Individual Engagement to Collective Participation: The Dynamics of Participation Pattern in Performance Budgeting

Active participation from all stakeholders in the budget process is one of the key issues to the integration of performance information with budgeting. While individual stakeholders' participation is cited as important by various studies, participation pattern, that is, how they engage relative to each other in performance measurement, is less known. Empirical studies on participation patterns and their collective impact on performance budgeting are scarce. Using the survey data collected in Georgia, this study conducted a cluster analysis in order to further provide a dynamic understanding of the mechanism and structure of a participative process in performance budgeting. The findings suggest that participation pattern is a different construct than individual participation and that the effective patterns vary by the purpose for which performance information is used. In addition, the patterns that are open to external professionals and citizens, with shared responsibilities among the agencies, executive offices and the legislative branch, and tailored to various purposes are more likely to be effective in integrating performance information with management and budgeting.     

Budgeters' Views of State Performance-Budgeting Systems: Distinctions across Branches

Given that a majority of states have had some sort of performance‐budgeting initiative on the books for several years, how has implementation of such reform progressed? To answer this question, we surveyed legislative and executive budgeters from the 50 states, asking them for their impressions of performance‐budgeting implementation in their state. Specifically, we asked these budget officers about the reasons for introducing performance budgeting in their state; the types of activities required of their system; responsible oversight bodies; extent of application across state agencies and departments; and perceived levels of effectiveness and problems experienced with implementation of the budget reform. Our findings indicate that implementation of performance‐based budgeting systems is proceeding slowly. While there are some benefits to highlight, results show that implementing performance budgeting is not without problems—perhaps the greatest being differing perceptions of use and success among budget players, particularly across branches of government.     

Implementing PBB: Conflicting Views of Success

A modern budget reform, performance‐based budgeting (PBB) emphasizes the measurement of government performance by agencies and public servants. In this article we define PBB as requiring strategic planning regarding agency mission, goals and objectives, and a process that requests quantifiable data that provide meaningful information about program outcomes. Performance‐based budgeting requirements are now pervasive in the states. Of forty‐seven states with PBB requirements, thirty‐one have legislated the process to be conducted, while sixteen have initiated the reform through budget guidelines or instructions.¹What remains unknown, yet of vital interest to state administrators, their staff, legislators, and citizens, regards implementation status of PBB systems. How many states are utilizing a PBB process as prescribed by law or administrative directive? And if PBB has been implemented, has it been successful regarding improvement of agency effectiveness and decision making about spending? Perhaps most importantly, has PBB influenced appropriation decisions?. This research is based on responses to a mail survey of executive and legislative budgeters regarding the PBB system established in their state. Results discussed in this article consider budgeters’ response about PBB implementation status and effectiveness as conducted. We find that there are differing perceptions across the branches of government regarding both the extent of PBB implementation as well as its success. Results show that states with better‐known PBB systems have not necessarily realized greater success in terms of effectiveness from this budget reform than states with less popularly known systems, at least as perceived by the budgeters included in this article.     

Linking Budgets to Activity: A Test of the Effect of Output‐Purchase Budgeting

Activity‐based budgeting is designed to strengthen the link between activity and budgets. If budgets automatically follow fluctuations in demand, uncertainty is reduced for agencies and politicians can focus more on long‐term decisions. Activity‐based budgeting is likely to fail unless activity can be defined and measured with reasonable accuracy. An equally fundamental condition is the credibility of the budgeting rules. This article provides an empirical test of the effect of output‐purchase budgeting based on data over time from public and private schools. Potentially disturbing variables are held constant, allowing for analysis of the interplay of budgeting systems and credible commitment. Output‐purchase budgeting does indeed strengthen the link between activity and budgets, provided that politicians are able to credibly commit themselves to the rules.     

What Can Performance Information Do to Legislators? A Budget‐Decision Experiment with Legislators

Studies on the influence of performance information on budgeting decisions have produced contradictory findings. This article offers a framework of the parliamentary context that links performance information to legislators’ budgeting decisions. The framework suggests that the impact on politicians’ allocations will differ depending on whether performance information is reflected in the budget proposal, whether the allocation issue concerns a politically difficult trade‐off for the decision maker, and whether information falls into a receptive partisan mind. The experimental study uses 57 actual legislators. The results show that the introduction of performance information into legislators’ deliberation process leads to stronger deviations from the status quo allocation. This difference occurs because performance information highlights more clearly the expected consequences of budgetary changes and allows for more pronounced reactions. More informed decisions, however, might make compromise among legislators more difficult because individual positions will become more polarized.     

