Rules of Procedure as a Cause of Legislative Paralysis: The Case of Costa Rica, 2002–2012

Research on executive‐legislative relations in Latin America has focused on the impact of minority presidents and multiparty legislatures on legislative productivity. But an additional deadlock scenario, the blocking of a majority president by a minority through filibustering, has been understudied. This article analyzes filibustering in Costa Rica and explains the legislative paralysis in the wake of the nation's transition to a multiparty system in 2002. Legislative paralysis is seen as a product of the interaction between increased legislative fragmentation and polarization and the legislature's preexisting rules of procedure, which enable legislators easily to block bills they oppose, even when those bills are supported by supermajorities. This argument is tested through a comparison of major economic reforms in the 2000s to the reforms tackled in the 1990s. The role of filibustering, well acknowledged in U.S. politics, should also be studied in comparative politics.     

Informal Institutions and Horizontal Accountability: Protocols in the Chilean Budgetary Process

Studies of executive‐legislative relations are usually based only on the analysis of formal institutions, although informal institutions also shape interbranch behavior. This omission leads to questionable results when scholars examine the capacity of state institutions to audit other public agencies and branches of government. This article explores how the protocols, an informal institution that shapes the Chilean budgetary negotiations, have increasingly allowed the congress to have a more relevant budgetary role than what the constitution permits. It argues that protocols accommodate some of the undesired consequences of a charter that is strongly biased toward the central government, and describes how this institution has departed from its stringent budgetary focus to encompass broader executive‐legislative agreements that enhance the legislature's capacity to oversee the executive.     

Executive‐Legislative Deadlocks in the Dominican Republic

This study analyzes the causes of executive‐legislative deadlocks in the Dominican Republic in the period 1978–2005. Deadlocks are considered a pernicious element in (presidential) democracies. The study applies a combination of simple statistical techniques and process tracing to test four institutional hypotheses, which argue that certain institutional and party system constellations increase the probability of deadlocks. The hypotheses point to necessary causes of deadlocks, but their predictions are imprecise. Presidents' persuasive powers and coalition building have helped alleviate the deadlock problem. Analysis of the deadlock periods shows that the additional triggering or sufficient causes for deadlocks are either exogenous to the political institutions or related to the instability of coalitions in the nation's nonideological party system, which consists of three almost equal‐sized parties.     

Strategic Overshooting in National Council Elections

The Swiss party system has become strongly polarized over the last decade, following the rise of the Swiss People's Party and the electoral losses of center parties. This article suggests that these developments are, at least in part, a consequence of strategic behaviour among voters. As the government policy is the result of institutionalized multiparty bargaining, voters have incentives to compensate for this watering‐down by supporting parties whose positions are more extreme than their own. This article empirically tests extent and conditions of compensatory voting in the 2007 National Council Elections using Selects survey data. Our results suggest that compensatory voting generally outweighs voting based on ideological proximity and increases with rising district magnitude.     

Coalition Erosion and Presidential Instability in Ecuador

This article advances the idea that coalition formation and maintenance in highly fragmented presidential regimes is not only crucial to overcoming policy deadlock, but in some cases, critical to ensuring government survival. To advance this argument, the article looks at the formation and demise of legislative coalitions in Ecuador between 1979 and 2006. The empirical data suggest that paradoxically, government coalitions became more difficult to sustain after the adoption of institutional reforms intended to strengthen the president's legislative powers. The adoption of those reforms, it is argued, undermined the legislative incentives to cooperate with the government and helped to accelerate coalition erosion. Not only did the reforms fail significantly to avoid policy deadlock, but in some cases they contributed to the early termination of presidential mandates. This article contributes to the study of coalition survival and how it is linked to policymaking.     

Legislative Parties in Volatile,Nonprogrammatic Party Systems: The Peruvian Case in Comparative Perspective

This article extends the analysis of political parties in electorally volatile and organizationally weak party systems by evaluating two implications centered on legislative voting behavior. First, it examines whether disunity prevails where weakness of programmatic and electoral commonalities abound. Second, it analyzes whether inchoate party systems weaken the ability of government parties to control the congressional agenda. The empirical analysis centers on Peru, a classic example of a weakly institutionalized party system, and how its legislative parties compare to those of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States. The results lend support to the view that lower unity characterizes weakly institutionalized settings. The agenda‐setting power of government parties, however, appears to be influenced more by the majority status of the government than by the level of party system institutionalization.     

