Explaining the Role of Restrictive Rules in the Postreform House

Abstract Four competing explanations have emerged regarding restrictive rules in Congress. Informational theory claims that rules reduce information costs and facilitate committee specialization. The distributional perspective suggests that rules enforce legislative bargains and help members achieve gains‐from‐trade. Another claim is that rules increase the Rules Committee's independent influence over policy. Lastly, partisan theory asserts that rules are used to increase the majority party's influence over policy. Abstract This analysis tests these claims during the 97th, 98th, 104th, and 105th Congresses. The findings demonstrate that theoretical constructs developed in earlier analyses of special rules are not robust over time and across legislative contexts. The results refute majoritarian assertions that rules are used as informational devices. Similarly, little evidence supports the claim that Rules Committee preferences independently affect rule assignment. Instead, a partisan principal‐agent framework emerges as the most useful construct to explain procedural choice in the postreform House.     

The Development of Special Orders and Special Rules in the U.S. House, 1881–1937

The modern Committee on Rules plays a critical role in structuring the agenda of the U.S. House of Representatives. In fact, resolutions from the Committee on Rules are the primary means through which controversial legislation reaches the House floor. But the Committee on Rules did not play a role in shaping the floor agenda until the 1880s and, despite intense scrutiny of episodes such as the institution of the Reed rules and the revolt against Speaker Cannon, our understanding of the role of the Committee on Rules is limited and skewed heavily toward the post‐World War II era. This limitation is unfortunate, because special rules play a starring role in major theories of legislative organization. In this article, I present analysis of the usage and historical development of special rules in the House, and I offer findings from my empirical analysis of the determinants of rule choice from 1881 to 1937. A nuanced interrogation of new data on special rules in this era reveals support for committee specialization and conditional party government as motives for rule choice in this era.     

Preferences,Partisanship, and Whip Activity in the U.S. House of Representatives

Using Democratic whip counts from the 92d House, we compare representatives' stated intentions to their actual roll‐call votes to detect evidence of party pressure. After arguing that this strategy understates real party influence, we nonetheless point to evidence of member conversion by party leaders. On 16 bills analyzed, two‐thirds of the switches between the count and the vote occur in the direction favored by party leaders. We examine one bill in depth, showing how the efforts of party leaders were consequential to the outcome. The pattern of movement on this bill, along with data from the larger set of bills, provides evidence that leaders act strategically, targeting the members whose persuasion requires the fewest resources.     

The Iraq War,Partisanship, and Candidate Attributes: Variation in Partisan Swing in the 2006 U.S. House Elections

Although partisan swing is often assumed to be uniform across congressional districts, our analysis of the 2006 House elections demonstrates that systematic variation exists. In addition to incumbency status, partisanship, spending, and scandal, variation in the local salience of national issues across districts affects vote shifts in these districts. Notably, partisan swing in Republican districts proved highly sensitive to the number of Iraq war deaths from that district and, to a lesser degree, to the roll‐call vote of Republican House members on the war resolution. These findings have implications for theories of anticipatory representation, retrospective voting, and electoral accountability.     

Minority Status,Ideology, or Opportunity: Explaining the Greater Retirement of House Republicans

Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives tend to retire at a higher rate than Democrats—a fact with potentially important electoral and policy ramifications—but research on the possible explanations for this partisan disparity has been scarce. I test various explanatory hypotheses using multilevel statistical analyses and find that Republicans are more likely to retire—not because they have been the predominant minority party, had more political opportunities, or had different private‐sector experiences, but because they harbor more conservative ideologies than their Democratic colleagues.     

Slavery,Partisanship, and Procedure in the U.S. House: The Gag Rule, 1836–1845

From the 24th through the 28th Congresses, the House of Representatives operated under versions of a “gag rule” that blocked petitions dealing with abolition and related matters. This article presents the gag rule as not only a historically important window into slavery deliberations in Congress but also a case study in majority party restrictions of minority rights—and in the boundaries that constituency politics can place on majority power. Through analysis of vote choices and voting changes over time, I demonstrate that the gag rule's partisan origins gave way as northern members voted against party and with specific constituency pressures as well as general sectional sentiment. The gag rule shows the power of electoral considerations and constituency in the early U.S. House, and it also illustrates the force that constituency can have over majority procedural maneuvering.     

