The Trade Union Movement and the European Union: Judgment Day

Abstract: The trade union movement faces a challenge to the legality of transnational collective action as violating economic freedoms in the EC Treaty. How are disparities in wages and working conditions among the Member States to be accommodated? Are national social models protected? Does the internal market allow for trade union collective action? How does EU law affect the balance of economic power in a transnational economy? What is the role of courts in resolving economic conflicts? This article analyses the responses to these questions as referred to the European Court of Justice by the English Court of Appeal and offers some conclusions. The purpose is to highlight the different positions adopted by the old Member States and the new accession Member States as regards the underlying substantive issues, and the options available to the Court of Justice in answering the questions posed.     

The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty

Abstract:  One of the core constitutional questions for national constitutional courts in the EU in the past decades has been whether to accept the claim made by the Court of Justice that EU law is the supreme law of the land, taking primacy even over conflicting national constitutional provisions. With the inclusion in the recently adopted Constitutional Treaty of a clause explicitly confirming the 'primacy of EU Law' appearances suggest that the EU is about to establish a characteristic of mature, vertically integrated, federal states such as the USA. This article argues that this view is mistaken. It develops a comprehensive jurisprudential framework for addressing constitutional conflicts, 'Constitutionalism Beyond the State' (CBC). CBS detaches the discussion of supremacy and constitutional conflict from a statist framework; provides a jurisprudential account that explains and justifies the highly differentiated, context-sensitive and dynamic set of conflict rules that national courts have in the past adopted; and provides the lacking theoretical basis for the more attractive, but undertheorised sui generis accounts of European constitutional practice that have recently gained ground in the literature. CBS provides a jurisprudentially grounded reconstructive account of why the issue of constitutional conflict is as rich and complicated in Europe as it is and why it is likely to remain so even if the Constitutional Treaty is ratified. The article then goes on to make concrete proposals addressed to national constitutional courts and the Court of Juctise respectively about how, in application of the developed approach, constitutional conflicts ought to be addressed doctrinally. It includes a proposal to read the new 'constitutional identity' clause as authorising Member States as a matter of EU Law to set aside EU Law on constitutional grounds under certain circumstances.     

The federalism dimension of proportionality

EU Treaties contain an arsenal of purpose-defined and ambiguous competences that are enjoyed by EU institutions, yet devote little attention to the restraining impact of EU competences on Member States' autonomy and policies. While the focus has traditionally been on subsidiarity to deal with competence issues, the judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Weiss revitalises the discussion on the potential of proportionality to guide competence issues. This inquiry seeks to highlight both the existing traces of competence proportionality employed by the Court to allocate competences as well as the potential of the proportionality standard to temper the spillovers on Member States' autonomy accruing from the exercise of EU competences. While the Treaty restricts proportionality to reviewing the use (not existence) of EU competences, the Court has implicitly employed proportionality considerations to verify the existence of EU competences. In addition, drawing from established case law, competence proportionality assessments could rely on an effect-based substantive review in combination with procedural duties allowing a meaningful balancing of national autonomy against the dynamics of deeper integration.     

‘The referring court asks,in essence’: Is reformulation of preliminary questions by the Court of Justice a decision writing fixture or a decision‐making approach?

The Court of Justice can rephrase or otherwise depart from the questions referred to it by national courts under Article 267 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. It does so routinely: a practice known as reformulation. Legal literature often argues that reformulation is used to clarify national court questions and bring them within the scope of European Union law. The aim of the present article is to explore this claim systematically. To this end, it compiles a unique dataset consisting of the Orders for Reference, in which the referring courts embed the preliminary questions, and the judgments, in which the Court of Justice communicates the answers. The findings suggest that reformulation is a decision‐making approach rather than a fixture of decision writing. It's main function is to neutralize conflicts and Europeanise disputes. It underlines the Court's power to shape the preliminary ruling procedure and its outcomes.     

