Bureaucratic locus of control

To what extent do public officials feel they have control over their lives in public service? We develop a new measure of perceived control in the bureaucracy based on the locus of control scale. The “bureaucratic locus of control” (BLOC) scale extends standard measures to a bureaucratic context as well as introduces an extension to these measures that focuses on the power of systemic forces in officials' lives. Field tests among a representative sample of Ethiopian public officials suggest that the BLOC scale has good internal reliability and that it is positively associated with promotion opportunities, rewards and motivation. We showcase its use by investigating the extent to which inequality in control impacts the general perception of control. Potential uses of the scale to study bureaucratic dynamics are discussed.     

Constructing a decolonized world city for consumption: discourses on Hong Kong Disneyland and their implications

The paper argues that, under the globalized economy, state power is far from diminishing. I study how the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government officials in 1999 developed “competition-development” discourse and “disappearing-world-city” discourse to persuade the public to approve the unequal and non-transparent Hong Kong–Disney deal for setting up the Hong Kong Disneyland (HKDL). I also examine how newspaper reports have circulated and have reinforced these two pairs of political discourses in wider popular discourse. I further reveal, in the post-colonial context of HongKong, how the HKDL project functions to accomplish decolonization tasks and to reshape Hong Kong as a consumption-based tourist spot instead of a citizen-based participatory community.     

Rewarding the Top: Citizens' Opposition to Higher Pay for Politicians

The rewards of politicians are a key part of the implicit contract between politicians and citizens, and the effect of these rewards on democratic legitimacy and political recruitment is a central concern in public debate and democratic theory. Using a survey experiment, we show how citizens respond to hypothetical changes in politicians’ pay. The results indicate that citizens express lower levels of trust in the politicians when these politicians award themselves higher pecuniary rewards. However, our results also show that a devious strategy in which the rewards for politicians are less transparent ensures lower opposition from citizens than open and transparent strategies. Based on this, we outline a reinvigoration of the research agenda on “rewards at the top.”     

Promiscuously Partisan? Public Service Impartiality and Responsiveness in Westminster Systems

Public servants in Westminster countries are being drawn into the limelight by demands from their political masters that they publicly defend policies. Critics suggest these conditions undermine the capacity and willingness of senior public servants to manage the enduring Westminster tension between serving elected governments and remaining nonpartisan. Interviews with senior officials from Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom challenge this pessimistic view, showing that officials consistently stress the importance of not “crossing the line” when dealing with their elected masters. Two exploratory case studies are presented—one of an Australian ministerial department (Treasury) and another of a Canadian quasi‐autonomous agency (Statistics Canada)—in which public servants faced pressure to defend controversial government policies. These cases show how contemporary public servants actively interpret, establish, and defend the line between appropriate responsiveness and inappropriate partisanship in Westminster systems.     

(Un)principled principals, (un)principled agents: The differential effects of managerial civil service reforms on corruption in developing and OECD countries

Do management practices have similar anticorruption effects in OECD and developing countries? Despite prominent cautions against “New Zealand” reforms which enhance managerial discretion in developing countries, scholars have not assessed this question statistically. Our article addresses this gap through a conjoint experiment with 6,500 public servants in three developing countries and one OECD country. Our experiment assesses Weberian relative to managerial approaches to recruitment, job stability, and pay. We argue that in developing countries with institutionalized corruption and weak rule of law—yet not OECD countries without such features—“unprincipled” principals use managerial discretion over hiring, firing, and pay to favor “unprincipled” bureaucratic agents who engage in corruption. Our results support this argument: managerial practices are associated with greater bureaucratic corruption in our surveyed developing countries, yet have little effect in our OECD country. Alleged “best practices” in public management in OECD countries may thus be “worst practices” in developing countries.     

