Placebo scrutiny? Far-right extremism and intelligence accountability in Germany

The post-9/11 era has seen a proliferation of special, or one-off parliamentary inquiries into intelligence. This article examines the question of what quality such inquiries can achieve, exploring the scandal surrounding the case of the German far-right terrorist group National Socialist Underground (NSU). The article introduces a theoretical framework, with remit, rigor and reception as the key pillars of analysis. While special inquiries are often seen as a way of overcoming imperfections of the traditional accountability system, they can also create a placebo effect – an illusion of accountability which allows intelligence services to go uncontrolled under a blanket of democracy.     

NHS Inquiries and Investigations; an Exemplar in Peculiarity and Assumption

There is little research focussing on how bereaved families experience NHS inquiries and investigations. Despite this gap, there is a consistent assumption that these processes provide families with catharsis. Drawing on my personal experiences of NHS investigations over a five‐year period after the death of our son, Connor Sparrowhawk, I suggest the assumption of catharsis is misplaced and works to erase the considerable emotional ‘accountability’ labour that families undertake during these processes. I further question whether inquiries or investigations are an effective way of holding stakeholders to account. I conclude with two points: first, qualitative research is needed to better understand bereaved family experiences of inquiries and investigations and second, the ‘lessons learned’ objective underpinning inquiries should be replaced with ‘leading to demonstrable change’, which is what families typically want.     

The Value of Non-Governmental Intelligence: Widening the Field

In the UK, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) has a poor track record of predicting attack. In the US, official inquiries into 9/11 identified ‘a failure of imagination’ to conceive of a large scale threat to the American homeland. There is a long-standing literature on surprise attack which emphasizes that clues to predict attack often exist but are not pieced together by an intelligence sector which is not structured to look in the right direction. In a world of increasingly fragmented threats and weak signals, it is apparent that much of the challenge in intelligence work now lies not in collection but in managing requirements, setting priorities, and conducting incisive analysis based on the ability to imagine new threats. One solution to a failure of imagination is to widen the range of people who can contribute to the task. Non-Governmental analysis of security issues, whether by academia, civil society or the private sector, can help to identify emerging issues and set priorities. Whilst collection of secret intelligence may always remain the preserve of specialist Government agencies, the rest of the intelligence cycle can benefit from external contributions and open source intelligence. We argue that the process of setting intelligence requirements could be opened to a wider range of actors. In conflict environments, there may be particular value in an open process to identify what each side would need to know about the other to confidently seek peace.     

Intelligence,Iraq and the limits of legislative accountability during political crisis

This article argues that there is an inherent tension in legislative intelligence oversight bodies between their responsibility to the voters who elect them and their political parties who select them to run for office. At a time of acute political crisis, the partisan interests of the legislators who sit on oversight bodies may override their other responsibilities. This can result in distorted and misleading investigations and reports. This hypothesis is examined against the evidence of precisely such a mode of failure in both the British and American legislative inquiries into intelligence on Iraqi ‘weapons of mass destruction’. The authors conclude that any effective oversight must include a range of parallel legislative, judicial, executive and independent mechanisms to try and minimize the inherent weaknesses in each oversight model.     

Governance costs and defence intelligence provision in the UK: a case-study in microeconomic theory

Abstract

This paper focuses on how distinct organizations and functions interact in a symbiotic way to provide the governmental functions of security and intelligence, and the place of defence intelligence amongst them. Because the external environment in which security and intelligence provision must be managed is both uncertain and complex, the manner in which defence intelligence negotiates its role and priorities with other organizational entities is critical to overall levels of success. This paper uses a mix of primary and secondary sources, supported by qualitative interviews, to argue that the narrow focus of previous theoretical approaches has left them able to explain either good or poor cooperative working in the defence intelligence sphere, but not both. It contends that the more holistic theoretical paradigm offered by an adapted transactional costs model that captures the governance difficulties involved can better explain all possible outcomes.     

