Richard Musgrave,public finance,and public choice

Review Article

Richard Musgrave, public finance, and public choice     

Reapplying behavioral symmetry: public choice and choice architecture

Public Choice - New justifications for government intervention based on behavioral psychology rely on a behavioral asymmetry between expert policymakers and market participants. Public choice...     

State capacity and public choice: a critical survey

Public Choice - ‘State capacity’ is a term associated with a popular argument in fiscal sociology, history, and political economy regarding the role of the state in the process of...     

Procyclical government spending: a public choice analysis

Procyclical government spending occurs when government expenditures increase at a faster rate than income in an economic upturn but fall at a faster rate in a recession. Voracity effects occur when competition for increased spending proves more effective as national income increases. Public choice theory can be applied to describe the distribution of fiscal power across different tiers of government to shed insight into competition for intergovernmental transfers. Politicians have electoral incentives to press for intergovernmental transfers but they also have electoral incentives to signal their ability to manage the economy. With this mix of incentives, the prediction is that intergovernmental transfers will be procyclical and that sub-central government spending will be more procyclical than central government spending. Public choice analysis of pressure for increased public spending predicts a specific pattern of cyclical government spending. This pattern can be observed when analyzing government expenditures in 20 OECD countries between 1995 and 2006.     

Rational choice theory,public policy and the liberal state

Liberalism requires a high order of responsible behaviour from its citizens in order to be sustainable. Yet when the modern liberal state makes policy, it is the stereotyped economic man, driven by self-interest and influenced only by carrots and sticks, who occupies center stage. This regulatory approach to public policy can be shown theoretically to give rise to a paradox — the greater the need for regulation, the less likely, because of compliance problems, it is to succeed. It is contended that an alternative approach which explicitly focuses on a broader behavioral understanding of citizens' attitudes and motivations provides a rationale for the use of a much wider range of policy instruments than does the regulatory framework, and is also more in keeping with those values necessary to the sustainability of the liberal state.     

Agent-based modeling, public choice, and the legacy of Gordon Tullock

The future of modeling in public choice may be glimpsed by examining its evolution in economics. For problems that are influenced by heterogeneity of actors, social networks, or emergence—the arising of a complex system from simple phenomena, such as Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”—economists increasingly are turning to agent-based modeling. Agent-based modeling is a form of computational analysis that focuses on agents rather than on aggregates. In his long career as a founding scholar of public choice, Gordon Tullock repeatedly followed the agent-oriented approach of methodological individualism. Many of Tullock’s models are thus highly amenable to further exploration using that method. As agent-based modeling becomes more and more popular, the importance of Tullock’s work will continue to grow.     

Behavioral economics and public choice: introduction to a special issue

We provide an introduction to a special issue on behavioral economics and public choice.

     

The comparative endurance and efficiency of religion: a public choice perspective

Public Choice - All of the major religious confessions existing today have outlasted every single secular ruling regime known in human history. That observation poses an interesting puzzle for...     

Toward a public choice theory of monopoly regulation

This paper benefited from valuable comments when presented at the Sixth Annual Conference of the Rutgers University Advanced Workshop in Public Utility Economics and Regulation at Bolton Landing, New York in May 1987.     

On the efficiency of law: A public choice perspective

The authors thank Robert Higgs, Charles Rowley, and Gordon Tullock for helpful comments on an earlier draft. They also thank participants at the Law and Economics Session of the Public Choice Society's 1989 annual meetings for constructive suggestions.