Playing Base Politics in a Global Strategic Theater: Futenma Relocation,the G-8 Summit,and Okinawa

In late 1995, a culmination of events on Japan's southernmost island of Okinawa, home to over 70 percent of U.S. military facilities in Japan, both threatened the future of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and posed a direct challenge to the contradictory legacies of Japan's postwar system of constitutional democracy. Almost five years later, in July 2000, in anticipation of the gathering of heads of state at the Okinawa 2000 G-8 Summit, Bill Clinton became the first U.S. president to visit the island in over forty years. Speaking at the Cornerstone of Peace, a monument built in memory of the only ground war fought on Japanese soil between Japanese and U.S. forces in World War II, Clinton reaffirmed the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance – and Okinawa's role within it – to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. Yet in Okinawa the nature and constitution of peace itself has never been a political given. This article traces the politics surrounding the U.S. military presence over this period, delving into the deeper historical, political, and social issues at stake for both this small island prefecture and for parts of the world beyond.     

Waging Peace on Okinawa

“Waging Peace on Okinawa” examines peace discourses as enacted in tours of battle sites and war (peace) memorials on the main island of Okinawa. Pointing out linkages with and divergences from mainland Japanese peace practices, the essay focuses on “peace guides” that have emerged as the backbone of educational tours that cater to Okinawan and, especially, mainland Japanese schoolchildren. Staffed by volunteers in conjunction with private and public organizations, peace guide tours and their supporting materials endeavor to promote peace by conveying a historical knowledge of the Battle of Okinawa that is more richly contextualized – “complete” – than that which is typically found in official textbooks, commercial tours, and patriotic pilgrimages. “Complete” in this context implies open discussion – even highlighting – of the violence and discrimination Okinawan civilians suffered at the hands of Japanese during the battle, but it also signals discriminatory treatment toward Okinawans before and beyond the battle (the most concrete example of the latter being the maintenance of U.S. military bases under the U.S.-Japan security arrangement). Peace guides and their supporters thus find themselves in a battle over historical representation that arguably has more to do with immediate political and economic issues than with setting the historical record straight.     

The Sacrifice Of A Schoolgirl: The 1995 Rape Case,Discourses of Power,and Women's Lives in Okinawa

In September 1995 relations between the United States, Japan, and Okinawa were transformed when three U.S. servicemen brutally gang-raped a twelve-year-old schoolgirl. Okinawan feminists called public attention to the rape, but it wasn't long before the media and political leaders shifted their focus to concerns about Okinawa's colonial history and its postwar occupation by the United States. A crisis of sovereignty replaced the crisis for women and a particular girl, which gradually faded from view, as did the agenda of feminist activists. Through an examination of Okinawa's contentious identity politics, the author traces the political trajectories of Okinawa's component groups and asks why this particular crime, in a long list of crimes against Okinawans by U.S. personnel since 1945, resonates so strongly both in Okinawa and in mainland Japan. The author argues that the rape has been enlisted for its powerful symbolic capacity: Okinawa as sacrificed schoolgirl/daughter. As such it is emblematic of past, prior narratives of Okinawan victimhood, most notably the Himeyuri students in the Battle of Okinawa. Feminists' cooperation in a patriarchal language that posits Okinawa as daughter within a national Japanese family is problematic but necessary as a strategy in the fight for women's human rights.     

IMPASSE AT MCAS FUTENMA

In 1960, a Japanese prime minister was forced to resign after he committed Japan to an unpopular security relationship with the United States. In 2010, exactly fifty years later, the security relationship with the United States, centered on the stationing of a vast U.S. base complex in Japan, has unseated a prime minister who came to office just last year with an over 70 percent approval rating. In the small southern prefecture of Okinawa, where 75 percent of the U.S. military in Japan is stationed, the continued presence of the unpopular Futenma air base has become a lodestone for Okinawan frustration. High-level talks to remove Futenma from the crowded city of Ginowan have been ongoing since 1996, yet nothing has been accomplished. On 25 April 2010, an estimated 90,000 people rallied in Okinawa and demanded the base be removed from the prefecture completely, and not simply relocated to a location near the city of Nago. This essay attempts to explain Washington's central role in creating the problem and argues that Futenma is an unnecessary burden on the people of Okinawa and on cash-strapped Japanese and American taxpayers.     

