An Assessment of Anti-Satellite Capabilities and their Strategic Implications

ABSTRACT

The success of space-based communications, navigation and reconnaissance programs – in both the commerical and military arenas – presents a significant vulnerability. Intuitively, as the economic importance and military indispensability of space systems grows, so will their attractiveness as targets. Although attacks against satellites would involve significant operational challenges, economic costs and diplomatic risks, it is well within the realm of technological possibility. For example, China's decision to research ASATs is an indication of its long-term strategic goal of weakening America's monopoly on military space capabilities. This essay describes the current capabilities of anti-satellite (ASAT) technology, assesses its military impact and considers its broader policy and security implications. In light of the broad implications of ASAT weapons on the debate about missile defense in particular and space weaponization in general, the author concludes that the best way to protect America's space-related economic and military functions is to avoid ASATs development.     

The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Space Warfare

Space warfare will be an integrated part of battle planning by the Chinese People's Liberation Army in any future conflict with the United States. The People's Liberation Army has carefully absorbed and is reacting to what the American armed forces have published on space warfare and counter-space operations. Chinese strategists and legal scholars are engaged in an internal debate on how traditional ideas of sovereignty and the laws of war apply in space. One authoritative volume explored the importance of ensuring that the People's Liberation Army sets out legal justifications for military actions in advance of any conflict. Chinese scholars believe that many of the concepts surrounding the conduct of war on the “common seas” apply in space. Also, there is disagreement between the United States and China on the American position on outer space. The United States treats “peaceful uses” to mean “non-aggressive,” whereas the Chinese interpretation is that to be peaceful uses, it must be “non-military.”     

Viewpoint: Space System Negation in the Context of Space Policy and Law

For 21st century warfare, space is the unquestioned new high ground for military operations. The United States (U.S.) has relied on satellites for significant support to military operations and activities since Desert Storm in 1991. Indeed, the U.S. enjoys an asymmetric advantage in modern warfare utilizing our space capabilities. States with interests hostile to the U.S. believe that the significant dependence on space assets by the U.S. military could become its “Achilles heel” in future combat operations. What are the legal and policy bases for the U.S. to respond to threats to space systems that provide support to our military forces? Should the U.S. rely on space arms control initiatives to ensure security in space? This Viewpoint analyzes the international space law regime and U.S. National Space Policy framework applicable to the conduct of military space operations and activities, including the use of force in space to protect and defend our satellite networks as well as our military forces.     

SPACE WARFARE: A MARITIME-INSPIRED SPACE STRATEGY

In an attempt to formulate a spacepower strategy, various strategists have noted the similarities of space operations to those of air and naval operations. Consequently, many have attempted to derive a space theory through analogy and comparison to either airpower or sea control strategic models. Both air and naval models fail, however, to capture the breadth of issues regarding space operations and strategy; yet, by expanding the purview of naval operations to include those of maritime operations, which includes the interaction of land and sea, the nature and scope of space operations can be fully encompassed. By using Sir Julian Corbett's maritime model, a space theory and associated principles can be subsequently derived to predict concerns and develop ideas not currently recognized.     

‘Words are cheaper than bullets’: Britain’s psychological warfare in the Middle East, 1945–60

Psychological warfare, the use of propaganda to aid military operations, acquired prominence in British strategy in the early Cold War Middle East. This article argues planning made limited progress until the 1956 Suez crisis. Suez produced optimism about propaganda’s ability to address threats from Egypt, the USSR and the Yemen. In Oman, Aden and Cyprus, psychological warfare was practiced to demoralise enemies, bolster allies and counter smears about British conduct. Only mixed results ensued though, and doubts about the military’s involvement in propaganda lingered. Psychological warfare endured because it was a cheap option that might sometimes work, and could induce opponents to surrender rather than fight on.     

