The politics of IO performance: A framework

Some international organizations (IOs) are subject to constant criticism for producing poor results while others are praised for accomplishing difficult tasks despite political and resource constraints. Indeed, IO performance varies substantially over time and across tasks, and yet the international relations literature has devoted little attention to why this occurs. This article provides a framework for studying IO performance. After addressing some of the distinct challenges of conceptualizing and analyzing performance in the context of IOs, we discuss the tradeoffs of using different performance metrics—from process indicators to outcome indicators—and present a typology of factors that influence performance. Finally, we discuss research strategies for those interested in studying performance rigorously. The policy relevance of studying IO performance is clear: only if we understand why some IOs perform better than others can we begin to improve their performance in a systematic way. As many organizations come under pressure to reform, while at the same time taking on new and more complicated tasks, scholars should be actively engaged in debates surrounding IO performance and its role in effective governance at the international level.     

Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in International Organizations

On those rare occasions when scholars of international organizations (IOs) consider the issue of change, they typically highlight the centrality of states. Although states are important for understanding when and why there is a change in the tasks, mandate, and design of IO, IOs themselves can initiate change. Drawing from sociological institutional and resource dependence approaches, in this article we treat IOs as strategic actors that can choose among a set of strategies in order to pursue their goals in response to changing environmental pressures and constraints that potentially threaten their relevance and resource base. We delineate six strategies—acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, manipulation, and strategic social construction, and suggest that the strategic choice by IOs is contingent on the level of both organizational insecurity and the congruence between the content of environmental pressures and organizational culture. We emphasize how IOs must make a trade-off between acquiring the resources necessary to survive and be secure, on the one hand, and maintaining autonomy, on the other. We apply this framework to the case of Interpol, investigating how different calculations of these trade-offs led Interpol staff to adopt different strategies depending on its willingness to accept, resist, or initiate changes that demand conformity to external pressures.     

The World Trade Organization at work: Performance in a member-driven milieu

This article discusses performance in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Applying the framework by Gutner and Thompson and inspired by principal-agent theory, it is argued that existing studies have underspecified the institutional milieu that affects performance. The WTO represents a member-driven organization where Members are part of the international organization (IO) (e.g., through rule-making) and at the same time act outside the IO (e.g., through implementation). Thus, a narrow reading of the IO (focusing on the civil servants and the Director-General and his staff) will not suffice to understand IO performance in the WTO context. Selected evidence is presented to illustrate aspects of the WTO’s inner-working and the institutional milieu of performance. In addition, the article discusses a number of performance parameters, including the relationship between Secretariat autonomy and performance, the role of information, and the mechanisms of performance aggregation. The article ends by cautioning against quick fixes to the system to improve performance.     

Mainstreaming international governance: The environment,gender, and IO performance in the European Union

International organizations (IOs) have moved increasingly in recent years to adopt cross-cutting mandates that require the “mainstreaming” of particular issues, such as gender equality or environmental protection, across all IO policies. Successful IO performance with respect to such mandates, we hypothesize, is determined in large part by the use of hard or soft institutional measures to shape the incentives of sectoral officials whose cooperation is required for successful implementation. We test this hypothesis with respect to two such mandates—gender mainstreaming and environmental policy integration—in a single international organization, the European Union, demonstrating a strong causal link between the use of hard incentives and IO performance in these and related mandates.     

Who matters for memory: Sources of institutional memory in international organization crisis management

Scholarship on organizational learning has explored how international organizations (IOs) reform but has paid little attention to the origins of institutional memory. For IOs engaged in crisis management operations, acquiring knowledge about strategic errors is necessary for adopting reforms that could save lives. This study seeks to identify the sources that affect whether or not IO elites will contribute knowledge to an IO’s institutional memory in crisis management. The study employs a survey experiment in the field on 120 NATO elites who decide on and plan operations. Findings indicate that when the United States introduces knowledge of a strategic error, NATO elites are significantly less likely to share it. This deterrent effect on knowledge-sharing illustrates an unexpected way in which the US influences international crisis management. The study also finds that an IO’s secretariat can somewhat increase elites’ likelihood of contributing to the IO’s institutional memory.     

Looking beyond States: Openings for international bureaucrats to enter the institutional design process

Surprisingly little research investigates a stark reality: the vast majority of today’s international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) were crafted not by states alone, but with participation by international bureaucrats working in pre-existing IGOs. What explains this phenomenon? Drawing on international relations scholarship, this article develops predictions involving the capabilities of states, or a matter’s salience to states. The predictions are tested with a new and original dataset that captures, for the first time, variation in the roles that international bureaucrats play in the institutional design arena. Statistical analyses find that states’ need for expertise, as well as the design negotiations’ distance from high-politics, leave openings for international bureaucrats to enter institutional design processes. The findings enhance our understanding of institutional design, principal-agent relationships, non-state actors, and divisions of labor in contemporary global governance.     

