Mismatched Deterrents: Preventing the Use of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons

The basic logic of graduated deterrence worked fairly well against the Soviet Union, as each level of aggression was to be deterred by a matching response. But this logic has now been undermined vis-à-vis future rogue state chemical and biological attacks by the spread of dual-use technologies that can be diverted to weapons, and by decisions of the United States and other democracies to forego possession of chemical or biological weapons. This article identifies some of the serious difficulties of alternative approaches to deterring chemical or biological attacks, ranging from nuclear escalation to a reliance on supposed American advantages in conventional weapons. Lumping chemical and biological weapons together with nuclear weapons into a new category of weapons of mass destruction is a very imperfect solution.     

The Location and Purpose of Wars Around the World: A New Global Dataset, 1816–2001

A critical question in the quantitative study of war is how to choose appropriate units of analysis. While most studies link wars to the sovereign states that fight them, several authors have recently offered alternative perspectives, focusing on the the properties of rebel organizations and armies or tracking events in fine-grained geographic spaces. We contribute to these developments by introducing a new dataset of wars fought from 1816–2001 on fixed territorial units of observation that conform to the grid of states in 2001. Compared to standard datasets, we expand the geographic purview to include states not recognized by the international system. We provide location codes that identify the territories on which conflicts are fought, which is especially important for the analysis of imperial wars and colonial rebellions. We also introduce a new typology of wars based upon the aims of warring parties rather than their status in the state system. This dataset is uniquely suited to explore new questions that cannot be addressed with other datasets. To illustrate, we test an institutionalist theory of war and show empirically that the types of wars fought in a territory depend on whether it is governed as a modern nation-state, an imperial dependency, or the center of an empire.     

Introduction: studying political violence while indicted – against objectivity and detachment

ABSTRACT

Knowledge construction should seek to embrace empiricism – the deriving of knowledge from data and experience – while not confusing this with a false notion of objectivity. As a truly objective approach is not only difficult but likely impossible to establish, it obscures the burden placed upon social scientists by sociologist C. Wright Mills who advocated for the study of society in order to change it. This action-centric, emancipatory-focused approach is a hallmark of the critical turn in the investigation of political violence. Regardless of how neutral scholars and teachers may try to appear, what does it mean when our audience – our readers, colleagues and students – glimpse behind the curtain and begin to understand knowledge producers as three-dimensional political actors with subjectivities, positionalities and passions? Upon embarking on a multi-semester research and writing process with undergraduate students, what did it mean to begin such a relationship only hours after being released from federal custody, and how did my position vis-à-vis powerful juridical discourses shape our collaborative scholarship and the process of shared knowledge construction?     

Weapons as political symbolism: the role of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

This study evaluates the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) for NATO today. Historically, TNWs fulfill five objectives. First, they provide a deterrent by denial capability. Second, TNWs serve to deter TNWs by other countries. Third, as the most ‘useable’ of nuclear weapons, they offer militaries solutions to a small target set of hardened targets. Fourth, they bridge the interface between nuclear and conventional forces, maintaining linkage up the ladder of escalation. Fifth, they serve as a powerful political symbol of an extended deterrent commitment. While the perception is that their utility for NATO in plausible European contingencies is low, we argue that there is variation in the political and military roles of TNWs. We submit that, in general, the first role has lost its significance but the other objectives remain relevant to NATO's present political circumstances, especially as a symbol of the transatlantic relationship and as a safeguard against Russian belligerence. Accordingly, TNWs remain a significant part of NATO's capabilities and should remain deployed in Europe.     

Absolute and limited war: The possibility of foreign‐imposed regime change

This paper examines the relationship between foreign imposed regime change and war participation. The oppertunity and willingness of an opponent to impose a new regime on a war participant affects the likelihood that such a change will occur. Results from a logistic regression model suggest that (1) winning or losing the war, (2) the amount of war costs the participant endures, (3) the power of the participant relative to its opponent, (4) the amount of war costs the opponent endures, (5) the occurrence of a domestic regime change during the war, and (6) the difference between the authority structures of the war participant and its opponent all have a significant and sizable impact on the probability that a war participant endures a foreign imposed regime change. The first three variables measure the opponent's opportunity to force a regime change, while the last three measure its willingness. I suggest that these results increase our ability to evaluate the likely consequences of a war, and may have important implications for our understanding of the decision to enter and terminate a war.     

Communication frightens me: Derrida on communication

ABSTRACT

In this tribute to Jacques Derrida my main aim is to emphasise the radical nature of his questioning of the assumptions of the Western philosophical tradition without ever turning his back on this very tradition. The focus is only on one aspect of his thinking, namely his views on the notion of communication. These views are interpreted as representative of his general approach, and certainly provide an excellent illustration of his broader intellectual work. Attention is given to his articulation of the traditionally accepted views on communication and his alternative to this tradition is explored in terms of his deconstructive approach. Reference is made to terms that feature in a prominent way in communication, namely idealisation, intentionality, context, meaning, reading and writing, among other things. This enquiry leads in a spontaneous way, and as a natural consequence of his style of thinking, to an ethic of communication made very briefly explicit in the areas of thinking, theorising, reading and writing.     