Documentation: Space-Based Solar Power as an Opportunity for Strategic Security

Preventing resource conflicts in the face of increasing global populations and demands in the 21st century are high priorities for the United States Department of Defense. All solution options to these challenges should be explored, including opportunities from space. In 2007, the National Security Space Office's Advanced Concepts Office presented the idea of space-based solar power as a potential grand opportunity to address not only energy security, but environmental, economic, intellectual, and space security as well. First proposed in the late 1960s, the concept was last explored in NASA's 1997 “Fresh Look” Study. In the decade since this last study, advances in technology and new challenges to security have warranted a current exploration of the strategic implications of space-based solar power. For these reasons, the National Security Space Office sponsored a no-cost Phase 0 Architecture Feasibility Study of space-based solar power in 2007.     

Strategic Disorder,the Office of Policy Coordination and the Inauguration of US Political Warfare against the Soviet Bloc, 1948–50

This article examines the inauguration of US political warfare operations against the Soviet bloc, 1948–50. It builds on diplomatic and military historiography of US Cold War foreign policy, and engages with more recent scholarship of the ‘covert’ and unconventional confrontation between east and west. Two key interrelated themes are explored. The failure of Truman's policymakers, particularly the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, to devise a coherent strategy to wage political warfare against communist regimes was fundamental to its ultimate failure. Also, the disordered US government bureaucracy further impaired and strategically dislocated the application and overall success of political warfare operations by the Office of Policy Coordination.     

Reappraising the debate and practice of US strategic ambiguity/clarity in cross-strait relations

Abstract

China's influence in the South Pacific appears to be growing rapidly. Some analysts are concerned that China is on its way to replacing the West as the dominant power and China's rise in the region poses a major threat to the West. However, there is no clear evidence to suggest that China's deepening involvement in the South Pacific is a calculated strategic move for its military security. The move can be strategic mainly in the sense that it has strong implications for China's reunification strategy and it serves China's long-term development strategy. The strategic value of the South Pacific to China's national security is limited at present and will remain so in the foreseeable future. China also lacks the military capability to challenge the US-led West in the region in the years to come. Chinese influence in the region is not deep-rooted and is largely based on its ‘no-strings-attached’ aid and its increasing economic interactions with the region. China has serious image problems in the region and these problems are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. China thus has neither the hard power nor the soft power to become a genuine hegemon in the region.     

Spanning “Bleeding” Boundaries: Humanitarianism,NGOs, and the Civilian‐Military Nexus in the Post–Cold War Era

How do nongovernmental (NGO), international (IO), and military organizations cope with their dependencies and address their perceptual and real differences in order to coordinate their field operations? This question is addressed through the creation of a matrix grouping civilian (NGOs and IOs) and military operations into four general types: peacekeeping; disaster relief; complex humanitarian emergencies/warfare; and stabilization and reconstruction. Second, using Galbraith's information processing approach to organizational design, a range of formal coordination mechanisms that organizations use at the strategic and operational levels to help them cope with their dependencies in different field operations is identified. Third, the author underscores how communities of practice are emerging as informal mechanisms of coordination among civilian and military organizations. And finally, a framework of organizational forms that views communities of practice as an alternative to hierarchy and markets is offered. Believing communities of practice hold the most promise for coordination in the human security domain when hierarchies are politically untenable and markets lack accountability, the author concludes with implications for interorganization coordination research and practice.     

The strategy of responsive space

This article explores the utility of responsive space in the context of the strategies of Sun Tzu, Mahan, Corbett and John Boyd. Responsive launch is important to applying military strategy to space for achieving space control and in protecting the space systems which are part of the United States's critical infrastructure. It follows that if responsive launch is important in achieving military strategic objectives and protecting the national critical infrastructure, implementing responsive launch must also drive changes in satellite design and operational concepts. The article discusses some of these possible changes resulting from the implementation of a doctrine of responsive launch.     