Do Policy Makers Use Academic Research? Reexamining the “Two Communities” Theory of Research Utilization

Academics and policy makers in many Western countries are perceived as occupying separate communities, with distinct languages, values, and reward systems. However, data from a survey of more than 2,000 policy officials and 126 in‐depth interviews with public servants in Australia suggest that the “two communities” conceptualization may be misleading and flawed. More realistically, there is a range of interaction between policy and academia, with some individuals valuing and using academic research more than others. Furthermore, this relationship is complicated by the internal division between the political and administrative components of the public policy process.     

Whither Power in Public Administration? Attainment,Dissipation, and Loss

Norton Long's 1949 essay, “Power and Administration,” has a complicated legacy. First, analysis reveals both support for and important refinements of Long's arguments since the article's publication. Second, Long's claim has proven problematic that competition among agencies for power would bring more coordination and a cross‐agency sense of purpose to the federal government. Third, the bureaucratic pluralism that he explained and defended produced special interest biases that were off‐putting to large segments of citizens and thus helped create an unsupportive political environment for needed capacity building in the federal government. Fourth, by not considering how institutions “coevolve,” Long failed to warn that “horizontal power” building by individual agencies would provoke efforts by elected officials to enhance their control over bureaucracy in ways that, over time, diminished their collective sources of power. Finally, much remains to be done before what Long called a “realistic science of administration” incorporating the “budgeting of power” exists in public administration.     

What is wrong with job security?

Most Western studies into motivation suggest that public servants are prosocial. Moreover, scholars suggest that a desire for external rewards, like pay and job security, may crowd out prosocial proclivity. However, recent studies from non‐Western contexts provide mixed results about the actual drivers of public servants' motivation to seek and retain public sector employment and perform their duties. To advance the development of theory regarding motivational dynamics of public servants in developing countries, we examine how pursuing external rewards impacts public service motivation, job satisfaction, and turnover intention among public servants in Kazakhstan (n = 627), a developing former Soviet republic that has been subjected to various waves of personnel reform. Our quantitative and qualitative data show that a desire for job security relates positively to public service motivation and job satisfaction, whereas a desire for monetary rewards correlates negatively with public service motivation and positively with turnover intention. We conclude with the implications for theory and practice.     

The Attitudes of Senior Public Servants in Australia and New Zealand: Administrative Reform and Technocratic Consequence?

This article is in the tradition of comparative international research conducted over recent years into changing political-bureaucratic role relations. Its focus is the attitudinal orientation held toward various dimensions of their work by senior public servants in Canberra and Wellington. In particular, it is concerned to gauge officials' tolerance for pluralistic politics, their programmatic commitment, democratic sensibilities, and identification with conventions of ministerial responsibility. The study draws on and develops into four the two categories of public servants identified by Robert D. Putnam during the early 1970s in Western Europe. The information generated may be used as a baseline for future surveys of a similar type, which could identify changing patterns of distribution among the four basic categories: Political Bureaucrats, Classical Bureaucrats, Traditional Bureaucrats, and Technocrats. The present survey shows some significant differences between senior public servants in the two cities. In particular, those in Canberra are less programmatically committed than their Wellington counterparts, and considerably more “elitist” in their attitudes to popular involvement in policymaking. In both capitals officials are proactively rather than reactively orientated, a finding that may run counter to reformers' beliefs in the predominance of “Sir Humphrey Applebys.” The article goes on to relate the survey findings to major public sector changes that have taken place in both cities since the data for this article was collected. It speculates that, especially in New Zealand (but perhaps less so in Australia), these changes will see the emergence of more strongly technocratic attitudes among top public officials. Such attitudes may not sit easily with expectations that senior public servants be both politically accountable and managerially orientated. Finally, the four categories used in this study are related to the “images” of political-bureaucratic role relations developed in other comparative research.     

