Agonizing Reappraisals: Anthony Eden, John Foster Dulles and the Crisis of European Defence, 1953-54

In 1953, the US government threatened to undertake an 'agonizing reappraisal' of its commitment to European security if the rearmament of West Germany through the European Defence Community (EDC) came to nothing. Although many in Europe dismissed the threat as a bluff, the British government, and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in particular, took it extremely seriously. In September 1954, following the demise of the EDC, the British broke with long-standing tradition and pledged to retain military forces in Germany at a set level for as long as their European allies so desired. This was Britain's own 'agonizing reappraisal', undertaken at Eden's prompting to neutralise the danger of the United States implementing its own version.     

Yvon Delbos and Anthony Eden: Anglo-French Cooperation, 1936-1938

The period of tenure of Anthony Eden and Yvon Delbos as the foreign ministers of their respective countries coincided with a remarkable improvement and convergence in Anglo-French relations. This was no accident. Both men had similar ideas in relation to the challenges confronting Britain and France in international affairs. Neither wanted really close relations with Soviet Russia and both supported non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War despite their growing concern over German and Italian intervention. Delbos was highly critical of Mussolini's Italy and was firmly opposed to a Franco-Italian rapprochement while Eden, having originally given the Duce the benefit of the doubt, came to distrust him and to oppose even conversations with Italy without prior concessions, such as the withdrawal of Italian volunteers from Spain. Finally, both supported the appeasement of Nazi Germany, including colonial concessions, although Delbos towards the end of his period as foreign minister became more sceptical as to the prospects for success.     

'The limits of international leadership': The Eisenhower administration, East-West trade and the cold war, 1953-54

This article examines the Eisenhower administration's trade policy towards the Soviet Union in 1953-54. It argues, contrary to previous scholarship on the subject, that the liberalization of East-West trade controls in August 1954 cannot be attributed solely to the presidential leadership of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Instead, whilst Eisenhower played a significant role in changing American embargo policy, it was the Churchill government which provided the impetus required for the revision of the international export control lists. Despite conflict and confrontation over the shape and contents of the new embargo between Washington and London, the two governments forged a compromise in the summer of 1954.     

The Soviet Union and Churchill's appeals for high-level talks, 1953-54: New evidence from the Russian archives

New evidence from the Russian archives offers proof that Winston Churchill's calls for top-level talks, 1953-54, were greeted with mistrust and scepticism by Moscow. Soviet policy makers realized that Churchill was weak, entirely dependent on American policy and unable to act as mediator between East and West. They were also sceptical as to whether any real progress could be made during an Anglo-Soviet summit meeting and, instead, pressed for four-power talks at Foreign Minister level. Finally, the Soviet records shed light on the impact of the power struggle within the Kremlin on its responses to Churchill's initiative, with Vyacheslav Molotov preventing Georgi Malenkov from meeting the British Prime Minister.     

Eisenhower, the British and the security of Hong Kong, 1953-60

This article is an examination of Hong Kong's importance within British-American security arrangements in the Far East during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Archival evidence indicates that the Eisenhower Administration accepted a greater deal of commitment to the defence of Hong Kong during the 1950s — a period of significant hostility between the United States and the People's Republic of China. To understand this policy evolution in the broader context, this study evaluates the differences in British and American attitudes towards China during the 1950s and the effect of this on US policy towards Hong Kong.     

欧洲主权债危机和欧元的前景

2009年11月希腊爆发的国家主权债危机引发欧洲货币市场流动性短缺加剧,继而使西班牙、爱尔兰、葡萄牙和意大利等国也遭受信用危机,一时间,欧洲主权债危机风声鹤唳。欧洲央行及欧元区国家出台一系列应对措施及救助计划,终于使危机加剧势头得以遏止。当前欧洲主权债危机虽尚未结束,但通过对危机的处置,欧洲一体化程度将会进一步加强。强大的欧洲经济和强大的欧元符合中国的利益,应对全球性债务危机（尤其是美国的巨额债务）将是世界经济面临的最严重的挑战。     

Sir John Bradbury and the Reparations Commission, 1920-25

This article looks at a neglected episode during the work of the Reparations Commission of 1920-25 leading up to the Dawes Plan of 1924, when the British delegate to the Commission, Sir John Bradbury, drew up a plan to reschedule German reparation payments in an attempt to take the venom out of the debate over these payments. It takes as its documentary basis the previously unpublished papers of Sir John in his role as Britain's representative on the Reparations Commission from 1920 to 1925. The article concludes that Bradbury's plan had the potential to defuse at least some of the problems encountered in the political and economic results of the reparations policy and that it made a significant contribution to the thinking that emerged in the Dawes Plan.     

