The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy

When dealing with terrorism as a threat to liberal democracy, it is a common assumption that it is the terrorists — who by definition refuse the rules of the liberal democratic "game"— who pose the greatest threat to the underlying principles and freedoms that are enshrined in this form of political life. However, in instances where the state fails to ensure that its response to terrorism is limited, well-defined and controlled, it is likely that institutionalised counter-terrorist policies will pose an even greater threat to the political and civil traditions that are central to the liberal democratic way of life. This paper demonstrates the potential danger by examining three cases when counter-terrorist policies initiated by (supposedly) liberal democratic entities came dangerously close to transplanting subversive terror from "below" with institutionalised, bureaucratised terror from "above": the "strategy of tension" initiated in Italy between 1969 and 1974; the Spanish "dirty war" against ETA between 1983 and 1987; and the abandonment of democratic rule in Peru between 1992 and 1996. The paper concludes that ultimately the effectiveness of the liberal democratic state's response to terrorism depends on its acceptability. It is therefore paramount that any solution which is initiated is made with due regard to the long term impact that it will have on the wider process of liberal democratic life.     

La représentation politique dans les doctrines et dans les institutions au XVIIIème et au XIXème siècles en Europe et aux Etats‐Unis: Une recherche en cours

SUMMARY

In this article Cristiana Senigaglia seeks to elucidate Hegel's conception of the coup d'état. This is necessary because Hegel did not systematically expound his view in this writings, notably it is not treated in his central work, Die Philosophie des Rechts. But a consistent view can be found in his historical and philosophical writings. The article suggests that Hegel did consider there were circumstances in which a use of force to change an existing political order, or lack of it, were justified. He cited the political chaos in early modern Italy, or the constitutional instabilities in France in his own time as examples where the forces of history justified illegal and forceful interventions, be they from above or below, or the intervention of the decisive historical individual, a Caesar or a Bonaparte. To be justified, in Hegel's view, such irregular actions must be consistent with the contemporary underlying forces driving the historical process: they must have the effect of creating a new, acceptable legal order to replace that which is overthrown; and in consequence must result in a new normalization. In order to be justified, and thus to succeed in the long term, the exceptional situation created by the coup must be temporary and limited. Hegel saw Robespierre and Bonaparte as examples where a justified coup was initiated, but then the will of the initiators became an obstacle to a new normalization.     

Us strategy in the middle east and the 2004 presidential election 9/11: towards a redefinition of america's role in the world

September 11th dramatically changed the geopolitical landscape for the United States. Though President Bush was elected as a domestic policy president, the war against radical Islam has become the central theme of his presidency. In this war, adhering to the analyses of the neoconservatives, the President believes that the region's tyrannies are a breeding ground for Islamic extremism. Overthrowing Saddam Hussein's tyranny and replacing it with a more democratic regime is the start of a long process of liberalization of the Arab world that will have reverberations for years to come. Though Senator John Kerry has based his 2004 presidential campaign on criticizing President Bush's Iraq policy, if Kerry were elected president, his Iraq policies would actually differ little from those of Bush.     

Willard Straight, The First World War, and "Internationalism of all Sorts": The Inconsistencies of An American Liberal Interventionist

Willard D. Straight was a banker-diplomat and one of the most prominent early twentieth-century advocates of a greater international role for the USA. From the beginning of the war he argued the Mahanist line that American security depended upon the British fleet and in its own interest the United States should therefore intervene. At the same time he perceived the war as offering a golden opportunity for American bankers and businessmen to make international commercial gains at the expense of Britain. In 1915 this outlook led him to leave the insistently pro-Allied banking firm of J. P. Morgan & Company for the National City-affiliated American International Corporation, which was consciously designed to expand American overseas investments. Throughout the war Straight, who died in late November 1918, consistently argued that an Anglo-American alliance must be the essential foundation of any postwar international order — a position also taken by Theodore Roosevelt — but Straight also demonstrated significant and growing suspicion of and hostility to Great Britain. The numerous inconsistencies in his thinking seem to have sprung from the fact that, rather than being a well thought-out position, his internationalism arose primarily from an indiscriminating psychological need to have his country play a great but poorly defined role on the world stage.     

