Agonizing Reappraisals: Anthony Eden, John Foster Dulles and the Crisis of European Defence, 1953-54

In 1953, the US government threatened to undertake an 'agonizing reappraisal' of its commitment to European security if the rearmament of West Germany through the European Defence Community (EDC) came to nothing. Although many in Europe dismissed the threat as a bluff, the British government, and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in particular, took it extremely seriously. In September 1954, following the demise of the EDC, the British broke with long-standing tradition and pledged to retain military forces in Germany at a set level for as long as their European allies so desired. This was Britain's own 'agonizing reappraisal', undertaken at Eden's prompting to neutralise the danger of the United States implementing its own version.     

IAI annual report, 1971

Despite the belief of some that British Prime Minister Brown's attitudes towards the European Union could not be predicted, much in his period as Chancellor of the Exchequer suggested that Britain's role within the European Union would not be a high priority of his premiership. Early indications bear out this expectation. There will probably not be a British referendum on the Reform Treaty, but the rhetoric employed by Brown's government to describe the Treaty will be negative and minimalist. Although no significant body of British opinion favours withdrawal from the European Union, British popular resentment towards the Union is unlikely to disappear under Brown's leadership.     

Sunset over the swamp – the independence and dependence of Belarus

The Federal Republic of Germany has since the end of the Cold War been at a crossroad in defining its role in European security. On the one hand, its contribution to democratic reform and economic stabilization in North Central Europe has enhanced enormously the prospects of representative government there; on the other, Germany remains wed to an outdated concept of military security and is reluctant to commit either the fiscal resources or the political capital to assume a role commensurate with Germany's importance in the development of a European Security and Defense Identity. Moreover, Bonn's precipitous diplomacy in the recognition of the breakaway Yugoslav states of Croatia and Slovenia betrays a willingness to permit Germany's allies to assume the less profitable burdens of hard security.     

British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis 1922–24

This article provides an overview of British policy during a defining episode in the interwar period — the Ruhr crisis of 1923–4. The author assesses the external considerations influencing Britain's policy (especially the roles of France, Germany, and the United States), and also explores the processes of foreign policy making within Britain's complex bureaucratic system. In particular, the relationship between the Foreign Office and the Treasury is analyzed and its impact on European policy assessed. The article challenges traditional views of British policy at this time, concluding that it was far more complex, but also far more limited and constrained, than previous studies would suggest.     

The Spirit of Ulysses? Ideology and British Appeasement in the 1930s

The British government's appeasement of fascism in the 1930s derived not only from economic, political, and strategic constraints, but also from the personal ideologies of the policy makers. Widespread guilt about the terms of the Versailles Treaty and tensions with France created sympathy for German revisionism, but the Cabinet properly recognized that Nazi Germany represented the gravest threat to peace in the 1930s. Fear of war and the recognition that Britain would have to tolerate peaceful change underlay attempts to appease the dictators, culminating in the Munich agreement in September 1938. After Munich, continued German belligerence, the Kristallnacht, and British intelligence assessments indicating that Hitler was prepared to attack the Western powers led to a reassessment of appeasement. The British government gave security guarantees to several European countries, seeking to deter future aggression and to lay the groundwork for a successful war against Germany should it prove necessary. While most of the British elite detested communism, anti-communist views did not govern British policy; security considerations required Soviet support in Eastern Europe, and Britain and France made a determined effort to secure Soviet support for the Peace Front.     

Tweaking the Lion's Tail: Edgar J. Tarr,the Canadian Institute of International Affairs,and the British Empire, 1931–1950