Nationalist Sources of International Economic Integration

Most scholars of international relations and nationalism presume that nationalist ideology acts uniformly to hinder international economic integration, globalization, and free trade. This article challenges the conventional wisdom by developing an analytical framework of the incentives majority and minority nationalists face in the realm of foreign economic relations. Defining nationalism as the promotion of the autonomy, unity, and identity of the nation, it argues that nationalists have strong possible motivations both for and against close economic ties with foreign nations and states. As a result, oftentimes nationalists must make trade-offs among their goals of autonomy, unity, and identity when developing foreign economic policy preferences. Case studies of nationalist organizations in Quebec, India, and Ukraine that favor a high degree of international economic integration are presented to show the usefulness of the analytical framework.     

Bureaucratic power at play? The performance of the EU in the International Atomic Energy Agency

This article examines the performance of the European Union (EU) in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Following Barnett and Finnemore, the article argues that the EU as an intergovernmental organization (IO) possesses bureaucratic power based on high technical knowledge and rational–legal authority that it can use to gain influence in the Agency. The EU uses its technical knowledge to be a first-mover in political and technical discussions, and uses its financial support to influence the Agency's technical standards and practices for nuclear safeguards, security, and safety. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that its rational–legal authority as an international organization is limited. Being a regional IO, it does not automatically possess the impartiality and hence legitimacy that ordinarily characterize an international organization. Thus, to further improve its performance in the IAEA, the EU must look beyond internal policy issues and focus on its external legitimacy and standing as well.     

Stability and change in international policy-making: A punctuated equilibrium approach

International organizations (IOs) have developed into important policy venues beyond the state. Yet our understanding of the broader dynamics of IO policy-making is limited. This article offers the first comparative analysis of macro patterns in IO policy-making. Theoretically, we draw on punctuated equilibrium theory to develop hypotheses about stability and change in the orientation of IO policy agendas. Empirically, we examine novel data on the policy output of five general-purpose IOs between 1980 and 2015, combining statistical analysis and comparative case illustrations. The analysis yields two central results. First, the policy agendas of all five IOs display patterns of punctuated equilibria, with longer periods of stability interrupted by shorter periods of dramatic change. Second, the level of institutional friction in decision-making contributes to variation in punctuations across IOs and within IOs over time. The results suggest four broader implications: (1) punctuated equilibrium theory applies to a broader empirical domain than previously thought; (2) patterns of change in IOs are more complex than conventionally expected; (3) institutional friction matters for IOs’ responsiveness to societal demands and problem pressures; and (4) deeper integration of punctuated equilibrium theory into the study of IOs can pave the way for a promising IR research agenda.     

The structure of the international telecommunications regime in transition: A network analysis of international organizations 1

This paper examines the structure of the international telecommunications regime in terms of networks of social interaction and institutional affiliation among international actors. Social interaction and overlapping membership data of 69 international telecommunications organizations in the Yearbook of International Organizations 1994/1995 are analyzed to describe the social structure of the international telecommunications system through network analysis. The analysis reveals a center‐periphery structure with the Western industrial countries at the center and the less developed countries at the periphery. The international telecommunications system is also regionally structured suggesting influence by geopolitical and cultural proximity. The results indicate that inter‐governmental global organizations such as the ITU and UNESCO play intermediate and coordinating roles at the central linking‐pin positions (or cut‐points) in the international telecommunications regime. In summary, this research shows that transitional trends in international telecommunications have affected the interaction patterns of international actors.     

Regional public goods and international organizations

This article focuses on the provision prognosis for regional public goods (RPGs) and the role of international organizations in fostering supply in developing countries. All three properties of publicness—i.e., nonrivalry of benefits, nonexcludability of nonpayers, and the aggregation technology—play a role in this prognosis. The paper highlights many provision impediments, not faced by national or global public goods. When intervention is necessary, the analysis distinguishes the role of global, regional, and other institutional arrangements (e.g., networks and public-private partnerships). The pros and cons of subsidiarity are addressed. JEL codes H87 · O18 · R58     

Looking in the mirror: Comparing INGO networks across issue areas

International Relations scholarship has begun to focus a great deal of attention on social networks and their influence on political outcomes. In this paper, we contribute to this effort by examining the network relationships of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) across four issues areas: the environment, health, human rights, and development. Using originally coded data on over 4000 INGOs, we find that the characteristics of network relations across the four areas are in fact quite different. Further, we find that these differences are driven in part by the characteristics of the INGOs, including whether they are located in the global North or South and their ties to intergovernmental organizations. Finally, we highlight the crucial “bridge” role of organizations that focus on a “hybrid” of multiple issue-areas within the overall network.     

International Norms and National Indigenous Politics: Mapuche Demands for Territory in Chile

Indigenous movements have increasingly turned to the global arena to achieve their political goals at the national level. Using the norm diffusion model, the present article analyzes the relationship between the international indigenous rights regime (IRR) and the conceptualizations of indigenous territory used by four Mapuche organizations in Chile over the last 10 years. We find that the organizations draw on the IRR to frame their demand for autonomous territories based on historical Mapuche practices. We identify two conceptualizations: (1) a larger territory with political but not economic autonomy and (2) a smaller natural-cultural space characterized by a distinctive economic logic.     

