The Problem of Law's Authority: John Finnis and Joseph Raz on Legal Obligation

Law and Philosophy -     

Raz on Constitutional Interpretation

Law and Philosophy -     

Joseph Raz and the Instrumental Justification of a Duty to Obey the Law

Law and Philosophy -     

The Authority and Interpretation of Regulations

In the past half century, governments have increasingly relied on regulations—secondary legislation issued by administrative bodies and departments—to impose obligations on private parties, multiplying the occasions for regulatory interpretation. This article develops a theory of regulatory interpretation. It argues that such a theory involves understanding the authority of regulations. Turning to the public law of the UK, US, and Australia, this article identifies an intriguing similarity; in each case, regulations have authority when they rationally and nonarbitrarily implement delegated power within the means permitted by statute. The article then argues that this account of regulatory authority justifies a common approach to interpretation in which the object of interpretation is the purpose the regulation seeks to implement, discerned from the regulation's text and accompanying explanation of its purpose, and constrained by background legal norms.     

The Purpose of Legal Theory: Some Problems with Joseph Raz’s View

This article seeks to clarify Joseph Raz’s contention that the task of the legal theorist is to explain the nature of law, rather than the concept of law. For Raz, to explain the nature of law is to explain the necessary properties that constitute it, those which if absent law would cease to be what it is. The first issue arises regarding his ambiguous usage of the expression “necessary property”. Concurrently Raz affirms that the legal theorist has the following tasks: (a) explain the essential properties of that which the concept of law refers to, which exists independently from any concept of law; (b) explain the essential properties of law given our concept of law. After trying to dissolve the ambiguity of Raz’s argument, I conclude that based on his methodological commitments the only possible task for a legal philosopher would be conceptual analysis, understood as the task of explaining our concept of law.     

法律权威与行动理由——基于拉兹实践哲学进路的考察

权威可以分为理论权威与实践权威、事实权威与合法权威,拉兹讨论的是合法的实践权威。权力与承认这两个概念都无法有效地界定合法的实践权威,在一定意义上可以说,拉兹的实践权威理论批判性地借鉴了权力论的分析模式并用行动理由作为基本分析概念。法律主张合法权威是法律的一个本质特征,法律规范也是一种强制性的行动理由,即一种内容独立的排他性理由。     

论越权刑法解释

在当代中国,越权刑法解释问题已经成为类推制度寿终正寝之后罪刑法定主义的最大敌人,极大地损害了刑法的人权保障机能.刑法解释有权力和权利两种不同层面的存在样态,刑法解释的对象是刑法条文背后的刑法规范,对刑法立法而言具有从属性特征."越权"包括越实有职权和越解释权两种类型.越权刑法解释包括越权刑法立法解释和越权刑法司法解释两大类.本文进一步探析了越权刑法解释的成因,进而提出了包括建立撤销机制等在内的一系列应对方案.     

宪法解释:一种拯救中国宪法权威性的方法--读范进学教授著《宪法解释的理论建构》

依法治国的前提是依宪治国。在当下中国,依法治国方略虽然被写进了宪法,但宪法却没有得到很好的适用,宪法仍然缺乏必要的权威性。《宪法解释的理论建构》一书充分论证了“释宪演进模式”较之“立宪演进模式”在提高宪法权威方面的优越性,并从界定宪法解释的概念入手,对宪法解释的场合、主体、目标和原则做了令人信服的论证。尽管《宪法解释的理论建构》没有解决宪法解释的方法等技术层面上的问题,但该书对宪法解释主体的界定和对解释原则的论证已经为宪法解释的技术性研究扫清了理论障碍。     

我国警察权力与权威关系之探究——兼谈我国刑法"袭警罪"之确立

近年来,我国警察在执法活动中遭受对抗甚至暴力袭击致伤亡的人数很高.袭警直接损害的是警察的身体,间接损害的却是国家法律的尊严.警察权力与警察权威的失衡,说明警察机关没有坚持和贯彻执行群众路线,警察队伍内部存在违法犯罪行为,社会的荣辱观念发生错位以及警察自身装备能力和警察机关维权意识等方面存在问题.我国应当在法律上明确规定袭警行为.     

Hart,Raz and the Concept of a Legal System

An underpinning assumption of modern legal positivism isthat the question of how legal standards differ fromnormative standards in other spheres of human thoughtis resolved via the concept of a legal system and thenotion of internal logic, through use of contextualdefinition. This approach is seen to lead to anuntenable form of structuralism altogether atodds with the positivist's intentions. An alternativestrategy is offered which allows the positivists toretain their deepest insights, though at a price.     

中外检察机关职权运行关系比较

各国不同层级检察机关之间的职权运行关系可以分为四种类型,国家结构和检察首长任免机制决定和影响了这种关系的具体表现形态。检察首长、部门主管和办案检察官之间的职权运行关系可以分为三种类型,上司领导下属、检察一体是这一关系的共有特征。我国检察机关在职权运行的内部分工协作上还应进一步加强。     

论审判权与执行权关系的良性构建

进一步深化民事审执关系改革,应充分认识执行权的司法权本质,并在制度设计上注重其行政性特点。因此,二者在职能配合与职责分立上,必须在立法上为执行权正名;充分认识审执兼顾,避免机械办案恶果;深化执裁分立。从执行权自身特点出发,应注重纵向上管理方式的改革,横向上构建执行官的单独序列以及推行执行警务化的试点。     

Authority and Authorisation

The core of Kelsen's strong views onauthority emerging from his concept of law is this:Authority of law, authority in law andauthority about law are one and the same thing.The conceptual problems suggested by these threedifferent prepositions must and can be solved in onefell swoop. Kelsen's core view will first be probed bygiving an account of what is a promising approachoffered in a fairly early text, Das Problem derSouveränität, namely, what it means to`set' or `posit' the law. Inevitably, this leadsto an interpretation of the Grundnorm, one thatintends to accommodate as many Kelsenian emphases aspossible. The Grundnorm will be presented as ashield against hypostatising authority. From there,some characteristics will be inferred of the type ofauthority that arises from Kelsen's account of legalknowledge, which will be called, somewhat polemically,authority without an author.     

Raz on Rights: Human Rights,Fundamental Rights,and Balancing

After clarifying the outlines of Raz's interest theory of rights and its relationship to aspects of the principles theory of rights, I consider how his recent observations on human rights manage to fit (or fail to fit) into the interest theory. I then address two questions. First, I elaborate on Raz's definition of morally fundamental rights, arguing that he is right in claiming that there are no such rights. I then show that the interest theory accommodates the notion that rights may take qualitative precedence over conflicting considerations—a question that has become increasingly relevant in light of recent writing on rights.     

Authority and Representation

The act of `setting the law' enjoysa central position in Kelsen's theory of authority.His analysis of this act criticizes, amongst others,the assumption of natural-law doctrines that norms areobjective when they duplicate a content given directlyto cognition and independently of the act whereby thenorm is enacted. Correctly, Kelsen attacks the conceptof representation underlying this assumption as anexample of metaphysical dualism and a copy theory ofknowledge. Does, then, an alternative understanding ofauthority require scrapping representation from atheory of positive law? Or does it requireinterpreting representation differently? Following thesecond path, this paper reconstructs the act ofsetting the law in terms of the critical concept ofrepresentation developed by Ernst Cassirer andsuggests how, thus reconstructed, the structure ofthis act can account for the law's authority and itscontingency.