Dulles’s second visit to Japan: The Tokyo talks of 1951

In January–February 1951, intensive negotiations were conducted in Tokyo between the Japanese and American governments about Japan’s roles in American strategy in Asia. The United States expected Japan to play two vital roles in the cold war. The first was that Japan could act as a potential offensive base from which to mount warfare against Soviet Russia and communist. China. the second was that Japan would serve as a supplementary balancer in the maintenance of the balance of power in Northeast Asia through the reactivation of her defense forces. This article, examining the Japanese government’s preparations for the Tokyo talks, discusses Japanese-American negotiations on a bilateral base arrangement and rearmament. It is argued that, although the United States succeeded in securing Japan as a major strategic base in the cold war by obtaining Japanese agreement to the U.S. proposal for stationing requirements for post-treaty American bases and troops, it failed in having Japan accept a U.S. plan for the revitalization of Japanese power because of the Japanese government’s reservation about rearmament.     

The U.S. military and sexual violence against women

Abstract

The Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (BCAS) created the “Notes from the Field” section in 1992 in an attempt to bring BCAS closer to its activist origins and goals by publishing brief reports on events and issues of particular concern in the world today. Not intended to duplicate BCAS's usual in-depth and well-documented analysis and research, these reports are meant to be a less formal equivalent of “field notes” describing what is happening or being debated or studied out there in the world of action. Although analysis is usually a valuable part of these presentations, the “Notes” are more akin to urgent notices or offerings for discussion. The name “Notes from the Field” is not meant to imply the colonialist concept of people reporting back from the so-called Third World, and even though the name can be seen to loosely apply to the field of Asian studies, it does not refer to reporting on the more strictly academic aspects of fields of study within academia. The hope is that the information and opinions presented in these “Notes from the Field” will inspire readers to concern themselves with issues that matter, either through further study and analysis or by speaking out or taking action more directly.

It has been reported that on 4 September 1995 two U.S. Marines and one U.S. Navy man stationed at Camp Hansen Marine Base in Kin, Okinawa, raped a twelve-year-old Okinawan girl. This situation caught the Okinawan, Japanese, and international media's attention, brought out an Okinawan demonstration of 90,000 people in the latest of “U.S. Bases Out Of Okinawa” demonstrations that go back at least to 1972 with the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, made apologies by U.S. president Clinton mandatory, and resulted in the turning over of the three servicemen to the justice of Japanese courts, itself an act reflecting the need of the U.S. military and civilian authorities to try to defuse the situation.     

U.S. COURT RULES IN THE “OKINAWA DUGONG” CASE

In January 2008, a U.S. federal court in San Francisco ruled that the U.S. Defense Department's plans to construct a new U.S. offshore Marine airbase in Okinawa violated the National Historic Preservation Act by not protecting a Japanese “national monument,” the endangered Okinawa dugong. This article discusses the background and trajectory of the lawsuit and the implications of this judgment. The outcome of this lawsuit is expected to improve processes of evaluating and managing environmental and other social impacts of U.S. military forces on hosting communities in Okinawa/Japan. The case also demonstrates the potential of transnational civil society actors to overcome a deficient democratic system within one state. The expanded theater of the anti‐base Okinawans' protest brought them new allies while avoiding difficult and unnecessary conflict on the ground at home.     

The Okinawa “Effect” in US–Japan Alliance Politics

Abstract

Discontent over US military bases in Japan’s Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominent “thorn in the side” of US–Japan relations. But what exactly has been the effect of Okinawa’s base politics on the management of the alliance? We examine Okinawa’s significance on the US–Japan alliance—the “Okinawa effect”—in terms of the alliance’s strategic coherence. Through an examination of the post–Cold War history of the base issue, we argue that, while there little to suggest that the Okinawa issue has undermined the alliance’s strategic effectiveness, alliance efficiency in dealing with burden sharing problems has been diminished, at times substantially. While reduced efficiency may often be inevitable in alliances between democracies, this persistent inability to resolve burden sharing disputes in the Okinawan case means that there is still potential for deteriorating efficiency to eventually undermine the alliance’s solidarity and effectiveness.     

Fighting the Korean War in pacifist Japan: Korean and Japanese leftist solidarity and American Cold War containment

Where does “pacifist” Japan fit within the history of the Korean War? Was Japan simply the beneficiary of the wartime boom – a case best exemplified by Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s characterization of the Korean War as “a gift of the gods”? When North Korean troops crossed the thirty-eighth parallel and launched a full-scale attack against South Korea, the U.S. occupation in Japan quickly transformed the pacifist nation into the indispensable rear base of United Nations military intervention in the Korean War. The Japanese Communist Party and leftist groups organized by zainichi Koreans (Korean residents in Japan) launched an antiwar movement to stop Japan from producing and sending arms to UN forces in Korea. The U.S. occupation responded with determined efforts to contain every antiwar voice emerging from the streets of the pacifist country. By examining the political dynamics of zainichi Korean and Japanese leftist solidarity and U.S. countermeasures, this article shows how the Korean War was fought in pacifist Japan. It also illuminates how the practice of Cold War containment was mutually linked on the ground between occupied Japan and South Korea.     