Assessing the military utility of space-based weapons

The debate about whether or not to weaponize space is contentious and sometimes heated. Arguments on both sides often ascribe to space-based weapons broad capabilities that are either technologically unfeasible or extraordinarily expensive to develop. Major questions many fail to address include what capabilities space-based weapons provide that land, sea or airborne weapons cannot, and what space-based weapons are likely to cost. This article evaluates the military utility and relative feasibility of space-based weapons to find that there are few missions for which they are uniquely suited. Barring dramatic breakthroughs in technology, land, sea and airborne weapons are more feasible and equally effective.     

Counterspace Operations and Nascent Space Powers

In twenty-first-century warfare, satellites have become indispensable for gaining dominance in battlespace. This highlights the need to protect space assets while countering the qualitative edge that space can provide to adversarial actions. Hence, “counterspace operations” continue to gain the attention of military planners and researchers around the globe. Although it is the major space powers that have developed requisite capability and are showing more concerns for space security, these concerns are global in nature. As such, there is a need to develop a framework that can be utilized by nascent space powers to ensure protection of their space assets. This research work is intended to draw the attention of policymakers, space-technology protagonists, and military personnel, particularly of nascent space powers, to these global concerns. It gives an overview of counterspace operations and explores the doctrinal view-point of major military space powers for safeguarding their own space programs and negating the advantage of space to the enemy. Based upon this, a step-by-step approach is proposed for nascent space powers for embodying of elements of counterspace operations to remain protected during peace, crisis, or war.     

The New Generation Warfare: India’s Need for Comprehensiveness

The article is an enquiry into the nature of the new form of warfare known as the fourth generation warfare. The concept of comprehensive national power (CNP) that encapsulates the sum total of a nation’s power, which includes its economic, military, science and technology, education, resources, and global influence, becomes a prerequisite for it, in order to counter this new generation warfare. Therefore, for any nation today faced with this newly emerged threat, there is a need to establish comprehensiveness in its CNP.     

Determinants and directions for Chinese weapons imports

This article assesses and presents the determinants and directions of Chinese acquisitions of weapons and weapons technology from abroad, focusing on major conventional weapons and their relevant technologies. Following a brief development of historical themes which continue to affect Chinese military‐related imports today, the study considers the principal contemporary domestic and international determinants which contribute to shaping Chinese arms import policies, and the type of foreign arms acquisitions likely to result from those policies. In analysing past and current security policies, weapons development policies, foreign weapons procurement policies, the study reaches four main conclusions. First, a wide range of problems — including prohibitive cost, political and bureaucratic infighting, absorptive capacities, managerial and administrative roadblocks, and supplier controls — stand in the way of a Chinese military modernization strategy based on foreign procurement. Second, with the exception of Sino‐Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, Chinese arms and arms technology acquisitions from abroad have consistently been relatively modest, sporadic, and problematic. Even in the case of current transfers from such suppliers as Israel and Russia, it is unclear the extent to which these countries are willing to part with significant amounts of top‐of‐the‐line systems and technologies. Third, the impact upon international security of the improvement of Chinese military capability through the acquisition of foreign weapons and technology is not likely to manifest itself in violent military disruptiveness, but rather in the nuanced and steady expansion of Chinese power and influence in parts of East Asia around China's periphery. Fourth, the military capabilities of China's arms clients will probably not be significantly improved through the acquisition of foreign weapons and weapons technologies by China. In sum, Chinese military modernization through arms and technology imports will continue to be a slow and painful process.     

China's security agenda after the cold war

The end of the cold war has changed China's basic perception of world politics and its conception of national security. In the cold war era, Chinese leaders tended to view national security from the perspective of global balance of power and China's strategic relations with the two superpowers. It was in Beijing's security interests to maintain a comfortable position in a strategic triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States. When the Soviet Empire and the East European communist regimes collapsed, the structure of the postwar international system dissolved, and the old parameters for Beijing's security strategy disappeared. The Chinese leadership suddenly found itself in a totally new world in which China needed to reorient and redefine its security strategy on a new strategic axis.

