Racial Vote Dilution: Impact of the Reagan DOJ and the Burger Court on the Voting Rights Act

Since passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA) and the subsequentregistration of millions of minority voters, racially basedvoting discrimination has shifted from a strategy of vote denialto one of vote dilution. The VRA, especially Section 2 and 5,is the dramatic congressional effort to eliminate strategiesthat deny effective political participation to millions of citizens.However, the VRA has to be aggressively implemented by the U.S.Department of Justice (DOJ), and it has to be broadly validated,in concrete cases and controversies in federal courts, if itis to blunt the vote discrimination/dilution strategy. Whilethe Warren Court saw Section 5 as a radical but legitimate toolto end the perpetuation of voting discrimination, the BurgerCourt has seen Section 5 in less sweeping terms. And while theCarter administration DOJ aggressively supported minority plaintiffsin federal voting rights litigation brought under Sections 2and 5, the Reagan administration has redirected civil rightspolicy, including the methodology of implementing Sections 2and 5 of the VRA.     

The Calculus of Voting in Compulsory Voting Systems

Compulsory voting laws have consistently been demonstrated to boost electoral participation. Despite the widespread presence of compulsory voting and the significant impact these laws appear to have on voting behavior, surprisingly little effort has been devoted to analyzing how mandatory voting alters the decision-making calculus of individual voters in these systems. Moreover, studies that investigate the influence of compulsory voting laws on electoral participation generally treat these policies monolithically, with scant attention to the nuances that differentiate mandatory voting laws across systems and to their consequences for voting rates. Analyses that explicitly and empirically examine the effects of penalties and enforcement are surprisingly rare. This study aims to fill that void by adapting rational choice models of participation in elections for compulsory voting systems. I find that the level of penalties countries impose for non-compliance and the degree of penalty enforcement impact turnout rates. Voters in mandatory voting systems abstain least when both the penalties and the likelihood of enforcement are high, and abstain most when both meaningless.

A comparative analysis of Inspector responses to complaints about psychosocial and physical hazards

Work Health and Safety Inspectors are at the forefront of efforts to protect workers from harm from psychosocial hazards, yet the application of regulatory theory to their practice has been limited. Drawing on models of responsive regulation and strategic enforcement, we analyze extensive (N = 46,348) complaint and incident notification data from an Australian Work Health and Safety Inspectorate, to compare Inspectors' responses to psychosocial versus non-psychosocial hazards. We found psychosocial hazards were less likely to be actioned than non-psychosocial hazards. When they were actioned, psychosocial hazards saw more Inspector activity, but fewer enforcement notices than non-psychosocial hazards. These findings are inconsistent with the version of responsive regulation espoused by the regulator. Our theoretical conclusion is that Weil's strategic enforcement approach is likely to offer greater possibilities for guiding future resource allocation.     

What is the cost of voting?

Despite a wealth of literature on the determinants of electoral turnout, little is known about the cost of voting. Some studies suggest that facilitating voting slightly increases turnout, but what ultimately matters is people's subjective perceptions of how costly voting is. This paper offers a first comprehensive analysis of the subjective cost of voting and its impact on voter turnout. We use data from an original survey conducted in Canada and data from the Making Electoral Democracy Work project which covers 23 elections among 5 different countries. We distinguish direct and information/decision voting costs. That is, the direct costs that are related to the act of voting and the costs that are related to the efforts to make (an informed) choice. We find that the cost of voting is generally perceived to be very small but that those who find voting more difficult are indeed less prone to vote, controlling for a host of other considerations. That impact, however, is relatively small, and the direct cost matters more than the information/decision cost.     

Social pressure, surveillance and community size: Evidence from field experiments on voter turnout

Citizens participate in elections, at least partly, because they perceive voting as a social norm. Norms induce compliance because individuals prefer to avoid enforcement mechanisms—including social sanctions—that can be activated by uncooperative behavior. Public visibility, or surveillance, increases the likelihood of norm-compliant behavior and applies social pressure that impels individuals to act. Some scholars have linked social pressure to community size, advancing the notion that pressure to conform to social norms is heightened in smaller, less populous communities in which citizens interact frequently and where monitoring behavior is less onerous. Others argue that even highly-populated communities can exhibit “small world” properties that cause residents to be sensitive to social pressure. In this paper, I analyze data from a recent field experiment designed to test the impact of social pressure on voting taking interactions with community size into account. The findings I report suggest community size does not moderate the impact of social pressure.     

Tax systems and tax shares

Public Choice - How can one use the results derived in Sections 3 and 4? The type of use one can make in theoretical voting analysis was suggested in Section 4 already. Comparative statics results...     