Variations in Member States’ Preliminary References to the Court of Justice—Are Structural Factors (Part of) the Explanation?

The preliminary reference procedure in Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which enables national courts to request the Court of Justice to provide a ruling on the interpretation or validity of an EU legal act, is widely considered to be the jewel in the crown of EU law. When considering the number of references from different Member States, it will become immediately apparent that there are considerable variations. This article examines to what extent these variations may be explained by three structural factors, namely (1) population size, (2) willingness to litigate and (3) Member State compliance with EU law. It is concluded that some—but not all—of the variations in number of references from Member State judiciaries may be attributed to structural factors rather than being merely a reflection of different Member State courts’ willingness to make use of Article 267 TFEU on such references (the so‐called behavioural factors).     

Social Insurance Monopolies in Community Competition Law and the Italian Constitution: 'Practical' Convergences and 'Theoretical' Conflicts

An Italian judge, following earlier suggestions of the national antitrust Authority, has referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC Treaty two questions on the interpretation of Articles 81 and 86 of the EC Treaty. With those questions, raised in an action brought by a self‐employee against the Istituto Nazionale per l'Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro (INAIL) concerning the actor's refusal to pay for social insurance contributions, the Tribunale di Vicenza has in summary asked the Court of Justice whether the public entity concerned, managing a general scheme for the social insurance of accidents at work and professional diseases, can be qualified as an enterprise under Article 81 EC Treaty and, if so, whether its dominant position can be considered in contrast with EC competition rules. This article takes this preliminary reference as a starting point to consider in more general terms the complex constitutional issues raised by what Ge´rard Lyon‐Caen has evocatively called the progressive ‘infiltration’ of EC competition rules into the national systems of labour and social security law. The analysis is particularly focused on the significant risks of ‘constitutional collision’, between the ‘solidaristic’ principles enshrined in the Italian constitution and the fundamental market freedoms protected by the EC competition rules, which are implied by the questions raised in the preliminary reference. It considers first the evolution of ECJ case law—from Poucet and Pistre to Albany International BV—about the limits Member States have in granting exclusive rights to social security institutions under EC competition rules. It then considers specularly, from the Italian constitutional law perspective, the most recent case law of the Italian Constitutional Court on the same issues. The ‘contextual’ reading of the ECJ's and the Italian Constitutional Court's case law with specific regard to the case referred to by the Tribunale di Vicenza leads to the conclusion that there will probably be a ‘practical convergence’in casu between the ‘European’ and the ‘national’ approach. Following the arguments put forward by the Court of Justice in Albany, the INAIL should not be considered as an enterprise, in line also with a recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court. And even when it was to be qualified as an enterprise, the INAIL should in any case be able to escape the ‘accuse’ of abuse of dominant position and be allowed to retain its exclusive rights, pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty. This ‘practical convergence’in casu does not, however, remove the latent ‘theoretical conflict’ between the two approaches and the risk of ‘constitutional collision’ that it implies. A risk of a ‘conflict’ of that kind could be obviously detrimental for the European integration process. The Italian Constitutional Court claims for herself the control over the fundamental principles of the national constitutional order, assigning them the role of ‘counter‐limits’ to the supremacy of European law and to European integration. At the same time, and more generally, the pervasive spill over of the EC market and competition law virtually into every area of national regulation runs the risk of undermining the social and democratic values enshrined in the national labour law traditions without compensating the potential de‐regulatory effects through measures of positive integration at the supranational level. This also may contribute to undermine and threaten, in the long run, the (already weak) democratic legitimacy of the European integration process. The search for a more suitable and less elusive and unilateral balance between social rights and economic freedoms at the supranational level should therefore become one of the most relevant tasks of what Joseph Weiler has called the ‘European neo‐constitutionalism’. In this perspective, the article, always looking at the specific questions referred to the Court of Justice by the Tribunale di Vicenza, deals with the issue of the ‘rebalance’ between social rights and economic and market freedoms along three distinct but connected lines of reasoning. The first has to do with the need of a more open and respectful dialogue between the ECJ and the national constitutional courts. The second is linked to the ongoing discussion about the ‘constitutionalization’ of the fundamental social rights at the EC level. The third finally considers the same issues from the specific point of view of the division of competences between the European Community and the Member States in the area of social (protection) policies.     

