Sir Ernest Satow and the 1907 Second Hague Peace Conference

Based on Satow's own account of the conference in his diaries, this article examines the role played by Sir Ernest Satow as the second plenipotentiary on the British delegation at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. His previous experience at the post-Boxer conference at Peking in 1900-1901 stood Satow in good stead during the preparations for the conference as well as once the actual negotiations commenced. His main contribution to the proceedings at The Hague, however, was the preparatory work for the London Naval Conference of 1909. Satow's stance towards the negotiations of 1907 marks him out as a predecessor of twentieth-century internationalists.     

Sir Ernest Satow in Tokyo, 1895-1900: From Triple Intervention to Boxer Rebellion

Satow's term as minister plenipotentiary at Tokyo has not been studied much in detail, though it is arguably the highpoint of his career as a diplomat. Satow was the first British envoy to Japan to have a profound, scholarly understanding of Japanese culture and politics gained over many years of residence in the country. This article offers a survey of Satow's diplomatic activities, and focuses especially on the revision of the so-called unequal treaties in 1899 and the marked improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations during this period.     

Ernest Satow's Early Career as Diplomatic Interpreter

This article is concerned with Satow's seven years as diplomatic interpreter in the Japan of the fateful 1860s. He was sent first to Peking because the Foreign Office in its ignorance thought that Japanese was very similar to Chinese, but this detour did at least enable him to meet there another notable British diplomatic interpreter, Thomas Wade. He soon learned better about Japanese, and once he had mastered it fluently he became a privileged observer of traditional society and culture in the crucial period when it was being shaken by the first rumblings of the Meiji era. He was therefore able to render outstanding service to his head of mission, who was himself an ex-interpreter. Satow went on to enjoy a long and distinguished career in the diplomatic corps, rising from interpreter to ambassador.     

'Not Proficient in Table-Thumping': Sir Ernest Satow at Peking, 1900-1906

Satow's diplomatic career was more multifaceted than the older, often Japan-centred, assessments of his work suggest. His period as minister to China especially has not been given the attention it deserves. His appointment to the Peking legation coincided with one of the most momentous periods in Sino-Western relations in the aftermath of the Boxer crisis of 1900. Satow exercised significant influence on the negotiations which led to the Boxer settlement of September 1901; and he proved to be a shrewd and skilful player in the Great Power competition for influence in China. The last two years of his term at the head of the Peking legation were taken up with steering British diplomacy through the turbulences caused by the Russo-Japanese War.     

Oleaginous Diplomacy: Oil,Anglo–American Relations and the Lausanne Conference, 1922–23

There has been considerable controversy as to the significance of oil in the Lausanne Conference of 1922–1923, in particular British attempts to retain Mosul as part of Iraq. However, as this article explores, the conference also had important implications for the composition of the British-registered Turkish Petroleum Company, which was expected to win the Iraqi oil concession. In the first phase of the conference, the United States observer delegation's stance persuaded the British Government to put pressure upon the British companies involved in the TPC to admit American companies upon the latter's terms. Despite this, in the second phase, the Americans supported the Turkish delegation in its opposition to clauses in the proposed Treaty, which would have guaranteed the rights of the TPC, and forced a British compromise on the issue. The Lausanne Conference played a significant role in the Anglo–American “oil war” of the inter-war period.     

Editors’ introduction: neoliberalism and/as terror

The articles in this special issue are drawn from papers presented at a conference entitled “Neoliberalism and/as Terror”, held at the Nottingham Conference Centre at Nottingham Trent University by the Critical Terrorism Studies BISA Working Group (CSTWG) on 15–16 September 2014. The conference was supported by both a BISA workshop grant and supplementary funds from Nottingham Trent University’s Politics and International Relations Department and the Critical Studies on Terrorism journal. Papers presented at the conference aimed to extend research into the diverse linkages between neoliberalism and terrorism, including but extending beyond the contextualisation of pre-emptive counterterrorism technologies and privatised securities within relevant economic and ideological contexts. Thus, the conference sought also to stimulate research into the ways that neoliberalism could itself be understood as terrorism, asking – amongst other questions – whether populations are themselves terrorised by neoliberal policy. The articles presented in this special issue reflect the conference aims in bringing together research on the neoliberalisation of counterterrorism and on the terror of neoliberalism.     