Toward a Theory of Non-State Actors' Intelligence

The literature on intelligence contains many laments that scholars of intelligence have not developed widely accepted theories, or even definitions, of intelligence. This paper describes, compares, and modestly theorizes about intelligence-related activities of two variants of non-state actors – violent insurgent/terrorist groups and advocacy NGOs – focusing on their counterintelligence and covert action-like activities. These groups operate in some ways similarly to, and in other ways dramatically different from, states' intelligence services. This comparative analysis extends the scope of intelligence studies and offers suggestions for additional research.     

Intelligence,crises and security: Lessons from history?

The scholarly study of intelligence has grown steadily into what is now a distinct sub-field of history and political science. Recent events – notably jihadist attacks on the US, Spain and the UK and the war on Iraq and its aftermath – have generated debate and controversy about the use and representation of intelligence. A plethora of official inquiries have fuelled debates into the ‘intelligence failures’ involved. This essay explores how lessons might be learned from the history of intelligence for contemporary debates and controversies. An overview of the issues includes discussion of how different approaches are apparent between American and British perspectives. Challenges and opportunities for applying lessons from the past are explored and a case is made for greater engagement between academia and officialdom.     

The policy implementation process

There is an implicit assumption in most policy studies that once a policy has been formulated the policy will be implemented. This assumption is invalid for policies formulated in many Third World nations and for types of policies in Western societies. Third World governments tend to formulate broad, sweeping policies, and governmental bureaucracies often lack the capacity for implementation. Interest groups, opposition parties, and affected individuals and groups often attempt to influence the implementation of policy rather than the formulation of policy.A model of the policy implementation process is presented. Policy implementation is seen as a tension generating force in society. Tensions are generated between and within four components of the implementing process: idealized policy, implementing organization, target group, and environmental factors. The tensions result in transaction patterns which may or may not match the expectations of outcome of the policy formulators. The transaction patterns may become crystallized into institutions. Both the transaction patterns and the institutions may generate tensions which, by feedback to the policymakers and implementors, may support or reject further implementation of the policy.By application of the model, policymakers can attempt to minimize disruptive tensions which can result in the failure of policy outcomes to match policy expectations.     

The use and abuse of medical intelligence

When a leader suffers from a diminished ability to formulate high quality judgments and decisions, international peace and security may be compromised. Systematic use of medical intelligence on foreign leaders can provide early warning to American leaders about the potential for destabilization in particular regimes where leaders are gravely ill. This information remains particularly important in less democratic governments, where power and decision making remain concentrated in the hands of very few, or even one man, or where an entire governmental structure appears unstable. This paper examines the impact of medical illness in foreign leaders in four cases in American foreign policy: the Shah of Iran; Ferdinand Marcos; Tancredo Neves; and Boris Yeltsin.     

“Big Questions” about Intergovernmental Relations and Management: Who Will Address Them?

Fiscal, administrative, and political tensions among the partners in the federal system have not eased, and perhaps have grown, since the demise of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1996. Yet no governmental organizational capacity exists to address big intergovernmental questions in an ongoing manner through nonpartisan or bipartisan research, data collection, deliberation, and policy formulation.     

Public Inquiry Methods,Processes and Outputs: an Epistemological Critique

Public inquiries are an important phenomenon in modern British society, often used to address controversial or difficult issues of major concern to policy makers, the media and the public. Although people often comment adversely on how costly inquiries are and how long they take, inquiry methods are rarely discussed, let alone critiqued or challenged. However, from a social sciences perspective, inquiry methods, processes and outputs are often at odds with accepted standards for research methods. This paper discusses this divergence and the implications for how we should regard the inquiry as a way of knowing, or learning.     

Credible Commitment in Covert Affairs

A recurring challenge in politics is to convince actors to take cooperative actions against their self‐interest. This is especially challenging for executives conducting covert activities, as infractions are unobservable and institutional reforms often require the executive's consent. We develop a model based in the auditing literature to investigate when executives agree to reforms that credibly constrain their behaviors. If the revelation cost falls in a high range, the risk of whistleblowing convinces executives to restrain themselves. Executives cannot credibly commit to this when the costs are low, resulting in inefficient investigations from watchdog groups that tax executive resources. We show that executives are sometimes better off in the first case than the second, which results in executives endogenously reforming institutions to achieve this outcome. We illustrate the mechanism with a case study of Gerald Ford's executive reforms to the intelligence community in the 1970s.     