Principle of Proportionality as Principle of Economic Efficiency

The principle of proportionality is at the cornerstone of EU law, and precisely of the case‐law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In the law and economics literature, the general principles of law are commonly opposed to legal rules in terms of efficiency. On the one hand, the legal formalistic approach consists of apprehending the law as principled, whereby principles of law do not and should not encompass an efficiency rationale and should be self‐sufficient. On the other hand, the legal nihilism denying the existence or relevance of the general principles of law favours legal rules that are said to incorporate an efficiency rationale. I intend to analyse the efficiency rationale of probably the most important general principles of EU law—the proportionality principle. In this paper, I shall assert that not only does the EU proportionality principle encapsulate an efficiency rationale, but most importantly, it has been interpreted by the ECJ as such—hence, I propose the representation of the principle of proportionality as a principle of economic efficiency. After having introduced the principle of proportionality (1), I shall decipher the proportionality principle both from a law and economics perspective, and from a comparative perspective (2). Then, I shall delve into the jurisprudence of the ECJ so that the judicial reasoning of the Court as this reasoning proves the relevance of the proposed representation (3). Finally, I conclude in light of the findings of this paper (4).     

Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain: Labour and Social Welfare Law in the Context of EU Market Integration

European economic integration with a minimalist social policy at EU level was in part made possible by strong domestic labour market and social welfare institutions. The main contention of this paper is that EU market liberalisation was embedded within institutions of social citizenship at domestic level, which served to counter the liberalisation of the internal market. But this settlement has been put under strain. In addition to the challenges posed to the sustainability of European welfare states by the global economic crisis, the internal market jurisprudence of the Court of Justice casts doubt on the sustainability of the ‘embedded liberal bargain’. This paper focuses on the role of the Court, in particular in its jurisprudence on the interaction between (EU) market freedoms and (national) labour law, which undermines the ability of states to retain their regulatory autonomy over labour or social welfare law and, arguably, speeds up the unravelling of the ‘embedded liberal bargain’.     

How Bureaucracies Listen to Courts: Bureaucratized Calculations and European Law

The European Court of Justice, and courts in general, were key actors in the creation of the European Union (EU). However, they cannot change major policy without political supporters to lobby and litigate for implementation. We argue that part of the resolution of this apparent paradox comes from complementing existing work on the activities of EU courts and litigants with a focus on a third actor: implementing bureaucracies, whose effect on law and politics has not been a focus of studies of EU legal development. Their calculations about whether to pay attention, lobby, and comply shape the impact of the law. Those calculations are variable and patterned; when and how bureaucracies listen to courts varies in predictable ways. We find evidence for this proposition in the case of EU health care services law, both in the secondary literature and in empirical studies of France and Spain.     

Effet utile and the (re)organisation of national judiciaries: A not so unique institutional response to a uniquely important challenge?

The current repurposing of the principle of effet utile of European Union law can be found in the revolutionary steps taken by the Court of Justice in its application of Article 19 TEU. The implicit goal of this recent body of case-law is to equip national judges with the tools to resist domestic judicial reforms that affect their freedom to adjudicate independently. Considering Simmenthal to Unibet, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses to the latest case-law relating to the organisation of national judiciaries, this article contends that, while the case-law on judicial independence is unprecedented, the Court of Justice has gone to great lengths to ensure that the developments in EU law precipitated by its rulings are grounded in established doctrine. They follow a line of case-law that builds on the principle of primacy of EU law and the obligation to guarantee the effectiveness of EU law in the domestic legal order. Further, the current trajectory is for Article 19 TEU to form the operational basis of review of any judicially minded reforms, whether they be organisational (Article 19 TEU, together with Article 47 CFREU), limit actually or potentially the freedom for dialogue between national courts and the Court of Justice (Article 19 TEU together with Article 267 TFEU and Article 47 CFREU) or where they reduce the protection of the value of the rule of law (Article 19 TEU, Article 2 TEU, Article 49 TEU and Article 47 CFREU), with potential implications for the effective application in EU law of the principle of mutual trust.     

