FEDERAL COURT INVOLVEMENT IN THE APPLICATION OF SURFACE MINING LAW

This article surveys 122 federal cases reported in the Surface Mining Law Summary from the earliest legislation under SMCRA to the end of 1987. The analysis distinguished between cases in which all OSMRE regulations or applications of SMCRA were upheld by the federal courts, and those in which one or more regulations/applications were overturned. The analysis further classifies the cases according to whether the decisions were favorable to industry (or, conversely, to environmental/citizen groups), according to whether the issues involved were primarily of narrow private right (or, conversely, of broad public policy), and according to state-of-origin. Finally, separate examination of those cases in which OSMRE's discretion in the enforcement of SMCRA was restricted is provided. The author concludes t h a t both the federal courts and OSMRE have been reasonably even-handed in their application of SMCRA, contrary to the earlier expectations of some proponents and opponents of surface coal mining regulation in the United States.     

Judicial review of regulatory decisions: Decoding the contents of appeals against agencies in Spain and the United Kingdom

Despite the important role that courts play to supervise the legality of regulatory agencies' actions, only few comparative studies analyze the contents of judicial appeals against regulatory decisions within European countries. This paper builds on the comparative administrative law scholarship and administrative capacities literature to analyze the content of 2,040 rulings against decisions issued by competition and telecommunications regulators in Spain and the United Kingdom. To understand the substance of the appeals, the study classifies cases according to the alleged administrative principles under breach and the regulatory capacities under challenge. Findings show a clear country-sector variation regarding the information contained in judicial disputes for both dimensions of analysis, which can be explained as a result of existing differences between the institutional settings of courts. These results offer a more in depth understanding of the political role of judicial oversight over regulatory agencies embedded in different institutional arrangements and policy sectors.     

Judicial Use of Foreign Law in Human Rights Cases: Illegitimate and Unacceptable Practice?

The use of foreign law by national courts when deciding cases that concern fundamental rights has provoked a debate on the legitimacy of the judiciary to resort to this practice. Indeed, many arguments have been made by legal scholars to support the proposition that judges should not take account of unincorporated international human rights instruments or the decisions of foreign courts when they decide cases that concern fundamental rights. This article puts these arguments to scrutiny, and discusses whether this judicial practice should be resorted to.     

The European Court's political power

The European Court has emerged as one of the most powerful political institutions in the European Union and the most influential international court in existence. National courts are the linchpins of the European legal system, making European Court decisions enforceable and creating an independent power base for the European Court. This article examines why national courts agreed to take on a role enforcing European law supremacy against their own governments and why national politicians did not stop an institutional transformation of the European legal system which greatly compromised national sovereignty. Competition between lower and higher national courts, each trying to enhance their influence and authority vis‐à‐vis each other, explains how national legal interpretive barriers and high‐court ambivalence regarding the European Court's declaration of European Law Supremacy was overcome. Politicians proved unable to reverse national court acceptance of European law supremacy, and institutional rules kept politicians from sanctioning either national courts or the European Court for judicial activism. Legal doctrine became a form of institution‐building, and a mechanism to make international law enforceable was created, giving the European Court the ability to make unpopular decisions and to compel compliance with European law.     

State High Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey

In 1985, state courts of last resort issued more decisions thanin any year since 1950 in which they extended rights protectionsto individuals beyond those recognized by the U.S. Supreme Courtby basing rights protections solely or independently upon stateconstitutional grounds. A survey of state high court judgesand justices reported here indicates that there has been a nationwideincrease in the number of individual rights cases litigatedunder state constitutions since 1980. Significant-to-moderateincreases, however, were more likely to be reported by justicesfrom the Northeast and West, from states having a moralisticpolitical culture, and from courts whose members are appointedby the governor and/or legislature. State constitutional rightsclaims are more likely to be raised in criminal than noncriminalcases, though in both types of cases and in most states, stateconstitutional rights claims are raised less frequently thanfederal constitutional rights claims. Majorities of judges andjustices favor the ideas of teaching state constitutional lawin law schools and of testing for knowledge of state constitutionallaw on bar examinations.     