In its first 2 decades the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA), Canada's premier foreign policy think tank, never functioned merely as a neutral and apolitical research organization. Under the leadership of Edgar Tarr, president of the Monarch Life Assurance Company, and in its capacity as the Canadian Council of the transnational Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), in the 1930s and 1940s the CIIA became an instrument that championed Canadian national autonomy and sought to expand Canada's international role, while challenging British imperialism, racism, and Anglo–Saxon dominance. Prominent Canadian diplomats and other officials were complicit in this enterprise, which reached its apogee at the IPR conference held at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, in December 1942. The CIIA's activities during this period revealed the porosity and imprecision of the boundaries in Canada between the state and non-state realms. Throughout World War II, DEA and other Canadian government representatives attended CIIA and IPR conferences as “official non-officials,” effectively cooperating with private individuals in a network of purportedly non-governmental organizations that enabled Canada to exert leverage on the British government, reject British leadership, align itself with the United States, and secure a greater world role. CIIA leaders and Canadian officials also consciously encouraged nationalist forces in India, China, and Southeast Asia that sought to reject colonial rule and Western dominance. CIIA activities thus became part of a web of diplomatic interactions across a transnational network of think tanks within and outside the British Empire that had their own impact upon international affairs.     

Austria and European integration, 1947–60: Western orientation,neutrality and free trade

The purpose of this paper is to analyze Austria's role in the early days of European integration. This includes the attempt to find a European solution to the South Tyrol problem and the first steps towards the economy's Western orientation, that is, Austria's participation in the Marshall Plan, its OEEC and EPU memberships as well as its relationship with the Council of Europe and the ECSC. International relations determined Austria's room for manoeuvre in its efforts to obtain independence. This excluded EEC membership. The Ballhausplatz was thus striving for a European Free Trade Area. The role of the political parties are also covered in this paper. A further objective is to examine Austria's integration policy and the contrasts between the situation in Austria and West Germany. The paper points out how this small European state tried to avoid its exclusion from the European integration process and how it applied various methods to approach and cooperate with European institutions.     

Commercial Interests and Calculated Compassion: The Diplomacy and Paradiplomacy of Releasing the Lockerbie Bomber

The release of the only man convicted of the bombing of Pan-Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988 is the most significant diplomatic decision taken by the Scottish government. The decision constituted a two-level process: the British government's behaviour was characterised by commercial interests; and the Scottish governments by calculated compassion. Britain's policy was steered by its national interest in securing Libya's rehabilitation into international society and ensuring that British businesses could benefit. Scotland's paradiplomacy shifted from a strategy of avoidance to one using the release to further the idea of an independent Scotland. Presenting the release in such a way was to bolster the idea of Scotland as a distinct entity with its own set of values, laws, and customs and possessing an ability to operate autonomously on the international stage.     

Identity,Insecurity, and Great Power Politics:The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War

Why did Germany pursue naval expansion at the turn of the twentieth century? This question has long puzzled scholars of international security, who consider German naval ambition to be an instance of suboptimal arming—a decision that decreased Germany's overall security and risked the survival of the German state. This article argues that the social desire to be recognized as a world power guided Germany's decision to challenge British naval hegemony. From the beginning of its naval planning, Germany had one clear aim: a powerful fleet of battleships stationed in the North Sea would alter the political relationship with Britain in such a way that it could no longer ignore Germany's claim to world power status. Reconceptualizing Germany's naval ambition as a struggle for recognition elucidates the contradictions at the center of German naval strategy, explaining how the doomed policy could proceed despite its certain failure. The article concludes that the power-maximizing practices of great powers should be seen as an important component of identity construction and an understudied dimension of contemporary security practice.     

德国新政府对华政策前瞻北大核心

不同于默克尔时代,德国新政府执政纲领及部分新政要对华表态尤为强调意识形态分歧和对华竞争。在近年来中西方对抗性上升、美国不断拉欧遏华的大背景下,德国对华认知趋于负面,加之德国自身政局变化以及中德经贸关系的变化,新政府或将加强对华防范与施压,减少对华战略依赖,同欧美盟友加强协调,一致对华,在经贸、科技、全球基建、规则标准等领域争夺主动权。中德关系存在波动的可能性,但由于中德经贸捆绑、西方内部矛盾、德国外交务实传统等因素,新政府将在延续的基础上调整对华政策,中德关系尚不致发生逆转。     

Salience and sanctions: a principal-agent analysis of domestic win-sets in two-level games—the case of British European policy under the Blair government

The two-level approach is often criticized for its failure to provide thorough theoretical guidance to the empirical task of establishing the boundaries of governmental win-sets. Addressing this deficit, the article builds upon principal-agent theory to deduce two determinants of win-sets: the salience of a foreign policy issue for a government's domestic principals and the credibility of these principals' threats to sanction their governmental agent for its policy on this issue. To illustrate the analytic utility of the framework, the article puts forward a case study on British European policy under the Blair government. It is argued that the major patterns of New Labour's policy on Europe can be accounted for by shifts in the domestic salience of the European issue and in the ability of principals to credibly sanction their agent's European policy making.     

