U.S.-India Space Partnership: The Jewel in the Crown

The new strategic partnership between the United States and India is creating opportunities for security cooperation. A key element in this partnership—U.S.-India space cooperation—will most likely become the defining relationship for international space cooperation around which other space-faring nations will posture. The Indian space program is rapidly developing world-class capabilities and presents itself as a worthy partner. The U.S. space program should be able to provide innovative ideas for fruitful collaboration. Despite these propitious circumstances, there are potential obstacles of cost, security, and risk. The biggest obstacle, however, might simply be bureaucratic intransigence and inertia. The opportunity is here, now, for the United States and India each to add an important new jewel to their crown of international space cooperation activities. Most importantly, this new space partnership should enhance the security and prosperity of the United States, India, and the world.     

Space and Deterrence∗

Regardless of whether the United States decides to extend deployment of its weaponry beyond land, sea, and air to the medium of outer space, military dependence on assets stationed between low Earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit for communication, navigation, and surveillance will likely remain high. Deterrence as a strategy to protect these assets carries with it the risk that a crisis over satellites will escalate out of control. Nevertheless, when evaluated against other options on the agenda—such as space control and space avoidance—it is the only strategy for which the United States is currently equipped militarily and politically. In order to mitigate the downsides of deterrence, in particular to stave off a decision that would require disproportionate retaliation, the new United States Administration is likely to mix in tactical elements of control and avoidance. These elements, however, will not subvert deterrence as a core strategy, nor will they obviate uncomfortable and undemocratic compromises that have marked deterrence since the Cold War.     

Viewpoint: Space System Negation in the Context of Space Policy and Law

For 21st century warfare, space is the unquestioned new high ground for military operations. The United States (U.S.) has relied on satellites for significant support to military operations and activities since Desert Storm in 1991. Indeed, the U.S. enjoys an asymmetric advantage in modern warfare utilizing our space capabilities. States with interests hostile to the U.S. believe that the significant dependence on space assets by the U.S. military could become its “Achilles heel” in future combat operations. What are the legal and policy bases for the U.S. to respond to threats to space systems that provide support to our military forces? Should the U.S. rely on space arms control initiatives to ensure security in space? This Viewpoint analyzes the international space law regime and U.S. National Space Policy framework applicable to the conduct of military space operations and activities, including the use of force in space to protect and defend our satellite networks as well as our military forces.     

Chinese dilemmas in thinking about regional security architecture

From about the middle of the 1990s China's leaders began to articulate a new concept of security that they called ‘cooperative security’, which was seen as more appropriate to the post-Cold War era than the more traditional military alliance systems. It sought to promote mutual trust and consultation as a means of addressing security problems between states that were neither adversaries nor friends. The new approach was better suited to a China that felt more comfortable about itself and its growing integration into international society. It involved a more proactive approach that was ready to take initiatives for the first time in multilateral settings. It also reflected current Chinese interests by seeking to reassure neighbours that they had little to fear and much to gain by the rising China in their midst and by implicitly dissuading them from participating in any significant attempt to contain China. But the new approach is not without its problems. It will need to show a greater readiness to pay attention to the concerns of others, it will require greater transparency in the conduct of foreign policy and it will need to find a way of accommodating the American approach. But in itself most of the countries of the Asia-Pacific will find this a welcome development even though it does not as yet provide a satisfactory basis for erecting a new security architecture to supplant that established under the aegis of the United States.     

Viewpoint: Bureaucratic Politics and the Case of Satellite Export Controls

The export control regime applied to commercial satellites in the United States (U.S.) is not rational suggesting that the desired policy outcome of this regime is not met. The regime under review is the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Commercially available technologies were placed within this regime to make sure that such technologies do not harm U.S. national security interests. It is argued in this viewpoint that not only does this regime weaken national security, but it also affects commercial space. The commercial space sector is affected through a cost of compliance with the regime. Discussed herein is the political process of export control and commercial satellites with particular attention to how that process is influenced by bureaucratic politics.     

Chinese Capabilities as a Global Space Power

Since the early 1960s, China has been enhancing national power and, in this regard, Chinese space capabilities play a pivotal role. Today, China is second among spacefaring counties, behind the United States, as a measure of human spaceflight, as well as in commercial and military satellite systems. Chinese space technology, in contrast to developed nations, is comparatively cost-effective; China is sharing it with developing nations for their space programs, consequently expanding the pool of spacefaring states. Most significantly, China’s nuclear, military, and space capabilities provide it with an opportunity to reassert itself as a global power, enhancing its strategic outreach and preventing adversaries from contemplating strategies against it.     

