Explaining the Decline of Macro-corporatist Political Bargaining Structures in Advanced Capitalist Societies

A growing consensus among many observers of Western European politics has developed in recent years that, in certain countries, national level, consensus-based political bargaining arrangements involving representatives of organized capital, trade unions, and the state are giving way to more sectorally-based, conflictual forms of relations. These developments suggest an overall decline in the efficacy of national-level corporatist institutional structures in the liberal democracies of Western Europe. This article contends that neither of the two general theoretical approaches to the study of corporatism - the liberal model of the "neocorporatist state" (which fails to acknowledge the potential for serious system-threatening instability within corporatism) nor the Marxist model of corporatist "political structures" (which incorrectly predicts labor-generated corporatist instability due to inevitable rank-and-file discontent with the policy outputs of corporatist forms) - can account for this current wave of macro-corporatist instability and decline. In response to this theoretical impasse, this article develops a capitalist-centered explanation for the declining significance of corporatist forms. Business interests, it is maintained, may no longer be viewing corporatist arrangements as beneficial due to certain domestic structural economic changes and to transformations in the global capitalist system.     

全球化中国家权力的走向

全球化的社会生活跨越国界,国家权力出现某些失效.国家的一些权力向跨国公司、金融集团和跨国组织转移.传统的国家观在全球化中需要调整和转型.全球化中的国家权力一方面具有深厚的存在依据,另一方面也要在权力的范围和行使方式上受到限制.国家权力需要依照民族的利益在保留和限制之间作出平衡的选择.     

Public Pensions and Collective Bargaining Rights: Evidence from State and Local Governments

An aging workforce and increasing retirement benefits are ongoing problems for states and municipalities. Unions are often blamed for governments offering too generous pension benefits. This contributes to budgetary pressures in some state and municipal governments. This article analyzes the impact of collective bargaining on pension benefit generosity under different economic conditions. The study finds that the impact of collective bargaining on pension benefits is not consistent over time or across pension plans. Collective bargaining has a positive effect on pension benefits under worsening economic conditions. Additionally, unions indirectly influence pension benefit generosity through campaign donations and unionization intensity. The findings suggest mixed impacts of collective bargaining on different groups of public employees regarding pension contributions. The article concludes with implications for the role of unions in public financial performance and strategic human resource management during fiscal austerity.     

Coalition Governments Versus Minority Governments: Bargaining Power, Cohesion and Budgeting Outcomes

Recent empirical work investigating the role of minoritygovernments in the selection of fiscal policies has shown thatthe majority status does not affect the budget size. Thispaper presents an analytical framework which accounts for thisresult. It combines a government formation game and a budgetgame involving cabinet and parliament. A general indifferenceresult applies. An exogenous shock to the bargaininigenvironment which absorbes the cohesion of the governmentincreases the demand for expenditures. At the same time theconditions for the formation of a minority government arefulfilled. If the formateur is strong, a minority governmentcan be a device for cutting expenditures.     

The State versus the Alien: Immigration Control and Strategies of Irregular Immigrants

In the past decade the Dutch state and the European Union have initiated a number of measures to make the strategies of irregular immigrants more visible in order to exclude, apprehend and expel them more effectively. These measures have limited the scope of irregular immigrants to manoeuvre in the legitimate institutions of society. As a consequence irregular migrants are pushed towards the fringes of legality and beyond. This article discusses three shifts in the residence strategies of irregular immigrants: (1) from formal to informal work, (2) from legitimate to criminal behaviour, and (3) from being identifiable to being unidentifiable. In reaction to these strategies, the state is countering again with new measures, especially with instruments to identify immigrants who do not reveal their true identity. There is a constant struggle in the field of migration, in which individual and collective actors involved respond to each other with different strategies.     

The Power of the State: How Postcards from the State Increased Registration and Turnout in Pennsylvania

Political Behavior - Unlike citizens in nearly all other democracies, most U.S. citizens bear the responsibility for registering to vote. We test whether states can help citizens overcome the...     

Collective Bargaining and The Performance of the Public Schools

Students of American politics rarely study public sector unions and their impacts on government. The literature sees bureaucratic power as rooted in expertise, but largely ignores the fact that bureaucrats often join unions to promote their own interests, and that the power of their unions may affect government and its performance. This article focuses on the public schools, which are among the most numerous government agencies in the country, and investigates whether collective bargaining by teachers—the key bureaucrats—affects the schools' capacity to educate children. Using California data, analysis shows that, in large school districts, restrictive labor contracts have a very negative impact on academic achievement, particularly for minority students. The evidence suggests, then, that public sector unions do indeed have important consequences for American public education. Whether they are consequential in other areas of government remains to be seen, but it is an avenue well worth pursuing.     

Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models

This article evaluates, by drawing on Barry's distinction between 'power' and 'luck', the predictive accuracy of competing bargaining models. We explore whether models that take various facets of political power into account predict legislative outcomes more precisely than purely preference-based models like the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Our empirical examination compares how well different formal models predict the outcome of 66 legislative decisions made within the European Union (EU). A model that considers the saliency actors attach to a contested issue performs best among all the models under examination. Although resource-based models provide less accurate forecasts on average, they offer relatively precise point predictions. The analysis also shows that domestic constraints are not a particularly important bargaining resource in legislative decision making.     

The Effects of Changes in Federal Aid on State and Local Government Spending

This study suggests federal grants-in-aid had an important influenceon state and local government spending during the 1960s andmost of the 1970s. This positive stimulation also seems to havecontinued during 1982–1985, despite the Reagan administration'sefforts to cut the level of federal aid to states and communities.The stimulative effect of federal aid, however, was showingsigns of diminishing after 1977 and was conspicuously absentfor the 1977–1981 and 1985–1988 periods.     

