Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Why do lower courts treat Supreme Court precedents favorably or unfavorably? To address this question, we formulate a theoretical framework based on current principal‐agent models of the judiciary. We use the framework to structure an empirical analysis of a random sample of 500 Supreme Court cases, yielding over 10,000 subsequent treatments in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. When the contemporary Supreme Court is ideologically estranged from the enacting Supreme Court, lower courts treat precedent much more harshly. Controlling for the ideological distance between the enacting and contemporary Supreme Courts, the preferences of the contemporary lower court itself are unrelated to its behavior. Hence, hierarchical control appears strong and effective. At the same time, however, a lower court's previous treatments of precedent strongly influence its later treatments. The results have important implications for understanding legal change and suggest new directions for judicial principal‐agency theory.     

Change over Tenure: Voting, Variance, and Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Existing scholarship on the voting behavior of U.S. Courts of Appeals judges finds that their decisions are best understood as a function of law, policy preferences, and factors relating to the institutional context of the circuit court. What previous studies have failed to consider, however, is that the ability to predict circuit judge decisions can vary in substantively important ways and that judges, in different stages of their careers, may behave distinctively. This article develops a theoretical framework which conceptualizes career stage to account for variability in voting by circuit judges and tests hypotheses by modeling the error variance in a vote choice model. The findings indicate that judges are more predictable in their voting during their early and late career stages. Case characteristics and institutional features of the circuit also affect voting consistency.     

Taking It to the Next Level: The Elevation of District Court Judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals

We address an important aspect of judicial careers: the elevation of judges from the U.S. District Courts to the Courts of Appeals. We argue that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of informational cues and signals regarding the nature of the judge and the judge's compatibility with presidential preferences. We also expect norms involving the intersection between geography and Senate politics to affect a judge's elevation chances. Using data on district court judges appointed between 1946 and 1995, we find that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of the judge's ideological compatibility with the president, the judge's previous ABA rating, and Senate norms involving state "ownership" of appeals court seats. Blunt indicators of policy preferences trump direct signals when presidents decide whom to elevate, leaving judges little control over their career prospects and thus less incentive to slant their decisions in the direction of the president's preferences.     

The Etiology of the Occurrence of En Banc Review in the U.S. Court of Appeals

The U.S. Courts of Appeals, working principally through three-judge panels, constitute important final arbiters of the meaning of the federal constitution, laws, and regulations and, hence, significant policymakers within the federal system. En banc rehearing—reconsideration of the decision of a three-judge panel by the full complement of judges appointed to the circuit—is an institutional device that ensures circuit decisions are in line with the established preferences of the circuit. The use of en banc varies in frequency across circuits and within circuits over time. Drawing on legal, attitudinal, and strategic perspectives of judicial behavior, we develop and test a set of integrated expectations regarding the causes of this variation. Our analysis finds support for the operation of all three models and suggests that the influence of ideology on the use of en banc in the recent era is not unique but part of a long-standing pattern .     

Strategic Voting in a U.S. Senate Election

Due to the strength of its two-party system, the opportunity for voters to strategically defect in favor of third party or independent candidates is rare in high profile American elections. Indeed, it has been almost a century since a third party candidate finished better than one of the major party presidential nominees—in 1912 Bull Moose Progressive Teddy Roosevelt finished ahead of Republican William H. Taft. In this study we examine strategic voting in a U.S. Senate election where the independent candidate also finished above one of the major party nominees. In the 2010 Florida Senate contest the sitting Governor Charlie Crist shed his Republican label in order to compete in the general election since he was certain to lose in the GOP primary to Marco Rubio, the eventual winner. Crist finished second by taking a substantial share of votes away from the third place candidate, Democrat Kendrick Meek. Because this type of contest seldom occurs, in American politics there is scant empirical research on strategic voting under these conditions. We employ an unobtrusive survey of a large sample of registered Floridians in order to assess the likelihood of strategic voting among respondents who preferred the Democrat Kendrick Meek. For voters who sincerely preferred the Democrat, a significant portion defected in favor of the Independent Charlie Crist if they expected him to finish ahead of Meek. Additionally, we find that after a major news story broke, in which former President Bill Clinton allegedly advised Meek to drop out of the race so that Crist might win, respondents surveyed after this event were more likely to vote strategically in favor of Crist. Our study clearly demonstrates the importance of political context. Under the appropriate conditions, we find a high likelihood of strategic voting.     

