A comparison of insanity defense standards on juror decision making

Following the Hinckley acquittal, 17 states and the federal government made changes to the insanity defense, including revising the standard, reassigning the burden of proof, and altering the standard of proof. Two studies were conducted to determine whether the specific insanity standard (including the assignment of burden of proof and standard of proof) employed had a significant effect on mock jurors' verdicts. Participants' comprehension of insanity defense instructions was measured and the factors jurors used to decide whether to find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) were also assessed. Participants' comprehension of insanity defense standards was very low. When asked to identify the factors they considered important in determining whether to find a defendant NGRI, only three elements of insanity defense standards were identified as significant. The results may have important implications for policy decisions regarding the insanity defense.     

The insanity defense

Changing thelegal test definition of insanity remains the remedy of choice when insanity outcomes appear problematic, despite empirical studies showing no significant differences among tests. An alternative strategy suggests changing theverdict schema, although critics contend that jurors will reach compromise verdicts that are unconscionable and incoherent. Undergraduate subjects (N=179) rendered insanity verdicts and ratings for four insanity cases using one of four different verdict schemas: a traditional two-choice schema, a three-choice schema (DR) without instructions, a threechoice schema (GBMI) with instructions, and a sequential schema proposed by Finkel (1988) that separately assesses different types of culpability. When internal consistency measures between verdicts and broad ratings and specific construct ratings of the defendant were examined, the sequential schema produced the highest internal consistency, reducing the most error variance and yielding the highest prediction criterion of any of the schemas.     

The military insanity defense

This article describes the military insanity defense. The success of the litigated insanity defense is explored through the number of insanity acquittals over a 28-month period. A questionnaire distributed to all United States Army psychiatrists provided information on the number of forensic evaluations performed, the number of not criminally responsible (NCR) opinions made, and the disposition of noncontested NCR opinions. The questionnaire also tested the Army psychiatrists' knowledge about recent changes in the military insanity defense. This pilot study raises interesting questions about the military insanity defense that further research can address.     

Schizotypal personality disorder and the insanity defense

What constitutes a "mental disorder" for purposes of the insanity defense? Does mental disorder denote any diagnosable condition listed in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders? Is a mental disorder a disturbance wherein the functional criteria of the appropriate insanity law appear to be met? Or does insanity law define mental disorder apart from functional criteria of insanity? The answer to the last question is that some insanity laws attempt to define or qualify mental disorder, but many do not. Unclarities in the law leave room for unnecessary disagreements between expert witnesses even before the functional criteria for insanity are to be addressed. The potential for confusion is compounded when the defendant's disturbance is ambiguous, amphibious, or both. Schizotypal personality disorder is offered as an example of such a disturbance, and inferences are discussed.     

The evolution of insanity standards

Health care professionals are often called upon as expert witnesses in insanity determinations. Most are familiar with the “insanity standard” applicable in the court in which they are called to testify. It might be helpful to understand that not all jurisdictions apply the same standard and how the different standards are related. This article is intended to address the problems associated with each insanity “test” presently in use and how “determining” insanity is an evolutionary process.     

The death-qualified jury and the defense of insanity

We predicted that people who are excluded from serving on juries in capital cases due to their opposition to the death penalty (excludable subjects) tend to place a greater value on the preservation of due process guarantees than on efficient crime control, and therefore are more likely to accept an insanity defense in criminal cases than are people who are permitted to serve on capital juries (death-qualified subjects). Subjects who had previously been classified as death-qualified or excludable read four summaries of cases in which the defendant entered a plea of insanity, and made judgments of guilt or innocence. In the two cases involving nonorganic disorders (schizophrenia), death-qualified subjects were significantly more likely than excludable subjects to vote guilty; in the two cases involving organic disorders (mental retardation and psychomotor epilepsy), there were no differences between the two groups. In addition, excludable subjects gave significantly higher estimates than death-qualified subjects of the proportion of defendants pleading insanity who really are insane.     

Demythologizing inaccurate perceptions of the insanity defense

Public opinion data show that the most prevalent concern expressed regarding the insanity defense is that it is a loophole through which would-be criminals escape punishment for illegal acts. This article examines the extent to which the public's perceptions of the insanity defense are consistent with newly collected empirical data. Specifically, it compares perceptions of the use, success, and outcomes associated with the insanity defense to data derived from a large-scale study of insanity pleas in eight states. The analysis reveals that the public overestimates the use and success of an insanity defense and underestimates the extent to which insanity acquittees are confined upon acquittal. The role of selective media reporting in the formation of public perceptions is discussed.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1992 meetings of the Society for the Study of Social Problems. Special thanks go to John Monahan and Joel Dvoskin for reviewing an earlier draft and to Sharon Steadman for providing editorial comments.     

The insanity defense to suicide

The certification of suicide as the manner of death can result in either the complete loss or a significant reduction in life insurance benefits to the victim's survivors. It is, thus, not uncommon for these beneficiaries to contest suicide as the manner of death. Insanity is a recognized defense in law against suicide. It is recognized in law that, in some cases, an insane man cannot intentionally destroy himself. However, it is also recognized that life insurers can exclude suicide by an insane man from coverage. This article discusses the common law doctrines upon which the insanity defense to suicide is based, with references to judicial opinions from cases which involve contested suicides and the issue of insanity.     

The social construction of criminal responsibility and insanity

This study examines the effects of judicial instructions (traditional American Law Institute [ALI] not guilty by reason of insanity [NGRI] instructions contrasted with ALI instructions supplemented with the guilty but mentally ill [GBMI] alternative) and case information cues (delusional content and planfulness) on student and community subjects' attributions of responsibility. GBMI instructions substantially reduced the probability of NGRI and guilty verdicts in response to vignettes portraying highly psychotic defendants and altered the pattern of variability in responsibility construal ratings. Variation in delusional content cues (self-defense versus non-self-defense) influenced ratings of criminal appreciation but did not affect the verdict distributions. Less planfully commited crimes resulted in higher proportions of insanity verdicts. However, individual differences in responsibility construals of the defendant and in attitudes toward the insanity defense were stronger predictors of verdicts than the design variables, suggesting that individual differences in social-moral cognition are at least as relevant to the attribution of responsibility as are case cues or legal frames of reference. Contrary to previous studies,Witherspoon death penalty attitudes were not related to verdicts, but people without conscientious scruples toward the death penalty were more likely to render guilty verdicts.     

Civil commitment and the criminal insanity plea in Israeli law

In Israeli jurisprudence there is a substantial difference towards mentally ill patients between the civil and penal law systems that goes well beyond differences required by their separate objectives. Mentally ill people dangerous to others due to their illness belong in the hospital, not in the community or in jail. The data gathered especially for this paper make it hard to escape the conclusion that contemporary practice in Israel does not accord with this objective. On the civil front, inaccuracy in predicting who is dangerous may lead to involuntary commitment of people who are not dangerous. On the criminal side, too few people are sent to the hospital in Israel and correspondingly too many to jail. Comparison with US data and practice shows that on the civil side prediction has been improved by using actuarial methods, while on the penal side more up to date definitions of mental illness have been adopted. Whatever the appropriate solution for Israel, surely the first requirement is recognition of the problem.