Diffusion and Diversity: Federalism and the Right to Die in the Fifty States

Right-to-die issues—from the right to have life-sustainingtreatment withdrawn to the right to assisted suicide—arebecoming important sources of state policy activity. Withoutmuch federal instruction, some state courts have constructeda general consensus position for other courts to follow usingthe federal Constitution to legitimize their decisions. Statelegislatures have accomplished less. Statutory diversity wasthe rule until recently, with legislatures passing a rich varietyof generally conservative rules. Lately, with the pressure fromrights-oriented interest groups and professional organizations,state legislators have been edging closer to the more liberalpattern of policy charted by judges of the state supreme courts.Policymaking that applies to assisted suicide may be expectedto follow the same pattern: the federal government will remainsilent while the state courts take the lead using the U.S. Constitutionas ammunition. The state legislatures can be expected to trailbehind, catching up to the courts only after statutory diversityis found wanting.     

The Post-2000 Round of Redistricting: An Entangled Thicket within the Federal System

A new round of revisions in the geographical districts usedto elect federal, state, and local legislators in the UnitedStates has followed the 2000 census of population. While legislatorsthemselves typically have the initial responsibility to performthis frequently contentious task, courts play an active supervisoryrole as well. This article reviews how United States SupremeCourt decisions concerning the post-1990 round of redistrictinghave resulted in the rules concerning the design of districtsbeing more ambiguous in this post-2000 round. This, it is argued,enhances the opportunity to gerrymander for partisan or otherpolitical reasons, a practice that is virtually immune to judicialinvalidation. The article also notes the more active role ofstate courts in this process. The districting process now involvesnot only competing districting plans, but more often than inprevious rounds, competing courts as well.     

State Constitutions, Freedom of Expression, and Search and Seizure: Prospects for State Court Reincarnation

This article examines the decisions of ten state high courtsin the areas of access to private property for expressive purposesand exclusion of the fruits of illegal searches and seizures.The analysis centers on two questions. First, are some statesrelying on their own constitutions to resolve individual rightsissues while other continue to follow the United States SupremeCourts interpretation of the federal Constitution? Second, havethe states that do rely on their own constitutions to resolveindividual rights issues developed an independently based stateconstitutional jurisprudence, or have they simply attemptedto circumvent decisions of the Burger Court? The authors findlittle evidence that the state high courts examined here havebegun, as yet, to develop an independent approach to state constitutionalanalysis.     

Constitutional Review and the Selective Promotion of Case Results

A significant majority of the world's constitutional courts publicize their decisions through direct contact with the national media. This interest in public information is puzzling in so far as constitutional judges are not directly accountable to voters. I argue that the promotion of case results is consistent with a theory of judicial behavior in which public support for courts can undermine incentives for insincere decision making. In this article, I develop a simple game theory model that identifies how case promotion is linked to judicial choice. Results of a simultaneous equations model estimating the Mexican Supreme Court's merits decisions and its choices to publicize those decisions by issuing press releases to national media outlets support an account of constitutional review in which judges believe they can influence their authority through case promotion.     

Rivalry and superior dispatch: an?analysis of competing courts in medieval and early modern England

In most areas, economists look to competition to align incentives, but not so with courts. Many believe that competition enables plaintiff forum shopping, but Adam Smith praised rivalry among courts. This article describes the courts when the common law developed. In many areas of law, courts were monopolized and imposed decisions on unwilling participants. In other areas, however, large degrees of competition and consent were present. In many areas, local, hundred, manorial, county, ecclesiastical, law merchant, chancery, and common law courts competed for customers. When parties had a choice, courts needed to provide a forum that was ex ante value maximizing.     

The Electoral Connection: How the Pivotal Judge Affects Oppositional Success at European Constitutional Courts

Constitutional courts are often considered to be ‘veto players’ or ‘third chambers of parliament’. However, no attention has been paid to the composition of European constitutional courts and how they make decisions. Do European judges exhibit political preferences as their US counterparts do? If so, it is important to know who selects the judges as the selection determines the outcome. This article analyses the composition of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and the French Conseil constitutionnel. It tests the correlation between the party affiliation of the pivotal judge and oppositional success empirically for all abstract reviews filed between 1974 and 2002. In both countries the likelihood of an oppositional victory or defeat varies with the ideological position of the pivotal judge. This leads to the conclusion that European judges decide on the basis of their political preferences like their US counterparts.     

