Risk and Financial Armageddon in Ireland: The Politics of the Galway Tent

This article examines Ireland's financial crisis. Thus far explanation has focused on individual or collective administrative failure: the office(r) of financial regulation singularly failed to scrutinise the banks sufficiently: it was a matter of poor risk management. While this article would agree that the (mis)management of risk was important to how the crisis unfolded, I argue that an explanation of why the crisis emerged demands an altogether different focus. Put simply, after financial regulatory reform, a reconfiguration of risk in politics took place as the locus of decision‐making about financial risk shifted from the realm of the political/legal (Cabinet/Central Bank/Department of Finance) to the economic/legal (retail banks, shareholders/consumers). It was a critical development, one that mirrored events taking place in the UK, upon which Ireland drew experience, for now assessments about risk undertaken by the banks demanded that intervention could be justified only on an ascertainable risk, not a theoretical uncertainty (or spurious fear). The evidentiary bar for intervention was therefore raised, removing the precautionary instinct implicit in the prudential governance of Central Banks.     

Pacifying uncooperative carbon: examining the materiality of the carbon market

This paper scrutinizes how greenhouse gases are ‘pacified’ so that they can become tradable in the carbon markets. To advance the economization programme and other materialist frameworks, I argue that the existing literature does not pay enough attention to the diverse modes of carbon accounting and, in particular, carbon measurement – the most basic step – is overlooked and undertheorized. Drawing from the ‘critical metrology’ approach, I suggest that we need to take carbon’s diverse materialities seriously in the study of marketization processes. Some carbons are more cooperative than others. I, therefore, argue that it is important to conceptualize ‘pacification’ as a dynamic process that is mediated through materials of varying capacities as well as standards and technologies. The empirical case examined here concerns carbon measurement standards at coal-fired power plants – an ‘extreme case’ in the sense that coal is well-understood and relatively easy to measure. My findings indicate that, even for one of the most ‘cooperative’ carbons, measurement uncertainties are significant and pose challenges for the marketization of carbon emissions. While human actors work to cope with these uncertainties, the contours of the market are ultimately constrained by carbon’s materiality.     

Financial industry mobilisation and securities markets regulation in Europe

The 2007–2009 financial crisis has led to considerable debate about the role of financial industry actors in global regulatory processes. This article seeks to contribute to this debate by assessing when and why financial industry actors mobilise in order to influence securities markets regulations. Do these mobilisation patterns suggest undue influence by a small set of powerful industry actors, or do they reflect the engagement of a more diverse set of actors representing broader public interests? It is argued that variation in mobilisation patterns is a function of: (1) institutional opportunity (the openness and accessibility of regulatory politics); and (2) demonstration effects (how crises increase the salience of regulatory issues). Empirical analyses suggest that the financial crisis diminished the diversity of mobilising actors. This trend, however, is reversed when the news media disseminate information about the costs of weak financial regulation and thereby increase the salience of regulatory issues.     

On arbitration,arbitrage and arbitrariness in financial markets and their governance: unpacking LIBOR and the LIBOR scandal

Abstract

Amongst a series of scandals to hit international financial markets in recent years, that surrounding the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) – a highly influential interest rate benchmark – has attracted particularly intense media scrutiny. This paper seeks to push beyond conventional understandings to unpack critically both LIBOR itself and the scandal involving its manipulation by major international banks. Envisioning LIBOR as a commodity beset by inherent contradictions, the paper mobilizes the tropes of arbitration, arbitrage and arbitrariness to illuminate, respectively: the market-making work performed by LIBOR; its role in enabling the transfer of financial risk, most notably when fraudulently manipulated; and the nature of the regulatory prosecution of such manipulation.     

Naming without shaming: The publication of sanctions in the Dutch financial market

Enforcement agencies increasingly disclose or “name and shame” corporate offenders. This article uses responsive regulation as a framework for an empirical study of the impact of non‐anonymous publication of sanctions in the Dutch financial market. These publications are characterized as “naming without shaming”, because they are used for technical guidance rather than with the intention to shame. The findings show that naming offenders functions as a general deterrent in the market for financial intermediaries, but considerably less so in the capital market. In both markets, the publication of sanctions weakened the impact of enforcement. In the capital market, the publications neutralized the seriousness of offenses and contributed to the image of the regulator as powerless. In the market for financial intermediaries, naming offenders was perceived as stigmatizing shaming and led to defiance, rather than compliance. The case study suggests, however, that the publication of sanctions may provide an opportunity for guidance, provided they contain a moral message, rather than technical instruction.     

