A class analysis of the bureaucratic process in Mali∗

The impact of colonization had different results according to the native social structures which it met and according to the degree of economic transformation which it brought about. In this process, the African countries were an appendage of the Western capitalist economies, and the social forces which were stirred up in Africa were thus the dependent and terminal part of European society. Such an incomplete and dependent process of social development was bound to give aberrant results in terms of class analysis. Mali is a case in point.

A native aristocratic and slave society was developing when this process was halted by the French conquest. The lack of industrial development which followed did not permit the emergence of capitalist classes, while administrative growth gave rise to a comparatively large bureaucracy. African trade remained in the hands of a Moslem and illiterate native bourgeoisie. The colonial crisis abruptly brought these forces into a competition for power in which the outcome was a victory for the bureaucracy. The question raised here is whether this success is indicative of the development of a new ruling class in Mali or, if not, to what extent the process remains susceptible of class analysis. The occurrence was not the result of a domestic class struggle, but depended on external factors which initiated a rapid movement towards independence. This combination of circumstances acted upon a society where class development was still limited both in the traditional and the colonial context. Hence it gave to an otherwise dependent body the opportunity to assume dominant political functions. The concept of social class is a valid instrument of analysis, given, firstly, that the social evolution of dependent countries is considered as part of the broader social system constituted by the economic and political sphere of influence of the dominant foreign power, and, secondly, that a distinction is made between classes proper and other dependent social elements which are the outgrowths of classes.     

What factors increase the probability of Chinese interventions in intrastate wars?

This study examines the question: What are the factors that increase the probability of Chinese interference in intrastate wars? Chinese behaviour concerning intrastate wars was examined using multivariate logistic regressions. The analyses included the general behaviour of China regarding interference in intrastate wars, Chinese support of violent non-governmental organizations and of state governments. Both were also studied separately for the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras. Among the covariates that were examined, several emerged as possible explanations for China's behaviour: geographic contiguity, adversary regime type, and China's relative military capabilities. Furthermore, differences were found between Chinese support of violent non-governmental organizations and of governments in intrastate wars. Different results were also obtained for Cold War and post-Cold War eras.     

The behaviour of indigenous and non‐indigenous farmers: A case study

This paper contrasts the economic performance of a group of immigrant Chinese paddy farmers in West Malaysia with their native Malay counterparts. The situation involves their differing response to the introduction of doublecropping. Productivity measures, production function estimates, and field observations indicate significant differences in performance. The reasons for these differences are attributed to the characteristics of immigrant groups, differences in perception of the innovations, and historical factors.     

Can elite corruption be a legitimate Machiavellian tool in an unruly world? The case of post-conflict Cambodia

Elite corruption may have a significant role in ending conflicts and shaping post-conflict development. This article enquires into the legitimacy accorded to such corruption. It reviews literature on post-conflict Cambodia, seeking evidence that academic commentaries, public opinion or elites themselves regard elite corruption as a legitimate Machiavellian tool for achieving other ends. Corruption has been an element of the style of government adopted by the dominant party in Cambodia, shaping both the achievement of peace and the uneven economic development that followed. Academic commentaries provide some implicit and explicit legitimation of corruption as a means to secure peace and to resist neoliberal policy settings by affording government discretionary resources and power. Meanwhile, public dissatisfaction with elite corruption appears to the most likely source of renewed violent conflict in Cambodia. How elite actors rationalise and legitimise corrupt behaviour remains poorly understood, and is deserving of more attention.     

A changing world: is the UN development system ready?

This article examines five contemporary areas of development concern that have become major drivers of global transformation since the turn of the millennium: the plight of fragile states; the emergence of new powers and new development funds in a changing aid landscape; the need for developing countries to manage the growing resources at their disposal; encroachments on the political sovereignty of states; and new global challenges that demand global action, including climate change, migration, and food security. These drivers of change call for responses from the UN – and in particular its development system of some 30 organisations. The ongoing protracted debate on the future UN development agenda should take cognisance of these changes if the system is to remain relevant after 2015. But the signs are not promising that either the agenda or the UN development system are up to the task.     