Timothy E. Cook: 1954–2006

Abstract

This article describes the organizational and operational aspects of diplomacy's interplay with the news media in Britain. It examines the media's role as a source of information for ministers, officials, and the wider public; the media's effect on official and unofficial thinking; the media's roles in interdepartmental coordination and during international negotiations; and the uses of the media by the government as channels to mold public attitudes at home and abroad. It concludes by considering the implications of advancements in media technology, and greater public interest in international affairs, for media diplomacy.     

Anatomy of a government massacre: Abuses of hostage‐barricade protocols during the Waco standoff

A systematic evaluation of the FBI's crisis negotiations with the Branch Davidians during a 51‐day standoff in 1993 is conducted. The analysis uncovers extensive violations of basic hostage‐barricade standards and protocols. The violations appear shortly after negotiations began indicating a premature disregard for the publicly declared goal of a peaceful resolution. Failed negotiations subsequently were cited by FBI officials as a rationale for organizing a violent and dangerous CS gas assault on the barricaded group, resulting in the destruction of the religious community and the deaths of 74 people. The violations do not appear to be random, incidental, or the result of disorganization, as officials claim. The data indicate that the FBI's on‐scene commanders and tactical component of the Hostage‐Rescue Team (HRT) contributed largely to the failed negotiations through methods of increased tactical pressure and psychological warfare providing justification for the high‐risk assault. The thesis is advanced that the HRT command may have pursued furtively what some insiders call a ‘Western’ view of hostage‐barricade incidents ‐ i.e., that negotiations should be used as a means of manipulating people into positions where a tactical solution can be executed. In this context, the standoff is analyzed as a government massacre. Possible motives for this state violence are linked to the sect's defiant posture, aspects of police culture, effective demonization of the sect, and the disturbing trend of ‘militarization’ within law enforcement.     

Essence of Negotiation: Understanding Appeasement and “The Great Munich Stereotype”

The relative merits of rational choice and behavioral approaches to the study of negotiation continue to be hotly debated. This article tests qualitative postdictions (assertions or deductions about something in the past) from these paradigms as well as the alternative approach of new institutional theory against the extensive record of negotiation process, contractual form, and contract implementation from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. I find the incomplete relational form of the peace treaty to be consistent with the behavioral and new institutional concepts and find that only behavioral theory can explain how unilateral German moves unraveled the treaty during the 1930s. But the historical record further reveals that the close fit between the behavioral paradigm and these events is more than coincidence. I also discuss the role of conference participants, particularly John Maynard Keynes and Walter Lippmann, in establishing the basis for modern behavioral science. The behavioral paradigm emerged from efforts to understand and fix serious policy mistakes such as those made in the peace negotiations. The study of human error was intended to serve as the basis for broad‐based organizational solutions. Finally, I discuss the impact of “the Munich stereotype” on such recent events as the planning for the American invasion and reconstruction of Iraq; such examples suggest continued imperfections in the system of organized intelligence that has actually evolved in the United States.     

EU Foreign Policy in the Italian Parliament: The Debates on China and Iran

Governments have always been more reluctant to accept parliamentary oversight in foreign policy than in any other domestic policy field. This examination of the recent performance of the Italian Parliament in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) scrutiny and control in the two case studies of the EU's arms embargo against China and negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program shows that institutional arrangements concerning parliamentary control in this field have significant shortcomings. Although limited, the reforms under discussion in the new intergovernmental conference could contribute to improving the performance of parliaments and to creating a common awareness of the problem of democratic deficit in CFSP among the parliamentarians of EU member states.     

Groups,Decision Rules,and Negotiation Outcomes: Simulating the Negotiator's Dilemma

The negotiator's dilemma is a vexing problem (structurally similar to the prisoner's dilemma), but it is made more complicated by the fact that many negotiations involve teams of negotiators. Although it is widely recognized that the behavior of groups of people can deviate in important ways from the behavior of individuals, the implications of this for the negotiator's dilemma are unclear. For this article, I have used a computer simulation to explore the impact of different decision rules (majority rule, consensus, and weakest link) on how the approach of groups to negotiations might differ. The results suggest that the use of different decision rules can greatly complicate negotiations. While the majority rule is quite versatile in multiple contexts, a pairing of weakest link and consensus decision rules is highly problematic for finding a negotiated settlement.     

