Romanticizing bureaucratic leadership? The politics of how elected officials attribute responsibility for performance

A core task for elected officials is to hold bureaucratic leaders responsible, but how do they determine if public managers actually influence outcomes? We propose that partisan and leadership heuristics affect how politicians apply a logic of individualized responsibility, that is, focus on individual bureaucrats rather than situational factors to explain organizational outcomes. We match survey data of local elected officials in Denmark with individual partisan variables and objective performance data about the schools they oversee. We provide evidence that partisan beliefs matter, with conservative elected officials more willing to pursue a logic of individualized responsibility. We also find that elected officials are more likely to assume that bureaucratic leaders determine organizational outcomes where performance is very high or low, a leadership attribution heuristic previously established in private sector studies. We argue that our findings have important implications for contemporary governance, given the growing reliance on performance metrics to assign responsibility.     

Businessman Candidates

Why and when do businessmen run for public office rather than rely upon other means of influence? What are the implications of their participation for public policy? We show formally that “businessman candidacy” and public policy are jointly determined by the institutional environment. When institutions that hold elected officials accountable to voters are strong, businessmen receive little preferential treatment and are disinclined to run for office. When such institutions are weak, businessmen can subvert policy irrespective of whether they hold office, but they may run for office to avoid the cost of lobbying elected officials. Evidence from Russian gubernatorial elections supports the model's predictions. Businessman candidates emerge in regions with low media freedom and government transparency, institutions that raise the cost of reneging on campaign promises. Among regions with weaker institutions, professional politicians crowd out businessmen when the rents from office are especially large.     

Citizens, Representatives, and the Myth of the Decision-Making Divide

In this study, I use a computerized experiment to test whether elected officials differ from everyday citizens in how they use information to make political choices. Ninety state and local level elected officials took part in the study, as did 179 adults from the general population. I tracked participants’ information use as they attempted to solve two hypothetical public policy problems. The data show that while elected officials differ from everyday citizens in their demographics and in the consistency of their political views, these groups did not differ systematically in their depth of information search, their proclivity to compare choice alternatives, or their depth of information processing. These findings held across two different public policy scenarios, controlling for differences in political knowledge, education, and elective experience. In addition to opening a new methodological frontier for the study of political elites, these results accelerate an ongoing debate between Burkeian paternalists and advocates of a more populist democracy.     

The productivity of elected and appointed officials: the case of school superintendents

For over 40 years researchers have attempted to test the relative efficiency of governments run by elected versus appointed officials with conflicting results. The focus of prior research has been the expenditure levels of municipal and county governments. In this paper, we consider the achievement of students in public schools. Using data from Florida??s 67 school districts, we compare academic outcomes of students in districts run by elected and appointed superintendents. To overcome selection bias, we utilize both instrumental variable methods and panel data techniques. We find no consistent differences in the performance of elected and appointed superintendents.     

Understanding Shared Roles in Policy and Administration: An Empirical Study of Council‐Manager Relations

Recent literature in public administration emphasizes enhanced collaboration between elected and administrative officials. The complementarity view is presented as an alternative to the traditional politics–administration dichotomy. At the center of this new perspective lies the concept of shared roles between elected officials and public administrators with respect to policy making and administration. This article expands the emerging literature on role sharing by proposing and testing new variables to understand what enhances the policy‐making role of city managers and the administrative role of elected officials. Employing data collected from a nationwide survey of city managers and utilizing structural equation modeling methodology, this research finds that the council’s expectations and the city manager’s role conception significantly influence the city manager’s involvement in policy making, while the context of policy making, the city manager’s support, and the council’s access to resources affect elected officials’ involvement in administration. This article aims to make a cumulative contribution to the literature on role sharing.     

“It's the Central Government's Fault”: Elected Regional Officials' Use of Blame‐Shifting Rhetoric

This article investigates regional officials' use of blame‐shifting rhetoric in times of heated public criticism of unpopular regional policy decisions. Based on a content coding of nearly 500 political accounts from elected regional officials it is shown that “it's the central government's fault” is the most frequently used excuse when regional officials publicly defend unpopular decisions to cut public health care. The article finds that this excuse is used more by regional leaders (mayors and chairmen of regional boards) than by other elected officials and that partisan competition affects how often this excuse is used.     

Local feminist policy networks in the contemporary American interest group system

The emergence of local feminist policy networks is set within the context of the New Federalism of the Reagan-Bush administrations and the transformation of the U.S. interest group system over the past three decades. A case study of policymaking in a single urban setting focuses on changes in four policy areas of special interest to women: sexual assault, domestic violence, child care, and displaced homemakers. Single-issue feminist policy networks, composed of feminist advocacy groups, women-run services, local elected officials, and urban bureaucrats responsible for delivering, funding or regulating each policy, have formed around these issues. Each is characterized by: responsive policy changes; frequent interactions between local legislators, bureaucrats, and feminists; interlocking directorates; a symbiotic support system; diverse strategies and funding sources; and a federal-type organization. Local feminists have been incorporated in a new group universe embedded within a complex system of intergovernmental grants, contracts, and mandates. These networks help to sustain feminism and its public policy agenda through crises and challenges.     