Explaining State High-Courts' Selective Use of State Constitutions

Although state constitutions offer substantial policy-makingopportunities, state courts are reluctant to base decisionson independent state constitutional law. Using state high-courtjudicial review decisions from 1981 to 1985, we tested a modelpredicting countermajoritarian state-law rulings. Legal andpolitical variables best predicted state constitutional decisions.Intragovernmental conflicts were particularly likely to resultin state-law decisions, while courts were especially reluctantto base civil liberties decisions on state constitutions. Casesbrought by government officials were likely to be decided onstate constitutional principles; state-law decisions were alsolikely to emerge from conservative states and states with tradilionalisticpolitical cultures. Although these latter findings stand apartfrom previous research connecting some forms of judicial activismto liberal political environments, they seem consistent withthe element of American conservatism seen particularly in traditionalisticstates (in the South and Southwest) demanding protection ofstate autonomy in the realms of policy development historicallyleft to the states.     

The Norwegian Supreme Court and Equitable Considerations: Problematic Aspects of Legal Reasoning

Legitimacy, confidence and autonomy in the court system are dependent on people trusting the institution to make decisions based on predefined legal rules. Simultaneously, confidence in the system is also dependent on the system's capability to adjust to changes in values in society. The Norwegian courts appear to be increasingly basing their rulings on ‘equitable considerations’. This involves the making of decisions by reference not only to predefined rules – as expressed in structures or pre‐existing legal practice – but also to policy considerations such as utility and fairness. Judicial decisions made with reference to political considerations imply that the courts are arrogating a role that democratic theory reserves for legislators. What happens when ‘equitable considerations’ play a large part in the decisions of the Supreme Court? Does the institution have capabilities and mechanisms that sustain such a judicial practice as a legitimate form of law enforcement? I argue that the capability to adjust to changes in society only seems possible if the judges act beyond the domain of traditional judicial competence. Through different kinds of mechanisms, elements of ‘equitable considerations’ over time become hidden and difficult to grasp. On the one hand, this makes it possible for the Supreme Court to sustain a judicial practice as a legitimate form of law enforcement, but simultaneously it creates problems of confidence and legitimacy because the premises for the decisions are not explicated.     

Taking the Law to Court: Citizen Suits and the Legislative Process

The institution of citizen suits is a decentralized form of public participation that allows citizens to influence the implementation of public laws in courts. How does this institution influence policymaking? This article proposes a model of citizen suits. It then analyzes how this institution influences legislative decisions. The legislature bargains to choose the budget, distributive spending, and spending on an ideologically contested public good (e.g., health care or environmental protection). I find that citizen suits enable courts to forge a compromise between opponents and proponents of the public good by responding to the diverse claims of citizens. Anticipating the mobilization of citizens in courts, legislators in turn craft more socially efficient bills, with less distributive spending, which better represent the distribution of preferences for the public good compared to when citizens have no role in the implementation of legislation.     

Friends of the Court? Why EU governments file observations before the Court of Justice

The preliminary reference procedure under which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) responds to questions from national courts regarding the interpretation of EU law is a key mechanism in many accounts of the development of European integration and law. While the significance of the procedure has been broadly acknowledged, one aspect has been largely omitted: The opportunity for member state governments to submit their views (‘observations’) to the Court in ongoing cases. Previous research has shown that these observations matter for the Court's decisions, and thus that they are likely to have a significant impact on the course of European integration. Still, little is known about when and why member states decide to engage in the preliminary reference procedure by submitting observations. This article shows that there is significant variation, both between cases and between member states, in the number of observations filed. A theoretical argument is developed to explain this variation. Most importantly, a distinction is made between legal and political reasons for governments to get involved in the preliminary reference cases, and it is argued that both types of factors should be relevant. By matching empirical data from inter‐governmental negotiations on legislative acts in the Council of the EU with member states’ subsequent participation in the Court procedures, a research design is developed to test these arguments. It is found that the decision to submit observations can be tied both to concerns with the doctrinal development of EU law and to more immediate political preferences. The conclusion is that the legal (the CJEU) and political (the Council) arenas of the EU system are more interconnected than some of the previous literature would lead us to believe.     

THE COURTS AND RISK ASSESSMENT1

In the past decade the federal courts have come to play an important role in reviewing agency decision-making on prospective risks. Questioning the conventional wisdom that judges are poorly equipped for the task, the authors outline the range of choices facing courts in such cases and contend that they cannot avoid making ultimate decisions on risk policy. However, recent Supreme Court cases on nuclear hazards and occupational benzene indicate narrowing of the scope for judicial review.     