Explaining Seat Changes in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1950–98

Abstract: Recent U.S. House elections have challenged existing models of congressional elections, raising the question of whether or not processes thought to govern previous elections are still at work. Taking Marra and Ostrom's (1989) model of congressional elections as representative of extant theoretical perspectives and testing it against recent elections, we find that the model fails. We augment Marra and Ostrom's model with new insights, constructing a model that explains elections from 1950 to 1998. We find that, although presidential approval ratings and major political events continue to drive congressional elections, the distribution of open seats must also be taken into account.     

机动车损害赔偿责任对交通行为的规范作用

机动车损害赔偿责任是一种对近代以来民事上的过失责任原则做出修正的特殊侵权行为责任。它有着深厚的社会基础、法理根据。其重要作用在于促进机动车驾驶人注意义务的履行和提高。机动车损害赔偿责任作为一种特殊侵权行为责任,在及时救济保护受害人方面发挥着积极作用。     

The Structure of China's Conflicts Law: New Developments of the Rules on Special Commercial Law

Netherlands International Law Review -     

Agenda Control,Majority Party Power,and the House Committee on Rules, 1937–52

The role of the U.S. House Rules Committee is consequential for theories of congressional parties, yet its role during the “conservative coalition” era is not well understood. We systematically analyzed the politics surrounding all special rules considered in Democratic Congresses from 1937 to 1952. We found that Rules repeatedly used its agenda power to push to the floor conservative initiatives that were opposed by the Democratic administration, the Rules Committee chair, and most northern Democrats, especially in Congresses that followed Republican election gains. The 44 conservative initiatives we identified include many of the most important policy issues considered during the period. Our findings challenge the idea that the majority party has consistently enjoyed a veto over which initiatives reach the floor, and they underscore the limits of roll‐call‐vote analysis in assessments of agenda control.     

融贯于特定场景中的规范、事实与证据——以司法过程为例

规范、事实与证据是司法过程中的三个核心范畴,具有多义性,但又能够在司法过程中融贯一致,无论是探寻本质的定义方法,还是后现代主义的解构方法都不能合理地解释这一点,只有在融合这两者理论优势前提下,规范、事实与证据才能够得到合理而一致的理解。     

降临在民宅内的恐怖

美国警察在执行拘留和逮捕任务时,曾多次选错对象或误闯不该进入的民宅,这无疑给执法的正义性蒙上了阴影。     

《鹿特丹规则》述评

2008年12月11日,联合国大会正式通过了<联合国全程或部分海上国际货物运输合同公约>,并建议将公约命名为<鹿特丹规则>.本文在介绍该公约主要内容的基础上,比较了公约与<海牙规则>、<维斯比规则>、<汉堡规则>及我国<海商法>的主要区别并加以评析,最后提出对我国<海商法>修改的立法建议.     

初评《鹿特丹规则》

对《鹿特丹规则》中的海运＋（maritime＋）、承运人的义务和赔偿责任、托运人的义务和赔偿责任、货物的交付、批量合同与合同自由、承运人的识别等问题进行探讨和评论。     

Special Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives: A General Election Barometer?

Vacancies in the U.S. House of Representatives are filled using special elections. These elections occur off the usual American electoral cycle, and their results are routinely portrayed by the American mass media as indications of what to expect in the next general election. We examined the predictive power of special elections results with respect to the general election outcomes for the U.S. House of Representatives from 1900 to 2008. We found that special elections that yield a change in partisan control do have predictive power regarding general election results.     

Disentangling the Role of Ideology and Partisanship in Legislative Voting: Evidence from Argentina

We present a novel approach to disentangle the effects of ideology, partisanship, and constituency pressures on roll‐call voting. First, we place voters and legislators on a common ideological space. Next, we use roll‐call data to identify the partisan influence on legislators' behavior. Finally, we use a structural equation model to account for these separate effects on legislative voting. We rely on public opinion data and a survey of Argentine legislators conducted in 2007–08. Our findings indicate that partisanship is the most important determinant of legislative voting, leaving little room for personal ideological position to affect legislators' behavior.