From vocational training to education: the development of a no‐frontiers education policy for Europe?

This article focuses on developments towards an EU educational policy. Education was not included as one of the Community competencies in the Treaty of Rome. The first half of the article analyses the way that the European Court of Justice and the Commission of the European Communities between them managed to develop a series of substantial Community programmes out of Article 128 on vocational training. The second half of the article discusses educational developments in the community following the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty of Amsterdam. Whilst the legal competence of the community now includes education, the author's argument is that the inclusion of an educational competence will not result in further developments to mirror those in the years before the Treaty on European Union. If the 1980s were a decade of expansion, the medium‐term future is likely to be one of consolidation.     

Bridging the Widening Gap between the EU Treaties and the Agreement on the European Economic Area

For almost 20 years now, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) States Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway have been included in the EU's internal market through the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA). The continuing success of the EEA is threatened, however, by an ever widening gap between EU primary law and the still unchanged main part of the EEA Agreement. Unwilling to begin the strenuous work of updating the Agreement, the Contracting Parties place their trust in the ability of the courts to bridge the gap. While it is shown in this article that both the EFTA Court and the Court of Justice of the EU are indeed willing to go far in order to preserve homogeneity between EU law and EEA law, it is argued that there are limits to the courts' ability to remedy the failed updating of the Agreement.     

The Evolving Judicial Politics of European Integration: The European Court of Justice and national courts revisited

This article analyzes how the judicial politics sparked by the European Union's (EU) legal development have evolved over time. Existing studies have traced how lower national courts began cooperating with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to apply EU law because this empowered them to challenge government policies and the decisions of their domestic judicial superiors. We argue that the institutional dynamics identified by this ‘judicial empowerment thesis’ proved self‐eroding over time, incentivizing domestic high courts to reassert control over national judicial hierarchies and to influence the development EU law in ways that were also encouraged by the ECJ. We support our argument by combining an analysis of a dataset of cases referred to the ECJ with comparative case study and interview evidence. We conclude that while these evolving judicial politics signal the institutional maturation of the EU legal order, they also risk weakening the decentralized enforcement of European law.     

Of Values and Legitimacy – Discourse Analytical Insights on the Copyright Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) increasingly faces societal value‐conflicts in EU law disputes. For example, in EU copyright law, in the digital age, diverse fundamental values, as well as cultural and societal developments, are at stake. This article discusses the role of the CJEU in the European value discourse, using copyright law as a case study. The methodological approach used, critical discourse analysis, is seldom applied in jurisprudential studies, but is well suited for teasing out value‐related aspects of case law. Exploratory research of seminal copyright cases suggests that the CJEU's discourse of the various values seems unnecessarily one‐sided and shallow. A lack of discursiveness in the jurisprudence would diminish the legitimacy of the Court's decisions, and would not offer adequate guidance to national courts or private decision‐makers, to whom the Court at the same time may be leaving more of the task of value reconciliation.     

The Last Bite of the BITs—Supremacy of EU Law versus Investment Treaty Arbitration

According to Article 267 TFEU, national courts of the EU Member States can (and sometimes must) ask for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice on the interpretation and application of Community law, including international treaties and recommendations, and on the validity of Community secondary legislation. In this way, it is ensured that EU citizens are treated equally throughout the Union. However, this is not applicable when it comes to arbitral proceedings, be they commercial or investment arbitrations. The Court does not accept references for preliminary rulings from arbitral tribunals. For this reason, respondent states in international arbitral proceedings have argued that arbitration and EU law are utterly incompatible. In their submissions as respondents in arbitral proceedings, EU Member States have argued that, as a result of EU accession, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have been automatically terminated. In subsidiary, they sometimes claim that, due to their incompatibility with EU law, BITs cannot apply. But if BITs are not applicable anymore, there are few remedies left for investors within the EU.     