Outsiders and Executive‐Legislative Conflict in Latin America

One of the most significant developments in Latin American democracies since the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization is the rise to power of political outsiders. However, the study of the political consequences of this phenomenon has been neglected. This article begins to fill that gap by examining whether the rise of outsiders in the region increases the level of executive‐legislative confrontation. Using an original database of political outsiders in Latin America, it reports a series of logistic regressions showing that the risk of executive‐legislative conflict significantly increases when the president is an outsider. The likelihood of institutional paralysis increases when an independent gets elected, due to the legislative body's lack of support for the president and the outsider's lack of political skills. The risk of an executive's attempted dissolution of Congress is also much higher when the president is an outsider.     

Strengthening the Legitimacy of Representative Democracy: Public Participation,Bipartisan Floor Bills and Plenary Deliberations in the Japanese Diet

It is argued that parliamentary legislation in Japan has become the almost exclusive playing field of the bureaucracy, who acts on behalf of the executive, and party councils. Moreover bureaucrats bypass the legislative Diet process by making rules themselves. This is problematic because it is the lawmakers who are directly held accountable by voters for the enacted legislation risking to be eventually voted out of office. It is suggested that under the given circumstances of strict party discipline, drafting of bills by the bureaucracy and endorsement by party councils, the formal majority rule alone is not sufficient to justify legislative outcomes. The legitimacy factor is introduced to verify in how far individual lawmakers are enabled to initiate and draft floor bills by themselves, discuss bill contents in plenary deliberations and get the public opinion involved. The article attempts to demonstrate that bipartisan floor bills reflect the quest for parliamentary legitimacy and equality among lawmakers across party boundaries. It is suggested that the more legislators participate in drafting and discussing a bill the more legitimate the outcome becomes. The paper screens to this effect several bipartisan bills submitted to the Diet of Japan. Bills such as the NPO law, the law to ratify the Rome Statute for the accession to the ICC, the law to prevent suicide and the law to implement internet filters to protect children are the result of cooperation among lawmakers trying to constrain the interference of the executive or of the powerful bureaucracy. The participation of non-parliamentary agents taking an active part in the legislative process has enhanced the dynamics of representative democracy as well. In the decades of radical ideological confrontation in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s the majority rule risked to become an instrument of coercion. The opposition was compelled to resort to anti-parliamentary obstructionist tactics to derail majority legislation that was rammed through parliament without sufficient plenary deliberation and without taking into account the concerns or viewpoints of the minority. Obstructionism decreased with the LDP co-optation of opposition parties to government responsibility in the 1990s. Opposition for the sake of opposition (communists, DPJ until 2006) and governing for the sake of governing (SDPJ, Komei) have not been honored by the voters. After 2007 the DPJ started to refocus its policies more on ideological differentiation and managed to beat the LDP in the 2009 elections. Recently the work of the Diet has been increasingly put under the scrutiny of international NGOs and legislatures abroad. The unresolved controversial comfort women issue suggests that omission to pass appropriate and timely reconciliatory legislation can cause a serious loss of parliamentary institutional esteem and respect.     

Election through complaint and controversy for political power in Chile, 1874–1925

SUMMARY

This article offers reflections on the power relations between the executive and legislative branches of the Chilean state by examining the way political parties leveraged the electoral system to balance the weight of each branch in the configuration of government. The period from 1874 to 1924 is framed by a cycle of reforms to Chile’s 1833 constitution that were pushed through by liberal sectors to limit the power of the executive under the country’s presidential regime, efforts that contributed to a final breakdown of the presidential regime following civil war in 1891. That year the victorious revolutionary forces implemented a parliamentarian system that remained in place until it was overthrown by a military coup. The literature on this process has studied the use of legislative manoeuvres such as obstruction, accusation and filibuster by political parties to weaken the executive power. Little has been written, however, about the way parties exploited the rules and procedures of the electoral system and, specifically, the use of official complaints and the process known as calificación (qualification) by which congress audited final election results. This article will help fill that void, focusing on understanding how both practices worked and the effects that the election reforms of 1874, 1884 and 1890 had on them.     

‘Conflict and confrontation’: A comparison of the effect of trade embargoes on executive‐legislative relations in the USA during the Truman and Reagan years

This article examines the conflict between the American Congress and Presidency in US trade embargo policy during the Truman and Reagan years. After reviewing two cases of legislative‐executive confrontation over trade embargoes against the Soviet Union in the late‐1940s and early‐1950s and South Africa in the 1980s, it concludes that Congress has been successful in modifying presidential policy‐making that it believes does not serve the national interest. This is due to its powerful position in the American political process as the initiator of legislation. Its law making powers have allowed it to review executive foreign policy decisions forcing the Presidency to change its approach to particular policy concerns.     