The British Parliament and ministerial responsibility c. 1740–60*

This article deals with certain matters concerning the issue of the political accountability of ministers to parliament during the last twenty years of the reign of King George II. It emphasizes the fact that there was no constitutional convention during this period that would have allowed parliament or the House of Commons alone to force the dismissal or resignation of ministers (as the ultimate sanction of political accountability). At that time, the king was the real master of his ministers. On the other hand, and as a matter of fact, only those ministers who could best manage the king's business in parliament were kept in office by the king. These propositions are demonstrated by examining the practice of the various administrations between 1740–60. It was also especially important for the leading ministers, such as Robert Walpole, Henry Pelham, the Duke of Newcastle and William Pitt to secure both the favour of the king and the confidence of parliament to remain in office. The Pitt-Newcastle administration (from 1757) additionally confirmed the general principle in times of war that administrations can only have firm parliamentary majorities to hold onto power as long as they would lead a war successfully.     

"Real Solemn History" and its Discontents: Australian Political History and the Challenge of Social History

The relationship between Australian political and social history has received little historiographical attention. Political history has been lauded or, more often, dismissed as traditional historical practice, while from the 1960s social history took its place as a catch-all phrase for various "new" histories concerned with everyday life. This article examines the place of political and social history in the nascent Australian academic historical profession of the 1950s to the early 1970s, and then explores the impact of the new social history on academic political history. It will suggest that while there was only limited exchange before the late 1980s, in the last twenty years social history has contributed modestly to a reconstituted understanding of political history as part of lived experience.
"[…] I can read poetry and plays, and things of that sort, and do not dislike travels. But history, real solemn history, I cannot be interested in. Can you?"
"Yes, I am fond of history."
"I wish I were too. I read it a little as a duty, but it tells me nothing that does not either vex or weary me. The quarrels of popes and kings, with wars or pestilences, in every page; the men all so good for nothing, and hardly any women at all — it is very tiresome: and yet I often think it odd that it should be so dull, for a great deal of it must be invention […]". ¹     

Who needed the October 1973 war?

Scholars and pundits believe that Anwar Sadat went to war in October 1973 because Israel left him no choice. The Israeli government rejected his peace proposals during 1971–73, and Sadat initiated the war in order to demonstrate his refusal to agree to the status quo and to the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the territories it occupied in June 1967. However, when the peace treaty signed between Israel and Egypt in March 1979 is carefully studied, it appears the terms of the treaty were in fact much closer to the Israeli position and terms as presented before the 1973 war than to those set by Sadat. Careful reading of the relevant documents in general and Sadat's claims and arguments in particular will show that it was actually Sadat who needed the war, and he needed it not in order to force Israel into a political process, but for himself, so as to accept terms he could not accept without a war.     

Les États—Unis d'Italie: la solution fédérative du problème national chez les démocrates du Risorgimento

SUMMARY

In this article Franco Bozzi discusses the case made by the supporters of Italian Risortgimento, who advocated a federal structure for the new Italian national state. Because in the course of events, Cavour's model of a unitary state under the House of Savoy was adopted, it is often overlooked that coherent arguments were advanced, to the effect that the whole historical-political tradition of political life in Italy had been federalist, built around the tradition of the autonomous City Commune. Thinkers such as Carlo Cattaneo, Enrico Cemuschi and outsiders, including Proudhon, suggested that a federal structure for the new state would be in line with the political tradition of Italy and would attract a much higher level of popular support and consent, whereas a unitary structure would have to be enforced from above on a reluctant people. In the light of their thinking, the unification after 1860 could be seen, and has been interpreted, as a potential popular revolution that failed or was stifled by Cavour and the centralizers.     

Laos: the forgotten war

Abstract

In June 1968, Jacques Decornoy, reporting for Le Monde, was permitted entry into the Pathet Lao zones of eastern Laos. Decornoy's account of his experiences there, although already two years old, remains a classic statement on the horrors of the “forgotten war,” and one of the most insightful presentations of the political program of the Pathet Lao. With Mr. Decornoy's permission, we are reprinting his articles which appeared in Le Monde on July 3 through 7-8, 1968.—C.F.     

Enemy of the State: A Conversation with Ilan Pappé

Israeli academic Ilan Pappé first came to prominence in the 1980s as a member of Israel's "New Historian" movement, which chronicled the war crimes and ethnic cleansing against the Palestinians in the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948. Dr. Pappe teaches political science at Haifa University and is the academic director of the Research Institute for Peace at Givat Haviva. He is currently writing a second edition of his most recent book , A History of Modern Palestine, One Land, Two Peoples (2004). The following interview was conducted by Don Atapattu, a free-lance writer in London .     