The Impact of Supreme Court Activity on the Judicial Agenda

When the Supreme Court takes action, it establishes national policy within an issue area. A traditional, legal view holds that the decisions of the Court settle questions of law and thereby close the door on future litigation, reducing the need for future attention to that issue. Alternatively, an emerging interest group perspective suggests the Court, in deciding cases, provides signals that encourage additional attention to particular issues. I examine these competing perspectives of what happens in the federal courts after Supreme Court decisions. My results indicate that while Supreme Court decisions generally settle areas of law in terms of overall litigation rates, they also introduce new information that leads to increases in the attention of judges and interest groups to those particular issues.     

欧共体法中的相称性原则

相称性原则是欧共体法中的一项一般法律原则。其适用范围不仅包括共同体措施 ,而且包括成员国国内措施 ;不仅适用于行政行为 ,也适用于立法行为。适当性、必需性和最小限制性是相称性原则的三个构成要素。相称性原则与从属原则既有密切联系 ,也有本质区别。就其功能而言 ,相称性原则是欧共体法院司法审查的基础 ,是支配共同体行使权能的原则 ,是建立内部市场的指导原则     

Game of courts: A tale of principles and institutions

The ontological, terminological and conceptual confusion that surrounds the concept of ‘general principles of European Union law’ is far from being resolved. The constitutional interlocutors—the Court of Justice of the European Union and the highest courts in Member States—have at times fiercely argued about their different understanding of general principles, whereas European legal scholarship has failed to convincingly clarify the intricacies surrounding this source of law. Instead of engaging with a more abstract, theoretical question of what general principles are, this paper reflects on the practical, functionalist question: how are they used by the Court of Justice and what are some of their functions and implications? To do so, it enquires into contextual, institutional and strategic features of the Court's behaviour and jurisprudence and responses of the highest national judiciaries to this jurisprudence. The aim is to offer an alternative account of the Court's jurisprudence on general principles.     

EC Competition Policy: Is the Role of the Substantial Part of the Common Market in Determining Jurisdictional Subsidiarity Redundant?

The importance of the principle of subsidiarity lies in its role in drawing the demarcation line between EU and member state responsibility for policy formulation and implementation. In theory, the application of the principle of subsidiarity appears relatively straightforward based on the scale and effects of the action in question. The reality is somewhat more complex, at least in respect of two competition policy instruments—Article 102 EC and the ECMR. At the heart of this complexity is the little understood notion of a substantial part of the common market which, relative to competing jurisdictional subsidiarity tests, can fail to assign cases to the appropriate jurisdiction. This leads to the conclusion that the substantial part test is superfluous as the affects trade criterion and the distinct markets test perform the allocative role more effectively in relation to Article 102 and the ECMR respectively.     

The highest Dutch courts and the preliminary ruling procedure: Critically obedient interlocutors of the Court of Justice

Little is known about the motives of national courts to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) or their satisfaction with and implementation of answers. This article aims to fill this empirical gap on the basis of an analysis of judgments complemented with interviews with judges of the highest courts in the Netherlands. This article shows that judges extensively use the procedure and follow its outcome almost without exception, despite some dissatisfaction. This discontent has surprisingly not affected the courts' willingness to refer in future. The findings also downplay the bureaucratic politics and judicial empowerment theses emphasising strategic motives to refer. Instead, legal‐formalist considerations and the desire to contribute to the development of EU law explain most of the references of the Dutch Supreme Court. The decision (not) to refer of the three highest administrative courts is primarily based on practical and pragmatic considerations.