A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence

Abstract. “The Notebook Corner,” edited by Enrico Pattaro, makes its first appearance here as a new section of Ratio Juris. This new section can be described in a sense as an offshoot of the project for A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, a work still in progress composed of five theoretical volumes and six historical ones. The theoretical volumes receive a brief presentation in the paper immediately below, with a specific focus on Volume 1, entitled The Law and the Right: A Reappraisal of the Reality That Ought to Be. This volume is then discussed as well by Rosaria Conte and Cristiano Castelfronchi in the second paper of this “Notebook Corner”.     

Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal Justification

In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study of law's normativity, it is less attractive than the latter from the broader viewpoint of the study of the nature of law. I then distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of the normative force of legal justification, and argue that legal positivists may without contradiction embrace the moral conception, and that therefore the analysis of the normative force of legal justification need not be a problem for legal positivists. I conclude that, on the whole, we have reason to prefer legal positivism to natural law theory. I begin by introducing the subject of jurisprudence (section 1). I then introduce the natural law/legal positivism debate, suggesting that we ought to understand it as a debate about the proper way to explicate the concept of law (section 2). I proceed to argue that legal decision-making is a matter of applying legal norms to facts, and that syllogistic reasoning plays a prominent role in legal decision-making thus conceived (section 3). Having done that, I discuss law's normativity (section 4), the normative force of legal justification (section 5), and the relation between the former and the latter (section 6). I conclude with a critical comment on Joseph Raz' understanding of the question of law's normativity (appendix).     

Reasonable Interpretation: A Radical Legal Realist Critique

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique - The notion of reasonable interpretation of legal texts, as opposed to the absurd or unacceptable...     

Deduction and Justification in the Law. The Role of Legal Terms and Concepts

Abstract. Legal terms, such as “ownership,”“contract,”“validity,”“negligence,” are used as middle terms in legal deduction. The paper distinguishes two problems regarding this use. One is the logical function of terms for deduction within a normative system. Specific problems dealt with in this connection are meaning, definition, and economy of expression. The other problem connected with middle terms is the “moulding” and possible manipulation of the meaning of legal terms, for arriving at desired conclusions in a given scheme of inference. It is indicated how the moulding of contested legal concepts, if not restricted, will obscure the ratio of legal rules. This problem is relevant, inter alia, to arguments ex analogia in the law.     

Rights, Legal Reasoning and Rational Discourse

Abstract
The first part of this article contains an analysis of the concept of a right, which implies a rational structure of reasoning about rights, elaborated in the second part. In the third part both the concept of a right and reasoning about rights are connected with the theory of rational discourse. The author's thesis is that there exists an internal relation between the theory of rights and the theory of legal reasoning.     

对公安民警合法权益维护问题的理性思考

公安民警合法权益受侵犯的原因有不良社会风气的影响;舆论导向的失误和偏差;法律法规不完善,公安民警正当的执法活动得不到有效的法律保证;使用警力不够慎重,导致警民关系紧张;民警整体身心健康状况不佳;民警在执法活动中的安全防范意识不强等。应建立和完善公安民警权益保障机制;保障公安民警身心健康,落实从优待警政策;通过教育培训进一步加强公安队伍正规化建设;加强维护民警正当执法权益的制度和法律建设;加速公安队伍物质装备现代化建设步伐,从而维护公安民警合法权益。     

片面共犯成立之根据探析

关于具有片面合意的犯罪人能否成立共同犯罪的问题,中外刑法理论界历来存在肯定说与否定说之争。在对上述理论论争作出简要介绍的基础上,重点从其理论基础、修正的构成要件、便利司法操作三个层面上剖析片面共犯成立的根据。     

法律行为:我国刑法中作为义务类型的合理性质疑

不作为犯罪的义务来源一直是我国刑法理论中最具争议的问题之一。结合相关案例,分别从驳论和立论两方面对法律行为被确立为作为义务类型的合理性进行质疑。认为肯定论的观点问题在于:存在着逻辑上难以论证的难题;刑法理论不应当以其他法律为圭臬;与刑法谦抑主义的要求背道而驰;容易引发不良的司法反映。因此,认为法律行为不应当作为独立的作为义务的来源形式。其意义有四:符合思维的逻辑;为实质义务论提供了客观的推动力;有利于实现刑法保护机能和保障机能的协调;有利于犯罪和刑罚实现规范化和法定化。     

