The false promise of unipolarity: constraints on the exercise of American power

In World out of balance, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth make a valuable contribution to ongoing debate about the systemic effects of unipolarity and the durability of US primacy. They are correct that unipolarity engenders systemic stability because the power gap between the United States and potential rivals forestalls military balancing. However, Brooks and Wohlforth underweight other means through which major states are resisting US power and they fail to appreciate that the systemic characteristics of unipolarity may change in relatively short order.     

The future is uncertain and the end is always near

The standard view of contemporary unipolar politics is that systemic constraints impede the translation of American power capabilities into influence over security outcomes, rendering the United States (US) much less capable than its material capabilities imply. Challenging this logic, William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks argue that systemic constraints under unipolarity are largely inoperative with respect to the security policies of the unipolar power. Indeed, the US is uniquely positioned in today's world to convert its enormous capability advantages into influence and usable power. While World out of balance is a masterwork of logical and rigorous argumentation, Brooks and Wohlforth, in their exclusive focus on the hegemon and its policies, do not attempt to offer a general theory of unipolarity. Thus, they do not consider the possibility that unipolarity does not constrain any actors or the issue of system change. This essay advances two routes out of unipolarity: (1) a ‘delegitimation’ phase followed by regular balancing behavior and (2) a sudden and dramatic shift from unipolarity to multipolarity brought on by an unforeseen US collapse.     

Why unipolarity doesn't matter (much)

This article first argues that states have not balanced against US unipolar power because the potential balancers do not view the United States as a major threat, because they believe it has benign security-seeking motives, at least with regard to other major powers. This explanation runs counter to the Brooks–Wohlforth argument, which holds that states are not balancing because the magnitude of the United States’ power advantage makes balancing essentially infeasible. The second part of the paper challenges the conventional wisdom on the benefits of unipolarity, arguing that the benefits the United States derives from unipolarity are generally overrated. More specifically, US security need not be significantly reduced by growth in China's economy that supports a return to bipolarity.     

The unipolar exit: beyond the Pax Americana

In this article I show that the unipolar era already is drawing to a close. Three main drivers explain the impending end of the Pax Americana. First, the rise of new great powers—especially China—is transforming the international system from unipolarity to multipolarity. Second, the United States is becoming the poster child for strategic over-extension, or as Paul Kennedy dubbed it, imperial overstretch. Third, the United States' relative economic power is declining, and mounting US fiscal problems and the dollar's increasingly problematic role as the international financial system's reserve currency are undermining US hegemony. After examining how these trends undermine the argument for ‘unipolar stability’, I conclude by arguing that over the next two decades the Pax Americana's end presages dramatic changes in international politics.     

The Pacifism of Andrew Carnegie and Edwin Ginn: The Emergence of a Philanthropic Internationalism

This study analyses the pacifism of Andrew Carnegie and Edwin Ginn against the backdrop of the emergence of new philanthropic practices. Scientific philanthropy and the institutional model of the philanthropic foundation provided the means for new approaches to the peace cause. The study thus argues that Ginn and Carnegie personified a shift from a non-institutional pacifism to an institutional internationalism. Despite noteworthy similarities in Ginn and Carnegie's approach to peace, however, their two philanthropic foundations—the World Peace Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—differed in strategies. This study suggests that the leadership of these institutions shaped these different approaches to conflict.     

Failure after 1441: Bush and Chirac in the UN Security Council

The unanimous passage of Security Council Resolution 1441 marked the onset of the most severe crisis of legitimacy that the United Nations has faced in the post-Cold War period. While some have asserted that the diplomatic clashes between erstwhile allies France and the United States were inevitable given the rise of American unipolarity, an analysis of events leading to the failed US attempt to gain a second resolution reveals that the outcome was among the least preferred for both participants. Using the Verbs In Context system, we conduct a computer-based content analysis of the public statements of the United States and French leaders. Our findings suggest that the diplomatic breakdown was exacerbated by each leaders' elevated sense of control over the situation and their inaccurate perception of their opponent's preferences.     