Reinventing Reforms: How to Improve Program Management Using Performance Measures. Really

This paper looks at the design and use of incentivized performance measures to motivate managerial efficiency and promote greater program effectiveness. It starts off by looking at recent reforms like the Government Performance and Results Act to understand why they were largely unsuccessful in altering the decision‐making process of government agencies. One problem was that performance measures have been both numerous and complicated, thereby making their role in management and oversight difficult. Equally important, no external incentives were attached to program accomplishments. The paper then examines what elements would be needed to build a management system that encourages both more efficient and more effective agency behavior. The goal of performance budgeting is to develop performance measures that display the progress of a program toward its stated objectives. Assessments based on these measures may then call for rewards or punishments. As such, it also may encourage program managers toward improved performance. The paper examines the pitfalls and complexities dealt with by Congress and Office of Management and Budget in the process. For example, a performance system must distinguish between funding program needs, as warranted by sectoral indicators, and management concerns. It must also unambiguously tie incentives to performance measures to motivate agencies, while building in commitment devices for the principals. Incentivized performance measures may not be appropriate in all conditions, but may be helpful for motivating managers and improving program performance in particular circumstances.     

From Performance Budgeting to Performance Budget Management: Theory and Practice

This article examines the decades‐long practices of performance budgeting in different countries and their associated challenges from a multilayered institutional framework. Based on theory and lessons learned, the article recommends an array of strategies to address institutional and organizational barriers. It also proposes to reconceptualize performance budgeting as a performance budget management system and suggests how multiyear budget planning, financial risk assessment, policy planning, the departmental budget cycle, the program budget cycle, stakeholder engagement, regular spending reviews, and performance audits should be integrated more closely to address the long‐term fiscal challenges faced by many governments and to respond to the public pressure on agencies to do more with less.     

New rôles of government in supporting manufacturing: the capabilities of support agencies in Ghana and Zimbabwe

This study examines the roles and capabilities of executive agencies in providing support services to manufacturing in Ghana and Zimbabwe. It asserts that the new roles of government during and after adjustment have not been clearly defined and are in fact more complex than running state‐owned productive enterprises. The basic shift is said to be from direct provision of goods and services to the provision of an enabling environment through support in areas such as training, information, finance, export and investment promotion and technology. Economic development is stimulated when there is a harmonious relationship between entrepreneurs and their institutional environment, much of which is provided by the state. This article concentrates upon the role of meso‐level agencies in changing incentives faced by entrepreneurs and shifting them out of unproductive activity and into productive entrepreneurship, and outlines some of the preliminary results from related research. There are several factors which influence the capabilities of agencies providing these services. Essentially they may be divided into internal and external factors. This allows the analysis to consider not only budgeting and incentive systems but also the impact of external pressures experienced by any given agency. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

论人民代表大会在绩效预算改革中的运作与影响——以广东省A区为例

在当代中国的人民代表大会制下,加强人民代表大会对政府预算的监督是深化预算制度改革的核心内容。但是,在信息不对称的背景下,由于缺乏科学有力、具体可行的制度安排,人大的预算监督在实践中往往被大大弱化。通过参与式观察及无结构访谈的形式搜集广东省A区开展绩效预算改革的实证资料后发现,尽管以财政部门为主导的绩效预算改革模式缓解了人大与政府间的信息不对称现象而有助于加强人大的预算监督,但由于人大在改革中未能发挥主导作用而损害了绩效预算改革的最终效果。因此,发挥人大的内在优势,并以构建强化人大预算监督的制度安排为主要目标,应当是当前地方政府推行绩效预算改革的不二选择,而强化预算体制的公共性则应当是绩效预算改革的基本主轴。     

Does the Motivation for Market‐Based Reform Matter? The Case of Responsibility‐Centered Management

Organizational theorists have long examined the implications of market‐oriented policies for public agencies. Current research often aims to understand the effects of policies imposed on organizations by external stakeholder groups, but few studies have attempted to gain a better understanding of what mechanisms cause agencies to select into these strategies. The purpose of this article is to understand, first, which factors make an organization more likely to adopt a decentralized, market‐based budgeting system—termed “responsibility‐centered management (RCM)—and, second, whether this type of system has implications for organizational performance. Using data on doctorate‐granting public and private nonprofit four‐year universities in the United States, the authors find that mission, resource dependence, and state party control influence the take‐up of RCM. In terms of effects, RCM creates winners for graduation rates (white students) and degree production (science, technology, engineering, and math departments), which raises questions of equity across groups.     