Testing a Predictive Model of Voter Behavior on the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election

Abstract

Utilizing a predictive model of voter behavior, this study identified the motivations behind a sample of voters who cast a ballot for George W. Bush and AI Gore in the 2000 presidential campaign. The motivations of the voters were differentiated on the basis of the “value” they sought in a president. In other words, just as companies in the “commercial marketplace” have to create value to attract customers, so does a candidate in the “political marketplace” who is seeking to carve out a niche for himself that separates him from his competition. Pairwise discriminant analysis is used to identify the motivations behind the choice behavior of voters at both the candidate and party level. The results reveal the complimentary roles that the political party and each candidate's campaign organization played in their respective marketing strategies.     

Strategic Interaction and Candidate Competition in U.S. House Elections: Empirical Applications of Probit and Strategic Probit Models

In recent work, Signorino (American Political Science Review93:279–297, 1999; International Interactions 28:93–115,2002) has sought to test statistical models derived from extensive-formgames in the context of international relations research focusingon conflict and interstate bargaining. When two or more actorsinteract with one another under conditions of uncertainty, Signorinodemonstrates that it is necessary to incorporate such strategicinteraction into the underlying model to avoid potential threatsto statistical inference. Outside the realm of internationalrelations research, however, there have been limited applicationsof Signorino's strategic probit model in understanding strategicinteraction. In this article, I present an empirical comparisonof probit and strategic probit models in the context of candidatecompetition in House elections during the 1990s. I show thatincumbent spending deters challenger entry and factors suchas minority party affiliation and redistricting significantlyaffect incumbent career decisions, findings that run counterto those reported in the nonstrategic model. Overall, the resultsillustrate that failing to account for strategic interactioncan lead to biased and inaccurate estimates related to challengerand incumbent entry decisions.     

Strategic campaigning, closeness, and voter mobilization in U.S. Presidential elections

The scholarly literature on voter mobilization is ambivalent regarding the effects of closeness on turnout. Economic analyses of turnout (i.e. the classic calculus of voting) contend that as elections become closer, voters perceive their participation as more valuable because there is a greater chance that they will cast the deciding vote. Other work argues that voters do not take closeness into account because the probability that their vote uniquely changes the outcome of an election is quite small even in close elections. Still, this second perspective maintains that closeness may increase turnout because elites distribute campaign resources to places where election results could be affected by mobilizing additional supporters. While the latter perspective is theoretically well-developed, empirical support for the notion that elite activity (rather than citizen perceptions) connects closeness and turnout is limited. Using improved measures of closeness and campaign activities, we test for citizen perception and elite mobilization effects on turnout in the context of U.S. Presidential elections. Results show that while closeness has no direct effect on turnout, elites indeed target campaign activities on close states and the asymmetric distribution of resources across states results in higher turnout in battleground states.     

The impact of the U.S. war on terrorism upon U.S.-China relations

Using a framework of geopolitical analysis. Oliver Lee argues that the fundamental geopolitical relationships between the United States and China, namely the relationship between the world’s strongest naval and air power and the world’s strongest land power, would not be upset even after the American military presence in central Asia since September 11, 2001. The relationship would remain essentially unaltered because — American initiation of the use of nuclear weapons against China being ruled out for fear of Chinese retaliation — China would be able to withstand any U.S. military offensive conducted with conventional land, sea, and air forces, regardless of whether the U.S. possesses permanent air bases in Central Asia or not, and regardless of how many troops it may station on them. His teaching and research interests include domestic and foreign policies of China and power in America and U.S. foreign policy.     

Partisan Differences in Economic Outcomes and Corresponding Voting Behavior: Evidence from the U.S.

The present empirical work examines the differences ineconomic outcomes delivered by partisan governments, and theway in which voters take this into account. Autoregressivemodels of output growth, unemployment and inflation, augmentedwith political variables; and probit binary choice models ofvoting decisions, incorporating expectations about inflationand unemployment, are estimated for U.S. post-war data. Theanalysis confirms that partisan differences in economic outcomes are actually observed in the data. U.S. unemployment rate exhibits adistinct partisan cycle, behavior of output growth andinflation rate partly supports the partisan differenceshypothesis. Thus suggesting that each party can be``instrumental'' in solving particular economic problems. Inline with this logic, U.S. voters seem to believe in theasymmetric abilities of parties to fight inflation andunemployment. Most interesting empirical findings includeevidence that U.S. citizens tend to vote for the left party(Democrats) when high unemployment is expected, and for theright party (Republicans) when high inflation is expected.This relation is especially robust for Presidential elections.There is also evidence pointing to the presence of electoralinertia and absence of ``midterm'' electoral cycle in the U.S.     