Viewpoint: International Traffic in Arms Regulations—Controversy and Reform

The International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR) have, for decades, played a crucial role in shaping the movement of sensitive technology from the United States to the world. Originally intended to ensure military dominance, the ITAR regime is seen by some as stifling the competitiveness of American industry. A list known as the United States Munitions List (USML) contains the items subject to the ITAR export controls. This list includes clearly dangerous military technology such as missile navigation systems and fighter jet avionics but also includes seemingly benign items, such as coolant hoses or tape recorders for spacecraft. Among the items considered controversial are a number related to the space industry. An incident in the early 1990s began a jurisdictional tug of war. The United States strengthened its grip on the export of space technology. In the last two decades, some have observed a decline in the competitiveness of American industry. The content of the USML should be reviewed based not on the historical “catchall” approach, but rather based on a “military intent-based” or “military capability-based” approach. This will improve the competitiveness of the U.S. space industry without sacrificing national security.     

American National Security and the Death of Space Sanctuary

At the beginning of the space age, the United States relied upon the general acceptance of a sanctuary narrative of outer space in order to help support its reconnaissance activities over the Soviet Union. The notion that space could be a sanctuary thus served as a diplomatic tactic, one designed to thwart Soviet opposition to American overflight. While the Soviets eventually achieved parity—having later acquired the ability to surveil the United States—the notion of sanctuary became untenable once the Soviet Union began to further leverage space power for the aim of attacking American satellites and naval assets. The crucial moment, as revealed in recently declassified documents, occurred in 1976 when the Ford Administration recognized the need for an American anti-satellite capability. Subsequently, while the Carter Administration appeared to pursue comprehensive space arms control, what was really in play was a gambit, one designed to eliminate the Soviet’s co-orbital anti-satellite capability and maintain strategic parity in space.     

Viewpoint: China and Space War

In January of 2007, China knocked one of its weather satellites out of orbit, and threw the international community into panic. Some figured the satellite-killer test was the harbinger of a future war in space that could cripple a technology-dependent United States military. This viewpoint examines the possibilities of a Chinese assault on American satellites.     

European Union Space Initiatives: The Political Will for Increasing European Space Power

The European Union (EU) is the newest actor in the European space sector and is cultivating the political will to make Europe a world class space power comparable to the United States (US). The Galileo satellite system and the Global Monitoring for the Environment and Security space program are the most visible manifestations of this will. This article suggests that Europe can approach comparable space power if capabilities are considered rather than just budgets. The paper discusses the catalysts driving EU space initiatives, and assesses the EU's nascent European Space Policy and European Space Program, and EU organization and funding for space. Of importance are the asymmetric means for Europe to increase its space capabilities and the implications this has for the trans-Atlantic relationship with the US. The analysis is directed to the security, civil, and dual-use space sectors within the security aspects of EU space initiatives. This article also provides a baseline to track changes in EU space policy, organization, and funding dynamics.     

International social security agreements: the U.S. experience

International social security agreements are advantageous both for persons who are working now and for those whose working careers are over. For current workers, the agreements eliminate the dual contributions they might otherwise be paying to the social security systems of both the United States and another country. They also favorably affect the profitability and competitive position of American companies with foreign operations by reducing their cost of doing business. For persons who have worked both in the United States and abroad, and who are now retired, disabled, or deceased, the agreements often result in the payment of benefits to which the worker or the worker's family members would not otherwise have become entitled. Credit for social security coverage the worker earned in the United States and the other country can be combined, if necessary, to meet eligibility requirements, and partial benefits can be paid by one or both countries. Because international social security agreements benefit both workers and employers, the agreements program is supported by organized labor and the international business community. Since the first agreement was signed 15 years ago, every Presidential administration has endorsed the program. In view of this support, and the fact that the agreements enhance the image of the United States as a socially progressive member of the international community, it is expected that totalization agreements will be concluded with additional countries in the future.     

Space and Security: The Emerging Role of Europe

Space systems have grown increasingly integral to the United States' national security in the post-Cold War era. The diplomatic and military leverage that space capabilities can provide is not going unnoticed by other countries. Since the collapse of the USSR, the United States has enjoyed a near-absolute dominance in space activities. Only the civilian European space program has mounted any sort of technical challenge to the United States, with little interest devoted to space military activities, but the period of US hegemony in the space military domain might come to an end. In recent years the European Union (EU) and its member states have taken numerous steps towards designing and assembling a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a coherent European Security and Defence Policy. Furthermore, several important steps toward linking security needs and space capabilities have been taken by the tandem European Union–European Space Agency and other relevant institutions. Space is now seen as an essential asset for European integration and for non-dependence in the current geo-strategic context, since space-based systems and derived information can bring necessary capabilities for autonomous decision making. The development of an integrated European space capability for security is at an early stage, but it is an ongoing process presenting some opportunities to enhance European independence and security.     