Fiscal dynamics of local elected officials

The fiscal behavior of local elected officials is examined in a dynamic model where officials maximize an intertemporal objective function in two stages. Officials first decide upon an optimal mix of revenue and expenditure and then minimize loss and adjustment-cost functions. The model is tested using data from the 20 most populated U.S. cities whose mayor was elected on a four-year cycle. The empirical results support the model. Fiscal behavior differs between cities and local fiscal decisions made by elected officials are in part dependent on the timing of elections.     

Trust Matters: Enhancing Government Legitimacy through Participatory Budgeting

Legitimacy is a problem of contemporary governance. Communities lack trust in elected officials—in their effectiveness, fairness, and representation of the public interest. Participatory budgeting (PB)—a set of democratic processes where residents determine how to spend a public budget—helps bridge that distance by letting the public make spending decisions. Since 2011, some of New York City’s (NYC) council members have been implementing PB with their capital budget—setting aside a million dollars in their districts each budget cycle for PB. Participatory budgeting has the potential to rebuild relationships between government and communities. Using data from over eighty interviews conducted by New York University (NYU) graduate students in 2013 and 2014 with PBNYC participants over two years, this article suggests that in council districts using PB, residents have greater feelings of access to and voice in local government, and better understanding of the complexities of spending public monies, often leading to a more positive view of government officials, and bolstering legitimacy of local government.     

Do School Report Cards Produce Accountability Through the Ballot Box?

Public education has been transformed by the widespread adoption of accountability systems that involve the dissemination of school district performance information. Using data from Ohio, we examine if elections serve as one channel through which these accountability systems might lead to improvements in educational quality. We find little evidence that poor performance on widely disseminated state and federal indicators has an impact on school board turnover, the vote share of sitting school board members, or superintendent tenure, suggesting that the dissemination of district performance information puts little (if any) electoral pressure on elected officials to improve student achievement.     

Electoral Institutions and Distributive Policies in Parliamentary Systems: An Application to State Aid Measures in EU Countries

Electoral institutions should systematically affect the propensity of a country to rely and spend on distributive measures. Supporting evidence is however still rare because of the difficulty in finding comparable cross-national data, the employment of dummy variables to account for the electoral systems, and the failure to recognise the interacting effects of different electoral rules on policy outcomes. Employing national data on state aid expenditure and a number of measures across European Union countries, the article provides evidence that legislators elected in higher magnitude districts spend less. More interestingly, it shows the interlocking policy effects of electoral institutions. Where high district magnitude is combined with ballot control, party-based voting and pooling, these rules conjunctly dampen politicians’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote and lead to lower spending on, and use of, distributive measures. Where high district magnitude is not combined with these rules, results are inconclusive. With one exception though, if leaders do not have control over the ballot rank, higher magnitude increases reliance on distributive measures. Results are robust to several alternative political-economy explanations of fiscal policy outcomes.     

The grapes of rent: A history of renting in a country of owners

Abstract

In a recent study of neighborhood development, Goetz and Sidney (1994) found an “ideology of property” separating the interests of homeowners from the interests of lower‐income tenants. According to this ideology, owners are better citizens than renters, and therefore public policy should benefit owners at the expense of renters. In spite of continuing research that shows this allegation to be false, a widespread bias against renters persists. Why is this so?

A deliberate bias favoring property owners and harming renters has been prominent in American public policy from colonial times to the present, although its exact form has varied over time—property requirements for suffrage, land redistribution schemes promising ownership but delivering tenancy and poverty, and tax policies that privilege ownership and punish tenancy. Public policy that stigmatizes renters represents a bias as pernicious as other biases of gender, race, religion, and nationality.     

Rejecting representation? Party systems and popular support for referendums in Europe

Under what conditions do citizens favor deciding political issues by popular vote? Models of support for popular vote processes usually consider the influence of individual attitudes such as political trust and interest in politics. But much less is known about the effect of institutional variables on support for popular vote processes. This article builds on research showing that disaffection with elected officials shapes support for referendums by considering the influence of the party system. First, an analysis of multilevel data from twenty-four European democracies indicates that individuals are more supportive of referendums in countries with fewer effective political parties. Second, a mediation analysis provides evidence that the number of parties influences referendum support through individual-level political trust and external efficacy. Where there are fewer viable parties, feelings that elected officials are unresponsive tend to increase popular support for referendums. These findings suggest a trade-off between available representation by political parties and support for direct influence over public policy.     

