老挝2003年形势与2004年展望

2003年 ,老挝政治社会形势相对稳定 ;经济低速增长但低于预期目标 ,经济领域存在的突出问题及困难仍较多 ;对外继续奉行“和平、合作、友谊”的外交路线 ,争取国际经济援助与合作取得一定成效。一、政治2003年5月 ,老党和国会分别召开了七届六中全会和五届三次会议。六中全会的主要议题是研究加强思想政治工作并对中央和省级部分高层人事的分工和职务作了调整。国会五届三次会议则对老挝2003年度头6个月的经济形势进行了总结并提出后6个月的工作措施。同年9月和10月 ,老党七届七中全会和国会五届四次会议相继举行 ,分别审议并通过了《2002～…     

政局基本稳定 外交注重睦邻 经济有所增长——老挝2001年形势及2002年前瞻

2001年,老挝政治社会形势基本保持稳定;老党召开了"七大",为老挝在新世纪头15年制定了"分三步走"的战略目标,高层人事有重大调整;继续开展以争取国际合作和经济援助为主要目的的政治外交与经济外交;经济较上年有不同程度的增长.     

老挝人民革命党对社会主义的新探索

老挝人民革命党是以马克思主义理论武装起来的党,自1955年3月22日建党以来,成为老挝唯一的政党和执政党。迄今为止,老挝人民革命党团结和带领老挝人民沿着老挝特色社会主义道路不断前进,走过了62年的光辉历程,取得了举世瞩目的辉煌成就,推动老挝由"陆锁国"向"陆联国"转型。老挝人民革命党始终代表老挝工人阶级和各族人民利益,在长期反对殖民统治和帝国主义侵略的革命斗争与社会主义建设和革新开放实践中,形成了具有自身特点的一系列路线、方针、政策。2016年1月召开的老挝人民革命党第十次全国代表大会和4月召开的老挝第八届国会第一次会议取得的一系列成果,标志着老挝人民革命党对社会主义的新探索。     

谁澄清了“一大”召开的准确日期

早在延安时期,毛泽东就曾说过,他是1921年农历五月廿九日(公历6月29日)从长沙启程,于7月4日到达上海。董必武也回忆说:“1921年7月,在上海召开党的第一次代表大会。”但俩人对开会的具体日期已记不清了。一份来自共产国际的档案则说得更明白:“代表大会预定6月20日召开,但各地代表直到7月23日才全部到达上海,于是代表大会开幕了。”7月23日代表到齐,是否就在当日开幕?“一大”召开的日期,一时竟成了一个难解之谜。部队党史研究专家,解放军后勤学院的邵维正教授从20世纪六十年代开始研究,终于在改革开放之初解开了此谜。1978年底,邵维正参加…     

老挝2004年形势与2005年前瞻

2004年的老挝政局相对稳定 ;经济缓慢增长略高于预期 ;外交活跃 ,作为东盟轮席主席国并首次承办第十次东盟首脑峰会获得成功 ,其在东盟内部的地位与作用有所提升。展望2005年 ,老挝政局将保持平稳 ,但不稳定因素增多 ;经济社会将持续发展 ,但面临严峻挑战 ;外交趋于主动并在东盟组织内扮演重要角色。一、政治2004年5月和9月 ,老党分别召开了七届八中、九中全会。八中全会提出了本年度政治工作奋斗目标。九中全会在确定“2005年老挝经济社会发展方针及奋斗目标”的同时 ,还对老党“八大”筹备工作作了安排。年内对部分党政领导人职务作了微调…     

中国华侨文学艺术家协会第四次会员代表大会在京召开

~~中国华侨文学艺术家协会第四次会员代表大会在京召开@本刊记者~~     

老挝 政府采取措施发展经济

近年未，老挝政府采取积极措施，克服１９９７年亚洲金融危机带来的种种困难，使经济步入复苏轨道，今年的经济增长率可望达到６％。 人口只有５００多万的老挝，是一个内陆小国，国内国际交通都不便利，对外贸易绝大部分在过境地区进行。由于遭受数十年的战争破坏，老挝经济基础至今还比较落后，属于不发达国家。 １９８６年老挝党第四次代表大会提出：实行革新开放政策后，国家经济形势发生迅速变化。１９９７年亚洲金融危机爆发前，老挝经济年平均增长率达７％至９％。但金融危机给老挝经济带来了破坏性的冲击，导致老挝货币大幅贬值，物…     

