从奶粉案看我国的宽恕制度

反垄断法中的宽恕制度由来已久,是反垄断法中的重要角色。在打击卡特尔问题上,宽恕制度一直发挥着有力的作用。但从我国对于部分奶粉企业反垄断的过程中可以看出我们对于宽恕制度还没有足够的认识,还缺乏相应的具体规定和执法机构。我国应该从法律法规着手逐步完善我国的宽恕制度。     

论《反垄断法》上之宽恕制度

宽恕制度源于美国,作为反垄断法上的一项重要制度,逐渐成为各国启动卡特尔侦查程序的主要手段,当今世界卡特尔呈现越来越隐蔽的趋势,宽恕制度本身具备的合理性与合法性,使得世界上越来越多的国家将这一制度纳入自己的反垄断法体系中。我国在2007年颁布的《反垄断法》中也引进了这一制度,但是无论在立法还是在实践中,我国对宽恕制度的规定都存在许多不足,有一些问题亟需解决。     

论反垄断法中的宽恕制度

中国出台的《反垄断法》中出现了很多亮点,其中之一是学习了美国,日本,欧盟等国家,出现了有关宽恕制度的条文。但是,我国的法条中对此的规定过于笼统,抽象,没有具体的有关实施标准,应用步骤等详细规定,这对我国《反垄断法》的充分实施产生了阻碍。本文将借鉴国外一些国家法律中有关宽恕制度的规定,通过对几个国家相关制度的比较,进而探求我国宽恕制度规定中一些可以改进的地方。     

反垄断宽恕政策的理论分析与实证考察

宽恕政策是卡特尔执法的有效政策工具，它有利于破坏卡特尔的稳定性，有利于提高卡特尔的执法效率。设计合理的规则是宽恕政策有效发挥作用的基础，具体、确定、透明是宽恕政策的基本要求。宽恕政策的实施效果与卡特尔的立法、执法状况密切相关，严厉的法律制裁、坚定的执法态度和有力的执法措施能够有效促进宽恕政策的实施。为了加强卡特尔执法，我国反垄断执法机构应当根据《反垄断法》的有关规定尽快出台宽恕政策。     

略论我国反垄断法的宽恕政策

卡特尔是一种普遍存在的严重的垄断行为，如何有效打击卡特尔是反垄断法的重要任务。由于卡特尔都是秘密协商，证据难以被发现，因此反垄断执法机关发现并查处秘密卡特尔的难度很大。为此，许多国家都采取了宽恕政策以鼓励参与卡特尔的经营者主动告发。我国《反垄断法》第46条第二款也引入了此项法律制度，但与其他国家相比，我国的宽恕政策仍然有诸多不完善之处，本文就此提出了进一步完善立法的建议。     

浅析我国《反垄断法》宽恕制度

宽恕制度是专门针对核心卡特尔的一种反垄断法执法措施,我国《反垄断法》第四十六条第二款确立了这一制度。     

反垄断执法承诺制度中第三人权益保护的对象

承诺制度是反垄断执法中的重要制度,该制度被大多数国家纳入反垄断法中,我国《反垄断法》第四十五条也对其进行了相关规定。然而我国承诺制度的重点是关注公共利益,对该制度中涉及的第三人权益保护有所不足,也没有具体规定该制度中第三人权益的具体保护对象。本文根据相关规定,结合具体实践,对我国反垄断执法承诺制度中第三人权益保护的对象提出一些建议,希望对该制度的研究有参考价值。     

美国反垄断法宽恕制度及对我国的启示

垄断协议是反垄断法所规制的对象中存在最普遍、危害性最大、最难规制的垄断形式,各国均将其作为反垄断法规制的重点和难点。由于其形成和存在的高度隐蔽性,常使反垄断执法困难重重,宽恕制度应运而生,同其他制度一起在很大程度上减轻了执法机关的执法难度。而我国关于宽恕制度过于简单显然给执法造成了很大困惑,关于主体、执法程序、适用条件等方面都没有具体的界限与规定,很难直接被反垄断执法机关适用。     