Congressional response to public crisis: how corporations can prepare

Public policy is at the heart of US congressional investigations, where private corporations can confront a unique set of rules and mores—in a very public forum, often covered in the news and televised. This article traces the historical precedents to congressional inquiries, highlighting cases such as the ‘Teapot Dome’ scandal and the ensuing US Supreme Court case, McGrain v. Daugherty, confirming the Legislative Branch's independent investigative authority to compel a witness to testify and produce documents. The article explains the two types of congressional investigations, oversight and legislative, and how their differences could impact the corporations involved. It reviews recent examples of investigations, illuminating how a corporation's public relations and legal rights can both overlap and point to differing interests. Based upon first‐hand experience, the author provides a legal perspective in explaining the investigation procedures, the legal limits to congressional authority, and the steps taken to prepare a witness for testimony. Finally, the author explains how readiness for congressional inquiries is an integral aspect of prudent risk management for any major corporation. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

NHS Inquiries and the Problem of Culture

If inquiries are about learning the lessons of the past, why do they appear to find the same failings time and again? Bristol, Mid Staffordshire, Morecambe Bay, Liverpool Community Health are all examples of where culture went wrong. The lack of learning from inquiries is a prominent concern and one raised elsewhere in this issue. In this article, I explore why it might be that culture is repeatedly found to be the cause of healthcare failures. I start by reviewing perspectives on what culture is and the degree to which it is possible change it. I examine how culture was described in the Bristol, Mid Staffordshire, Morecambe Bay and Liverpool inquiries and question whether these are the same cultures, with the same problems, or whether they are different. I discuss possible explanations for apparent similarities, describe how cultural change occurs and conclude by drawing out the implications of focussing on culture as a threat to patient safety.     

Reading the Riot Act: The Schlesinger Report, 1971

The difficulty of satisfying competing needs of both national and sub-national officials and commanders for intelligence support capabilities that are too sensitive and expensive to duplicate for both sets of requirements emerged with the growth of industrial-scale imagery and signals intelligence assets and production during the Cold War. The literature of intelligence history and intelligence studies covers the symptoms of this problem, but says less a rigorous and well-documented nature on its causes. Thanks to recent declassifications in the United States, however, we can now read key documents in an American attempt to understand and deal with the dilemma. A study prepared for President Richard Nixon in 1971 and now dubbed the ‘Schlesinger Report’ has been published virtually intact by the US Department of State. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency has released two official histories which indirectly have added significant detail to the story. With these new releases, it is now possible to explain the genesis of the Report and chart its effects through the remainder of President Nixon's presidency. The Schlesinger Report marked a watershed for the intelligence community, helping the Nixon Administration to conceive and enact reforms that were both consequential in themselves and presaged the findings of later surveys and inquiries. A better understanding of the Report's background, text, and results can shed light not only the policymaking process in the Nixon Administration but also the trajectory of the intelligence community – and of foreign intelligence establishments that may, in some respects, be following in its path.     

Military Intelligence and Controversial Political Issues: The Unique Case of the Israeli Military Intelligence

Contrary to intelligence services in other democracies worldwide, the activity of the Israeli Directorate of Military Intelligence, AMAN, is not merely centered around collection and research regarding military intelligence matters. Instead, AMAN covers the majority of intelligence activity arenas, including intelligence regarding state-related issues. This field of activity presents a situation where AMAN's officers, and predominantly, its research division, are compelled to deal with sensitive issues embedded well within Israeli political and public controversy. This is commonly illustrated in the field of ‘Intelligence for Peace’ in general and more specifically in the Palestinian arena. Intelligence research surrounding the question of Palestinian commitment to peace throughout the Oslo Process and following the onset of the al Aqsa Intifada – activity classified as ‘Intelligence on Intentions’ – placed AMAM at the heart of political debate in Israel and resulted in bitter internal disagreements in AMAN as well as tensions between the intelligence service and the political leadership. Throughout the years, numerous recommendations have been repeatedly voiced to end AMAN's monopoly over Israel's national intelligence assessment (including aspects of intelligence regarding state-related issues). These recommendations were based predominantly on hindsight evaluations, such as AMAN's repeated failures in intelligence assessments. This paper calls for gradual termination of AMAN's activity of intelligence regarding state-related issues, in light of its contradiction with the appropriate military–political separation in a democratic society. Moreover, it places AMAN at the heart of the political debate dividing Israeli society.     