近访白金明

在辽宁省书法家协会第五次会员代表大会上，辽宁省财政厅机关党委专职副书记白金明高票当选为辽宁省书法家协会副主席。记者列他的专访，是从他的当选感受聊起的。     

老挝经济建设十年成果统计资料

1986年11月召开的老党四大,对建国十年来经济建设成就作了总结,列举了一些具体数字。在此之前,为庆祝建因十周年。老挝《人民报》亦曾陆续刊登了统计部门公布的统计资料和各部、委撰写的综合报道,宣传十年成就。尽管这些资料很不完整,亦不一定很准确,但尚能在一定程度上反映老挝经济和社会的发展情况。现将这些资料加以整理供参考。     

增强做好侨联工作的紧迫感和使命感

1993年12月8日至13日,全国侨联在北京召开了四届六次常委会和四届五次全委会。这次会议的主要任务是为今年第二季度召开的全国侨联第五届代表大会做准备、庄炎林主席首先讲话。陈彬藩副主席传达了中央统战工作会议精神,陈兰通副主席就起草第五次代表大     

新世纪俄罗斯与中东欧国家关系探析

苏东剧变后，俄罗斯与中东欧国家之间的关系先一度紧张，后有所改善。此后，中东欧国家先后加入了北约和欧盟。在此过程中和过程结束后，俄罗斯与中东欧国家之间在一定程度上仍然相互敌视，它们之间依然存在着一些矛盾，但是，如较少考虑外部因素的影响，仅从相互关系现实的各个方面来看，双方的关系正不断地加强。这既体现出俄罗斯外交越来越务实的特点，也折射出俄罗斯对外交战略层次的考虑。     

苏联初期印度支那干部的培训工作

苏维埃政权初期 ,为了适应列宁急欲发动世界社会主义革命的全球战略需要 ,根据共产国际的决议 ,在莫斯科成立两所高等学校 :莫斯科东方大学(全称为东方劳动人民共产主义大学)和列宁国际学校 ,专门招收和培养亚洲和苏联本国亚洲部分世居民族干部 ,旨在服务于世界革命和本国无产阶级专政。东方大学成立于1921年 ,针对亚洲各国学员设置两种培训方式 :短期班和全日制班 ,学制分别为1～1.5年和3～4年。校方按学员的国别、民族及地区进行分班 ,有中国班、印度支那班、汉特·曼西班、布里雅特·蒙古班、雅库特班、楚科奇班及伊杰里门班等等。列宁国…     

Lost in Transition: The Liberal International Order in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus

Abstract

While espoused by the newly independent states after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the liberal order has not taken root in interstate relations and is now openly contested in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. However, the challenges presented (primarily by Russia) to the international order also trigger growing contestation, in several Eastern European and South Caucasus countries, of an existing regional order premised on Russian hegemony. Therefore, the picture that emerges from these multiple contestations is not an alternative regional order, but rather overlapping orders in a fragmented region.     

Central Asia’s pipeline politics and India’s energy quest

Asia Europe Journal - Although Central Asia emerged out of the ashes of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, yet the ‘Five Stans’ (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan...     

Identity and democracy in the Baltics

The purpose of this essay is to consider the probable impact of issues related to ethnic and cultural identity on democratization in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Particular attention will be given to the demographic make‐up of the Baltic states, which are home to a high percentage of Slavs (mostly Russians but also Belarusians, Poles, and Ukrainians), and to those factors which affect how these Slavs and the majority Baits: (1) identify themselves; and (2) identify with the new states in which they find themselves. The key question is the degree to which civic democracy can prosper in a newly emerging multi‐ethnic state. The answer is important not only for the Baltic states but also for the other new multinational states that have emerged from the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe in the past few years.     

United States Responses to the Soviet Suppression of Rebellions in the German Democratic Republic,Hungary, and Czechoslovakia

Under Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson, the United States refrained from intervening during the three major Cold War crises in the Soviet bloc in 1953, 1956, and 1968. The uprisings in the German Democratic Republic and Hungary came at a contentious stage of the Cold War. In 1968 East–West relations were again groping towards détente and, the Czechoslovak Communist Party unleashed an ambitious reform agenda under Alexander Dub?ek. On 20 August, a massive military invasion by Warsaw Pact forces squashed the reform spirit. All three challenges to Soviet control on the periphery of its Cold War empire followed power struggles in the Kremlin and intimations of a slackening of the reigns of control in Moscow. Eastern Europe was terra incognita for most Americans, and the United States had never pursued an active policy in Eastern Europe. All three crisis scenarios were overshadowed by crises in other parts of the world—part of larger arcs of crises the superpowers were confronting simultaneously. The three crises also coincided, domestically, with intense presidential election politics. Washington ultimately respected the Yalta arrangements and tolerated the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Next to grudging respect for the Yalta outcomes, the ultimate spectre of mutual destruction in a nuclear war “compelled” the superpowers towards co-existence and, ultimately, in 1989, the satellite states had to liberate themselves.     