浅论反垄断法宽恕制度

宽恕制度是反垄断法中一项重要的制度。它是一套破坏组织成员间的信任,鼓励成员竞相自首的新策略。本文通过介绍宽恕制度的涵义、卡特尔的危害性及适用条件。并借鉴欧美国家宽恕制度的先进立法经验,为完善我国的宽恕制度提出建议。     

论核心卡特尔中的宽恕制度及我国《反垄断法》对其规制和完善

核心卡特尔通过相同的定价、一致的行动、固定的份额来获取高额的利润,给竞争带来重大的危害,但是其隐蔽性强,难以为执法机关所侦破.宽恕制度,通过豁免卡特尔协议成员的方式以鼓励其对卡特尔协议的披露,成为西方国家打击卡特尔的重要武器.我国<反垄断法>虽对宽恕制度做了规制,但尚且不足.仍待完善.     

Incomplete antitrust laws and private actions for damages

Our purpose in this paper is to identify some of the implications that derive from the incompleteness of antitrust laws. Since with regard to certain anticompetitive conduct, the law remains substantially incomplete up to the first relevant court judgment, in terms of policy it is worth concentrating on stand-alone claimants who, not relying on earlier judgments, face very high evidentiary requirements, while generating large positive (information) externalities for potential follow-on claimants. The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce the notion of incompleteness of the laws and address the process of production of evidence in antitrust lawsuits. Sect. 3 provides a survey of EU national case law and our summary of the results puts emphasis on incomplete laws, evidentiary requirements and stand-alone lawsuits. Sect. 4 presents a framework model to distinguish the decision-making processes for stand-alone and follow-on claimants in the presence of incomplete antitrust laws. In Sect. 5 we introduce a vector autoregressive model that we test with reference to the US antitrust law enforcement regime. Sect. 6 discusses some policy options and concludes the paper.     

COMPETITION POLICY IN CHINA AND ITS RELEVANCE TO SMES

Competition policy has great relevance to all the firms in any economy. Even though it is unlikely that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have enough market power to constrain competition through a misuse of such power, they may still face prosecution if they are involved in a boycott of competitors or suppliers, price-fixing, output-restriction and other monopoly agreements. This article discusses antitrust issues pertaining to SMEs with a focus on China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) and its implementation rules. Contrary to the popular view that SMEs benefit from competition laws, evidence shows that they are reluctant to get involved in antitrust litigation against large firms partly because of the high legal costs involved. There is an urgent need to promote an awareness of antitrust compliance in China and to educate SMEs about the need to avoid breaching the new antitrust law and its associated regulations. In the meantime, SMEs should take full advantage of the antitrust laws to fight against the abuse of market dominance directed at them, and to gain equal opportunities to market access.     

反垄断法的困境与出路

反垄断法不能有效地解决垄断定价问题,并在一定程度上破坏了自由竞争,阻碍了经济发展,其执行也造成了资源浪费和社会福利损失。反垄断法的这种缺陷根源于其规制对象的错误和反垄断方法的失当。从垄断形成的根源入手,清除引发垄断弊害的进入壁垒,重新设计反垄断法的制度框架,并以积极促进竞争的方式代替传统消极的反垄断政策,这样才能从根本上解决垄断问题。     

美国反垄断法豁免中的诺尔——本灵顿原则评析

诺尔——本灵顿原则是由美国联邦最高法院通过几个案例确立的联邦反垄断法中的一个原则,其主要含义是:根据《美国宪法第一修正案》的规定,即使竞争者通过游说政府而改变法律将会削弱竞争,其行为也不违反反垄断法。诺尔——本灵顿原则是协调《谢尔曼法》的重要目标与公民请愿权利和各级政府有效决策之间关系的产物。诺尔——本灵顿原则对中国的反垄断法执法也有一定启发意义,在执法过程应当全面协调经营者的竞争利益与其他经营者的宪法权利、与政府行为的关系。     

美国反托拉斯法生成进路研究——以规制铁路公司垄断为线索

19世纪下半叶是美国反托拉斯法生成的重要时期。这一时期铁路公司垄断成为社会普遍关注的焦点。面对此,联邦和州采取了不同的措施,其中州承担了反铁路公司垄断的主要任务,初步形成了州反托拉斯法的制度框架,为联邦反托拉斯法的生成奠定了基础。在这一历史进程中,对公用事业垄断的规制、州反托拉斯法的建设以及《谢尔曼法》背后利益的关注,构成了解读反托拉斯法生成进路的三个结点。     