International measurement of food security: Enhancing alignment between evidence and assistance programs

A definition of food security used in developing countries by United Nations Agencies, The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other international development agencies establish four dimensions of food security: access, availability, utilization, and stability. This definition provides a framework for a multidimensional, rigorous measure of food security across developing countries and enables an analysis of the magnitude and severity of food insecurity across time and space. This framework also permits an analysis of the drivers of food insecurity that foster appropriate, cost‐effective food assistance programs. In the developed world, food security is often defined more narrowly, resulting in a less rigorous measurement of food security. Food security experts in developed countries can exploit the framework applied in the developing world to improve the measurement of food insecurity, as well as evidence‐based food assistance programs that are informed by its measurement.     

China's evolving role in African security

China’s engagement in Africa is increasingly defined by its role in bolstering peace and security. Beijing has signalled greater political will with peacekeeping deployments on the continent, as well as increasing capabilities with its new naval base in Djibouti. Positive outcomes could include greater Chinese support for African security efforts and increased regional security cooperation with the United States. But these will depend substantially on how China's wider strategic outlook and relationships evolve.     

The Inevitability of the Weaponization of Space: Technological Constructivism Versus Determinism

The concept of national security is based on the need to maintain the safety and security of the population. In 1957, the Soviet Union was the first state to threaten this safety in space with the launch of Sputnik. Although Sputnik did not pose a credible threat, it was perceived as such by the Western world. As the space race intensified in the 1960s, efforts were made to prevent the development and use of space weapons. With the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, space weapons were effectively made unlawful, with signatories agreeing to forgo these expensive technologies. However, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, factors and efforts are beginning to converge that indicate the inevitability of space weaponization. Based on a new concept of technological development, this article proposes that as technology advances, space weaponization not only is likely, but indeed is inevitable in the near future. Grounded in the competing theories of technological determinism and social constructivism, I offer a new theory that incorporates both and introduces new components to analyze a near-future technological timeline for space weapons. I argue that the development of these weapons is inevitable and should therefore be accelerated in the United States, given the country's position as the lone superpower, to command and control the space commons. If the United States leads this drive for development, then in the end, as with thermonuclear weapons, space weapons will make the world more, not less, secure, and will contribute to the spread of democratic peace and globalized capitalism.     

Astropolitics and the “Exopolitics” of Unacknowledged Activities in Outer Space

The role of unacknowledged classified programs remains an enigma for fully understanding activities in space and the study of astropolitics. Classified programs by law are not publicly announced, and remain inaccessible to all except those with valid security clearances to be briefed about them. In the United States, waived Unacknowledged Special Access Programs are the most highly classified programs conducted by the military and intelligence community. The same classification protocols are also required of private contractors working with U.S. military departments and intelligence agencies on classified programs. As space continues to grow in its national security significance, the number of these unacknowledged programs pertaining to space is likely to grow significantly from its current number. This requires adopting the necessary conceptual tools and methodological flexibility for investigating unacknowledged activities in space. This also extends to evidence concerning unidentified flying objects and extraterrestrial life. This article suggests that “exopolitics” is a unique multidisciplinary approach to extraterrestrial life that offers a helpful set of conceptual tools for studying unacknowledged space activities, and complements the field of astropolitics.     

Viewpoint: The Strategic Context of the Moon Echoes of the Past,Symphony of the Future

A strategic framework for the Moon must weave together the economic, social, scientific, national security, and civil aspects that have evolved largely in isolation since the inception of the space age. The United States—based on its historical dependence upon space assets, exploration heritage, and global leadership position,—has the most to gain and lose by the tenor of its leadership in this framework's development and implementation. A permanent presence on the Moon, combined with the use of lunar and space resources, offers the means to create a new space age. Lunar exploration offers many scientific and cultural benefits and has significant historic implications. In addition, this extension of human reach beyond low Earth orbit, and the ability to regularly access and use cislunar space is critical for addressing emerging national, economic, and scientific challenges. An analogy to this strategic moment is the development of United States maritime policy at the beginning of the 20th century.     

A New US-Sino Space Relationship: Moving Toward Cooperation 1

Since the late 1990's the United States has maintained a strict policy of no cooperation with China on space activities. The reasons for that are several, including the desire to inhibit the development of dual-use technology considered potentially threatening to the United States and political reluctance to work with a communist country. Increasingly, however, it has become clear that policy is not constraining China from dual-use technology development and that the policy overall may be detrimental to U.S. security interests. Therefore a policy change, from a realistic consideration of circumstances, must be considered.     

Military transformation,political economy pressures and the future of trans-atlantic national security space cooperation

Investment demand for national security space is building on both sides of the Atlantic due to changes in technology and the threat environment. Many people hope that the close NATO alliance ties will facilitate trans-Atlantic coordination of plans. Coordination, they argue, would increase efficiency, yielding more and better space systems, and also would enhance effectiveness, increasing the operational pay-off of each unit of investment. However, several barriers stand in the way: the economic benefits would be smaller than advocates hope, political constraints bind tightly and military doctrine is evolving in different directions in Europe and the United States. Consequently, trans-Atlantic cooperation is unlikely to make a major contribution to national security space policy.