Contested geopolitical messages for tourists at the Okinawa Peace Park and memorials

Abstract

Now marketed as a tropical beach destination, Okinawa's identity is also forever linked with the horrors of war. Okinawa's tumultuous past encompasses the Ryukyu Islands, which had close economic ties to China until being annexed by mainland Japan, were invaded by the US in the Second World War, were occupied until 1972 and, more recently, have become the centre of heated debates over the continued presence of US military bases. The Battle of Okinawa was one of the bloodiest of the Second World War and the inhabitants faced not only the American invasion but also the tactics of the Japanese army, who viewed the islands as expendable in order to slow invading forces from reaching mainland Japan. In the context of the seventieth anniversary of the end of the Battle of Okinawa in 2015, and beyond, it is argued here that these conflicting geopolitical disputes present significant challenges in terms of the messages presented to educational dark tourists visiting the Okinawa Peace Park and Memorials. The Peace Park Story Tellers or kataribe who are the Second World War survivors, have the critical task of mediating the message to both domestic and international tourists, some of whom are not prepared to hear anti-Japan sentiment. Through an examination of the historical and geographic background, and an analysis of the tourist experience at the Peace Park and Memorials, this paper explores the complexity of educational dark tourism where competing messages collide.     

The US-Japan Alliance Dilemma in the Asia-Pacific: Changing Rationales and Scope

ABSTRACT

The changes in the US-Japan alliance are taking place in times of a global power shift – a transition from unipolarity to multipolarity – and China’s challenge to the US’ security dominance in the Asia-Pacific. The alliance security dilemma now manifests itself in the rise of ‘entrapment’ concerns for Washington and ‘abandonment’ anxieties for Tokyo. The US increasingly insists on more mutuality in alliance arrangements, while seeking to maintain ambiguity in its defence commitments to Japan. The relative decline of US power and the fluid regional security architecture, however, incentivise Japan to step up preparations for abandonment. Although Tokyo’s hedging strategy contributes to enhancement of the bilateral alliance in the short term, it also paves the way for Japan’s pursuit of strategic autonomy in the medium to long term.     

The (in)tangible Euro challenge to the dollar: insights from the financial elites in Brazil and China

The main purpose of this article is to shift the dollar vs Euro debate away from US–EU centrism to perspectives from emerging markets. Drawing on 40 semistructured financial elite interviews in Brazil and China, the key research question studied here is whether the US dollar is malfunctioning as the leading international currency in these parts of the world, and, if so, whether the Euro can be an alternative to the greenback. The results show that the status of the dollar as the main anchor in the monetary system is seriously questioned among financial elites in China and Brazil. As yet, though, the Euro does not represent an alternative to the dollar because of its fiscal and political fragmentations. However, despite these institutional shortcomings, the European currency is seen as an ideational role model for super-sovereign monetary integration out of dollar unipolarity based on consensual negotiations not only on a regional, but also on a global scale.     

Dealing with the Ambivalent Dragon: Can Engagement Moderate China’s Strategic Competition with America?

Can US engagement moderate China’s strategic competition with America? This study indicates that the answer is a qualified yes. Under unipolarity, a rising state may face both incentives to reach an accommodation with the hegemon and to expand its own stature and influence against the hegemonic dominance. The ambivalence of its intentions is structurally induced and reflects its uncertain stake in the hegemonic order. Consequently, a strategy of engagement may help the hegemon to promote cooperation over competition in dealing with an ascending power, but it does not necessarily eliminate the structural incentives for the competition. Against this theoretical backdrop, this study utilizes both qualitative and quantitative research to demonstrate that China’s reaction to American preeminence has long been marked by a profound ambivalence. Specifically, the findings suggest that while US engagement has some restraining impact on China’s competitive propensity, Beijing will continue to hedge against American hegemony, as its capabilities grow, by solidifying its diplomatic and strategic association with the developing world.     