Power transitions and the rise of the regulatory state: Global market governance in flux

This special issue examines the consequences of the ongoing power transition in the world economy for global regulatory regimes, especially the variation in rising powers' transition from rule-takers to rule-makers in global markets. This introductory article presents the analytical framework for better understanding those consequences, the Power Transition Theory of Global Economic Governance (PTT-GEG), which extends the scope of traditional power transition theory to conflict and cooperation in the international political economy and global regulatory governance. PTT-GEG emphasizes variation in the institutional strength of the regulatory state as the key conduit through which the growing market size of the emergent economies gives their governments leverage in global regulatory regimes. Whether or not a particular rising power, for a particular regulatory issue, invests its resources in building a strong regulatory state, however, is a political choice, requiring an analysis of the interplay of domestic and international politics that fuels or inhibits the creation of regulatory capacity and capability. PTT-GEG further emphasizes variation in the extent to which rising powers' substantive, policy-specific preferences diverge from the established powers' preferences as enshrined in the regulatory status quo. Divergence should not be assumed as given. Distinct combinations of these two variables yield, for each regulatory regime, distinct theoretical expectations about how the power transition in the world economy will affect global economic governance, helping us identify the conditions under which rule-takers will become regime-transforming rule-makers, regime-undermining rule-breakers, resentful rule-fakers, or regime-strengthening rule-promoters, as well as the conditions under which they remain weakly regime-supporting rule-takers.     

Regulating finance after the crisis: Unveiling the different dynamics of the regulatory process

It is now widely recognized that regulatory failures contributed to the onset of the global financial crisis. Redressing such failures has, thus, been a key policy priority in the post‐crisis reform agenda at both the domestic and international levels. This special issue investigates the process of post‐crisis financial regulatory reform in a number of crucial issue areas, including the rules and arrangements that govern financial supervision, offshore financial centers and shadow banking, the financial industry's involvement in global regulatory processes, and macroeconomic modeling. In so doing, the main purpose of this special issue is to shed light on an often understudied aspect in regulation literature: the variation in the dynamics of regulatory change. Contributors examine the different dynamics of regulatory change observed post‐crisis and explain variations by accounting for the interaction between institutional factors, on the one hand, and the activity of change agents and veto players involved in the regulatory reform process, on the other.     

Policy Inertia and the Persistence of Systemic Fragility

Many observers have diagnosed a fundamental shift in financial regulation since the 2008 crisis. In contrast, this article argues that changes have mostly been superficial. The ideas underpinning regulation have been adapted rather than overturned. Our financial system remains highly fragile, even if exceptionally loose monetary policy obscures such fragility temporarily. Governments show little appetite to correct the lopsided relationship between the financial sector and the real economy and turn the sector into a reliable engine of prosperity and stability rather than a continued source of systemic risk.     

The Political Origins of the Financial Crisis: The Domestic and International Politics of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

For much of the last decade it was clear that the commercial operations of the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were creating an increasing systemic financial risk. That risk was compounded by the fact that the Japanese and Chinese central banks were acting as cheap creditors. The Bush administration and some Republicans in Congress made efforts from 2001 to create a tougher regulatory framework for Fannie and Freddie. Fannie and Freddie were able to defeat these attempts to constrain their operations by a four-fold political strategy involving campaign contributions to members of Congress, a vast lobbying apparatus, the cultivation of a political language around affordable housing for minorities, and abusing and smearing their regulator. Since Japan and China understood that the US government would have to assume Fannie and Freddie's liabilities in a crisis they had no incentive to expose the political fiction that it would not.     

Financial industry groups' adaptation to the post‐crisis regulatory environment: Changing approaches to the policy cycle

This article explores the advocacy efforts of financial industry groups since the financial crisis. I describe key changes in the post‐crisis financial regulatory environment and argue that financial industry groups have adapted their advocacy strategies to these new conditions in innovative ways. Faced with a more challenging environment, financial industry groups have shifted their emphasis along the different stages of the policy cycle. Specifically, increased issue salience and a strained policy network have weakened financial industry groups' capacity to veto regulatory proposals at the stage of actual policy formulation. Focusing on the advocacy strategies of the global banking and derivatives industries, I show evidence that the response has been to invest in more subtle advocacy strategies which focus on other stages of the policymaking cycle. Self‐regulatory moves attempt to affect the agenda setting stage of policymaking, and a strong focus on the timing, rather than the content of new regulations, has attempted to affect the implementation stage. Such a transformation of advocacy strategies differs sharply from most depictions of financial industry groups simply “blocking” regulatory change since the global financial crisis.     