The changing role of the federal and state courts in safeguarding the rights of the mentally disabled

From the mid-1960s until the early 1980s, federal courts havegreatly expanded the rights of persons who have been institutionalizedfor treatment of mental illness. The rights have included dueprocess in commitment proceedings, provision of services, andtreatment in the least restrictive environment. Federal courtshave based their decisions on federal statutes and constitutionalprinciples of due process, equal protection, and protectionfrom harm. More recently, however, the U.S. Supreme Court haseffectively closed the federal courts as a forum for advancingthe rights of the mentally disabled. Federal courts must, inessence, defer to the states for decisions about treatment ofthe mentally disabled. State courts may decide what servicesare required under state law, while state mental health officialsmay decide specific treatment questions for individual patients.Consequently, advocates for the mentally disabled are turningto state courts to advance client rights. In 1984 two significantcases decided by the New York State Court of Appeals have thepotential for significantly expanding the rights of the mentallydisabled.     

General courts,specialized courts,and the complementarity effect

Among the major decisions any legal system must make is deciding whether to establish general courts with broad jurisdiction, or specialized courts with limited jurisdiction. Under one influential argument—advanced by both judges and legal theorists—general courts foster coherence within the legal system. This Article identifies a distinct effect of establishing general courts: the “complementarity effect.” In the case of complementarity, general courts strategically apply different principles in different fields, such that litigants losing in one sphere (e.g., public law) are compensated in another (e.g., private law). We support this conjecture by analyzing three case studies.     

When complex facts threaten court reviews: Litigation over navigation projects

The capacity of the U.S. courts to provide effective review of cases involving complex scientific and economic analysis is declining. Rational action in such cases requires three things: a general rule by which to judge the appropriateness of actual or proposed actions; a set of facts sufficient for determining the consistency of the action with the general rule; and an independent review institution with power to enforce actions under the rule. Where the issues are complex, however, government agencies increasingly have tended to cloak their decisions in needlessly technical formulations and to buttress their presentations in masses of impenetrable data. Courts tend to avoid involvement in the complexities, resting instead on a presumption that government reports are accurate and government actions appropriate; this is a tendency we label “judicial math block.” Two cases taken from the complex area of public navigation investment illustrate the problem.     

Constitutional courts as veto players: Lessons from the United States,France and Germany

The number of constitutional courts and supreme courts with constitutional review rights has strongly increased with the third wave of democratisation across the world as an important element of the new constitutionalism. These courts play an important role in day‐to‐day politics as they can nullify acts of parliament and thus prevent or reverse a change in the status quo. In macro‐concepts of comparative politics, their role is unclear. Either they are integrated as counter‐majoritarian institutional features of a political system or they are entirely ignored: some authors do not discuss their potential impact at all, while others dismiss them because they believe their preferences as veto players are entirely absorbed by other actors in the political system. However, we know little about the conditions and variables that determine them as being counter‐majoritarian or veto players. This article employs the concept of Tsebelis’ veto player theory to analyse the question. It focuses on the spatial configuration of veto players in the legislative process and then adds the court as an additional player to find out if it is absorbed in the pareto‐efficient set of the existing players or not. A court which is absorbed by other veto players should not in theory veto new legislation. It is argued in this article that courts are conditional veto players. Their veto is dependent on three variables: the ideological composition of the court; the pattern of government control; and the legislative procedures. To empirically support the analysis, data from the United States, France and Germany from 1974 to 2009 is used. This case selection increases variance with regard to system types and court types. The main finding is that courts are not always absorbed as veto players: during the period of analysis, absorption varies between 11 and 71 per cent in the three systems. Furthermore, the pattern of absorption is specific in each country due to government control, court majority and legislative procedure. Therefore, it can be concluded that they are conditional veto players. The findings have at least two implications. First, constitutional courts and supreme courts with judicial review rights should be systematically included in veto player analysis of political systems and not left aside. Any concept ignoring such courts may lead to invalid results, and any concept that counts such courts merely as an institutional feature may lead to distorted results that over‐ or under‐estimate their impact. Second, the findings also have implications for the study of judicial politics. The main bulk of literature in this area is concerned with auto‐limitation, the so‐called ‘self‐restraint’ of the government to avoid defeat at the court. This auto‐limitation, however, should only occur if a court is not absorbed. However, vetoes observed when the court is absorbed might be explained by strategic behaviour among judges engaging in selective defection.