打破政策“黑箱”的制度设计——基于广州政策兑现实践的研究

如何打破政策“黑箱”是学界和社会关注的重要议题。以广州市政策兑现改革实践为例,探讨如何从制度设计层面来打开公共政策过程中的政策“黑箱”。研究发现,虽然公共政策过程是一个动态且复杂的过程,但是通过统筹政策制定和政策落地两端、主观要素客观化、模糊标准明确化、重塑政府流程等,能够形成确定的决策环境,控制非理性因素,约束自由裁量权,并压缩权力寻租空间,从而可以从源头消除政策“黑箱”的形成土壤。广州市政府政策兑现改革过程中,通过“输入—转化—输出”的制度框架设计,形成了从政策制定到政策执行再到政策结果与评估的政策闭环,并对政策兑现的相关责任单位、流程和时限都进行了严格把控,进而实现对政策“黑箱”内部决策要素的控制。从政策“黑箱”本身入手,破解政策“黑箱”难题,实现政策的阳光承诺和给付,最终形成极具特色和借鉴意义的广州模式。     

Building horizontal coordination in Sri Lanka

Horizontal coordination is a focal topic in contemporary public management. However, greater attention has been given to developed states while developing countries struggle to improve the quality of public service delivery amidst skills shortages and siloed organisations. This article presents a foreign‐funded training programme designed to promote horizontal coordination at the most local level of government in a developing country, Sri Lanka, and analyses the factors that contributed to its success. Using data collected through participant surveys, focus groups, and programme‐related projects, the article shows how the formation of a “locally directed, donor‐supported” programme aligned with national development priorities that enabled the country‐level partner institution to deliver a programme that improved horizontal coordination and enhanced delivery of public services. Although findings confirm the importance of contextualising programme design, content, and delivery for achieving aid effectiveness, a novel conclusion was that the participation of elected officials alongside career public servants greatly contributed to the programme's success by creating new levels of trust and facilitating more productive working relationships between key stakeholders, culminating in improved outcomes for local communities. This suggests that elected officials can play a key role in building horizontal coordination in developing nations.     

Can disincentives bring accountability in governance? Experiences of Right to Public Services Guarantee Act in Madhya Pradesh State of India

Many Indian states have enacted Right to Public Services Guarantee Act that promises the delivery of public services to citizens in time‐bound fashion, failing to which, responsible government officials face financial penalty. Therefore, effective service delivery, an indicator of good and responsive governance, is being attempted to be achieved through a “system of disincentive.” The paper tries to analyze if the system of disincentive is effective in ensuring administrative accountability. The paper is based on primary and secondary data. The primary data were collected as part of an action research carried out in 2012, which was supplemented with secondary data collected for different studies during 2015 and 2016. The paper uses a governance accountability framework to analyze implementation of the Act. The study finds that although success rate of implementation of the Act is quite high, the Act presents a narrow idea of accountability. There are no accountability norms for higher officials and elected leaders who head the public service departments. The study also finds that necessary accountability structures have not been developed and there is a dearth of enabling environment that makes accountability structures effective. The study also finds that, despite the provisions for financial penalty, responsible officials find ways to escape. The study exposes weak points in the implementation of the Act, which can be strengthened to achieve desired outcomes. The study can be an important source for course corrections in the states/countries where right to public service delivery is in effect.     

Informal Accountability, Socially Embedded Officials, and Public Goods Provision in Rural China: The Role of Lineage Groups

In recent studies, analysts have found that so-called “informal accountability” exerts significant influence on public goods provision in rural China. According to these studies, such informal accountability may be formed through the embedment of local officials in social groups. However, there seems to be no agreement on the identification of such embedment and the conditions under which this embedment can influence public goods provision. To advance the literature of this debate, this study examines village officials who are embedded in such social groups as lineage groups and explores their role in shaping public goods provision in rural China based on a unique set of nationwide-survey data. Using a direct measure of social embeddedness of village officials, we have found that the embedment of village officials in a social group can be identified through a direct measure designed in this study and that the embedment has a positive effect on public goods provision in rural China. Finally, we draw some important policy implications from our findings.     