Gender, Parties, and Support for Equal Rights in the Brazilian Congress

This article analyzes a dataset of policy views of members of the Brazilian Congress to assess the nature of support for genderrelated policy issues. It makes three core claims. First, liberal and progressive opinions on gender correspond to party membership more than to sex. Left parties have consistent and programmatic policy positions on controversial gender issues. Women and men are more divided, as are parties of the center and the right. Second, coalitions supporting change differ across policy issues. Support for gender quotas, for example, does not translate into support for more liberal abortion laws. Third, there is a large gap between legislators' attitudes toward gender-related policy and actual policy outcomes. Institutional deadlock and executive priorities explain this discrepancy. This article concludes that although women may share some interests by virtue of their position in a gender-structured society, these interests may be trumped by partisan, class, regional, and other cleavages.     

From Collectivism to Capitalism: Neoliberalism and Rural Mobilization in Nicaragua

This article draws on longitudinal, ethnographic data gathered in rural Nicaragua over a two‐decade period to examine the ideological and political implications of neoliberalism in the prefigurative, grassroots stages of social mobilization. It contrasts divergent path‐dependent processes of accommodation and resistance to neoliberalism as Nicaraguan peasants have moved from collectivism to individual farming, with an emphasis on interpretive processes. This study explores how market processes both serve as an external grievance and operate internally in rural communities to reconfigure rural social relations and individual and collective identities. It also seeks to develop concepts and interpretations that may be applied more broadly to analyze links between deepening market processes and the forms and content of social movement responses to deteriorating economic conditions.     

The Ambiguity of Veto Power in Coalitions: German Liberals' Role as a Watchdog in Justice and Home Affairs and their Failure to Sell Stalemate as Success in the Federal Elections of 2013

The article demonstrates that the rigid use of veto capacity in coalitions causes risks for re-election. Justice was a high-salience domain of the German Liberal Democratic Party (FDP), which occupied this portfolio in its coalition with the Conservative majority in the federal legislative period from 2009 to 2013. By analysing several legislative projects the article shows that their contents or non-adoption were an effect of liberals' vetoes. This policy-seeking strategy provoked conflicts within the coalition and stalemate making it impossible to realise popular measures that would have enhanced the Liberals' reputation and the importance of the domain for the voters who were mainly interested in economic and social policy. Moreover, the Liberals' vetoes led to a loss of support from its major coalition partner in the pre-election campaign. Thus governmental parties have to trade off policy and vote-seeking goals in order to get re-elected.     

What Determines Foreign Policy in Latin America? Systemic versus Domestic Factors in Argentina,Brazil, and Mexico, 1946–2008

Is it domestic politics or the international system that more decisively influences foreign policy? This article focuses on Latin America's three largest powers to identify patterns and compare outcomes in their relations with the regional hegemon, the United States. Through a statistical analysis of voting behavior in the UN General Assembly, we examine systemic variables (both realist and liberal) and domestic variables (institutional, ideological, and bureaucratic) to determine their relative weights between 1946 and 2008. The study includes 4,900 votes, the tabulation of 1,500 ministers according to their ideological persuasion, all annual trade entries, and an assessment of the political strength of presidents, cabinets, and parties per year. The findings show that while Argentina's voting behavior has been determined mostly by domestic factors and Mexico's by realist systemic ones, Brazil's has a more complex blend of determinants, but also with a prevalence of realist systemic variables.     

Insurance for Good Losers and the Survival of Chile's Concertación

In the transition from military rule to democracy, the government of Augusto Pinochet bequeathed to Chile a unique electoral law by which all legislative seats are contested in two-member districts. A key implication of this rule is that in order to secure legislative majorities, coalitions have to put their strongest candidates in the most precarious electoral list positions. This generates a divergence of interests between coalitions and politicians. Chile's largest coalition, the Concertación, has resolved the dilemma by providing appointed posts to unsuccessful congressional candidates who accept personal political risk on the coalition's behalf. This study argues that this insurance system has provided the critical glue to hold the coalition together since Chile's transition to democracy in 1990. Recent changes in the electoral environment could threaten the Concertación's control over the appointed posts that have sustained this informal institution. This could jeopardize the Concertación's cohesion during the process of negotiating coalition candidate lists for the 2005 legislative elections.     