Syngman rhee: The pawn as rook the struggle to end the Korean war

Abstract

A quarter century ago, in 1951–53, while trying to end the Korean war, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations struggled to keep Syngman Rhee, the president of the Republic of Korea [ROK] , from undermining the negotiations, wrecking the armistice, endangering the United Nations forces, and extending the war. Often it was unclear whether or not he would abide by the armistice and whether or not he would leave the ROK troops under the UN Command, or imperil the UN forces by withdrawing his own. General Mark Clark, the American and United Nations commander in the last year of war, aptly summarized the problems, “I found myself engaged in a two-front diplomatic battle ... with the ... Communists and with ... Rhee [, and] the biggest trouble came from Rhee.” As Rhee's price for acceding to the armistice of July 27, 1953, he secured from the Eisenhower administration generous economic aid, continued military assistance, and a mutual defense treaty, which has endured to the present. Before the armistice, however, military and political leaders in both administrations seriously considered toppling Rhee and installing a more tractable government.     

The Reforming State, the Concerned Public and Indigenous Political Actors

Strangely, two recent critical political histories of Indigenous affairs — by Gunstone and by Short — reproduce a structure of perception that resembles the characteristic structure of 1950s perception: a sense of outrage at the helplessness of Indigenous Australians in the face of overbearing colonial pressure, eclipsing the narrative presence of the Indigenous political agent. By returning to the work of those political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists who observed the political reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, I suggest that a richer conception of Indigenous and non-Indigenous agency is both possible and necessary. There are three interlocking topics in the writing of Indigenous political history: the changing quality of non-Indigenous engagement; the Indigenous leadership and its historical formation; the differentiated institutional response of the state. The political history of Indigenous Australians should not be reduced to a narrative of the settler colonial state's persistently limited concessions to the Indigenous grievance — important though that theme may be.     

Biting the Fishhook

Abstract

For a long time after his abdication from the throne in 1955 and his subsequent rise to power as Chief of State, Norodom Sihanouk's main problem in governing Cambodia was how to deflect political breezes from the sails of the internal leftist-Communist opposition. In the last year and a half, that problem changed to one of how to upstage his political rivals on the right. His defeat in the latter enterprise signals the demise of peace in the only Indochinese nation successful in the last fifteen years in preventing war and strife from sweeping across its borders.     

Bin Ali's Tunisia: Democracy by Non-Democratic Means

The article tackles one principal question: Can the current dicing with democracy in Tunisia serve as a harbinger for good governance when it is founded on exclusionary political practices. It argues that Bin Ali's reforms represent yet another phase in the reproduction of hegemonic political practice which is about control not democratic power sharing. The article's analytical agenda is two-fold. Firstly, it will critically assess the nature of Bin Ali's 'electoral democracy'. In so doing, it looks at the tension between political rhetoric and practice. What becomes clear is that 11 years of 'electoralization' and 'parliamentarization' have not put an end to unlawful exclusion, muzzling of free expression, repression and disenfranchizement. Secondly, it will show that Bin Ali's obsession with hegemonic control may already be corroding his regime's legitimacy at home and denting its credibility abroad, especially in France. In this respect, the analysis will attempt to draw general conclusions from three recent crises. Specifically, can they be read as the first cracks in the monolith of singular rule in Tunisia? The article concludes on a negative and a positive note. On the negative side, Bin Ali, as this author believes, is not likely to give up power constitutionally. On the positive side, the April-May 2000 crises have placed his regime in the spotlight at home and abroad and may possibly galvanize civil society into pressuring the regime to reverse its return to a closed society.     

German policy towards the European union: The effects of historical memory

Reflection on the past and its implications shaped German policy towards the European Union during the early 1990s. Helmut Kohl's post‐reunification foreign policy rhetoric reveals two prominent historical themes: that European integration is a ‘question of war and peace’, and that German unity and European unity represent ‘two sides of the same coin’. In the post‐Cold War context, both themes served to orient and legitimate his European policy. They informed Kohl's strong support for the realisation of the Maastricht Treaty. And they were central to his efforts to maintain domestic political support for deeper integration.     