The European Budget and the Principles of Solidarity and Added Value

By presenting a proposal for the EU's fifth Financial Perspective, now named Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), in June 2011, the European Commission started negotiations on the European Union's budget policy and financial programming that are expected to end in December 2012. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the MFF negotiations will be extremely difficult because a settlement can only be achieved by consensus. That means that all 27 member states and the European Parliament will have to agree. Two principles might be taken as guidelines to facilitate a compromise: the principle of European solidarity and the principle of European added value. The task will be to define a concept that combines both principles so that it can become the main argument and narrative for explaining the complex budget negotiations, enabling the European Union to avoid a stalemate.     

British Peace Activism and ‘New’ Diplomacy: Revisiting the 1899 Hague Peace Conference

This analysis provides a re-appraisal of the 1899 Hague Conference by looking more closely at how citizen activists—notably in Britain but also transnationally—used it as a forum through which to press their agenda onto politicians and diplomatists. In so doing, this assembly existed as a stepping-stone between the ‘old’ diplomacy of the nineteenth century and the ‘new’ diplomacy of the twentieth. Peace activists identified and harnessed a growing body of progressive public opinion—on both a domestic and international scale—in the hope of compelling governments to take the necessary steps towards realising their ambitions of peace, disarmament, and international arbitration. Although the tangible outcomes of the 1899 Conference were limited, the precedents it established not only paved the way for further advances in international law, but also facilitated ever closer public and press scrutiny of international affairs into the twentieth century.     

British Foreign Policy,the Financial Elite,and the Nationalisation of the Constantinople Quays Company, 1934–1945

The analysis examines the role of British financial institutions, namely the Bank of England and the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders [CFB], in the making of British policy towards Turkey. The nationalisation of the Constantinople Quays Company, a port operator purchased in 1907 by the British and French governments, serves as a case study through which business–state relations, the role of finance in the conduct of international relations, and the impact of perceptions on policy decisions are explored. In this case, the financial elite’s role was minimal during most of the period considered, becoming more important in the final war years in a framework of the Anglo–Turkish debt restructuring negotiations of 1944. Significantly, the CFB, rather than the Bank, represented the British government in the negotiations. There exists an abundance of evidence of the divergent views between Whitehall and the financial elite about Turkey’s trustworthiness as a debtor and a signatory to treaties. The British government’s perceptions were much more positive than those of the financial elite. This difference stemmed from the different interests involved: Whitehall sought to secure Turkey’s collaboration in the increasingly unstable global security environment while the Bank and the CFB were more concerned with investor and bondholder interests and attempted to avoid further financial losses.     

Ballots,Bargains, and Bombs: Terrorist Targeting of Spoiler Opportunities

Benjamin Netanyahu's come-from-behind victory over Shimon Peres in the Israeli national elections of May 1996, following an apparent intensification of Palestinian terrorism over the course of that spring, reminded observers of the political ramifications of terrorism. Since May 1996 was also the month in which Israel reentered Final Status negotiations with a Palestinian delegation in Taba, Egypt, the timing of this surge in violence encourages us to ask if terrorists regularly conceive of elections and rounds of negotiations as “spoiler opportunities,” or opportune times to undermine peaceful political processes. We address this question in the context of Israel's long‐running experience with elections, negotiations, and terrorism. We hypothesize that attacks resulting in fatalities are likely to increase in periods immediately surrounding Israeli general elections and key rounds of negotiations affecting the fate of the Palestinian population. Negative binomial event count analyses of the period 1970–2007 suggest that violent opponents indeed viewed the periods preceding negotiations and the ends of electoral cycles as “spoiler opportunities.”     