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DEATH CULT IN 1930s JAPAN AND THE DECISION TO DROP THE ATOM BOMB

In the 1930s Japan developed a death cult which had a profound effect on the conduct of the Japanese armed forces in the Pacific War, 1941–1945. As a result of government directed propaganda campaign after the overthrow of the Shogunate in 1868, the ruling military cliques restored an Imperial system of government which placed Emperor Meiji as the Godhead central to the constitution and spiritual life of the Japanese nation. A bastardised Bushido cult emerged. It combined with a Social-Darwinist belief in Japan's manifest destiny to dominate Asia. The result was a murderous brutality that became synonymous with Japanese treatment of prisoners of war and conquered civilians. Japan's death cult was equally driven by a belief in self-sacrifice characterised by suicidal Banzai charges and kamikaze attacks. The result was kill ratios of Japanese troops in the Pacific War that were unique in the history of warfare. Even Japanese civilians were expected to sacrifice their lives in equal measure in the defence of the homeland. It was for this reason that American war planners came to the shocking estimate that as many as 900,000 Allied troops could die in the conquest of mainland Japan – Operation DOWNFALL. Contrary to the view of numbers of revisionist historians in the post-war period, who have variously argued that the atom bombs were used to prevent Soviet entry into the war against Japan, Francis Pike, author of Hirohito's War, The Pacific War, 1941 – 1945 [Bloomsbury 2015] reaffirms that the nuclear weapon was used for one purpose alone – to bring the war to a speedy end and to save the lives of American troops.     

Communist China’s entry into the Korean hostilities and a U.S. proposal for a collective security arrangement in the Pacific offshore island chain

In late 1950, against the background of communist China’s full entry into the Korean War, the U.S. government put forward a Pacific Ocean Pact, which would comprise the United States, Japan, the Philippines, if possible Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. This article, after tracing China’s intervention in the Korean War, discusses U.S. policy planning on the proposal for a Pacific Pact, and examines the precise objectives of the proposal. It is argued that the American proposal for a Pacific offshore island chain pact was basically intended to enhance U.S. security interests in Northeast Asia, particularly Japan. The Pacific Pact proposal therefore contained a scheme for committing formally substantial U.S. armed forces to the defense of the Pacific Ocean; the revitalization of Japanese power; and the welding of the resources of strength of Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines to the defense of Japan.     

“战争罪犯”还是“民族英雄”——以日本战后恢复对军人和战犯的抚恤政策为视角

对军人军属进行抚恤是日本军国主义战争动员的重要内容,日本战败后曾经一度废除。《旧金山和约》签订后,日本政府很快恢复了对不包括战犯在内的复员军人的抚恤、救助工作。在日本遗族会等保守团体的推动和"战犯释放运动"的影响下,经过几次修改,至20世纪50年代中期,日本政府全面恢复了对包括战犯在内的军人军属抚恤工作。无论是刑死还是狱死的"战犯"均被视为因公死亡享受抚恤,战犯服刑期间仍被作为"在职期间"累积计算抚恤年金,服刑期间伤病者另可以享受"伤病抚恤",战争罪犯俨然成了日本的"民族英雄"享受优待。日本政府从立法层面恢复对战犯的抚恤,对日本社会的战争认识和战争记忆的重构产生深刻的影响,也成为此后甲级战犯被靖国神社合祀的社会意识的基础。     

日本“国家正常化”与美国的东亚地缘战略

战后,由于美军单独占领日本,美国占领当局直接主导了日本的非法西斯化改革,日本的对外政策也被纳入美国的东亚地缘战略框架内。正因如此,战后日本的"国家正常化"进程与美国的亚洲地缘战略密切联系在一起。冷战时期,日本充当美国在亚洲的"冷战"哨兵,日本在"旧金山体制"下获得"独立"和国际空间。冷战结束后,美国推行全球霸权战略,日本乘机加强与美国的军事同盟关系,扩展自主权。尤其进入21世纪,日本通过参与美国的"反恐"战争,实现了海外派兵。近年来美国实施战略东移和"亚太再平衡",日本借机加快修宪活动和军事"解禁",加速日本"国家正常化"的步伐。     

Japan eyes China

A research trip to Tokyo found contrasts between Japanese policies of engaging China economically and the U.S. emphasis on human rights. It also found distinct differences between Washington and Tokyo in assessing the present and future security threat of China in Asia. While the United States is apprehensive about increasing military power, Japan is more concerned with China’s political and economic stability.     

