence served the needs of military forces. It focuses on failures as well as successes. It compares the real performance of intelligence during the conflict with the role forecast for C4ISR and Information Operations by theorists of the RMA, and modern strategy. It concludes that the Coalition forces practised Information Operations very well, but that at the operational level, there had been no revolution in military intelligence.     

Missing revolution: the American intelligence failure in Iraq, 1958

Why were American officials caught by surprise with the military coup and later revolution in Iraq on 14 July 1958? Drawing on American intelligence and diplomatic records as well as multilingual sources, this article argues that the US intelligence failure is the product of two factors: the collection of information from too few and too similar human sources of intelligence in Iraq’s ruling regime, and the unreceptivity of US officials to assessing new information and their unwillingness to update assessments of local Iraqi developments. It revisits America’s intelligence failure in Iraq and suggests important lessons for the study of intelligence.     

The Future of Civil–Military Intelligence Cooperation Based on Lessons Learned in Iraq

As part of the infrastructure for monitoring the movements of Private Security Companies (PSCs) in Iraq, a unique intelligence interface has been constructed to enhance cooperation between the military and PSCs. Using a wide range of existing intelligence-sharing agreements and guidelines for handling classified information, PSC contractors working with the US military have been able to provide unclassified intelligence products to the wider PSC community. Using lessons learned in Iraq as a contractor building this interface, the author explains how institutional difficulties were overcome and argues that the US military should be better prepared to share intelligence with the wide range of organizations it can expect to work with in future unconventional warfare or nation-building operations. Some of the lessons learned in Iraq can also be applied to the US Department of Homeland Security's Regional Fusion Centers, where many of the same difficulties with intelligence-sharing and integration with commercial organizations are being encountered.     

British intelligence and the middle east, 1900–1918: how much do we know?

Primary sources available in British and Israeli archives (first and foremost – the Public Record Office) allow serious study of the British intelligence apparatus in the Middle East and its contribution to the military operations and diplomatic-political process there, prior to and during the First World War. Yet, existing knowledge focuses on military intelligence, as documentation on the Secret Service and the Security Service (both in the form of EMSIB) as well as on army and naval signal intelligence operations in the region is barely available – destroyed or still classified. Examination of hitherto unexplored foreign depositories may serve as an indirect approach to overcome this paucity of material, owing to the close wartime cooperation between British, French, Russian and Italian intelligence on the Ottoman Empire.     

Democratic Oversight in Fragile States: The Case of Intelligence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In most transition countries the main aim of ‘democratizing intelligence’ is to weaken the authoritarian governmental structures by introducing more transparency, legality and oversight. In Bosnia and Herzegovina however, the state-building efforts driven by international parties combined formal democratization processes such as independent oversight with the strengthening and operational capacity building of previously weak-to-non-existent intelligence structures. In parallel with the descent into war when Yugoslavia collapsed in the early 1990s, the State Security Service (SDB) in the Republic of Bosnia had split into three ethnically-based outfits answering to the political and military leaders of war. ‘Democratization’ of intelligence in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the establishment of a unified, state-level Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA) in 2004 has followed its own unique path reflecting the fragmented nature of politics in Bosnia and the leading role of international organizations in proposing and effectuating institutional reforms. Nevertheless, in terms of habits, operational methods and values many Bosnian intelligence officers went through similar adaptations and transitions as their colleagues in countries where institutions at the time of democratic transition were too strong and authoritarian rather than, as in the case of Bosnia, being deemed too weak and ineffectual.     

The Joint Intelligence Bureau: (Not So) Secret Intelligence for the Post-War World

Abstract

In 1946 veteran British intelligence officer Kenneth Strong undertook the Directorship of a new intelligence organization, the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB). The JIB absorbed the responsibilities of several wartime intelligence organs, and was responsible for economic, topographic, and aspects of scientific intelligence on an inter-service basis. Its responsibilities grew over the following 18 years; most notably, it absorbed atomic intelligence in 1957. When the Defence Intelligence Staff was created in 1964, absorbing the JIB and the individual Service agencies, JIB was at its heart and Kenneth Strong its first Director. The organization conducted key work in the early Cold War, was at the centre of an international network of Joint Intelligence Bureaux, and was an important stepping stone in the movement to centralize military and military-relevant intelligence in Britain – but the historiography pays it surprisingly little attention. This paper introduces the JIB and various aspects of its work, and demonstrates that its low profile in the historiography is unjustified.     

Covert Operations and Official Collaboration: British Intelligence's Dual Approach to Ireland during World War II

Neutral Ireland posed a unique challenge to the wartime British intelligence community and the latter responded by adopting a dual approach. On the one hand, it carried out covert intelligence operations in Irish territory, involving the Service intelligence branches, the Ministry of Information, and, most importantly, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). On the other hand, unprecedented cooperation developed between military, police and intelligence agencies from Britain and Ireland, and in particular between MI5 and Irish military intelligence (G2). For most of the war British intelligence pursued this joint strategy of covert activity and official collaboration, and MI5 and SIS shared responsibility for Ireland. However, there was a gradual shift of emphasis towards cooperation and it was eventually concluded that the MI5-G2 link could serve all Britain's security needs. This article charts this evolution and places it within the context of Anglo-Irish wartime political relations.