U.S.-China Space Cooperation: Balancing Act between the U.S. Congress and President

There are a growing number of U.S. space scientists and managers calling for reinitiating cooperation with China in space. It is well-known that investigations of the U.S. Congress into various allegations involving China have resulted in a series of laws curtailing space cooperation between these two countries. By surveying the concurrent political developments within the United States in the 1980s and 1990s, this article attempts to reveal the domestic compulsions that propelled changes in the U.S. space policy towards China. The fundamental impetus is the power struggle and differences between the U.S. president and Congress in their perception of U.S. economic interests and national security in the context of space technology that strained these relations. Recent U.S. presidents who inherited this situation added to the discourse based on their own perceptions about outer space and China. These perceptions either found congruence with the policy of the U.S. Congress or led to finding ways to circumvent its legal restrictions. Based on these developments, it is concluded that the view of the U.S. president has alternated between necessary, desirable, and objectionable on the issue of U.S.-China space cooperation, and the U.S. Congress has thus shifted from supporting to restricting and then legally banning cooperation.     

Long–Range Corporate Strategic Planning in Government Organizations: The Case of the U.S. Air Force

Since 1994, the United States Air Force has undertaken two major reviews of its long–range corporate strategy. Both exercises stretched very substantially beyond the previous horizons for such reviews. Through visioning forward as far as 30 years, the Air Force leadership sought to quicken support for substantial reassessments of core programmatic commitments. The availability of two iterations of strategic visioning of this sort affords a rare opportunity to track the effects of an innovative approach to planning under different leaders, institutional approaches, and circumstances. Along the way, the analysis uncovers a number of important issues that might find applicability to other government organizations, whether in the United States or elsewhere.     

U.S. Intransigence and the Climate Change Reality

This essay is a response to the U.S. decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement and a rejoinder to Donald Trump’s allegations against India and China. It argues that U.S. intransigence poses a serious threat to the multilateral efforts to redress the climate change crisis.     

Lobbying and the 2006 U.S. midterm elections

• Lobbyists are inextricably intertwined with the electoral process in the United States, but rarely have they ever featured so prominently in an election year as in 2006. The midterm elections came at the end of a year in which the political news was often dominated by stories of lobbying scandal, most notably that involving Jack Abramoff. Lobbying was an important issue in many peoples' voting decisions, and moreover one of the immediate outcomes of the election was a raft of lobbying reform measures both in Congress and in the individual states. As one commentator put it: ‘For lobbyists, 2006 rolled by like a late‐night B movie where the earthquake wipes out the villagers who refused to heed the warning signs’ (Divis, 2006 ). This article reviews some of the most substantial lobbying scandals which emerged during 2006, considers how lobbying and lobbyists fared during the election campaigns, and analyses the various reforms which have recently been considered and implemented, before briefly examining how lobbyists will impact upon the 2008 election races.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dynamic Responsiveness in the U.S. Senate

I develop a theory of dynamic responsiveness that suggests that parties that win elections choose candidates who are more extreme and parties that lose elections choose candidates who are more moderate. Moreover, the size of past victories matters. Close elections yield little change, but landslides yield larger changes in the candidates offered by both parties. I test this theory by analyzing the relationship between Republican vote share in U.S. Senate elections and the ideology of candidates offered in the subsequent election. The results show that Republican (Democratic) victories in past elections yield candidates who are more (less) conservative in subsequent elections, and the effect is proportional to the margin of victory. This suggests that parties or candidates pay attention to past election returns. One major implication is that parties may remain polarized in spite of their responsiveness to the median voter .     

Preemption in the U.S. Federal System

The sharp increase in the number of congressional partial andtotal preemption statutes and innovative use of preemption powerssince 1965 have produced major changes infederal-state relations.The Congress has become a unitary government in several regulatoryfields and also finances its policies in other fields inpartby imposing burdensome mandates and restraints on state andlocal governments. Current federalism theories fail to accountfor the changes produced by preemption or to address alternativesto preemption other than conditional grants-in-aid