Candidate valence in a spatial model with entry

This paper studies electoral competition between two purely office-motivated and heterogeneous (in terms of valence) established candidates when the entry of a lesser-valence third candidate is anticipated. In this model, when the valence asymmetries among candidates are not very large, an essentially unique equilibrium always exists and it is such that: (a) the two established candidates employ pure strategies, (b) the high-valence established candidate offers a more moderate platform than the low-valence established candidate, (c) the entrant locates between the two established candidates and nearer to the established high-valence candidate and, surprisingly, (d) both established candidates receive equal vote-shares.     

A model of candidate location with endogenous valence

This work gives a theoretical explanation for the increase in campaign spending and party polarization in U.S. politics. I assume that the effectiveness of persuasive advertising, and of costly valence campaigning in general, positively depends on the share of nonpartisan voters. A decline in the number of partisan voters in a constituency results in greater campaign spending by the candidates. If the voters are risk-averse, the candidates who maximize their expected office rents minus the cost of campaigning will choose divergent policy platforms strategically in order to reduce the costs of subsequent campaign spending. The degree of policy divergence positively depends on the share of nonpartisan voters for a broad class of voter disutility and candidate cost of valence functions.     

Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the spatial model with valence: existence and characterization

Public Choice - Pure-strategy Nash equilibria almost never exist in spatial majority voting games when the number of positional dimensions is at least two, as the majority core is typically empty...     

Opposition backlash and platform convergence in a spatial voting model with campaign contributions

This paper investigates the effects of campaign contributions on candidate behavior in elections. The particular focus is on how candidates choose their platforms when they know that the positions they take will influence the level of campaign contributions that they (and their opponents) receive from concerned interest groups. The analysis is carried out in the context of a simple one- dimensional spatial voting model with two candidates and two interest groups. Since the earliest Hotelling-Downs formulations, a central issue in the literature on spatial voting has been the degree to which, under various sets of assumptions, the candidates' platforms converge in equilibrium. This paper extends that literature by examining how the introduction of interest groups making campaign contributions affects the degree of platform convergence. The paper shows that when choosing their platforms, candidates face a trade-off between generataing increased support from opponents and provoking a backlash from the opposition. An example is developed to illustrate a surprising result that can occur because of the backlash effect: the introduction of two extremist interest groups may lead the candidates to moderate their platforms, resulting in a greater degree of platform convergence than would be observed in the absence of any campaign contributions.     

Nash equilibrium strategies in directional models of two- candidate spatial competition

The standard approach to two-party political competition in a multi-dimensional issue space models voters as voting for the alternative that is located closest to their own most preferred location. Another approach to understanding voter choice is based on preferred direction of change with respect to some specified neutral point (e.g., an origin or status quo point). For the two-dimensional Matthews directional model (Matthews, 1979), we provide geometric conditions in terms of the number of medians through the neutral point for there to be a Condorcet (undominated) direction. In this two-dimensional setting, the set of residual locations for which no Condorcet directions exist is identical to the null dual set (Schofield, 1978) and to the heart (Schofield, 1993). In two dimensions, for most locations of the origin/status quo point, a Condorcet direction exists and points toward the yolk, a geometric construct first identified by McKelvey (1986). We also provide some simulation results on the size of the null dual set in two dimensions when the underlying distribution of points is non-symmetric.     

A spatial model of legislative voting with perceptual error

This paper presents a unidimensional spatial model of voting in which members of Congress vote based on an imprecise perception of roll-call alternatives. The model is applied to the Senate roll-call votes of 1977 to estimate the ideal points of the senators, and to examine the role of a liberal-conservative dimension in describing votes on economic issues relative to social issues. In light of the spatial model, the paper argues that “standard” models of roll-call voting are not based on a theory of choice, and hence, that it is difficult to interpret their results. Alternatives to standard models, based on the spatial model, are developed and are used to analyze the role of ideology in deciding a specific economic issue: coal strip-mining.     

A spatial analysis of candidate competition in dual member districts: The 1989 Chilean senatorial elections

This study uses empirical spatial theory to evaluate candidate and voter behavior in senate elections contested during the 1989 Chilean general election. The study evaluates whether senatorial candidates competing in dual member districts under Chilean d'Hondt locate near the periphery or interior of the electoral space. Spatial analyses demonstrate the Chilean senatorial electoral system is characterized by centrifugal forces. In particular, candidates of the right locate on the periphery of the space and face few incentives to pursue moderate electoral strategies. The study also characterizes bases of party and candidate support and the underlying dimensions of political competition. Spatial analysis reveals both change and continuity in the pre- and post-authoritarian electoral universes.     

A simulation model of Mexican internal migration flows: empirical application of a spatial interaction model

"In this paper spatial interaction theory is challenged in order to test if it is suitable to support the design and construction of an operative model of the Mexican internal migration flows. The main conceptual and operative aspects of the model are presented, the design and model building process is explained, the results of the calibration analysis are examined and a simulation exercise of migration policy evaluation is undertaken. The operative migration model presented in this paper seems useful to analyze and evaluate numerous migration policies, which suggest that spatial interaction theory offers a promising conceptual and operative foundation to analyze internal migration flows in Mexico." (EXCERPT)     

A test of the predictive dimensions model in spatial voting theory

We model correlated voter-candidate issue data within the framework of the Enelow-Hinich spatial model of predictive dimensions. The empirical consequences of this model of the issue data are surprising and allow for an indirect test of the Enelow-Hinich spatial model. The central prediction of the correlated data model we construct, which depends critically on the underlying spatial model, is tested with issue data from the 1980 NES pre-election interview. The test results are highly supportive of the model's predictions. We conclude both that the spatial model of predictive dimensions is empirically supported and that candidate spatial locations estimated by the model are not an artifact of correlated voter-candidate issue data.     