Modeling the influence of polls on elections: a population dynamics approach

We propose a population dynamics model for quantifying the effects of polling data on the outcome of multi-party elections decided by a majority-rule voting process. We divide the population into two groups: committed voters impervious to polling data, and susceptible voters whose decision to vote is influenced by data, depending on its reliability. This population-based approach to modeling the process sidesteps the problem of upscaling models based upon the choices made by individuals. We find releasing poll data is not advantageous to leading candidates, but it can be exploited by those closely trailing. The analysis identifies the particular type of voting impetus at play in different stages of an election and could help strategists optimize their influence on susceptible voters.     

Random votes under compulsory voting: Evidence from Brazil

Compulsory voting is known for boosting electoral turnout, even when sanctions for abstaining are small or loosely enforced. Much less is known, however, about the consequences of compulsory voting on vote choice, and, in particular, about the quality of electoral decisions. In this paper, we explore the extent to which voters meaningfully engage in the electoral process or simply vote randomly because voting is required by law. We conducted a large online survey in Brazil during the 2018 national elections to assess if voters engage in random voting. We evaluate random voting for low-profile, low-information elected offices (state and federal legislators) and others that receive greater media coverage (governor and president) and evaluate the determinants of random voting for each of them. We find that: 1) random voting does not appear to be affected by social desirability bias; 2) there is substantial random voting under compulsory voting; 3) more voters tend to engage in random voting in low-profile, low-information elections, as compared to elections that receive greater media coverage; and, 4) interest in politics, education, and disposition to vote if voting were to be voluntary reduce random voting. Our findings carry important implications for the study of citizen participation and civic competence under compulsory voting and for democratic representation, more broadly.     

Sequential vote choice: Applying a consideration set model of heterogeneous decision processes

This article analyzes the relative effects of a classic set of long-term and short-term determinants of party choice by treating voters' decision processes as a two-stage heterogeneous process. Departing from a consideration set model of voting behavior (CSM), we use panel data collected in Sweden in 2014 to analyze which voters considered voting for more than one party. To evaluate the CSM approach we estimate the relative effects of long-term and short-term determinants, for different parts of the electorate and at different stages of the decision process.Results confirm that the choice process for the ‘considering kind’ of voters is influenced by another mix of long-term and short-determinants than stable and party identified voters. Findings suggest that continued analyses of multi-stage decision making may bring new insights into electoral behavior. We argue that the core ideas of CSM – the sequential decision-making process and heterogeneity in the impact of long-term and short-term determinants – are generally applicable for analyses of voting behavior.     

Compulsory voting and political engagement (beyond the ballot box): A multilevel analysis

Proponents of compulsory voting argue that this institution leads to higher levels of political engagement. Opponents of mandatory voting instead argue that forcing people to vote can increase feelings of political alienation and generate lower levels of political engagement. The empirical record on this issue is scarce and inconclusive. This paper revisits this question with a series of multilevel models that evaluate the impact of compulsory voting on different forms of political engagement, using data from all the waves of the Americas Barometer Survey (2004–2014). The results suggest that compulsory voting has a negligible effect on political engagement. However, the results also reveal an interesting interaction. Citizens with low levels of education are more likely to be cognitively engaged with the political process when voting is mandatory.     

党内民主视阈下的反腐倡廉建设

以党内民主的动力助推反腐倡廉建设,必须充分保障党员民主权利,以此激发队伍纯洁的内在活力。保障党员的知情权是推进党内民主的基础,保障党员的参与权和选举权是尊重党员主体地位的标志,保障党员的民主决策权是发挥党员主体作用的关键,保障党员的监督权和罢免权是推进党风廉政建设的现实路径。要加强党内基层的民主建设,提升反腐倡廉的创新动力。积极探索农村基层党内民主和"两新"组织党内基层民主的多种实现形式,推进基层社区党内民主的创新。     

"Conquered Provinces"? The Voting Rights Act and State Power

Congress will soon review key provisions of the Voting RightsAct (VRA). A perennial concern has been the act's effect onfederalism. In 1982, Congress amended the VRA both to preventdiscriminatory electoral outcomes and to enhance minority politicalpower. Since the 1990s, the Supreme Court has adjudicated theVRA in a way that limits states' use of race to protect thatpower. An informal alliance has since emerged between Congress,the Justice Department, states, and minority voters againstwhat they view as a retrogressive voting rights jurisprudence.This article will argue that Congress should restore state autonomyto use race as a remedial factor when districting by reaffirmingthe spirit and intent of the 1982 amendments.     