THE INFLUENCE OF BLACKS IN STATE AND LOCAL FAIR HOUSING POLICY-MAKING

The influence of black officials and organizations on public policy varies among political settings. Factors responsible for this variation include the relatively limited political resources still available to blacks, the size of the black population in a location, the representation of blacks in elective office, the control of political gate keepers, and prevailing ideology. The ability of blacks to influence fair housing policy is further predicated upon the level of government addressed. Black individuals and organizations were in- strumental in gaining agenda status for the passage of federal fair housing legislation in the 1960s. Experiences in Cleveland and Ohio reveal a less prominent role for blacks in state and local fair housing policy. Two major factors peculiar to this topic, inattention of traditional civil rights groups and diminished public support for civil rights policies, combine with repre- sentational issues to require a broader coalition for support of these policies. The lead in advocacy has been assumed by black/liberal white coalitions that promote managed residential integration contrary to the preferences of black-dominated interests that prefer equality of housing opportunity regardless of racial impact. The latter group, lacking the politi- cal resources of the former, usually reacts to policy rather than initiating policy. Black elected officials, who play a pivotal role in responding to the demand-protests of their constituents, may be hampered or helped by the political resources available in state and local settings. The theory of politi- cal incorporation helps to explain the incremental gains of blacks as com- pared to long-term policy responsiveness in state and local policy-making.     

Reversing delegation? Politicization,de-delegation,and non-majoritarian institutions

Elected governments and states have delegated extensive powers to non-majoritarian institutions (NMIs) such as independent central banks and regulatory agencies, courts, and international trade and investment organizations, which have become central actors in governance. But, far from having resolved the balance between political control and governing competence or removed certain issues from political debate, NMIs have faced challenges to their legitimacy by elected officials and sometimes attempts to reverse delegation through “de-delegation”. Our special issue studies the politicization of NMIs, and then whether, why and how it leads to de-delegation through reducing the formal powers of NMIs or increasing controls over them. In this article, we examine how to analyze de-delegation, how politicization of NMIs has developed, and how it has affected de-delegation. We underline not only institutional rules that constrain elected officials but also the actions of NMIs themselves and their relationships with other NMIs as part of multi-level governance systems. We find that politicization has varied, but even when strong, elected officials have not introduced widespread and long-lasting de-delegation; on the contrary, they have frequently widened the powers of NMIs. Insofar as elected politicians have sought to curb NMIs, they have often preferred to use existing controls and non-compliance. Finally, we consider the wider implications of the combination of politicization and lack of de-delegation for broader issues of governance such as the division of powers between the elected and unelected and democratic accountability.     

Politics and Administration in Council-Manager Government: Differences between Newly Elected and Senior Council Members

This study examines the different attitudes of newly elected officials and senior incumbents on variables that are considered to be the building blocks of the relationship between local elected officials and professional civil service staff: council respect for the city's professional staff; a clear understanding of the roles of council and the staff; and the governing body's commitment towards working as a group and toward consensus. Governing body members who have served for eight or more years show greater respect for staff, have greater role understanding, and value teamwork among their colleagues more than their newly elected counterparts. While there are differences, the attitudes of long-term officials appear to change little while in office. They enter office with the building blocks of their own success. These findings are based on a cross-sectional and modest longitudinal survey research design, supplemented by in-depth interviews.     

Learning how to be efficient property owners and accountable governments: the case of Kyrgyzstan's cities

As a result of government decentralization and property devolution from central to local governments, many city governments in transition countries became the largest real property owners in urban areas. For transitional countries lacking sufficient democratic traditions, efficient asset management represents a dramatic and multifaceted challenge. Kyrgyzstan happened to be among the first transitional countries where cities obtained systematic technical assistance in adapting the most advanced methodology of municipal asset management, which was recently developed under the auspices of the World Bank. Based on experience of work within five pilot cities, the article summarizes factors and methods that help develop a sense of strong ownership and internalization of new asset management vision and approaches among local officials and elected members of city councils. The article presents the experience of how the government of Uzgen, a city of about 40,000 people in South Kyrgyzstan, has changed its attitudes and approach regarding management of municipal property. The article demonstrates how two key processes—improving professional aspects of municipal asset management and developing local democracy though public involvement—have been reinforced by each other. One of the main lessons from Uzgen's experience is that municipal property asset management—because it deals with tangible issues—is a perfect focal point for developing local democracy and communication between a local population and its government. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Community Commitment in Special Districts

ABSTRACT

Special districts now constitute about 42% of all U.S. jurisdictions, yet little is known about them. Some critics are concerned that special districts and their staffs have insufficient community commitment. This study, based on a national survey of senior managers in large special districts, examines activities and programs of special district managers that foster community building and engagement, including correlates of these. Study results reveal that special districts are committed to their communities and several strategies and conditions are associated with increased community commitment, such as jobs that focus on community interactions, service type, and ethics management, as well as, to a lesser extent, graduate degree qualifications and charters that specify the role of managers in promoting the public interest and in relation to the board.