Europe's others and the return of geopolitics

In the context of European Union enlargement and the discussions about a European constitution, the question of Europe's identity has once again entered the limelight of political debates. From a poststructuralist perspective, identities are constructed through practices of othering, articulating a difference. In this article, I follow Ole Wæver to argue that for most of the time after the Second World War the most important other in the construction of a European identity has been Europe's own past. This temporal form of othering offered the possibility to form an identity through less antagonistic and exclusionary practices than was common in the modern international society. However, since the 1990s geographic and cultural otherings are on the increase, marking a return of geopolitics in European identity constructions and undermining the notion of European integration as a fundamental challenge to the world of nation‐states.1 A previous version of this paper was presented at the workshop ‘Other Europes’, organised by the Poststructuralism working group of the British International Studies Association, Keele University, England, 16 May 2003. I would like to thank the workshop participants, Alessandra Buonfino, Bahar Rumelili and the three referees of this journal for their critical and constructive comments. View all notes     

Bringing in the rogues: political violence,the British government and Sinn Fein

The article explores the relationship between the British government and the Irish Republican movement. In contrast to the established view, it argues that the British government had never had any objection to the inclusion of Republicans into a political settlement, and that – therefore – there was no need for any significant changes in government policy during the 1990s. Far from being an obstacle to inclusion, the British government's political strategy not only provided an incentive for the IRA to cease its military campaign, but also the opportunity to follow it up with an equitable political process, resulting in the Belfast Agreement.     

European debates during the Libya crisis of 2011: shared identity,divergent action

The war in Libya of 2011 is generally portrayed as yet more evidence of the European Union (EU)'s inability to formulate a coordinated foreign policy. While the crisis took place in the EU's backyard, joint foreign policy action was hindered by member states' disagreements on whether or not to establish a no-fly zone in Libya. While this is true of political decision-makers, this paper investigates whether governmental decisions were reflected in similar divisions in national news media or whether references to European identity and criticism of European disunity transcended national media boundaries. Comparing a total of 6746 newspaper articles from Germany, France, the UK, Austria and the USA, the findings show that intergovernmental differences did not lead to similarly divided public spheres. Public debates in France, Germany and Austria constantly referred to a European foreign policy identity, though EU identity references were largely absent from UK newspapers.     

Sustainability in NGO relief and development work: Further thoughts from Mozambique

Mozambique during the 1980s and 1990s has provided a challenging context for non-governmental organisations seeking to collaborate with its government in national development. One British NGO, Save the Children Fund, has set out to work in partnership with the government on a range of programmes at central level and in Zambezia province. Longer-term and emergency inputs form part of a conscious strategy aimed at securing sustainability. Institutional and practical constraints, however, make the achievement of this goal difficult, particularly in relief and rehabilitation projects. Changes in donor policies and in the Mozambican government's own evolving political priorities make it imperative to review this strategy on a regular basis. Lessons are drawn from Save the Children Fund's practical experience of development in Mozambique during the last eight years.     

The Europeanisation of Arms Export Policy in the Czech Republic,Slovakia, and Poland

Abstract

The article examines British, French and Italian parliaments’ roles in overseeing the European Union's external military operations, Concordia and Artemis. It shows that a democratic deficit exists in European security and discusses factors shaping differential performance. The British European Scrutiny Committee approved both operations a posteriori. The French Parliament was involved through the use of the emergency examination procedure that required the president of the Delegation for the European Union to approve operations as an individual. The Italian Parliament had no say on Artemis and approved Concordia on the same day the operation was launched, three months after the Italian Government had agreed to its mandate and planning in the European Council. British parliamentarians asked qualitative questions, others did not.     