Military doctrine and intelligence fusion in the American homeland

Although a plethora of research has examined US efforts to combat terrorism both at home and abroad, very few scholars have investigated the unprecedented relationships among US national security institutions and urban law enforcement agencies that have emerged since the events of 9/11. Through evidence culled from semi-structured interviews with 28 security planners in Washington DC and New York City, this article explains how path dependence, isomorphism and diffusion are propagating the application of military doctrine within domestic security initiatives through ‘intelligence fusion’. With particular attention to the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative, this investigation builds upon a body of work that has emerged in recent years by charting the institutional and technological architectures that are driving the deployment of paramilitary tactics and surveillance systems in cities.     

Democracy and mediation in territorial civil wars in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific

The awarding of the 2008 Nobel Peace Prize to former President Martti Ahtisaari, Finland, cites his involvement in the settlement of the Aceh conflict. This at the same time highlights the lack of such efforts in the regions of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. While internal conflicts throughout the world often tend to be resilient to conflict management initiatives, conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region have proven to be particularly difficult to resolve. Internal conflicts in Southeast Asia and the Pacific often concern territorial issue, for instance, East Timor and ethnically based conflicts in Myanmar. This is also true for conflicts in the South Pacific, notably in Bougainville (Papua New Guinea) and New Caledonia (France). Territorial conflicts last longer, are more difficult to manage, and generally produce more adverse consequences than those over other issues such as ideology, government, and national power. Further, conflicts in this region appear to be of low priority for third parties, with comparatively few interventions from third parties. The strong central governments seem to be a factor in preventing mediation-based solution to such conflicts. Nevertheless, there are reasons to be optimistic. Third party mediation, democratization, and the recent success in Aceh provide promise for the future, and the recent Nobel Prize confirms this.     

The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World

The decline in the United States’ relative position is in part a consequence of the burdens and susceptibilities produced by unipolarity. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the U.S. position both internationally and domestically may actually be strengthened once this period of unipolarity has passed.     

Ambivalent Albion,Ambitious Ally: Britain's Decision for No Separate Peace in 1914

When Britain entered the First World War it did so as an especially hesitant belligerent. One month later, the British enthusiastically signed the Treaty of London, stating that the Entente powers would prosecute the war in common and that none would pursue a separate peace. Why would a state long known for jealously guarding its ability to maintain a free hand initiate a binding alliance that restricted its war termination prospects after one month of combat? And what were the effects of its decision to do so? Answering this question requires not only that we examine British decision making but that we understand No Separate Peace Agreements and why states sign them. I hypothesize that a state will initiate a No Separate Peace Agreement when it has reason to fear that one of its cobelligerents may defect. I also hypothesize that No Separate Peace Agreements will cause states to reconcile war aims with their allies, agreeing to different terms of peace than might have been necessary to satisfy any one of them individually. Using new archival documents, I analyze a case study of British decision making in the early weeks of World War I and find substantial support for the hypotheses.     

The mix that makes unipolarity: hegemonic purpose and international constraints

The nature of a global arena dominated by one great power remains a critical subject for understanding international relations. Brooks and Wohlforth's recent book makes an important contribution by arguing that unipolarity poses few constraints to the hegemon and that the United States today should pursue a policy of primacy. The puzzle is that the United States has mostly resisted a primacy policy since becoming the sole superpower, and when it has done so, has often been less successful than the promise of its power advantage. Explaining this puzzle requires building on ‘the no constraint’ approach to develop a positive theory based on hegemonic purpose, a reformulated notion of constraints, and how purpose and constraints interact to shape outcomes. This reformulation suggests that any American strategy that looks like ‘primacy’ is unlikely to succeed.     