Modes of participation over the adult life span

Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, in their 1972 workParticipation in America, advance the notion that political participation is not unidimensional, but is comprised of different modes. In recent years, the availability of panel and cross-sectional time series data has led to greater interest in the temporal dimension of political participation. Using data from nine American National Election Studies, we confirm the Verba and Nie findings with respect to voting and campaign participation and expand upon them. We examine the factor structure of indicators used in composite indices of voting and campaign participation and find that the structure of participation is stable across age groups, cohorts, and periods, confirming that composite indices of voting and campaign participation are not confounded by age, cohort, or period effects.This study was supported by grants from the Wayne State University Graduate School and the National Institute on Aging (NIA 5 AG06344-02).     

Politics,unemployment, and the enforcement of immigration law

Immigration control-related audits and their resulting sanctions are not solely determined by impartial enforcement of laws and regulations. They are also determined by the incentives faced by vote-maximizing politicians, agents acting on their behalf, and workers likely to compete with immigrants in the local labor market. In this paper, we use a unique data set to test the extent to which congressional oversight determines the bureaucratic immigration enforcement process. We examine the decisions made at each stage of enforcement from over 40,000 audits from 1990 to 2000. This includes analysis of (1) whether a firm is found in violation, (2) whether a fine is issued, (3) the size of the fine issued, and (4) how much of a dollar reduction fined employers were able to negotiate. We find that the number of audits conducted increases with local unemployment. We also find that a congressman’s party affiliation and its interaction with committee membership and party majority status, as well as firm size and local union membership, correlate to decisions made at every stage of enforcement.     

Spatial continuity and individual variability: A review of recent work on the geography of electoral change

Analyses have shown that the results of a series of general elections display considerable stability in the geography of voting patterns over time. Further, it has been suggested that the change between two electrons is similar in all places. This paper challenges the latter findings, using data from Great Britain and New Zealand. It is shown that even if there were a pattern of uniform swing, this would be produced by spatial variations in voter transition matrices. A review of analyses of those variations suggests the important roles of the neighbourhood effect, campaign spending, tactical voting, sectional effects, and migration as influences on voter behaviour.     

Gender,populist attitudes,and voting: explaining the gender gap in voting for populist radical right and populist radical left parties

Empirical studies have demonstrated that compared to almost all other parties, populist radical right (PRR) parties draw more votes from men than from women. However, the two dominant explanations that are generally advanced to explain this disparity – gender differences regarding socio-economic position and lower perceptions regarding the threat of immigrants – cannot fully explain the difference. The article contends that it might actually be gender differences regarding the conceptualisation of society and politics – populist attitudes – that explain the gender gap. Thus, the gap may be due, in part, to differences in socialisation. The article analyses EES 2014 data on voting for the populist radical right and the populist radical left in nine European countries. Across countries, the gender gap in voting for the PRR is indeed partly explained by populist attitudes. For populist radical left parties, the results are less clear, suggesting that populism has different meanings to voters on the left and on the right.     

Putting Electronic Voting under the Microscope

Electronic voting entered the political arena some years ago, with some countries advocating its use, some countries trialling and then abandoning it and yet others preferring to preserve the status quo of paper‐and‐pencil voting within a voting booth. In this paper we present the pros and cons of electronic voting and propose a set of characteristics we think electronic voting systems should exhibit. We then briefly review some pertinent concerns, issues and worries. We conclude by introducing the Handivote system, an electronic voting system that supports voting by means of SMS messaging, and explain how it measures up in terms of our own specified characteristics.     

Voting power and voting blocs

We investigate the method of power indices to study voting power of members of a legislature that has voting blocs. Our analysis is theoretical, intended to contribute to a theory of positive political science in which social actors are motivated by the pursuit of power as measured by objective power indices. Our starting points are the papers by Riker (Behavioural Science, 1959, “A test of the adequacy of the power index”) and Coleman (American Sociological Review, 1973, “Loss of Power”). We argue against the Shapley–Shubik index and show that anyway the Shapley–Shubik index per head is inappropriate for voting blocs. We apply the Penrose index (the absolute Banzhaf index) to a hypothetical voting body with 100 members. We show how the power indices of individual bloc members can be used to study the implications of the formation of blocs and how voting power varies as bloc size varies. We briefly consider incentives to migrate between blocs. This technique of analysis has many real world applications to legislatures and international bodies. It can be generalised in many ways: our analysis is a priori (assuming formal voting and ignoring actual voting behaviour) but can be made empirical with voting data reflecting behaviour; it examines the consequences of two blocs but can easily be extended to more.     

The Limits of Ecological Inference: The Case of Split-Ticket Voting

We examine the limits of ecological inference methods by focusing on the case of split-ticket voting. Burden and Kimball (1998) report that, by using the King estimation procedure for inferring individual-level behavior from aggregate data, they are the first to produce accurate estimates of split-ticket voting rates in congressional districts. However, a closer examination of their data reveals that a satisfactory analysis of this problem is more complex than may initially appear. We show that the estimation technique is highly suspect in general and especially unhelpful with their particular data.