Managing Asylum and European Integration: Expanding Spheres of Exclusion?

During the last decade, thhe European Union intensified its efforts to define its external borders in conjunction with its efforts to evolve into a coherent, frontier-free political territory. European policy-makers slowly shaped new norms and rules pertaining to asylum, with increasingly stronger mechanisms to enforce the policy decisions. In the case of asylum and refugee protection, Europe's efforts are nested in the broad global institutional framework negotiated through and carried out by international organizations. However, these developments raise the specter of deteriorating refugee protection in Europe and beyond. This article reviews the norms and rules on which the post–World War II refugee protection regime rests and then points to the recent developments in refugee protection in Europe, which might undermine the goals of the global refugee protection.     

The International Energy Agency after 35 years: Reform needs and institutional adaptability

Despite the mounting scholarly interest in processes of institutional change in international organizations, still very little is known about how and when such evolutionary dynamics occur. This article hopes to contribute to this young, yet growing body of literature by process-tracing the changes that have occurred in the institutional setup of the International Energy Agency (IEA). Founded during the first oil crisis of 1973–74, the IEA has had to deal with major environmental changes over its lifetime. In response, the agency has diversified away from its original raison d’être, namely managing an emergency oil sharing mechanism, to become a more proactive policy adviser guiding its member governments toward sustainable energy economies. The article seeks to explain the observed patterns of change and inertia, using a theoretic paradigm that builds on theories of “new institutionalism.” The paper argues that the agency’s institutional flexibility can only be fully explained by taking into account a combination of factors: (1) the member states’ choices, in particular the impulses of the G8-members of the IEA; (2) path dependency, especially the institutional link with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); and (3) agency by the secretariat and the executive bureau of the IEA.     

When BITs have some bite: The political-economic environment for bilateral investment treaties

Political risk frequently impedes the flow of capital into developing countries. In response, governments often adopt innovative institutions that aim to attract greater flows of international investment and trade by changing the institutional environment and limiting the risk to outside investors. One primary example of this is the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), aimed specifically at increasing the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing countries. Yet the literature in political science and economics is inconclusive about whether or not BITs do indeed stimulate FDI, and it provides conflicting theoretical reasoning for the claimed connection. This article argues that BITs do attract FDI to developing countries, but the story is a complicated one. Two important factors must be taken into account. First, BITs cannot entirely substitute for an otherwise weak investment environment. Countries must have the necessary domestic institutions in place that interact with BITs to make these international commitments credible and valuable to investors. Second, as the coverage of BITs increases, overall FDI flows to developing countries increase. However, although remaining positive, the marginal effect of a country’s BITs on its own FDI may fall because of heightened competition for FDI from other BIT countries. Using data from 97 countries for 1984–2007, we provide empirical evidence consistent with both of these theoretical claims.     

Media,democracy and the public sphere: towards a reconceptualisation of the public sphere

ABSTRACT

This article brings a synthesis of the recent literature about the role the media have played for the transformation of the public sphere. Departing from this literature, a general research framework for a critical political economy of the public sphere is presented. The central thesis of this approach is that a political economy of the public sphere shouldn't be restricted to an analysis of its institutional configuration and the actual labour process, but must extend its radius of action from the production of media messages to a political economy of reception and its signification.     

Issue linkage across international organizations: Does European countries’ temporary membership in the UN Security Council increase their receipts from the EU budget?

What explains the outcome of interstate negotiations in international organizations (IOs)? While existing research highlights member states’ power, preference intensity, and the IO’s institutional design, this paper introduces an additional source of bargaining power in IOs: Through issue linkage members of an IO leverage privileged positions in other IOs to obtain more favorable bargaining outcomes. Specifically, European Union members are more successful in bargaining over the EU budget while they hold a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Inside the UNSC EU members can promote security interests of other European countries, and they can use their influence to secure side-payments from the EU budget. The study tests this argument by investigating new EU budget data, and it shows that EU members obtain 1.7 billion Euro in additional net receipts during a two-year UNSC term, on average. Thus, bargaining processes in the EU and the UN are intricately linked.     

Intervenors with Interests and Power

This article presents a framework for understanding the roles that interested and powerful intervenors play in resolving disputes. Called an intervention role grid, this framework can be used to analyze the dispute resolution functions that third parties can perform. It may also be used to shed light on the difficult choices that confront intervenors with interests and power. The article uses case material from five recent international conflicts to illustrate how the intervention role grid works.     

Terrorism and Politics: The Case of Northern Ireland's Loyalist Paramilitaries

This article reviews the history of the various political parties associated with the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA): the two main loyalist or Protestant terrorist organizations in Northern Ireland. In the 1970s and 1980s, the UDA was more successful than the UVF in establishing a political presence, partly because it had the more distinct political philosophy and partly because its political leaders were able to distance themselves from the organization's terror campaign. However, since the ceasefires of 1994, fortunes have been reversed. The UVF's political party has been more successful; partly because it has managed to create the more distinct political position and partly because the new climate made close association with terrorism something of a political advantage.