Why Do Peace Negotiations Succeed or Fail? Legal Commitment,Transparency, and Inclusion during Peace Negotiations in Colombia (2012–2016) and Turkey (2012–2015)

This article examines the ways in which the negotiation framework—i.e., the legal guarantees, information management mechanism, and degree of inclusivity in peace negotiations—shapes the likelihood of concluding a peace agreement. Codifying the peace negotiations in law, publicizing information about the content of negotiations, and including mediators and civil society actors in peace talks is likely to increase a government's short‐term costs. However, doing so alleviates the adversaries' information asymmetry and commitment problems, sets guidelines to insure the process against exogenous shocks, and increases the number of actors taking part in conflict management. Comparing the recent peace negotiations to end intrastate wars in Colombia and Turkey, this article argues that a legalized, public, and inclusive framework made a peace agreement possible in Colombia, while the lack of such a framework caused Turkey's peace talks to fail.     

Regionalism's multiple negotiations: ASEAN in East Asia

This article explains East Asian regionalism as the product of two sets of negotiations. The first negotiation is between East Asia on the one hand and global forces and structures on the other. The second negotiation is intra-regional and includes a critical negotiation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Southeast Asia and East/Northeast Asia, which also provides the primary focus of this article. This article details ASEAN's extensions into East Asian regionalism as part of interdependent efforts to adapt transitioning global and regional systems. Conceiving these regional negotiations to be not just economic and utilitarian but first and foremost normative, this article details the opportunities and dilemmas represented by ‘East Asia’ for ASEAN, ASEAN-Southeast Asia and Southeast Asia as a meaningful organizing principle. Dilemmas associated with the ASEAN Plus Three process, an East Asia free-trade area and the ASEAN Charter provide illustrations of East Asia's understood challenges for Southeast Asia in addition to the ways that Southeast Asian agencies have been shaping the form and content of recent East Asian efforts and also how regional-global and intra-ASEAN negotiations continue to provide key constraints.     

Lost in Translation: The Problem of Perceptual Limitations in Civil War Peace Negotiation

This article examines the negative role that actors' perceptual limitations play in civil war peace negotiation by reviewing the Sino-Khmer Rouge interplay during the Cambodian peace negotiations (1987–1993). The study contends that China continually failed to challenge the Khmer Rouge's negotiation strategies, which were founded on the faction's flawed understanding of its situation. Moreover, the inadequate communication between China and its client faction and the Khmer Rouge's lack of institutions for obtaining and analyzing information are identified as the two main reasons for the failure of Chinese intervention.     

Is Bigger Better? Activity and Success in Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly

Theorists often claim that being bigger than one's counterparts offers advantages in multilateral negotiations. In this article, I examine that argument using data from negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The article analyzes and compares the activity levels of smaller and larger states in international negotiations, and sheds light on the conditions under which the latter “punch below their weight.” My analysis indicates that size directly affects participation, but not success rates. Bigger states can better formulate national positions on a broad range of issues, enabling their diplomats to more actively participate in negotiations, while smaller states are absent more often. Activity is conducive to success, which helps bigger states. But not every negotiation strategy is equally effective. In the UNGA's one‐state, one‐vote context, bigger states are not able to systematically exert disproportionate influence despite their often superior financial resources and bargaining strategies.     

Frameworks for Arab-Israeli Negotiations–What Difference Do They Make?

Conclusion It is unfortunate that procedural controversies about the appropriate forum for negotiations often delay substantive talks on how to accommodate conflicting interests. But historical experience indicates that the participants believe the forum to be important. If and when a decision to renew negotiations is reached, the choice of the forum and the shaping of its structure will not be determined by its effectiveness as a vehicle for conflict resolution, but by the political calculus of bargaining power, and side effects, that such a forum would entail.International negotiations are aimed at conflict resolution. But they cannot be divorced from competitive power politics. The disputes about fora for negotiations are not about choosing an effective structure for making peace, but about seizing the high ground for the diplomatic battles ahead. Saadia Touval is Professor of Political Science at Tel Aviv University in Israel. During the 1986–87 academic year, he is Visiting Professor of Political Science at Brown University in Providence, R.I. and Visiting Scholar at Harvard University's Centers for International Affairs and for Middle Eastern Studies. His recent publications includeThe Peace Brokers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982, and (with I.W. Zartman),International Mediation in Theory and Practice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985).An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Middle East Seminar of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University in March 1986. The support of the Center in preparing this article for publication is gratefully acknowledged.