THE SAUDI ARABIAN BUDGETING SYSTEM: AN INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT

This article describes and evaluates the budgetary institutions in Saudi Arabia. The primary sources of information for this study are publications from the Saudi Ministry of Finance and a survey implemented to investigate the different aspects of budget formulation and execution. We find that the Saudi budget experiences difficulties associated with incremental annual line‐item budgeting systems. Although capital expenditures in the education and health sectors are guided by five‐year plans developed by the Ministry of Planning, the rest of the budget preparation procedure is mainly driven by requests from government agencies to increase spending (i.e. a bottom‐up approach), instead of being based on an early determination of the macroeconomic constraints and the acceptable level of deficit (i.e. a top‐down approach). The result is an exacerbation of tragedy of the commons problems associated with information asymmetry and conflict‐avoidance strategies. We discuss possible reasons for this finding and offer budgetary reform proposals. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does Agency Autonomy Foster Public Participation?

Allocation of public resources is an area in which considerations of both economic efficiency and democratic legitimacy are likely to be present. Public administrators are often blamed for being too devoted to the norms of bureaucratic ethos, such as efficiency, effectiveness, and top‐down control, and less so to the norms of democratic ethos, such as inclusiveness and bottom‐up decision making. This article examines whether managers in agencies with greater budget autonomy are more likely to include the public when allocating resources. Because participation offers an opportunity for agencies to enhance the legitimacy of their decisions, it is expected that the value of citizen input will increase with the degree of agency autonomy. Using data on the practices of citizen participation in budgeting in two state departments—transportation and environment—this study finds that agencies with a higher degree of autonomy tend to be more open to public comment than agencies with more centralized budget processes.     

PBB in American Local Governments: It's More than a Management Tool

Despite academic findings that performance information seldom is used in appropriations decisions, many professional organizations and governments continue to press for integrating performance information into local public management, planning, and budgeting processes. Is it possible to reconcile such inconsistencies? Looking beyond the executive–legislative relationship and departmental appropriations, the author examines the budget implications of applying performance information at the subdepartmental program level. Case analysis of Indianapolis’s IndyStat initiative underscores that performance measurement application is positively related to intradepartmental program budget changes. Hence, performance‐based budgeting (PBB) can improve local budgeting despite severe political constraints. Still, successful use of PBB requires strong executive leadership, and its effects remain less visible at the departmental level or within the wider political arena of legislative bargaining. The author concludes by recommending some rethinking of the current analytical focus of PBB both in future research as well as recommended practice.     

From Cash to Accrual Budgeting and Accounting in the Public Sector: The Dutch Experience

Traditionally, governments used to deploy input‐based budgeting systems and cash‐based accounting systems. However, these systems do not provide the information that is necessary for a government to operate efficiently and effectively. Therefore, a growing number of countries have already shifted or are planning to shift from cash‐based to some form of accrual accounting in the public sector. Usually, the implementation of some accrual‐based system is linked to wider financial management reforms including performance management requiring information on cost. This paper focuses on the Dutch experience with the shift from cash‐based accounting and budgeting systems to an accrual‐based system.     

Performance Budgeting and Performance Funding in the States: A States Assessment

For a variety of reasons, performance budgeting has gained new life in the 1990s. Initially introduced in the 1950s by the Hoover Commission and others, performance budgeting efforts, in the 1990s, go beyond the workload productivity and efficiency focus of earlier phases and place greater emphasis on outcomes and accountability. This study reports on a survey of state executive-branch budget officers designed to determine the current status of state performance budgeting efforts including performance budgeting processes used by the states, their perceived impacts on budget decision making, and their probable future use. In addition, the study assessed the emerging role of performance funding as a further extension of performance budgeting processes. The linking of performance to the allocation or distribution of appropriated funds may be emerging as the next iteration of performance budgeting in the states. In addition to reporting on the survey, relationships between performance budgeting and various aspects of state budgeting practices are analyzed through crosstabulations, and regression analysis is employed to examine the states' organization, fiscal, and political capacity to implement performance budgeting and funding.     