Measuring Military Effectiveness: Calculating Casualty Loss-Exchange Ratios for Multilateral Wars, 1816–1990

In this article, we introduce and utilize a new dataset that provides battle- and war- level Loss Exchange Ratios (LERs) for combatant states involved in multilateral wars between 1816 and 1990.The battle-level data provide an alternative to the widely used, but problematic, HERO/CDB-90 data set on battle outcomes. To demonstrate the utility of the new data, we weigh in on the debate over democratic military effectiveness arguments by replicating models by Reiter and Stam (2002, 2009) and Downes (2009), finding that, when effectiveness is measured using LERs, democracies do not have an edge over their non-democratic counterparts.     

A Dutch revolt? The salience of the nonstrategic nuclear weapons issue in Dutch politics

Transparency, international credibility, democratic accountability, a new realism in defense expenditures – these basic policy goals fit awkwardly with the current deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) on Dutch territory. Most parties in the Netherlands want the NSNW removed. Some are even willing to challenge the idea that only consensus among all 28 NATO Allies can lead to the removal of the NSNW. The new Dutch minister of foreign affairs for example, Frans Timmermans, has a long track record of calling for an end to the deployment of US nuclear weapons on Dutch territory. Without NATO consent if necessary. His appointment fits with the political shift that we have seen over the past few years in Dutch politics. This article looks at the political rationale behind that shift: who are the main political actors involved? How have domestic and international pressures influenced party positions? The article also looks at the possibilities a new Dutch Government has were it to challenge the NATO consensus on NSNW. Would the USA refuse to take the NSNW away? How would NATO react and what could mitigate Allied concerns?     

Simplicity and Spook: Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration

It has been common, at least since 1945, to exaggerate and to overreact to foreign threats, something that seems to be continuing with current concerns over international terrorism. This paper sketches threat exaggeration during the Cold War and applies the experience from that era to the current one. Alarmism and overreaction can be harmful, particularly economically. And, in the case of terrorism, it can help create the damaging consequences the terrorists seek but are unable to perpetrate on their own. Moreover, many of the forms alarmism has taken verge on hysteria. The United States is hardly "vulnerable" in the sense that it can be toppled by dramatic acts of terrorist destruction, even extreme ones. The country can, however grimly, readily absorb that kind of damage, and it has outlasted considerably more potent threats in the past.     

A Nuclear-Free Middle East – Just Not in the Cards

A scheduled conference to promote a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East has renewed hopes for nuclear disarmament in this unstable region, if only innovative diplomacy could take advantage of the current shifts. However, a realistic assessment suggests that optimism is unwarranted. Fundamental strategic considerations related to Iran's nuclear program, Israel's atomic options, and the region's ingrate security architecture remain nearly insurmountable hurdles. Therefore, policymakers should focus first on attaining a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.     

无人武器变革及其对非对称安全关系的影响

新军事变革以来,无人武器在作战体系中发挥越来越显著的作用,得到各国的高度重视。历经百年演进,无人武器已具备侦察跟踪、试探诱骗、精确打击和支援保障四大功能。现有无人武器存在依赖遥控和自主水平低下等问题,这是制约其军事潜力发挥的主要瓶颈。未来,“网络式自主化”将成为无人武器变革的突破方向,带来“全体系”“广覆盖”“快反应”和“强协同”四大优势。叠加无人武器“零伤亡”特性所蕴含的政治影响力,弱者基于“抵消与杀伤”策略的抗争能力将受到质变挑战,同时原有差距会发生量变增大。假如缺乏科技和政治上的有力制衡,在技术垄断与社会变迁的双重影响下,非对称安全关系发生恶性演变的风险将显著增加。在“市场化战争”中,伤亡成本降低导致强权政治缺乏约束,低风险优势鼓励政客做出冒险决策,战争伦理的沦丧扭曲公众对非对称战争的认知,而弱者的极限求生手段还可能造成核扩散等“次生危害”。在西方主导的军备控制合作逐渐式微的背景下,中国需要以总体设计统筹无人武器的研发与实践,积极开发反制技术,并争取主导相关军控提议。     

Nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula: strategic adaptation,the Abe administration and extended deterrence in the face of uncertainty

Abstract

In the wake of two nuclear tests in 2016, an additional test in 2017 and a series of missile launches by North Korea in 2016–17, Japan's government is facing a critical set of security challenges. These require adaptation and careful planning by the Abe administration and raise important questions about the future of Japanese defence policy, alliance relations with the United States, and cooperation between Japan and the Republic of Korea. The following article considers both the history and current state of relations between Tokyo, Washington and Seoul, the relationship between elite and public opinion within Japan, and the character of Prime Minister Abe's leadership at a time of acute strategic risk. While the danger of conflict in northeast Asia should not be minimized, the gravity of the current crisis potentially offers an important opportunity for policy innovation for the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).     

Looking Beyond a Nuclear-Armed Iran: Is Regional Proliferation Inevitable?

The past year has seen a steady rise in tensions with regard to Iran's nuclear programme. Iran's economy is being crippled by far-ranging sanctions and the threat of an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities looms large on the horizon. Yet the country's nuclear programme marches on, stoking fears that Iran may indeed be seeking to cross the nuclear weapons threshold. In this context, it is timely to consider how key regional players would respond to a nuclear-armed Iran. Many argue that an Iranian bomb would prompt a proliferation cascade in the Middle East. However, a closer examination of the drivers for key regional players shows that this is not necessarily the case. There is a range of non-proliferation tools that could be applied by the West and others to offset this risk.