Militarizing Japan’s Southwest Islands: Subnational Involvement and Insecurities in the Maritime Frontier Zone

Abstract

This paper sheds light on a relatively underexplored aspect of Japan’s recent security changes by examining the subnational level where the impact has been far-reaching. It focuses on Japan’s maritime frontier zone: the Yaeyama Islands located at the southwestern end of the Japanese archipelago and administered as part of Okinawa Prefecture. It argues that while Yaeyama militarization has been primarily a national response to China’s portrayed assertiveness in the East China Sea, it has also been facilitated by the strategic actions of local political elites, in cooperation with sympathetic extra-local forces. Political elites from two islands, Yonaguni and Ishigaki, have been motivated primarily by diverging material and ideational factors. Yonaguni elites have viewed militarization largely through the prism of “compensation politics.” Their counterparts in Ishigaki have been driven by more ideological objectives, seeking militarization for deterrence purposes and otherwise transforming the island into a rightist breeding ground in defence of Japanese territory. Yaeyama militarization has not only diminished enthusiasm for seeking autonomy and enhancing economic security through microregional cooperation, but has also enhanced local-level insecurities while creating and exacerbating divisions.     

Japan’s Shifting Military Priorities: Counterbalancing China’s Rise

This article analyzes the most recent phase of Japan’s security policy reform, focusing on its shifting priorities towards the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the Japan–US alliance since mid-2010. From a realist perspective, it argues that these shifting military priorities first and foremost represent a traditional counterbalancing response to China’s rise. Conforming to the logic inherent in balance of threat theory, it moreover argues that this balancing behavior is explained by a confluence of two primary factors, namely Japanese perceptions of aggressive Chinese behavior in the maritime domain and concerns relating to the changing distribution of capabilities in China’s favor.     

Japan’s Diplomacy towards Member Countries of Pacific Islands Forum: Significance of Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM)

As an island country in the Pacific region, it is natural for Japan to have diplomatic relationships with neighboring island countries. By the early 1970s, Japan started to provide Official Development Assistance (ODA) to two individual island countries in the Pacific region, and, in the mid-1980s, when most of the island countries had achieved independence, Japan’s diplomacy expanded to additional countries. In 1985 then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone made an official visit to two of the island countries, and, in 1987, official policy expressing support for the Pacific island countries’ independence, regional cooperation, political stability, economic development, and people-to-people exchange was issued. In October 1997, the “Japan-SPF Summit Meeting” with participants of leaders from Japan and 14 South Pacific Forum member island countries/regions and government representatives of Australia and New Zealand was held in Tokyo. The 8^th Pacific Islands Leaders meeting held in May 2018 is symbolic of Japan’s diplomacy toward the Pacific Islands Forum member countries. This article is the author’s personal observation of Japan’s diplomacy toward Pacific Islands Forum member countries and the significance of Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting.     

从军事安全角度看东盟五国的美国观

冷战结束后,东盟国家虽然对美国在地区安全中的作用曾存在较大的争议,但逐渐倾向一致的看法是:美国虽然不再是军事“保护者”,但仍然欢迎美国的军事存在,以发挥一种制衡和协调的作用。为何东盟国家将日本、中国和印度的崛起视为潜在的安全威胁,而总体上并不将美国这个超级大国视为安全威胁?结合沃尔持(Stephen M．Walt) “威胁平衡”理论,笔者认为,关键的因素是对“大国进攻性意图”的认知和防范心理。     

The legacy of the Korean War: Impact on U.S.-Taiwan relations

If there had not been a Korean War, the Chinese Communists would probably have invaded Taiwan in 1950. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States began to reverse its hands-off policy toward the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan. The Korean War first compelled the United States to grant military aid to Taiwan and then put the island under U.S. protection. The war forestalled the deterioration of the ROC’s international status, but the legal status of Taiwan became undetermined in the eyes of U.S. policymakers. U.S. economic aid prevented Taiwan from sliding into an economic depression in the 1950s, and greatly contributed to the island’s later economic takeoff. He is the author ofThe Taiwan Security Triangle (Taipei: Laureate Publishing Company, 1989).     

战后日本“重返”东南亚与英国的应对

二战后,英国政府不希望日本经济复苏过快,并且不愿看到日本经济过多地染指东南亚。1954年英国促成日本加入由它倡导的科伦坡计划,以便把日本在东南亚的活动尽量纳入其可控范围之内。除此以外,在50年代和60年代前期,英国对日本在东南亚的企图进行了重重阻挠。但是进入60年代中后期,随着日本的经济飞速发展,国力日渐增强,英国已无力阻止日本进入东南亚。英国在日英首脑会晤的场合,不断敦促日本加强对东南亚国家的援助,而日本却一再敦促英国维持在东南亚的军事存在。