Political budget cycles and media freedom

This paper examines the effects of elections on the conduct of central governments' fiscal policies. To do so, it uses a unique panel database that includes disaggregated spending and revenue series at the central government level for multiple countries over the 1975–2010 period. Examining political environments under which incumbent governments generate political budget cycles (PBCs), and comparing the relative importance of factors influencing cycles, we identify media freedom as the factor that plays the most critical role. This result provides a micro-foundation for rational opportunistic models for PBCs that rely on asymmetry of information about politicians' competence, and also offers a way to relate different conditioning factors of PBCs, including fiscal transparency and the maturity of democracies. Further, we show that the election-year rise in budget deficits under low media freedom is primarily driven by an increase in the current, not capital, component of public expenditure.     

Political budget cycles and election outcomes

This paper addresses two empirical questions. Is fiscal policy affected by upcoming elections? If so, do election-motivated fiscal policies enhance the probability of re-election of the incumbent? Employing data for 65 democratic countries over 1975–2005 in a semi-pooled panel model, we find that in most countries fiscal policy is hardly affected by elections. The countries for which we find a significant political budget cycle are very diverse. They include ‘young’ democracies but also ‘established’ democracies. In countries with a political budget cycle, election-motivated fiscal policies have a significant positive (but fairly small) effect on the electoral support for the political parties in government.     

Political support and tax reforms with an application to Italy

In 2001 the Italian government introduced a personal income tax reform to be implemented in successive phases. In 2004 taxes were reduced to all income levels with higher gains for low-income and high-income individuals than for middle-income ones. A large debate arised. This paper explores the political economy reasons under this tax reform, mainly the attempt of the government to attract the uncertain voters (swing voters). A probabilistic voting model is introduced to capture the importance of swing voters. The model predicts that the average personal income tax rate tends to be lower for groups of lower income, higher preference for leisure and containing more politically mobile voters (swing voters). However, data from Italian polls show that, while the tax reform was a good strategy to attract swing voters, the specific design of the reform, which favored high-income and low-income individuals, but not the middle class, was not the more appropriate strategy.     

Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures

This paper investigates the presence of political budget cycles (PBCs) in the European Union using data from all 27 member states over the period 1997?C2008, and explores their variability across countries and over time. Three basic results emerge: First, incumbent governments across the EU tend to engineer PBCs in order to enhance their re-election prospects. Second, PBCs are much larger and statistically more robust in the Eurozone countries than in the countries that have not yet adopted the euro. Third, the degree to which governments manipulate fiscal policy is negatively correlated with non-economic voting and positively correlated with electoral competitiveness.     

政治文明:提升认识、整合理论及规制发展

政治文明范畴的提出 ,既有重大的理论意义也有重大的实践意义 ,首先 ,它将大大提升我们对政治建设重要性的认识 ,其次 ,它将我们在社会主义建设中取得各种政治认识成果整合成为完整的社会主义政治文明理论 ,最后 ,它将对正在广度和深度两个方面展开的政治发展进行必要的规制 ,使其朝着社会主义政治文明的目标发展     

The political monetary business cycle: Political reality and economic theory

This paper addresses the issue of expectations incorporated into political business cycle models. Rational agents anticipate Democratic efforts to stimulate the economy via monetary policy, discounting money supply from the calculations for determining output variance, so that output under Democrats is wholly unaffected by changes in the money supply. Rational agents appear to be naive about Republicans, incorporating money supply into the calculations for determining output variance, so that output under Republicans is significantly related to money supply.     