The Price of Nostalgia: Menzies, the "Liberal" Tradition and Australian Foreign Policy

This article surveys some of the key contributions to the secondary literature on Australia's foreign and defence policy during Robert Gordon Menzies' two prime ministerships (1939–41, 1949–66), and seeks to identify Menzies' place in a "Liberal" and Liberal Party tradition through a reading of this work. Via a study of Menzies' imperialism, British race patriotism, nationalism, and attitudes towards Asia and the United States of America, it argues that the prime minister stands in an ambiguous relationship to the transformation that occurred in Australia's international orientation between the 1930s and 1960s. In the 1950s the Australian government's cold war foreign policy, and the political language that Menzies used in private and public to articulate it, were largely successful in balancing the competing claims of Britishness, Australianness and the newly-formed "American Alliance". By the early 1960s, however, his nostalgia for a dissolving imperial order was sufficiently pronounced that it contributed powerfully to a symbolic and rhetorical defeat for his side of politics, allowing Labor to claim the mantle of Australian foreign policy modernity.     

Intellectuals and Political Power in Social Movements: The Parallel Paths of Fadlallah and Hizbullah

This article examines the intellectual impact of Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (1935–2010) on Hizbullah's political behaviour. Many depicted Fadlallah as the ‘spiritual guide’ and ‘oracle’ of Hizbullah, while others accentuated his socio-political independence and the potential he represented as an ‘alternative’ to Hizbullah and Iran. This study argues that Fadlallah directly influenced Hizbullah's political worldviews, but the Islamic movement's socialisation in Lebanon, its dependence on Iran and its war with Israel have led it to pursue a separate path from Fadlallah. But despite the separation, the Ayatollah shared a common world vision with Hizbullah and the Islamic Republic, and would not have formed an alternative. The article is divided into two sections. The first examines the socio-political origins of Fadlallah and Hizbullah as an intellectual and a political movement, respectively, and conceptualises the discursive and political fields that motivate the behaviour of the two actors. The second section assesses the impact of Fadlallah's ideas on Hizbullah by focusing on three main themes: (1) Islamic liberation and resistance against injustice; (2) the Islamic state and Lebanon; and (3) Wilayat al-Faqih and Islamic Iran.     

Franz Josef Strauß ‐ lasting legacy or transitory phenomenon?

Franz Josef Strauβ died in October 1988, exactly two years before German unity. He was undoubtedly one of Germany's most dynamic and controversial post‐war politicians, who aroused very strong emotions in the electorate, ranging from great support to condemnation. During his political career Strauβ had tremendous power and influence. As the tenth anniversay of his death approaches, this article sets out to assess his contribution to both Bavarian and German politics. Did he represent a transitory phenomenon or did he leave behind a lasting legacy?     

‘Haifa is still Burning’: Italian,German and French Air Raids on Palestine during the Second World War

The air raids against civilian and military targets during the Second World War have been a relatively unexplored chapter in Palestine's tumultuous history. This article examines the circumstances that led the air forces of Italy, Germany and Vichy France to launch attacks against Palestine. It surveys the damage these raids caused and assesses their effect on the country's population. The article raises three central arguments: although the attacks caused considerable damage in Haifa and in Tel Aviv, they failed to alter the course of the war in the Middle East; despite the hostility between Arabs and Jews before and after the war, the period of the air raids saw displays of solidarity between the two communities; and the experiences of the Second World War, including the air raids, played a part in the state-building process of the Yishuv (Jewish community).     

At Boiling Point: Like Water for Chocolate and the Boundaries of Mexican Identity

Abstract — This article explores the mechanisms of Mexican identity as they are constructed in Alfonso Arau's film Como agua para chocolate (1991) (Like Water for Chocolate). In re-designing the characters of Laura Esquivel's novel, Arau produces a range of filmic stereotypes drawn from both the Hollywood and the Mexican traditions of film-making. Through the careful manipulation of filmic devices such as editing, framing and close-ups, many of the features of Mexican otherness perpetuated by Hollywood throughout the twentieth century are inscribed. I apply the metaphor of boiling, derived from the film's title, to examine certain key concepts of cinematic 'mexicanness' including the tropes of 'revolution', 'border', 'race' and 'sex'. Crucial to this argument is a consideration of the contemporary political climate in which Like Water for Chocolate was both produced and released. In Mexico, it was released halfway through the sexenio (six-year period of rule) of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari's rule and is clearly one of the most succesful cultural products (and exports) of his government's now infamous rule. In the United States, the climate of anti-immigrant attitudes in 1992 and 1993 and the corresponding political tension provokes new readings of certain stereotypical images of Mexicans and mexicanness. It is the tension that is produced by the collision between these two contexts — cultural, political and ethnic — that forms the principal focus of discussion in this article.