Is the Animal Liberation Front morally justified in engaging in violent and illegal activism towards animal farms?

The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) is an activist group, mainly focused on violent and illegal direct action, including destruction of property, the rescuing of animals and the clandestine filming of animal cruelty on animal farms. Here, I engage with three arguments that are often raised against the ALF’s actions, namely these actions are not morally justified because: (a) they are not measures of last resort; (b) they are excessively violent and do not discriminate targets; and (c) they have no reasonable probability of success. I contend that clandestinely filming animal cruelty is morally justified, the destruction of property is not and that rescuing animals is morally justified, if the ALF incorporates some changes as to how this is done.     

Civil War Diffusion and the Emergence of Militant Groups, 1960–2001

In this research note, I argue that scholars of the international diffusion of civil conflict would benefit from directly measuring rebel mobilization prior to the onset of civil war. To better understand the way in which international processes facilitate dissidents overcoming the collective action problem inherent in rebellion, I focus on militant organizations and model the timing of their emergence. I use several data sets on militant groups and violent nonstate actors and rely on Buhaug and Gleditsch’s (2008) causal framework to examine how international conditions predict militant group emergence. While Buhaug and Gleditsch conclude that civil war diffusion is primarily a function of internal conflict in neighboring states, once militant group emergence is substituted in the dependent variable, I observe that global conditions affect rebel collective action. A final selection model links militant groups with civil conflict onset and demonstrates the variable performance of diffusion effects. The results indicate that many rebels mobilize in response to more global events and then escalate their behavior in response to local conditions.     

The prosecution of “others”: presidential rhetoric and the interrelation of framing,legal prosecutions,and the Global War on Terror

ABSTRACT

In examining the Global War on Terror, the effects of presidential rhetoric on the framing of terrorism has been well documented. However, little previous work links terrorism and its status as an “othered” phenomenon to differential legal prosecution in a post-9/11 era. Using the Prosecution Project data set, we compared “othered” individuals, as defined by a Muslim, Arab/Middle Eastern, and/or foreign-born status, to “non-othered” individuals charged with terroristic felonies. Furthermore, we subdivided the dataset into three analytical time blocks: the George W. Bush administration immediately post-9/11, the latter half of the Bush administration, and the Obama administration. For the first and third time blocks, we found that “othered” individuals were prosecuted significantly more frequently than “non-othered” individuals. These findings call into question the effect of presidential rhetoric and the national framing of terrorism on the legal prosecution of “othered” individuals.     

From Jerusalem to Baghdad? Israel and the War in Iraq

The prevailing opinion that the Bush administration took the United States to war against Iraq in March 2003 under false pretenses has led many to believe that Israel's security was the secret rationale for the war. According to this "war for Israel" thesis, neoconservative policymakers in the Bush administration, the pro-Israel lobby in the United States, and Israel's government all pushed the United States to go to war with Iraq for the sake of Israel's security. This article critically assesses this controversial claim and examines Israel's role in the U.S. decision to invade Iraq. I argued that while neoconservatives were instrumental in promoting the Iraq war, Israel was not their primary concern and that although American Jewish organizations and the Israeli government did largely support the Iraq war, they did not seek it or actively lobby for it.     

Ballots,Bargains, and Bombs: Terrorist Targeting of Spoiler Opportunities

Benjamin Netanyahu's come-from-behind victory over Shimon Peres in the Israeli national elections of May 1996, following an apparent intensification of Palestinian terrorism over the course of that spring, reminded observers of the political ramifications of terrorism. Since May 1996 was also the month in which Israel reentered Final Status negotiations with a Palestinian delegation in Taba, Egypt, the timing of this surge in violence encourages us to ask if terrorists regularly conceive of elections and rounds of negotiations as “spoiler opportunities,” or opportune times to undermine peaceful political processes. We address this question in the context of Israel's long‐running experience with elections, negotiations, and terrorism. We hypothesize that attacks resulting in fatalities are likely to increase in periods immediately surrounding Israeli general elections and key rounds of negotiations affecting the fate of the Palestinian population. Negative binomial event count analyses of the period 1970–2007 suggest that violent opponents indeed viewed the periods preceding negotiations and the ends of electoral cycles as “spoiler opportunities.”     

Let’s not jump (over) the guns: response to Christina Hellmich

This reply explains several decisions I made as author of “Terrorwars: Boston, Iraq.” Among points raised is the central comparison of the Boston counterterrorist operation in 2013, which I call a one-day war, with techniques of the early Iraq war. Relatedly, I use war knowledge presented in a “novel” by an American veteran of the Iraq war to make that comparison, plus my own experiences with the Boston lockdown, all of which raise questions about who or what is a legitimate source of information on war. I close with events of August 2013 in Ferguson Missouri that confirm the idea that the USA is bringing tools and techniques from contemporary wars into urban policing, and doing so in ways that many ordinary people on the ground are identifying as war.     

“Any press is good press?” Rebel political wings,media freedom,and terrorism in civil wars

As part of a recent effort to bridge the studies of terrorism and civil war, new research has begun to emerge on the use of terrorism by rebel groups as a strategy of war. Building on these findings, we examine the role of affiliated political wings in shaping the use of terrorism by rebel groups during civil wars. We contend that the presence of an affiliated political wing during the civil war should increase the use of terrorism by rebel groups only in countries where there are relatively few restrictions on the freedom of the press. As political wings are often designed to engage with the civilian population through the dissemination of information, these apparatuses are in a key position to frame the use of terrorism as part of the rebel’s broader war effort. To test this proposition, we examine the use of terrorism by all rebel groups from 1970 to 2011. The results from the analysis provide strong support for our argument that political wings increase the use of terrorism by rebel groups only when the press is allowed to independently cover terrorist attacks.     

Ethics, Foreign Policy, and Liberal Wars: The Role of Restraint in Moral Decision Making

Can morality be a basis for making foreign policy? What happens when it is? The dangers in using morality to justify violence are discussed in the light of the just war tradition and liberalism. An ethical case for the importance of restraint in moral decision making, especially with regard to unnecessary but desirable wars within liberalist approaches to foreign policy, is presented.     

More Combatant Groups,More Terror?: Empirical Tests of an Outbidding Logic

We examine and test the logic that outbidding among insurgent groups results in more suicide terrorism specifically and more terrorism of any type, which has become a popular argument in recent years. A global analysis of terrorism from 1970–2004 provides scant support for the notion that outbidding increases suicide terrorism. An extension of the argument to all types of terrorist attacks provides even less support. The logic of outbidding has received considerable attention in academic and policy circles in recent years. ¹ Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31 (2006): 49–80. Similar to the argument that democratic occupation increases suicide terror, ² Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terror (New York: Random House, 2005). our lack of empirical support suggests that considerable cross-national work is still needed to understand suicide terror adequately. We suggest some reasons why this may be the case, drawing particular attention to the problem of overgeneralizing from a limited set of cases.     

The Trouble with Terror: The Apologetics of Terrorism—a Refutation

This essay warns against a recent philosophical confusion concerning the definition of “terrorism,” which has dominated the post 9/11 literature. Terrorism, it is suggested, is nothing but the intentional random murder of defenseless non-combatants, with the intent of instilling fear of mortal danger amidst a civilian population as a strategy designed to advance political ends. Furthermore, this essay argues that regardless of its “root cause,” terrorism is diametrically opposed to the requirements of liberal morality and can only be defended at the expense of relinquishing the most basic of liberal commitments.