Urban government and market reforms in China

Chinese reformers wish through their economic programme to create a new form of developmental state in China and a new relationship between state and economy. This paper examines these issues through a study of the impact of Chinese economic reforms on the structure and behaviour of local government, focusing on urban government at the district level. It looks at three aspects of the issue—the trend towards financial decentralization, institutional changes in district administration and changes in the relationship between local government and the urban economy. It concludes (contrary to arguments which regard bureaucratic response to the reforms as one of pure inertia and obstruction) that urban local government has changed in several major ways, the most obvious being a trend towards institutional expansion and proliferation. From the point of view of the reform process, some institutional changes have been positive, others negative, resulting in a ‘dualistic’ state which contains elements of both old and new forms of developmental state. There is a need for systematic analysis of the specific future needs and evolution of China's urban government which would guide a process of politico-administrative reform comparable to the current economic reform.     

Legislative budget cycles

Recent literature suggests that electoral budget cycles are a phenomenon of new rather than established democracies. What part of the democratization process explains the amelioration of the political budget cycle? We argue the answer lies (in part) in the development of a strong party system. We extend the classic Rogoff-Siebert model to show that political budget cycles are possible in a legislative context with rational voters. We then demonstrate that the development of a strong party system can restrain political budget cycles in a majoritarian electoral system. Finally, we follow prior work in using vote share volatility as a measure of the institutionalization of the party system. Using newly collected vote-share data for 433 elections for 90 democracies from 1980–2007, we calculate a measure of party institutionalization. We then use this data to demonstrate that institutionalized party systems are associated with mitigated political budget cycles, especially in majoritarian electoral systems.     

Recommending a scheme of reason: Political theory,policy science,and democracy

It is the task of policy science, as of political theory generally, to recommend a scheme of reason that will presumably result in better public decisions. This may seem profoundly undemocratic, for in a democracy, should not the people be free to think precisely as they please? Yet all political theory intimates an idea of political reason and unreason. The problem then is which ideal of reason to teach in the name of a policy science of democracy. Herein I compare three common schemes of reason: utilitarian calculation, liberal rationalism, and practical reason. My conclusion is that there is no reason to suppose that the capacity for the more public-spirited forms of deliberation is less widely distributed in the population than calculated self-interest, and that either liberal rationalism or practical reason, or some combination of the two, is more compatible with democracy than utilitarian calculation.     

The inferential opportunity of specificity: theory and empirical causality in American Political Development

Public Choice - The context-specificity of the research field of American Political Development (APD) can make it an especially fertile ground for empirical assessment of causal explanations of...     

Wildavsky on budget reform

A large part of the literature on budgeting in the United States is concerned with reform. The goals of proposed reforms are couched in similar language - economy, efficiency, improvement, or just better budgeting ... However, any effective change in budgetary relationships must necessarily alter the outcomes of the budgetary process. Otherwise, why bother? Far from being a neutral matter of better budgeting, proposed reforms inevitably contain important implications for the political system, that is, the who gets what of governmental decisions (Wildavsky, 1961: p. 186). ... budgeting is a subsystem of politics, not vise versa - because of the current tendency to overload budgeting. As much as I respect the importance of budgeting and the talents of budgeteers, to substitute budgeting for governing will not work (Wildavsky, 1992b: p. 439).     

The electoral budget cycle

This article begins with a review of the now substantial literature on the thesis that polticians manipulate governmental outputs so as to favor their chances of reelection. It concludes that while this “electoral cycle” thesis was initially overstated by its proponents, it retains more plausibility than recent critics have allowed. This conclusion is then demonstrated through an analysis of expenditures by the ten provincial governments in Canada between 1951 and 1984.     

A better budget rule

Debt limits, interest coverage ratios, one‐off balanced budget requirements, pay‐as‐you‐go rules, and tax and expenditure limits are among the most important fiscal rules for constraining intertemporal transfers. There is considerable evidence that the least costly and most effective of such rules are those that focus directly on the rate of spending growth, even with their seemingly ad hoc nature and possibilities for circumvention. In this paper, we use optimal control theory and martingale methods to justify a transparent, nonarbitrary rule governing maximum sustainable rate of spending growth, treating the revenue structure of a jurisdiction as a given continuous‐time stochastic process. Our results can be used to determine whether a proposed rate of spending growth is sustainable or not. © 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management