Entropy and the trajectory of world politics: why polarity has become less meaningful

The random and indeterminate nature of the current unipolar world suggests a condition of increasing entropy. There are two reasons for this claim. First, relative capability advantages under unipolarity do not translate as easily as they once did into power and influence over others. Second, systemic constraint is a property that limits actors' freedom of action by imposing costs and benefits on certain kinds of actions. Unlike past multipolar and bipolar systems, the current unipolar system exerts only weak, if any, systemic constraints on the unipolar power and all other actors as well. Thus, polarity has become a largely meaningless concept. Today, system process rather than structure best explains international politics, and this process is one of entropy. Finally, I suggest two pathways from unipolarity to a more balanced system: one is fairly consistent with standard balance-of-power realism but adds an ideational component; the other restores equilibrium by means of entropy.     

The US View of the Transforming Strategic Context in the MENA

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently reiterated US support for the expansion of the Abraham Accords and called for renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. As highlighted by this volume’s authors, the Accords are the most significant regional peacemaking achievement in decades, having already reduced Arab-Israeli tensions—particularly at the government level—and provided opportunities for Arab states to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians. The changing regional security architecture can only be welcomed by the United States. Yet, due to political authoritarianism in the region, the Accords may fall short of their potential if the economic gains fail to reach marginalized populations. This essay contends that trade relations that support job creation and access to water and energy may increase public support. Just as a return to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is important, political reform in the Arab countries is needed to make the Accords successful by bringing more economic benefits to the Arab streets and ensuring that there will not be a “Cold Peace.”     

Counterterrorism in an Era of Great Power Politics

How should the United States recalibrate its counterterrorism policy for an era of great power competition? With the end of unipolarity, the United States cannot fight terrorists and compete with Russia and China with equal energy, but must instead make hard choices about its priorities and resources. Among those hard choices are what to do with the web of counterterrorism partnerships with other governments that have formed in the post- 9/11 era. This article proposes three broad principles—linkages, license, and legitimacy—that the United States can use to evaluate its policy and these partnerships, with the aim of recasting U.S. counterterrorism policy for an era of great power competition.     

Amnesty,peace and reconciliation in Algeria

Amnesties constitute the most contentious issue in transitional justice processes. While largely rejected for contravening international law and being morally objectionable, political realities may sometimes force us to accept them in the interest of peace and stability. Determinations about the desirability and effectiveness of amnesties to promote peace thus need to look beyond legalistic claims, and take into account the specific political context within a country, as well as the nature of the amnesty itself. Taking the case of Algeria, where an amnesty was adopted in 2005 with the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, this article argues that although the amnesty can be justified partially by the fragile political context in Algeria and may contribute to reducing levels of violence in the country, its effective contribution to peace and reconciliation will be limited because it has, so far, not been accompanied by other political and economic measures necessary to bring peace and stability to the country, and because it promotes amnesia and largely ignores the plight of the victims of the war.     

“印太战略”:以美印日澳的战略逻辑、利益与策略选择为分析视角

"印太战略"是美国均势+有限遏制+规制+话语诋毁的混合型战略。它意在前沿、中间地带与后方的三层构建不对称的对华遏制性力量,突破中美双边、单区域战略竞争的狭窄战略空间;在多地域与多维度孤立中国,拉拢更多国家在产业价值链、数字经济等层面与中国切割;制订基础建设投资透明化的新标准,嵌入有利于美国利益的规制;通过国际法、舆论等软性手段抹黑中国的"一带一路"与海权发展。虽然共同逻辑都是制衡中国崛起,但日澳印在策略上强调非对抗性。其中避免成为中国优先反制是日本重要的策略目标;印度在拉达克边界冲突后尚没有形成一个完全倒向美国的战略,因为这必定使其背上沉重的战略包袱,成为美国的附庸;澳大利亚作为地缘政治影响有限的中等国家,在美国反华行动中冲在最前列已使其利益严重受损。而"印太战略"与东盟所推动的包容性、合作安全理念也有着本质的区别,东盟要在"印太地区"发挥中心领导作用,定位"印太"为对话与合作区域。所以由于东盟的抵制、印日澳的消极政策,这个战略形成的攻势将很难保持可持续性,其长期前景并不看好。