反垄断效率抗辩适用模式及不确定性克服

反垄断法上的效率抗辩,是指经营者通过证明集中的效率效果足以抵消或超过反竞争效果而取得反垄断法豁免。在效率抗辩的适用上,世界范围内存在抵消分析、一体分析和混合分析三种模式。基于我国国情和《反垄断法》的相关规定,我国更宜采用混合分析模式。在此基础上,还需要借助相应措施克服效率抗辩本身的不确定性,提高制度运用的可能性。     

《反垄断法》实施的预期效应探究

我国的《反垄断法》是国家基于“公平与效率”的价值追求而创设的市场经济基础·肄法律，旨在维护市场有序竞争，落实国家竞争、产业等经济政策，实现国家经济管理职能。它的实施必将产生一系列预期效应：国家竞争政策统一、反垄断指南具法律效力、“成文法”与“判例法”相融合、为保护国家利益增添新的法律手段以及促进我国行政管理体制的进一步改革等。     

“油价问题”的法律规制——以产业法与竞争法的功能组合为核心

＂油价问题＂并非简单的价格管制,牵涉到产业、竞争等诸多体制性因素,其背后折射出产业法与竞争法之间的断裂。以产业法与竞争法的功能组合为核心规制油价,一方面应侧重于竞争法的角度推进《反垄断法》配套规范的制定和实施,并从公共政策的高度、超越具体执法机关以有效规制垄断性油企的限制竞争行为;另一方面应侧重于产业法角度打破既有垄断结构以实现局部充分竞争,并辅之以金融市场的基础建设及垄断性油企的公司治理,从而构建由石油储备机制、市场化的企业竞争机制和石油期货机制构成的油价形成系统。     

The Damage Done: Cocaine Methods in Detroit

The pro-competitive antitrust doctrine has originated in the free-market economies of Western capitalist countries but with economic transformations in Eastern Europe the doctrine ceased to be an exclusive Western concept. Using the example of the Polish law on combating Trust in the National Economy of 1987, the author demonstrates the spread of the antitrust doctrine from capitalism to socialism. Apart from these changes, the doctrine has been spreading on the international level because increasingly it has found application not only within particular countries but also with regard to trade and commerce between and among countries. The multidimensional nature of the antitrust doctrine has important implications for combating both domestic and international antitrust crime. The efficiency of efforts to combat abuse of a dominant market position, limiting access to the market or other forms of restraining competition will depend increasingly on the degree to which organs responsible for fighting antitrust crimes are willing to benefit from the multi-dimensional nature of the antitrust doctrine.     

Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive Compatibility

This paper reviews China's recent efforts to enact a competitionpolicy (antitrust) law. We focus on three issues: (1) What isthe substance of the proposed law, and how does it differ fromexisting antitrust law in other countries, (2) How will thelaw be implemented or enforced, and how will those who mustimplement this law interpret their mandate, and (3) What willbe the likely effects of this law given China's unique historyand cultural heritage. We emphasize China's economic, legaland regulatory contexts in which an antitrust law may be enforced.Our central focus is the problem of establishing a substantiveand procedural legal framework that is incentive-compatiblewith economic efficiency and growth. The draft law could beimproved, both to increase its clarity and to make its enforcementmore consistent with the goal of achieving improvements in economicefficiency. Nevertheless, there is much merit in the draft,especially its strong focus on reducing anticompetitive practicesof state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and other government bodies.However, our major difficulty with the new law is that, in theabsence of a tradition of reliance on the rule of law, Chineseand foreign enterprises will find it very difficult to relyon the antitrust statute or the actions of the courts in Chinaas a basis for predicting the antitrust liability that mightresult from various business practices. Therefore, the principalvector by which antitrust law (or indeed any law) affects economicbehavior is absent from the Chinese scene. Unless the bureaucracythat enforces the new antitrust law actively pursues a policyof consistent enforcement based on written guidelines, staredecisis, or other sources of predictability, the substance ofthe statute itself will have little significance. That outcomewould represent a significant loss for the economic welfareof the Chinese people.