Formed by thalidomide: mass torts as a false cure for toxic exposure

Professor Bernstein considers a theme of Judge Weinstein's judicial and academic writings--that tort law works imperfectly to effect justice in mass disaster cases--through the vehicle of thalidomide, the paradigmatic toxic substance. Thirty-five years ago, thalidomide poisoned thousands of children, inflicting limb-reduction birth defects. Professor Bernstein argues that the drug has also had a malforming effect on mass tort law. Courts and scholars have used the precedent of thalidomide to build stringent legal standards of proof and causation, without enough attention to the functions and consistency of these standards. Thalidomide has also prompted commentators to celebrate American drug regulation and the American liability system; Professor Bernstein argues that these paeans are exaggerated. She concludes that the United States must confront its thalidomide history, as other nations in the world have done, and build social institutions--strong regulation and social insurance--to guard against toxic disasters of the future.     

Sequential torts and bilateral harm

This paper analyzes care incentives of individuals in a bilateral-harm setting if care choices are sequential. We find that the efficient outcome is not guaranteed under any liability rule considered, irrespective of whether information is perfect or imperfect. Furthermore, it is no longer possible to generally rank liability rules according to their induced social costs. These findings are in strong contrast to the sequential-torts setting in which harm is unilateral.     

Mass torts and moral principles

This paper examines moral problems that arise when assigning liability in causally problematic mass exposure tort cases. It examines the relevance of different conceptions of corrective justice for such assignments of liability. It explores an analogy between the expressive role of punishment and the expressive role of tort, and argues that the imposition of liability in causally problematic mass exposure cases can be justified by appeal to expressive considerations.     

Procreative torts: enhancing the common-law protection for reproductive autonomy

Roe v. Wade's twenty-fifth anniversary is likely to herald widespread scholarly commentary on the decision's continued vitality and the future of abortion in the United States. However, if such commentary focuses solely upon the constitutional dimensions and political aspects of a woman's right to privacy, an important dimension of this right will be overlooked. Few commentators have considered the extent to which tort law safeguards a woman's interest in reproductive autonomy. In this article, Professor Northern argues that the interest in reproductive autonomy has not yet received the full protection to which it is entitled and that tort law is poised to evolve distinct causes of action for the interference with procreative autonomy interests. Professor Northern begins with an overview of the medical and psychological literature on abortion-related risks. She goes on to discuss current trends in abortion malpractice litigation. The author then reviews the three basic types of malpractice causes of action--battery, negligence, and lack of informed consent--and explores their application to abortion malpractice claims. The focus of the article then shifts to the development of specialized procreative torts, and Professor Northern contends that courts should go beyond previous decisions to redress any substantial interference with procreative autonomy. Finally, the author asserts that legislative alternatives to the common-law development of procreative torts, such as right-to-know statutes, are less protective of women's interests. Professor Northern concludes that tort law could and should be used to more fully protect women's interests in procreative autonomy.     

Jurisdiction problems regarding Internet torts: Critical remarks

As the facts that led to the Dow Jones/Gutnick-decision of the High Court of Australia (10 December 2002) illustrate, the Internet is a powerful platform for communication. Its continuous worldwide accessibility urges discussion of a number of questions regarding tort jurisdiction. These are the starting points for some critical remarks regarding states' reciprocal claims to cross-border activities and the way in which they deal with the interests of the involved parties. For tort jurisdiction, the paper proposes and applies criteria for the assessment of the place where the harmful event has occurred or may occur (art. 5, subsection 3 Regulation 44/2001), as explained by the European Court of Justice of the European Union. Special attention is hereby given to some particularities that characterize Internet torts. On the one hand it concerns the alleged global assignment of jurisdiction that art. 5, subsection 3 may lead to and on the other hand the scope of the assigned jurisdiction in the court of the place where the damage occurs. The European approach is confronted with the principles of personal jurisdiction that are embedded in long arm statutes and the Due Process Clause, as applied in some leading American cases regarding Internet jurisdiction. It leads to suggestions regarding the development of a marginal test for the reasonableness of the jurisdiction art. 5, subsection 3 could lead to in a particular case, as well from the point of view of the weight of the connecting factor as to the scope of the jurisdiction that is based upon it.     

Moral theories of torts: Their scope and limits: Part II

One approach to legal theory is to provide some sort of rational reconstruction of all or of a large body of the common law. For philosophers of law this has usually meant trying to rationalize a body of law under one or another principle of justice. This paper explores the efforts of the leading tort theorists to provide a moral basis - in the sense of rational reconstruction based on alleged moral principles - for the law of torts. The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part I consider and reject the view that tort law is best understood as falling either within the ambit of the principle of retributive justice, a comprehensive theory of moral responsibility, or an ideal of fairness inherent in the idea that one should impose on others only those risks others impose on one. The second part of the paper distinguishes among various conceptions of corrective or compensatory justice and considers arguments — including previous ones by the author himself — to the effect that tort law is best understood as rooted in principles of corrective justice. This paper argues that although the principles of justice may render defensible many (but by no means all) of the claims to repair and to liability recognized in torts, it cannot explain why we have adopted a tort system as the approach to vindicating those claims. Some other principle — probably not one of justice — is needed to explain why it is that the victim's claim to repair is satisfied by having his losses shifted to his injurer — rather than through some other means of doing so. The paper concludes that the law of torts cannot be understood — in the sense of being given a rational reconstruction — under any one principle of morality.     

Moral theories of torts: Their scope and limits: Part I

One approach to legal theory is to provide some sort of rational reconstruction of all or of a large body of the common law. For philosophers of law this has usually meant trying to rationalize a body of law under one or another principle of justice. This paper explores the efforts of the leading tort theorists to provide a moral basis — for the law of torts. The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part I consider and reject the view that tort law is best understood as falling either within the ambit of the principle of retributive justice, a comprehensive theory of moral responsibility, or an ideal of fairness inherent in the idea that one should impose on others only those risks others impose on one. The second part of the paper distinguishes among various conceptions of corrective or compensatory justice and considers arguments — including previous arguments by the author himself — to the effect that tort law is best understood as rooted in principles of corrective justice. This paper argues that although the use of principles of justice may render defensible many (but by no means all) of the claims to repair and to liability recognized in torts, it cannot explain why we have adopted a tort system as the approach to vindicating those claims. Some other principle — probably not one of justice — is needed to explain why it is that the victims claims to repair is satisfied by having his losses shifted to his injurer — rather than through some other means of doing so. The paper concludes that the law of torts cannot be understood — in the sense of being given a rational reconstruction — under any one principle of morality.     

Technology and torts: Memory costs, nondurable precautions and interference effects

This article examines the influence of nondurable precaution technologies on the expansion of tort awards. We provide four contributions to the literature. First, we present a general, formal model on durable and non-durable precaution technology that focuses on memory costs. Second, because liability exposure creates interference, we argue that tort law perpetuates the expansion of awards. Third, because plaintiffs do not consider the social costs of interference effects, private litigation induces socially excessive suits. Fourth, while new harm-reducing technologies likely increase accident rates, such technologies also raise the ratio of trial costs to harm, leaving undetermined the overall effect of new technologies on the rate of litigation.