State Court Strategies and Politics during the Appropriations Process

This article explores state court budgetary strategies and their effectiveness in the appropriations process as perceived by key budgeting actors. In general, we find evidence of state judiciaries that try to remain "above politics" when dealing with budget issues. The most important strategies to this effect include submitting realistic requests, providing documentation to support needs, and not using budget "weapons" at their disposal (e.g., writs of mandamus). However, the survey results do indicate that state judiciaries use certain strategies that have a more political tint, such as lobbying by court officials.     

建立健全科学的权力结构和运行机制

腐败的本质是权钱交易,加强对公共权力的制约监督,防止权力越界和失控,是反腐败的核心问题。遏制腐败的治本之策是科学配置权力。通过适当分解决策权、执行权、监督权,使决策职能、执行职能、监督职能由不同部门相对独立行使,形成既相互制约、相互把关,又分工负责、相互协调的权力结构,才能使决策更加科学,执行更加高效,监督更加有力,从而保证权力依法运行,最大限度地防止权力滥用现象的发生。建立健全科学的权力结构,离不开运行机制的保证。完善权力的运行机制,一是要"切实把防治腐败的要求落实到权力结构和运行机制的各个环节,最大程度地减少权力‘寻租’的机会";二是要用覆盖全过程的责任制度来保证;三是要"以加强对领导干部特别是主要领导干部监督为重点,推进权力运行程序化和公开透明"。     

Effects of Constitutional and Political Controls on State Expenditures

State governments have employed various statutory and constitutionaldevices to limit government spending. Many of these devicesare intended to increase executive control over expenditures.The research design employed here suggests that such effortsare ineffective or counterproductive. However, this researchindicates that state legislatures controlled by a single partyare more likely than divided legislatures to limit governmentspending and minimize debt. Thus, political and electoral influencesappear to explain state expenditures belter than legal restrictionson the appropriations process. This study adds to the literatureby simultaneously analyzing multiple restraints on state governmentspending and debt.     

The Effects of Partisan Trespassing Strategies Across Candidate Sex

Political Behavior - Candidates frequently engage in partisan trespassing strategies where a candidate will highlight issues and traits associated with stereotypes of the opposing political party....     

Contextual Effects on Retrospective Economic Evaluations The Impact of the State and Local Economy

The theoretical premise of this study is that individual retrospective evaluations of the national economy, which have a clear impact on voting behavior in national elections, are influenced not only by the national economy but also by the state and local economic context. This hypothesis is tested by analyzing the effect that the unemployment rate in the individual's state and community has on the individual's retrospective evaluation of the national unemployment situation in 1992, using data from the 1992 American National Election Study survey, supplemented with data on the unemployment rate during the third quarter of 1992 for the respondent's community and state. The findings show that the state unemployment rate has a clear effect on retrospective evaluations of national economic conditions. This effect occurs apart from any effect on fear of unemployment, which is unaffected by the state unemployment rate. The community unemployment rate has little or no effect on retrospective economic evaluations, except for a small impact on personal unemployment experience. The contextual effect that we observe therefore is primarily sociotropic, not personal pocketbook, in nature. We suggest that the contextual patterning of information, perhaps especially through media reporting of economic conditions, is responsible for producing this effect.     

Medical Regulation: New Politics and Old Power Structures

In the wake of the events at the Bristol Royal Infirmary, the Harold Shipman case and numerous other examples of doctor malpractice assiduously pursued by an attentive media, medical regulation is now fully politicised. In the context of the raft of policies produced in response to this situ-ation, and in the light of international experience, this article analyses the system power play which will determine by and for whom regulation is organised. In so doing, the analysis considers the impact of the rise of the active citizen/consumer, the decline of medical authority, the internal organisation of the medical profession, and the delicate position of the state as guardian of the public interest. The article concludes by reviewing the political criteria necessary for a sustainable solution.     

State Reform in Turkey: Reasons, Needs and Strategies

The state structure in Turkey including all its branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial) at both the national and local levels has been shown to be ineffective, even irrelevant, to the ingrained demographic, social, economic and political exigencies of the country. One of the main reasons behind this is the collapse of public finance. Conventional rhetoric limiting solutions to administrative reform fails to provide a sufficiently broad enough context within which public sector reform in Turkey can be discussed. Turkey's determination to become a full member of the EU also necessitates a comprehensive and radical overhaul of the Turkish public sector with respect to efficiency and productivity. Five main strategies are proposed to assist Turkey in overcoming its state governance predicament: initiating and carrying out a state-wide reform by employing modern principles of public management; understanding and solving the problem of internal and external debts; enhancing the conditions of governance; reintroduc-ing and strengthening the principle of meritocracy in public sector and cooperating more with the EU.     

State Reform in Education Finance: Territorial and Social Strategies

As of January 1991, state education finance systems had beenoverturned by the courts in twelve states and upheld by thecourts in another fourteen. This article examines the ways inwhich states have responded to the challenge of equity in schoolfinance. Equity reforms are rooted in two kinds of inequitiesin public elementary and secondary education. First, state governmentscan address interdistrict or territorial inequity that is dueto the disparity in local taxable wealth. Second, state governmentscan address the social inequity that arises from the presenceof special-needs populations within a district. A reform strategyis likely to reflect a state's relative emphases on territorialand social inequities. The common tendency, however, is to focuson territorial equity. These policy tendencies are shaped byvarious state political and institutional factors.