‘Sowing the Seeds of Love’? Determinants of Local Coalition Formation and Termination between the CDU and the Greens, 1994–2016

Drawing on empirical evidence from 11 CDU–Green coalitions in large German municipalities, this article investigates the determinants of formation and termination of black–green minimal winning coalitions. Such coalitions are likely to be formed if the mayor is a party member of either the CDU or the Greens, if one of the two parties dominates the local party system, and if the SPD suffers from severe vote losses. Furthermore, the results indicate that CDU–Green coalitions are primarily formed if neither the CDU nor the Greens have gained a parliamentary majority with their ‘usual’ coalition partners. Ideological connectivity, however, does not play a major role. Regarding coalition stability, Christian Democrats and Greens are able to govern successfully for an entire legislative term in most of the cases. If a coalition is terminated early, however, this is due to a party breaking the coalition agreement by voting on specific policies together with the SPD in the local council.     

The devil in the details: constitutional regime types in post-Soviet Eurasia

The constitutions of Eurasia’s more authoritarian countries categorically differ from those of the region’s more democratic countries, in that they codify a doctrine of presidential supremacy as well as several constitutional tools allowing for its implementation. Therefore, the classic typology of forms of government is inadequate for understanding the architecture of power in these countries. Rather, their routine categorization as presidential or semi-presidential formats of executive–legislative relations causes flawed case selection in extant comparative research about the impact of forms of government, particularly president-parliamentarism, on regime performance and stability. This article shows that almost a third of all constitutions in the region reflect a regional variety of genuinely authoritarian presidentialism. It systematizes the properties of this constitutional pattern of “Eurasian-type presidentialism” or, for that matter, “superpresidentialism.” Methodologically, the article encourages contextual analyses to understand non-Western, non-liberal constitutions “from within.”     

A Two‐Level Theory of Presidential Instability

This article analyzes the conditions that facilitate the ousting of Latin American presidents and the mechanisms that prevent their downfall. Drawing lessons from the impeachment of Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo, it extends previous arguments about the “legislative shield” to show that the same forces that sometimes conspire to terminate an administration at other times work to resist its demise. The argument underscores the interaction between legislators and social movements, two prominent actors in the literature on presidential instability. The article presents a two‐level theory to identify possible configurations of mass and legislative alignments, and tests some implications of the theory with data for 116 Latin American presidents over 28 years. Multiple comparison tests based on random effects logistic models show that popular protests can be neutralized by strong support in Congress, and hint at the possibility that legislative threats can be neutralized by loyal demonstrators in the streets.     

The Persistence of Confessional Political Cultures in Switzerland: Some Puzzling Empirical Evidence from Local Parties

A comprehensive comparative study of Swiss local parties (1990) shows that ideological positions and attitudes toward political issues still differ considerably in catholic and protestant settings. Catholic parties are more likely to define themselves as “centrist”, while protestant groupings show more dispersion on the right as well as the left wing of the ideological spectrum. Among catholic parties, positions on the left-right scale and attitudes toward specific political issues are weakly associated, while in protestant settings, the coupling between ideology and concrete issues is rather strong. In protestant populations, it is found that specific occupational and class segments differ significantly by their selective preferences for either leftist or rightist parties, while in catholic settings, such differences are attenuated. Astonishingly, most of these regularities persist or get even more pronounced in communities with a highly modernized occupational structure and in groupings with a younger membership. Following Greeley (1989), it is speculated that confessional traditions survive in the “sedimented” form of implicit folks traditions and habitualizations, and that they function as “semantic codes” which find additional ways of expression in the course of societal development.     

Minimum Winning Electoral Coalitions Under Presidentialism: Reality or Fiction? The Case of Brazil

This article studies the motivations of party leaders to form "minimum winning" electoral coalitions—alliances that cease to be winning if one member is subtracted. In Brazil, concurrent elections stimulate political actors' coordination, and electoral alliances are allowed. In 2002 and 2006, moreover, the Electoral Supreme Court obliged those parties with presidential candidates to replicate this electoral arrangement in the district. Under "verticalization," parties with presidential candidates could not form alliances with rival parties in the concurrent legislative and gubernatorial elections. Verticalization arguably pushed party leaders to form minimum winning electoral coalitions. This new rule forced them to reconsider the contributions of each possible ally in the elections for president, federal deputy, and governor. Examining the elections from 1998 to 2006, this study finds that under verticalization, while parties did form more electoral coalitions with those partners they considered crucial to win, they did so at the expense of policy.