Tracing policy influence of diffuse interests: the post-crisis consumer finance protection politics in the US

Dodd–Frank, the financial reform law passed in the United States in response to the 2008 financial crisis, established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a new federal regulator with the sole responsibility of protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices. This decision marked the end of a highly politicized reform debate in the US Congress, in which proponents of the new bureau would normally have been considered to be much weaker than its opponents. Paradoxically, an emerging civil society coalition successfully lobbied decision-makers and countered industry attempts to prevent industry capture. What explains the fact that rather weak and peripheral actors prevailed over more resourceful and dominant actors? The goal of this study is to examine and challenge questions of regulatory capture by concentrated industry interests in the reform debates in response to the credit crisis which originated in the US in 2007. The analysis suggests that for weak actors to prevail in policy conflicts over established, resource-rich opponents, they must undertake broad coalition building among themselves and with influential elite allies outside and inside of Congress who share the same policy goals.     

After the green gold rush: the construction of climate change as a market transition

Abstract

This paper examines the emergence of a representation of climate change amongst business and political elites as an axiomatic frame of long-term economic strategy. In this representation, the rationale for action on climate change is liberated from the premise of an exogenous physical threat, and replaced by incentives endogenous to the market in the form of opportunities in the so-called carbon economy. The relationship between climate science and action upon climate change has in this process become markedly different from common assumptions whereby science is either ignored or obfuscated, or followed faithfully as the evidence base for policy. Strikingly, the abandoning of climate ontology as irrelevant to corporate decision-making has enabled a large-scale investment of capital into the policies nominally designed to tackle climate change.     

Market making via regulation: The role of the state in carbon markets

Proponents as well as critics of carbon trading underestimate the institutional and political underpinnings of evolving carbon markets. Based on institutionalist approaches, this paper argues that the strong embeddedness of carbon markets explains why certain characteristics (positive and negative) materialize. Focusing on the actors who initiate and who influence carbon markets, this article also shows that currently only states and intergovernmental agreements provide the necessary regulation for carbon markets to exist and to work. Today, neither market actors nor NGOs nor public private partnerships have the political power to set up, regulate or capture evolving market structures. Thus, whether or not market‐based instruments bring about the desired results depends on good public regulation, which is – at least up to now – represented by the state. Four instances of the commodification of carbon serve as illustrations: the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS); the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM); the voluntary market; and new sectoral approaches, particularly Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+).     

The unstable core of global finance: Contingent valuation and governance of international accounting standards

Accounting standards are the foundations of the financial regulatory edifice, and global financial governance is no more stable than the asset valuations that feed it. Yet for two decades and up to this day, no international accounting rule for financial instruments – the bulk of banks' balance sheets – has emerged that was more than a temporary fix, to be succeeded by further reforms. We show how banking regulators have been central to this dynamic and how their support for applying fair value accounting to financial instruments, the cornerstone of regulatory debate, has oscillated throughout the whole period. The two common international political economy approaches to global financial governance, which analyze it either as interest‐based bargaining or as ideas‐driven expert governance, fail to account for this pattern. In contrast, we show how the contingency of financial valuations itself has made it impossible for regulators to embrace or reject a stable set of accounting rules.     

Historical perspective and better regulatory governance: An agenda for institutional reform

Compared to economics, sociology, political science, and law, the discipline of history has had a limited role in the wide‐ranging efforts to reconsider strategies of regulatory governance, especially inside regulatory institutions. This article explores how more sustained historical perspective might improve regulatory decisionmaking. We first survey how a set of American regulatory agencies currently rely on historical research and analysis, whether for the purposes of public relations or as a means of supporting policymaking. We then consider how regulatory agencies might draw on history more self‐consciously, more strategically, and to greater effect. Three areas stand out in this regard – the use of history to improve understanding of institutional culture; reliance on historical analysis to test the empirical plausibility of conceptual models that make assumptions about the likelihood of potential economic outcomes; and integration of historical research methods into program and policy evaluation.     