Beijing's security strategy after the cold war is redefined by its domestic priorities, growing foreign economic relations, the new security environment in Asia, and concerns over territorial disputes. In a sense, the myopic conception of security based on war and peace is fading away. Beijing's thinking on national security becomes more inclusive, diverse, and complicated. The nature and intensity of external threats has changed. China's growing economic ties with the outside world have redirected Beijing's attention to economic interests and security. The Chinese leadership realizes that its security is affected not only by the military forces of other countries, but also by political, economic, societal, and environmental factors in international relations Beijing needs to employ both traditional military defence and non‐military actions to safeguard its territorial integrity and to realize its full capacity in world affairs.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse China's security agendas after the cold war. It first examines the impact of the end of the cold war on China's thinking on national security, then discusses Beijing's threat perception and changing defence strategy. This is followed by an examination of domestic stability considerations and economic interests in Beijing's security strategy. Finally, it discusses the implications of China's growing power for regional security.     

CHINA: A GROWING MILITARY SPACE POWER

ABSTRACT

During the last few decades, space has gained considerable importance in many facets of military operations. China has always believed proficiency in space technologies to be an essential ingredient of its overall national strength. Since its beginning, the Chinese space programme has had a definite military orientation. This article examines the impact of Chinese manned space missions and their investment in Europe's proposed global navigation and positioning system (Galileo) on their military space capabilities.     

COVID-19 and the US military

COVID-19 has challenged US military readiness and raised some strategic concerns. Overall, however, the military's response appears to have struck a sensible and effective balance so far, establishing procedures for containing the disease while continuing deployments and crucial operations.     

Offensive for defensive: the belt and road initiative and China's new grand strategy

China's Belt and Road initiative came from the combined pressure of slowing down of Chinese economy, US pivot to Asia and deterioration of the relations with neighboring countries after weathering the storm of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. It also symbolizes a more proactive approach of Chinese new leader Xi Jinping in meeting the expectation on China's international obligation and leadership. Aimed to link Asia, Europe, Africa and Oceania, the initiative provides tremendous opportunities of international economic cooperation. The paper argues that as China's contribution to international public goods, it is in the line of economic liberalism; as China's grand strategy, it is more of defensive than offensive by nature. Despite risks and uncertainties exist, the enforcement will boost China's influence and position in regional and international institutions. US should consider making more strategic space to the rising China, and a better coordinated China–US relations will make Asia Pacific a safer and more promising region.     

North and South Korean Space Development: Prospects for Cooperation and Conflict

North and South Korea both have developed rocket technology for military and civilian applications, but their space programs differ in many important aspects. As late developing space powers, neither country poses a serious direct threat to U.S. space assets, but a successful U.S. cooperative engagement strategy towards the Koreas could help achieve U.S. policy objectives. The domestic politics of the two Koreas are very different, and Korean space development will depend upon a number of variables including inter-Korean relations and whether the two Koreas unify, domestic politics and budget constraints, the overall strategic environment, as well as opportunities for Korea in the realm of international space cooperation. The United States has opportunities to implement an engagement strategy in Korea, but it could be complicated by different U.S. objectives in North and South Korea, and by linkage to other issues. Despite the complexities, Washington should be prepared for a number of possibilities.     

A New American Way of War? C4ISR,Intelligence and Information Operations in Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’: A Provisional Assessment

This work examines publicly material available released as of 2 September 2003 on the role of intelligence for the Coalition side during the 2003 Gulf War. It assesses how far the Coalition side practised deception, psychological warfare, and information operations during that conflict, and how far intelligence served the needs of military forces. It focuses on failures as well as successes. It compares the real performance of intelligence during the conflict with the role forecast for C4ISR and Information Operations by theorists of the RMA, and modern strategy. It concludes that the Coalition forces practised Information Operations very well, but that at the operational level, there had been no revolution in military intelligence.