Women's rights in the muslim world: reform or reconstruction?

The issue of gender inequality is an acute problem in countries where women's lives are governed by laws, and configured by customs and traditions, said to derive from Islam. In the second half of the 20th century, two Muslim feminist paradigms have emerged in response to this malaise. Islamic feminists aim to establish women's rights within the Islamic framework by re-interpreting Islam's holy sources. In contrast, secular feminists challenge the particularistic nature of the Islamic framework and advocate the application of a set of standard universal rights for Muslim and non-Muslim women. This article focuses on the writings of the Moroccan feminist Fatima Mernissi, tracing her evolution from advocating secular reconstruction of Muslim societies to a position that resembles Islamic reformism.     

Modelling the impact of world bank policy‐based lending: The case of Malawi's agricultural sector

This article uses a multi‐market agricultural pricing model to analyse the impact of the World Bank's three structural adjustment loans (SALs) to Malawi on the smallholder agricultural sector. Three price policy scenarios are simulated on the model representing zero, partial and full compliance with the Bank's SAL price policy conditionality. These scenarios are analysed in terms of their impact on: the government budget; smallholder real incomes; maize production; exportable cash crop production; and the balance of payments. Critiques of the Bank's programme and the government and Bank bargaining strategies are assessed in the light of the modelling results.     

Pseudo‐democracy in the Muslim world

This paper investigates the mechanisms of democratisation leading to the formation of pseudo‐democratic political systems in the contemporary Muslim world. It is argued that pseudo‐democracies in the Muslim world are created and strengthened by the structural opposition between three types of democratic doctrines, social practices and institutional mechanisms inspired by liberalism, republicanism and Islamism. Departing from the usual instrumentalist analyses that dominate the democratisation literature, this account emphasises that pseudo‐democratic regimes are not simply an expedient fallback position from liberal democratic systems but dynamic political orders based on alternative notions of democracy. It is argued that what is specific to the Muslim world as a socio‐historical construct is that pseudo‐democracies are produced by the evolving stalemate between the three abovementioned political currents. In these polities liberal democratic discourses and practices are undermined by non‐liberal yet demotic forms of social mobilisation and political learning that are more effective than laissez‐faire models of liberal political mobilisation.     

Representative Bureaucracy in the Public Service? A Critical Analysis of the Challenges Confronting Women in the Civil Service of Ghana

In the public administration literature, the debate concerning the representation of minorities in the public bureaucracy continues to attract attention. The idea is that passive representation may lead to active representation with the later helping to develop policies and programs that will benefit minorities. Consequently, a number of governments have been implementing policies to enhance the involvement of minorities in public services. The Ghana government has not been left out in this endeavor. Since 1957, it has continued to institute measures to ensure a fair gender representation in the bureaucracy. This notwithstanding, the upper echelons of the bureaucracy continue to be dominated by males despite the over representation of women at the lower levels. What are the challenges confronting women in the public sector that make it difficult to achieve active representation? In this article, we examine the challenges confronting women to achieve active representation from a representative bureaucracy perspective.     

Utilising 360‐degree feedback in the public sector: A case study of the Korean central government

The 360‐degree feedback involves all aspects of a group: managers, colleagues, subordinates, and customers. Recently, the Korean Civil Service Commission (CSC) supports the use of multiple raters as an effective method of assessing performance, both for developmental and appraisal needs. The 360‐degree feedback was officially adopted for employee promotion in the Korean central government in 1998. However, there are direct costs in designing 360‐degree feedback instruments and in training sessions for implementation, as well as human costs that include confusion and fear about 360‐degree feedback. Like many organisational change efforts, cultures and habits are slow to change. Autocratic managers can be reluctant to change the rules in any fashion that could pose a threat to their positions of power.