商标法律制度的失衡及其理性回归

商标法律制度不断扩大商标权人的权利,使得商标权保护的基础从防止消费者混淆向保护生产经营者标记权转移,这导致商标法律制度的失衡。在数字网络化时代,商标的公共产品属性更加强化,消费者在品牌塑造过程中发挥的缔造者作用愈加突出。因此,商标法律制度设计中应该科学界定商标保护中的公共领域,完善商标权利限制制度,重申消费者混淆在制度中的灵魂地位,强调对消费大众的公共利益关怀,实现商标法律制度的理性回归。     

完善农民工法律援助的理性思考

一、农民工法律援助问题分析 （一）农民工法律援助相关规定的不足 虽然《宪法》、《民事诉讼法》、《刑事诉讼法》以及《法律援助条例》都有对法律援助的规定，并确立了法律援助的基本原则、范围及条件．但是还存在下述问题：     

A Review of A. John Simmons,Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations

Law and Philosophy -     

自然教育学史论

卢梭自然教育学的诞生标志着现代教育学的诞生。从卢梭以来的一切教育改革家都坚守卢梭自然教育学的立场。卢梭自然教育学并非资产阶级的专利,前苏联时期社会主义学者维果茨基、苏霍姆林斯基的教育思想便具有卢梭的气息。卢梭自然教育学有其西方的思想先驱,在古代中国亦能寻得丰厚的相似的思想资源。中国的现代教育学建设可扎根于深厚的中国古代思想资源,并与西方现代教育学相互会通、相互支援、相互提升。     

公司资本制度改革的正当性:基于债权人保护功能的法经济学分析

我国2013年公司资本制度改革主要包括取消最低注册资本额,废除法定的验资程序,采用完全认缴规则,工商登记不记载实缴出资等。此次改革的直接动因是降低公司设立成本,改善营商环境,但引发了关于债权人保护问题的激烈争论。对于2013改革前后债权人保护机制的成本收益分析表明,2013改革引入了债权人保护机制的新范式,而且比改革前的公司资本制度可能更为有效。从新制度经济学的制度变迁和法律改革理论的角度看,2013改革在债权人保护方面提供了法律净收益,在方向和内容上具有正当性,符合让市场在资源配置中起决定性作用的总体改革精神,但改革过程付出变法成本,特别是由于一些争议问题而导致的间接变法成本,建议及时处理这些问题,以后公司法改革应提供成本收益分析的评估报告。     

Soldiers as Public Officials: A Moral Justification for Combatant Immunity

How can we make moral sense of the international humanitarian law doctrine of combatant immunity? The doctrine is morally shocking to many: It holds soldiers on both sides of a war immune from criminal prosecution for their otherwise criminal acts of killing, maiming, destroying property, etc., carried out as part of their country's war effort. That is, soldiers who kill as part of an attack benefit from the immunity just as much as those defending their country. Traditionally, just war theorists have tried to provide situation‐specific arguments to show that soldiers on both sides had a good moral justification for their actions. Recently, self‐styled “revisionist just war theorists” have suggested that the doctrine of combatant immunity is just a convention designed to minimize harm. In this article, I suggest that the moral foundation of the doctrine lies in the status of soldiers as public officials in the service of their country. The reason why we hold them immune from prosecution for their war‐making acts is that such acts are properly thought of as acts of a state, rather than as acts of a particular individual. And the reason why states are immune from prosecution for their acts is one of moral standing: No other state has the moral standing to tell another how to carry out the matters that define its jurisdiction. So as long as a country deems (however implausibly) that it must use force to defend itself from aggression, then it may do what is required to defend itself. No other state has the standing to prohibit such acts or to punish those who carry them out. This argument is rooted in an understanding of how individuals may interact as free and equal under law. It does not aim at the perfection of human action, but it does serve to eliminate the worst forms of tyranny.