Toward More “Evidence‐Informed” Policy Making?

The quality of public decision making depends significantly on the quality of analysis and advice provided through public organizations. Champions of “evidence‐informed” policy making claim that rigorous evaluation practices can significantly improve attainment of cost‐effective outcomes. After decades of experience, performance information is more sophisticated, but evaluation practices and capabilities vary enormously. Public agencies gather and process vast amounts of information, but there has been little analysis of how this information is actually utilized for policy and program improvement. This article examines how government agencies use evidence about policy and program effectiveness, with attention to four themes: (1) the prospects for improving “evidence‐informed” policy making, (2) the diversity of practices concerning evidence utilization and evaluation across types of public agencies and policy arenas, (3) recent attempts to “institutionalize” evaluation as a core feature of policy development and budget approval, and (4) the relationships between public agencies and nongovernmental sources of expertise.     

Is the U.S. Congress an Insurmountable Obstacle to Any “Far‐Sighted Conception of Budgeting”?

In recent years, Congress has recurrently failed to meet its minimum responsibilities in federal budgeting. This article analyzes whether it is possible to repair this problem, using concepts popularized by Allen Schick in his influential article “The Road to PPB.” His article compared the PPB reform effort to the history of budget process reforms that started with the design of the executive budget. It publicized a logical sequence of budget process improvements that started with control and then advanced through management and planning. The article did not substantially address the role of Congress, but eight years after it was published, Congress reasserted its constitutional role in the budget process. Its record of performance since then has ranged from mixed to dysfunctional. The Congress has been criticized for budgetary delays, micromanagement, myopia, procrastination, indiscipline, and an inability to prioritize intelligently. If these faults are set in stone, then an integrated system of budgeting, as described in “The Road to PPB” and related work, is unattainable. On the other hand, if reform of Congressional budgeting is politically feasible, improvements to that system can utilize the unique contributions that a legislature can make to a good system of budgeting.     

Program Budgeting and Accountability in Local Government

Much has been written about program budgeting and its relevance to improved efficiency and effectiveness. However, there is little discussion about the relationship between the use of program budgeting and accountability. While, organisations using program budgeting focus on the issues of performance, the accountability of management to an elected body, such as a local council has been given little attention. In this article three questions are posed: (1) Is the performance information available to enable councillors to form a judgment about management's performance?; (2) Is management involved in determining issues of policy, such as objectives, programs and performance measurement?; and (3) Are councillors confronted by a greater volume of budgetary documentation but with no increase in time to consider it? The results show that program budgeting does not always enhance accountability in local government.     

Can Needs-Based Grants Improve Local Transit Performance? Varying Effects by Level of Control

Needs-based grant programs are budgeting systems that tie grant dollars to the needs of the grantees as determined by objective indicators. Although performance improvement is not an explicit goal of such grants, the associated awards could work as incentives for grantees to meet the grant criteria. In other words, grantees seek to improve their performance to fulfill the criteria, even though the grant-makers intend such grants to support the existing operational needs of the grantees. This study tests these assertions in the context of the small transit intensive cities (STIC) grant that was established as a needs-based grant system by the federal government to support small local transit agencies operating with unusually high service demands. This study argues that these systems would have a stronger impact on indicators over which grantees have more control. This study tests these assertions using a difference-in-differences analysis of 290 transit agencies over 17 years. The findings show that STIC is effective in improving grantee performance, at least on the indicators which are more amenable to control.     

Political characteristics, institutional procedures and fiscal performance: Panel data analyses of Norwegian local governments, 1991–1998

Abstract.  Budgeting can be understood as a common resource pool problem where spending agencies have incentives to encourage excessive levels of current spending and reduce budget surplus or create budget deficits. The political leadership is assumed to have an important role in keeping fiscal control and resisting the high-demanders' pressure for increased spending. Three factors of relevance for their success are investigated: political characteristics (political colour and political strength, the strength of relevant interest groups) and two institutional characteristics – committee structure and budgeting procedures. The analyses are based on panel data from up to 434 Norwegian municipalities in the period from 1991 to 1998. The results support the hypothesis that strong political leadership improves fiscal performance. The effect of interest groups is to a high degree community-specific. However, an increased share of elderly reduces fiscal surplus. Differences in budgetary procedures do not seem to affect fiscal performance. A strong committee structure seems, on the other hand, to result in better fiscal performance than a weaker one.