The Impact of Public Officials’ Corruption on the Size and Allocation of U.S. State Spending

This article demonstrates the impact of public officials’ corruption on the size and allocation of U.S. state spending. Extending two theories of “excessive” government expansion, the authors argue that public officials’ corruption should cause state spending to be artificially elevated. Corruption increased state spending over the period 1997–2008. During that time, the 10 most corrupt states could have reduced their total annual expenditure by an average of $1,308 per capita—5.2 percent of the mean per capita state expenditure—if corruption had been at the average level of the states. Moreover, at the expense of social sectors, corruption is likely to distort states’ public resource allocations in favor of higher‐potential “bribe‐generating” spending and items directly beneficial to public officials, such as capital, construction, highways, borrowing, and total salaries and wages. The authors use an objective, concrete, and consistent measurement of corruption, the number of convictions.     

“It's the Central Government's Fault”: Elected Regional Officials' Use of Blame‐Shifting Rhetoric

This article investigates regional officials' use of blame‐shifting rhetoric in times of heated public criticism of unpopular regional policy decisions. Based on a content coding of nearly 500 political accounts from elected regional officials it is shown that “it's the central government's fault” is the most frequently used excuse when regional officials publicly defend unpopular decisions to cut public health care. The article finds that this excuse is used more by regional leaders (mayors and chairmen of regional boards) than by other elected officials and that partisan competition affects how often this excuse is used.     

Public Debt,Economic Growth,and Public Sector Management in Developing Countries: Is There a Link?

The article investigates whether differences in public sector management quality affect the link between public debt and economic growth in developing countries. For this purpose, we primarily use the World Bank's institutional indices of public sector management (PSM). Using PSM thresholds, we split our panel into country clusters and make comparisons. Our linear baseline regressions reveal a significant negative relationship between public debt and growth. The various robustness exercises that we perform also confirm these results. When we dissect our data set into “weak” and “strong” county clusters using public sector management scores, however, we find different results. While public debt still displayed a negative relationship with growth in countries with “weak” public sector management quality, it generally displayed a positive relationship in the latter group. The tests for non‐linearity shows evidence of an “inverse‐U”‐shape relationship between public debt and economic growth. However, we fail to see a similar significant relationship on country clusters that account for PSM quality. Yet, countries with well‐managed public sectors demonstrate a higher public debt sustainability threshold. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Communicating Global Citizenship: Multiple Discourses Beyond the Academy

This article demonstrates that notions of “global citizenship”, as communicated beyond academic debates in political theory and sociology, can be situated within two overarching discourses: a civic republican discourse that emphasizes concepts such as awareness, responsibility, participation and cross-cultural empathy, and a libertarian discourse that emphasizes international mobility and competitiveness. Within each of these discourses, multiple understandings of citizen voice can be identified. Exploring how myriad ways of thinking related to “global citizenship” are springing forth in public debate serves to illustrate new ways in which a wide variety of political, social and economic actors are reflecting upon the meaning of voice and citizenship in the context of increasing public recognition of global interdependence. Not only has “global citizenship” emerged as a variant within the concept of citizenship, but the concept of “global citizenship” contains many variants and sources of internal division. How the concept of “global citizenship” continues to evolve in public discourse, especially in response to watershed events, promises to remain a fruitful line of inquiry for years to come.     

Social equity and LGBTQ populations in African public administration: A macro- and micro-approach

How do public administrators understand social equity toward lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) individuals and communities? To better understand social equity, this study uses data on the views of public and nonprofit administrators in 33 countries in Africa on LGB people. Based on these responses, we gain a better understanding of homophobia in public administrators. Furthermore, this data helps public administrators to explore how social equity might look differently to public and nonprofit administrators in different countries. Building on this foundation, this study proposes understanding social equity from both a Micro (individual) and a Macro (cultural)-perspective. Bringing in this micro- and macro-perspective can help public administrators and researchers to discuss how individuals and organizations identify “vulnerable” populations and appropriate ways to support vulnerable groups.     

政府公权力异化的微观经济机理研究

公权力问题是吏治的一个核心问题,政府公权力异化的预防和治理是当代中国法治政府和责任政府建设的一项重要内容。从微观机理探讨公权力异化的成因,以此为基础构建公权力治理的多种途径,对于当代中国吏治研究具有重大的理论和现实意义。