An 'Aladdin's lamp' for free enterprise: Eisenhower, fiscal conservatism, and Latin American nationalism, 1953-61

This study explores the Eisenhower administration's efforts to promote free trade and investment policies in Latin America. US officials believed that private capital investment, rather than US foreign aid, would best promote Latin American economic development and improve its abiliry to purchase American products. By eliminating the need for foreign aid, Latin American economic autarky complemented Eisenhower's zeal for fiscal conservatism. Although most scholars have focused on the primacy of anti-communism in Eisenhower's inter-American policies, this study contends that economic nationalism posed the greatest threat to Eisenhower's policies. US officials eventually responded by expanding aid to Latin America, but the additional economic aid was always intended to complement private capital, rather than replace it. This article, based upon the papers of influential administration officials and State Department records, sheds considerable light as to why the United States promoted free trade and investment policies in the developing world, as it still does today.     

In Defence of the West: General Lauris Norstad, NATO Nuclear Forces and Transatlantic Relations 1956-1963

In the history of NATO, lack of Atlantic communality is a recurring theme. Atlantic cohesion was constantly challenged. However, the discord among NATO members rarely threatened the very existence of the Alliance. The late 1950s and early 1960s witnessed such a rare occurrence. In Europe the question of nuclear sharing triggered the development of blue-prints for a step-by-step replacement of the Atlantic security co-operation by a European Security Community. These blueprints were discussed among the EEC member-states and within the forum of the WEU. This study analyses not only those concepts, but also the role of the SACEUR, General Norstad, in defending NATO from external threats and internal decay. By studying the leeway of the SACEUR, this study tries to establish whether the subsystem of the international system, formed by the nations of the North Atlantic area after the Second World War, should be characterised as a system of hegemonic stability or as a pluralistic security community. The article is based on recently declassified archival material from both sides of the Atlantic.     

Austria and European integration, 1947-60: Western orientation, neutrality and free trade

The purpose of this paper is to analyze Austria's role in the early days of European integration. This includes the attempt to find a European solution to the South Tyrol problem and the first steps towards the economy's Western orientation, that is, Austria's participation in the Marshall Plan, its OEEC and EPU memberships as well as its relationship with the Council of Europe and the ECSC. International relations determined Austria's room for manoeuvre in its efforts to obtain independence. This excluded EEC membership. The Ballhausplatz was thus striving for a European Free Trade Area. The role of the political parties are also covered in this paper. A further objective is to examine Austria's integration policy and the contrasts between the situation in Austria and West Germany. The paper points out how this small European state tried to avoid its exclusion from the European integration process and how it applied various methods to approach and cooperate with European institutions.     

A Crisis of Empire: The Anglo-Ottoman Dispute Over the Aden Frontier, 1901-1905

The crises which accompanied the rise and decline of the European empires have not been the object of systematic study in the manner of superpower crises of the Cold War period. Many of the techniques used to study Cold War crises have broader scope, including the models of governmental politics and organisational process developed by Graham Allison. The application of the Allison models to the events surrounding the delimitation of the Aden frontier between 1901 and 1905 illuminates significant aspects of the Anglo-Ottoman confrontation: they explain the manner in which non-rational elements in the policy-making process transformed a relatively insignificant issue into a crisis situation. Such insights also require a detailed examination of the documentary record which in this instance reveals the discord amongst British policy-makers and the organisational imperfections of the bureaucracy. The frontier Commissioners, the Aden Resident, the Government of India, the metropolitan government in London and the embassy in Constantinople were involved in a series of factional squabbles over the Aden frontier, the resolution of which often required the coercion of the Ottomans by the deployment of warships along the Yemen coast. Coordination amongst these different elements in the bureaucracy also played a role in generating tensions between London and Constantinople. The case of the Anglo-Ottoman dispute over the Aden frontier suggests that the analysis of internal governmental politics and organisational processes can be applied successfully to crises of empire which predate the Cold War era.     

The foreign office of the federal republic of Germany and the question of relations with communist states, 1953-55

The thaw in the Cold War following Joseph Stalin's death in March 1953 initiated a debate within the West German Foreign Office about intensifying relations with Eastern European communist states. Several veteran diplomats advocated expanding economic ties in particular. By 1955, however, the ministry's leadership around Foreign Minister Adenauer had won out with its more cautious course of limiting contacts to diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This early debate already highlighted most of the issues central to West German deliberations on expanding relations with communist states right up to Brandt's Neue Ostpolitik of the late 1960s and early 1970s.