Refugee movements in the post-Cold War era

"This article briefly describes the scope and dimensions of contemporary refugee movements by analyzing some of the forces which shape these flows. Democratization, problems of nationality and minority rights, and structural, political, economic, environmental and social changes in the post-Cold War world (especially in large parts of the developing world and in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union), are likely to result in growing numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons in the years ahead. Refugees and asylum seekers are increasingly regarded not only as a major humanitarian challenge but as a political problem and a threat to the national security of Western states. Refugee policy involves much more than defining or adjudicating claims for asylum, safe haven and refugee status for those who seek to enter or stay in the West. It is now apparent that an effective response to these issues will have to involve major Western foreign policy and international actions." (SUMMARY IN ENG)     

Difficult Europeans: NATO and Tactical/Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War

This analysis examines NATO’s tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Cold War both for their perceived deterrent value against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and as potential war fighting weapons. Within this debate lay questions related to extended deterrence, security guarantees, regional or theatre conflict, and escalatory potential. A central tenet that emerged in Europe was that nuclear weapons needed emplacement on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members to make deterrence more tangible. It raised huge questions of consultation. Once the Soviet Union had intercontinental missiles, the credibility of American readiness to use nuclear weapons in defence of its allies came into question. European alternatives and different consultation mechanisms to facilitate nuclear use became central to intra-NATO relations. Actively debated across NATO, they directly concerned above all the United States, Britain, and France—the nuclear weapons states in the NATO area—and West Germany, the potential main battleground in a Warsaw Pact invasion. Although dormant in NATO since the end of the Cold War, these issues will likely see revisiting in both Europe and other regional trouble spots.     

试析抗战后期苏联因素的影响

战略反攻阶段,苏联因素在国共两党的关系中作用日益增强,究其原因,主要有以下几个方面:苏联国际地位提高,在重大国际事务处理上举足轻重,这是苏联因素再度受到重视的最主要因素;蒋介石集团出于战略考量,主动改善与苏联的关系;美国的推动,也是促使苏联在中国政局再度受到关注的因素之一;就中国共产党而言,为抗衡英美对国民党的支持,中国共产党有必要保持同苏联的友好关系,这也是苏联作用增强的因素之一。在错综复杂的国际关系中,联合一切可以联合的力量,利用一切积极因素,有利于推进革命事业的发展,同时,在处理国内党派之争时应最大限度地避免外部消极因素的介入;处理国家间关系时,要时刻以国家利益为重,不应以意识形态和党派之间矛盾为重,这是历史给予我们的昭示。     

“Only the USSR Has… Clean Hands”: The Soviet Perspective on the Failure of Collective Security and the Collapse of Czechoslovakia, 1934–1938 (Part 2)

The second part of this two part essay focuses on the Czechoslovak crisis in 1938, based on papers from the Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii in Moscow and the recently published journals of Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan M. Maiskii. The essay is also grounded in British, French, and Romanian archives, and the standard document collections, including the American and German series. The Soviet Union did all that it could do, given Anglo-French abdication, to help the Czechoslovak goverment defend its independance against Nazi Germany. The British and French portrayed a manipulative Soviet Union, seeking to abandon treaty commitments to Czechoslovakia, while at the same time they fled from obligations to Prague and projected their own evasions onto Moscow. In spite of everything, the Czechoslovak president, Edvard Bene?, might have held the fate of his country in his own hands. Would he do “something crazy”, would Czechoslovakia fight alone at the outset, hoping that public opinion would force France and Great Britain into war? Tragically, Bene? would not bid va banque and indeed was complicit in the Anglo-French abandonment of his country. By its reckoning, the Soviet Union escaped the crisis with “clean hands”, though a clear conscience was no consolation in Moscow, where the government had to contemplate the ruin of collective security and its own isolation in Europe.