Intelligence analysts and policymakers: Benefits and dangers of tensions in the relationship

This article is occasioned by public interest in reported tensions between CIA analysts and policymaking officials of the administration of President George W. Bush regarding the significance of ties between the Saddam Hussein regime and Al Qaeda terrorists, an important factor in the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003. No evaluation of the latter case is provided. The article addresses, instead, general patterns of tensions between intelligence analysts and policy officials in order to provide context for public assessment of the Iraq-Al Qaeda incident when the public record is more complete and enhance understanding of similar future instances of tension.     

‘We Need Our New OSS,Our New General Donovan,Now ...’: The Public Discourse over American Intelligence, 1944-53

The popular origins of the modern US intelligence bureaucracy have largely escaped the scrutiny of historians. This article examines the critical public discourse over American intelligence and the clear domestic support for a new type of national intelligence system following World War II. The organization of American intelligence was thoroughly examined in newspapers, polling data, popular magazines, public speeches and lectures, petitions to government officials, and for the first time — the medium of radio. This frank discussion, fostered to a large degree by William Donovan, undoubtedly influenced the tenor surrounding the establishment of the modern intelligence bureaucracy, but also resulted in an unwelcome public relations quandary for intelligence officials. This distinctly American postwar dialogue illustrates the great challenge of conducting intelligence in an open democratic society.     

FISCAL STRESS AND HEALTH POLICY IN THE A.C.T.*

Abstract: Since 1981, the financing of the‘ ACT has been subject to five inquiries by the Commonwealth Grants Commission. These inquiries have incorporated the ACT into the fiscal equalisation process between Australian states and territories. and have significantly affected the ACT'S general revenue grants from the commonwealth. The inquiries produced evidence of generous commonwealth funding of the ACT compared with the other states. This funding has given rise to “over-spending” on service provision by the ACT government. The ACT government is not currently responsible for all identified “over-spending”. being buffered to some extent by transitional allowances recommended by the Grants Commission. The ACT government is, however, experiencing fiscal stress for the “overspending” for which it is responsible. This stress is expected to increase in the future as the ACT government comes to bear the full burden of all “overspending”. A significant cause of the “over-spending” identified by the Grants Commission was health services expenditure. This situation has raised a number of interesting questions. Is the “overspending” on health a conscious policy decision to produce a higher quantity/quality combination of health services in the ACT? Or does it represent inefficiency? What policy options are appropriate in view of the “over-spending” on health? This paper addresses these questions using data from the Grants Commission inquiries and a recently released study of hospital utilisation and costs in Australia. It is concluded that, at least with respect to public hospitals in the ACT. excessive stafting is the primary cause of “over-spending”. There is little evidence to support an argument that this “over-spending” is resulting in superior health outcomes for ACT citizens.     

社会福利指数、政府支出规模及其结构优化

政府支出规模及其结构优化应以提高社会福利水平而不是以经济增长为其最终目标。构建了政府支出与消费、社会福利之间的理论分析模型,利用优化控制理论与方法,从理论上论证了在最大社会福利的基础上存在最优政府支出规模与支出结构安排,设计了衡量社会福利水平的新指标,并以此指标为基础,利用中国1982年—2005年的年度数据,对政府支出规模及其结构优化进行计量分析。其基本结论是:我国政府支出规模及其各种单项支出与社会福利指数之间存在较强的相关性,为满足我国不断增加的公共服务需求,应增加政府支出规模,优化政府支出的内部结构体系,即适度提高中央政府支出在政府总支出中所占的比重,减少投资性支出和行政管理支出,增加以教育、公共卫生、公共安全、社会保障为主体的公共服务性支出,以促进我国社会福利水平的提高。