Tailoring Strategies According to Ever-Changing Dynamics: The Evolving Image of the Kurdish Diaspora in Germany

Germany might be considered as the European country that has suffered the most from the spatial diffusion of Turkey's internal conflicts. It has received the highest number of Kurdish migrants in Europe and it became the core of Kurdish mobilization in transnational space. Germany's approach to the Kurdish Question on its own soil—combined with the strategies that the Kurdish activists used—determined the scope of opportunity structures for the mobilization of the Kurdish movement. This article explains how Kurdish activism has come to be perceived in Germany, and analyzes the German political environment by focusing on the criminalization and stigmatization of the Kurdish movement, especially during the 1990s. It then describes the discursive shift and change in framing strategies that the Kurdish diaspora experienced after the capture of the the Kurdistan Workers' Party's (PKK) leader in 1999. Lastly, it touches upon the recent developments in the Middle East, especially in Kobane, and their impact on the image of the Kurdish movement. The article is based on extensive fieldwork in Germany and includes testimonies of Kurdish diaspora activists, with a focus on their own perceptions about their situation and how they respond to securitization policies in the host country.     

German crisis management and leadership—from ignorance to procrastination to action

The financial crisis of 2008 and even more so the crisis of the Eurozone drastically increased the demand for decisive leadership and public crisis management. Due to the size of its economy and its position in the global as well as in the European economy, Germany should take the lead in this crisis management. Germany’s management of the two crises differs but also shows strong similarities. A “center-left Grand Coalition” managed the global financial crisis; a global crisis in which Germany was one among several relevant global players. A center-right government under the leadership of the same chancellor then during the sovereign debt crisis manages the Eurozone crisis. This is a regional crisis but with global implications. German government was slow in responding to both crises but acted eventually after some procrastination. Both cases, however, differ with regards to Germany’s actual role in crisis management. During the global financial crisis, other global actors pushed Germany to the forefront. The Eurozone crisis, a regional crisis, demands a leading role of Germany, the largest economy and member state of the EU. The paper, however, argued that the German crisis management with regards to the Eurozone is very much driven by ideas that preserve German norms but do not live up to the challenges of the crisis. Germany’s insistence in its own interests and norms hinders the delivery of a comprehensive crisis management of the Eurozone crisis within the European Union.     

The Preventive War that Never Happened: Britain,France, and the Rise of Germany in the 1930s

The theory of “preventive war” states that, under certain conditions, states respond to rising adversaries with military force in an attempt to forestall an adverse shift in the balance of power. British and French passivity in response to the rapid rise of Germany in the 1930s would appear to constitute one of the leading empirical anomalies in the theory, one the theory's proponents must explain. After clarifying the meaning of the preventive motivation for war and specifying the conditions under which it should be the strongest, we examine French and British behavior in the crises over the Rhineland in 1936 and Sudeten Czechoslovakia in 1938 through an intensive study of government documents and private papers. We argue that French political leaders, anticipating a continuing adverse shift in relative power, wanted to confront Hitler, but only with British support, which was not forthcoming. British leaders believed, even by 1936, that the balance of power had already shifted in Germany's favor, but that German ascendancy was only temporary and that British rearmament would redress the balance of power in a few years. We contrast our argument with alternative interpretations based on domestic political pressures and ideologically driven beliefs and interests.     

Ministers,Markets and Missiles: The British Government,the European Economic Community and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1964–68

Existing accounts of British efforts to achieve a nuclear non-proliferation treaty between 1964 and 1968 largely overlook the later stages of decision making within the Labour government. Scrutiny of previously classified sources reveals that a desire for entry into the European Economic Community had a much larger influence on the content and conduct of British non-proliferation policy than previously suggested. By 1967, Prime Minister Harold Wilson sought a secondary role in treaty negotiations, and left the running to the superpowers. This avoided unnecessary conflict with the countries of the Community, resentful of the Treaty's discriminatory terms, and helped to protect Britain's application to join the EEC. Although this bid was unsuccessful, ambitions for future membership continued to influence non-proliferation policy in 1968. Indeed, a desire for future entry into the EEC helps to explain why Britain became the first nuclear weapon state to ratify the Treaty.