An analysis of the neighborhood impacts of a mortgage assistance program: A spatial hedonic model

Down payment or closing cost assistance is an effective program in addressing the wealth constraints of low‐and moderate‐income homebuyers. However, the spillover effect of such programs on the neighborhood is unknown. This paper estimates the impact of the City of Dallas Mortgage Assistance Program (MAP) on nearby home values using a hedonic model of home sales from 1990 to 2006. We define neighborhoods of 1,000 feet around each sale and estimate the average differences in sales prices between neighborhoods with various numbers of MAP properties before and after their appearance. We find that MAP properties tend to locate in neighborhoods with lower property values; however, unless a concentration of MAP properties forms, the infusion of MAP properties has little detrimental impact on neighboring property values. Moreover, low concentration of MAP properties has a modest positive impact on surrounding property values. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

A covariance structure model for the analysis of spatial differences in Mexican mortality

"This article examines some of the possible determinants of spatial mortality differentials in Mexico, on the basis of [a] path analytical model with latent variables." (SUMMARY IN ENG)     

Frequency of monotonicity failure under Instant Runoff Voting: estimates based on a spatial model of elections

It has long been recognized that Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) suffers from a defect known as nonmonotonicity, wherein increasing support for a candidate among a subset of voters may adversely affect that candidate’s election outcome. The expected frequency of this type of behavior, however, remains an open and important question, and limited access to detailed election data makes it difficult to resolve empirically. In this paper, we develop a spatial model of voting behavior to approach the question theoretically. We conclude that monotonicity failures in three-candidate IRV elections may be much more prevalent than widely presumed (results suggest a lower bound estimate of 15 % for competitive elections). In light of these results, those seeking to implement a fairer multi-candidate election system should be wary of adopting IRV.     

Equal Employment Policy in France: Symbolic Support and a Mixed Record

This article analyzes the policy framework for and the implementation of equal employment policy in France. After presenting the equal employment policy framework and the role of state feminist women's policy offices in its development, the author discusses the limited support for positive action strategies among French firms and unions. The implementation of equal employment policy has had a mixed record, often limited to symbolic gestures rather than concrete change. Contributing to this symbolic dynamic are the effects of reconciliation policy and the impact of the development of part‐time work on women employment. The analysis argues that reconciliation policy has not for its part always privileged an egalitarian set of measures that facilitates the sharing of family and domestic work between men and women. The article asserts that the development of part‐time work has contradicted equal employment policy efforts and has effectively contributed to maintaining women's positions in low‐paying and marginal jobs. The article concludes that despite an apparently comprehensive policy framework for equal employment policy in France, the situation of women workers appears to be followin two tracks: a top‐tier track of qualified, relatively well‐paid women who are able to have a career and to reconcile family and work, and a lower‐tier track of less‐skilled, lower‐paid women workers who continue to be marginalized on the labor market.     

Slavery: a dual-equilibrium model with some historical examples

What sustains slavery, and why at critical junctures—the fall of the Roman Empire, the early modern expansion of plantation agriculture, the later phases of the industrial revolution, the totalitarian regimes of the 1930s—has it often expanded or contracted so rapidly? Why have elites sometimes been united, but sometimes violently divided, over the choice between free and servile labor? Why has slavery usually been ended by legal prohibition rather than voluntary abandonment? An extremely simple dual-equilibrium picture can illuminate how, when, and with whose support slavery is introduced or abolished. Internal divisions over slavery are likely to be most intense as a society approaches either of these “tipping points.” The most striking example, explored fleetingly here, is the US Civil War.     

Dimension manipulation and choice strategy in US-China relations: a spatial game-theoretical analysis

Political and economic relations between the United States and China are viewed as two games in a two-dimensional evaluation space of decision making: a deadlock game along the political dimension and a prisoners’ dilemma game along the economic dimension. Based on a spatial game framework, this study shows that dimension manipulations and different choice strategies across these two evaluation dimensions will result in different game equilibria. Specifically,dimension combination anduniform strategy would keep U.S.-China relations in the status quo, anddimension differentiation ordiverse strategy would benefit both sides. Two policy suggestions are derived from this analysis. First, both sides should de-link political and economic dimensions and separately evaluate political and economic relations along these two distinct dimensions. Second, both sides should follow diverse strategy if political and economic relations have to be simultaneously evaluated in the two-dimensional policy making space.     

Regression without a model

Frequently in public policy analysis, researchers and decisionmakers confront the problems of building, testing, and interpreting a regression equation. This paper examines these general problems in the context of the efficiency of secondary schools in Karachi, Pakistan. It displays some of the tools of exploratory data analysis in constructing a regression model in the absence of a convincing, a priori specification. A simple and useful technique is presented for testing, after numerous statistical explorations, the model one has constructed. Finally, the paper takes seriously the differences between the policymaker's questions and the statistician's, providing some guidelines of general relevance for the interpretation of regression-based studies of public policy.