Adversarialism versus legalism: Juridification and litigation in corporate governance reform

Recent reforms of corporate governance law and related litigation rules in the US and in Germany indicate that reports of the spread of adversarial legalism are greatly exaggerated. Politics and legislation in the US since the mid‐1990s have turned quite decisively against shareholder litigation even as corporate governance and securities law reforms have expanded the role and scope of the regulatory state. Germany's extraordinary expansion of financial and corporate governance regulation since the early 1990s exemplifies juridification. Although these reforms included some liberalization of shareholder litigation rules, the changes reflected skepticism towards private litigation and imposed new constraints on the most prevalent forms of shareholder suits. Marketization of economic relations and the era of finance capitalism have produced far more legalism than adversarialism, more regulation than judicialization, and more ex ante transparency rules than ex post litigation remedies.     

Spatializing the future: financial expectations,EU convergence and the Eastern European Forex mortgage crisis

Existing accounts of failure to predict the financial crisis focus on the complexity of the financial system, and are less useful for understanding crises in non-securitized markets. We examine the roots of optimism leading up to the Eastern European mortgage crisis through the case of Hungary, and use recent theories of expectations, which understand them as both pragmatic and fictional practices that commonly incorporate narratives. Based on archival research and interviews with bankers, regulators and legislators, we demonstrate how the EU convergence narrative was central in forming optimistic expectations. Fusing the underspecified convergence process with an orientalist geographical imaginary, this narrative and its associated measures translated growing indebtedness as ‘catching up’ with Europe, de-emphasized exchange rate risk through a belief in European convergence and precluded crisis scenarios originating in the European Union. Our findings contribute to theories of how economic expectations are formed, stabilized and maintained by developing the concept of ‘spatializing the future’, denoting practices that handle uncertainty by charting the future as movement in concrete geographical or abstract space, along externally verifiable pathways.     

Politicians,regulators, and regulatory governance: The neglected sides of the story

We offer a series of reflective insights about the state and direction of studies related to the politics of regulation. Notably we argue that the field is characterized by persisting divisions between Americanists and Europeanists. Largely focused on the actions taken by political principals, the former regularly report a substantial politicization of regulatory behavior. Reflecting on recent developments in US politics however, we show that political influence could be overestimated in the United States. Symmetrically, this same influence could be underestimated by Europeanists, who for now have largely focused on regulators and agencies. This is notably suggested by a discussion of recent development in European politics, as revealed by contributions systematically measuring agency politicization in Western European democracies. On this basis, we identify some promising research questions and agendas for future studies on the politics of regulation.     

Negotiating climate legislation: Policy path dependence and coalition stabilization

This article investigates the nature of policy path dependence through analysis of climate policy formation in the United States. In 2008 the US Congress attempted to pass the Lieberman–Warner bill, a comprehensive climate and energy package that would have capped greenhouse emissions and established a nationwide cap and trade program. In the same year, California successfully enacted the Global Warming Solutions Act. This article explores the circumstances of both cases and raises the question of why legislation at the state level was successful and took such a divergent form from legislation at the federal level. The divergence of these cases is used to highlight the nature of coalition formation and policy path dependence in the legislative process. Explanations of policy tend to gravitate toward either the generalizability of game theoretic approaches or the empirical depth of case studies. This article suggests a combined approach that uses case studies to analyze the positions and motivations of actors and to then model policy development over time. The approach examines policy through the formation and negotiation of policy coalitions. Drawing on the Advocacy Coalition Framework and omnibus analysis, the approach expands these coalition theories first by analysing legislative development at the interface of legislators and constituent interest groups, and second by adding temporal dimension to the analysis. The findings suggest that policy is path dependent in that it is negotiated between coalitions that in turn create stability in the policy process and insulate policy fields from external shocks. Policy path dependence suggests that theory alone is insufficient to predict policy outcomes; policy results depend strongly on prior policy efforts, historically and socially contingent coalitions, and the resulting framing of policy possibilities.     

Technocracy,the market and the governance of England's National Health Service

England's National Health Service, the fifth largest employer in the world, has become heavily influenced by expert authority and the market economy, which has had implications for accountability and the receptiveness of health decisions to stakeholder needs. One response has been the introduction of a range of regulatory provisions designed to facilitate effective governance and stakeholder engagement. These provisions are scrutinized using three conceptual devices: core accountability, social reporting and social learning. These devices have significant implications, as they enable technical experts to form closed communities, communicate among themselves mainly about economic and financial matters, and make decisions that aid the market without meaningful recourse to citizens. While technical experts are necessary to help manage complex areas, current arrangements reinforce an existing gap between economic and democratic values through hardened technocratic approaches to health care governance.