Trust Your Compatriots, but Count Your Change: The Roles of Trust, Mistrust and Distrust in Democracy

Although trust is clearly central to human relations of all kinds, it is less clear whether there is a role for trust in democratic politics. In this article, I argue that trust is central to democratic institutions as well as to democratic political participation, and that arguments which make distrust the central element of democracy fail. First, I argue for the centrality of trust to the democratic process. The voluntary compliance that is central to democracies relies on trust, along two dimensions: citizens must trust their legislators to have the national interest in mind and citizens must trust each other to abide by democratically established laws. Second, I refute arguments that place distrust at the centre of democratic institutions. I argue, instead, that citizens must be vigilant with respect to their legislators and fellow citizens; that is, they must be willing to ensure that the institutions are working fairly and that people continue to abide by shared regulations. This vigilance – which is reflected both in a set of institutions as well as an active citizenry – is motivated by an attitude termed 'mistrust'. Mistrust is a cautious attitude that propels citizens to maintain a watchful eye on the political and social happenings within their communities. Moreover, mistrust depends on trust: we trust fellow citizens to monitor for abuses of our own rights and privileges just as we monitor for abuses of their rights and privileges. Finally, I argue that distrust is inimical to democracy. We are, consequently, right to worry about widespread reports of trust's decline. Just as distrust is harmful to human relations of all kinds, and just as trust is central to positive human relations of all kinds, so is distrust inimical to democracy and trust central to its flourishing.     

Norms and Human Rights in International Relations

The three volumes on human rights reviewed here constitute the first wave of in-depth case studies of human rights from a constructivist approach in international relations. By acknowledging the theoretical contributions of these works, identifying their shortcomings and engaging in critiques of the authors' conceptions of identity and norms, this article provides direction for future studies on human rights through the constructivist framework.
Foot, R. (2000) Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle Over Human Rights in China . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Risse, T., Ropp, S. C. and Sikkink, K. (eds) (1999) The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thomas, D. C. (2001) The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism . Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.     

Modeling Dependencies in International Relations Networks

Michael D. Ward Department of Political Science, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195 e-mail: isere{at}msn.com Despite the desire to focus on the interconnected nature ofpolitics and economics at the global scale, most empirical studiesin the field of international relations assume not only thatthe major actors are sovereign, but also that their relationshipsare portrayed in data that are modeled as independent phenomena.In contrast, this article illustrates the use of linear andbilinear random–effects models to represent statisticaldependencies that often characterize dyadic data such as internationalrelations. In particular, we show how to estimate models fordyadic data that simultaneously take into account: (a) regressorvariables, (b) correlation of actions having the same actor,(c) correlation of actions having the same target, (d) correlationof actions between a pair of actors (i.e., reciprocity of actions),and (e) third-order dependencies, such as transitivity, clustering,and balance. We apply this new approach to the political relationsamong a wide range of political actors in Central Asia overthe period 1989–1999, illustrating the presence and strengthof second- and third-order statistical dependencies in thesedata.     

Intelligence,International Relations and 'Under-theorisation'

This article submits that the conceptual framework within which intelligence is studied must continue to evolve and adapt to the new conditions of the early twenty-first century. As more intelligence and intelligence related material than ever before enters the public domain, scholars of international relations must take greater account study of the role of intelligence. Despite its obvious importance to the course of the Cold War, for example, most accounts of the Cold War tend to ignore or downplay the importance of signals intelligence in particular. Intelligence, moreover, is all but absent in most contemporary international relations theory. The essay argues that intelligence should be placed closer to the centre of new interpretations of both the course of the Cold War and of the political dynamics of authoritarian states.     

Gramsci, Machiavelli and International Relations

The paper begins by expressing some doubts about how Gramsci has been appropriated by the so-called 'Italian School' of International Relations/International Political Economy (IR/IPE). Particularly questionable is the attempt to 'internationalise' his concepts of 'civil society' and 'hegemony', whose respective meanings are sometimes extended beyond Gramscian usage. Also dubious is the tendency to assume that his conceptual framework supports a counter-discourse within IR/IPE that contradicts the 'realist' mainstream. In his political ideas, Gramsci was as much a child of Machiavelli as of Marx, and he praised the Florentine for developing a progressive or 'transformative' realism in opposition to the conventional type of realism that seeks only to 'manage' the status quo. This interpretation of Gramsci as a kind of realist is defended by highlighting three 'Machiavellian' aspects of his thought: (a) his contempt for abstract ideals of justice or democracy, (b) his hostility to 'vague and purely ideological' (his words) internationalism; and (c) his surprising (for a supposed Marxist) doubts about the prospects for a non-coercive and egalitarian society. In conclusion, it is pointed out that Gramsci helps us to illustrate a tension at the heart of Marxism: that between utopianism and realism. Because of his admiration for Machiavelli, he eventually betrayed second thoughts about Marx's vision of a world without borders or conflict. His idea of transformative realism, rather than his concept of hegemony, should perhaps be seen as his chief contribution to IR/IPE.     

International Relations and the Methodological Turn

Confusion has arisen in the debate between the advocates of classical and behavioural modes of analysis because epistemological and methodological issues are conflated in the debate. A distinction between logic-in-use and reconstructed logic disentangles these issues and demonstrates that the division between the classical and behavioural approaches cannot be sustained on methodological or epistemological grounds. History and social science cannot be distinguished in terms of either epistemology or methodology but only by the kind of research questions asked. This argument is reinforced by examining the methodological and epistemological posture adopted by Waltz. It is an illusion to imagine that theoretical debates in international relations will be resolved by methodological or epistemological fiat.     

International Trust and Public Opinion About World Affairs

This study argues that citizens base their opinions about world affairs in part on generalized beliefs about how much their nation can trust other nations. Using original data from a two-wave panel survey and a cross-sectional survey, we show that Americans hold stable, internally consistent, and largely pessimistic generalized beliefs about whether the United States can trust other nations. We find that social trust, political trust, partisanship, and age influence this form of trust, which we call international trust. We then demonstrate that international trust shapes whether Americans prefer internationalism to isolationism, perceive specific foreign nations as unfriendly and threatening, and favor military action against Iraq. The role of international trust in shaping opinion may be consistent with theories of low-information rationality, but competing interpretations are also plausible.